tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-34623777794464811112024-03-19T01:01:44.982-07:00ANJA A THIRD EYESTRATEGIC DEFENCE & INTELLIGENCE FORUManjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.comBlogger319125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-91610624644343354192010-02-07T21:23:00.001-08:002010-02-07T21:23:51.405-08:00INSIDE THE CHINESE DEFENSE INDUSTRY<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgexy0oqKXYRPsYIep8zajn7Xybp4DuKSa0b0GvW8_h4JUcM22pOpqSQBvV9F5Z0XEWrcQCGnu4rQAX3S1tGOZvG-JQl9voa433l36gzf10MtSKlcFepi6GeoHROArewWNz-C2p_OT-FsbC/s1600-h/SAIC1.GIF"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 220px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgexy0oqKXYRPsYIep8zajn7Xybp4DuKSa0b0GvW8_h4JUcM22pOpqSQBvV9F5Z0XEWrcQCGnu4rQAX3S1tGOZvG-JQl9voa433l36gzf10MtSKlcFepi6GeoHROArewWNz-C2p_OT-FsbC/s320/SAIC1.GIF" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5435739022247505090" border="0" /></a>anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-52316876039858714412010-02-07T21:22:00.001-08:002010-02-07T21:23:11.276-08:00INSIDE THE CHINESE DEFENSE INDUSTRY<a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhj8fjSpt6lUuRAgdoIfIsZc3eOhnGDXZdRss52mEtxAkgL9O0WSEg1_PxbfqvutyQaH-ZddVO2Bj_Vp6wwqhffCFtxRqo9dWHIee-NslHvP3KKDD5-RXQgX2vLQ6yDkHM8zPGAi9JSfMIY/s1600-h/PLA1.GIF"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 220px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhj8fjSpt6lUuRAgdoIfIsZc3eOhnGDXZdRss52mEtxAkgL9O0WSEg1_PxbfqvutyQaH-ZddVO2Bj_Vp6wwqhffCFtxRqo9dWHIee-NslHvP3KKDD5-RXQgX2vLQ6yDkHM8zPGAi9JSfMIY/s320/PLA1.GIF" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5435738842324076770" border="0" /></a>anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-57699528631220479952010-02-07T21:21:00.001-08:002010-02-07T21:21:47.968-08:00Is Chinese Naval Doctrine Based On The Theories Of Admiral Mahan?Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was one of the greatest theorists of naval power. He conducted a cost benefit analysis of imperial expansion by integrating commercial, naval and political aspects. How does a nation expand its power at the lowest possible cost? He concluded that commerce was of paramount importance. War was to be a last resort, he stressed. In other words, the goal was expansion by stealth.There are two main schools of thought about naval power. One posits that the largest and most powerful navy should be assembled and then used to defend and expand power. Battleships and aircraft carriers are of key importance. The other regards the huge expenditure and servicing of such a navy as a needless waste of national resources. The main concern should be to protect and expand trade. This involves securing strategic bases in strategic regions. Do not develop a navy which is perceived as a growing threat to one’s neighbours and competitors. In other words, do not get involved in a naval arms race.<br /><br />Mahan’s most famous work is The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, published in 1890. In it he attempted to elucidate the reasons for the rise and fall of empires and great states. He deduced that the secret of Great Britain’s success was sea power. This was the critical factor in the defeat of Napoleonic France when Britain was able to blockade French ports and hence neutralise the French navy. His other writings could not explain the rise of Bismarckian Germany. However, he was vindicated in 1918 when a major factor in the defeat of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany was the weakness of its navy.<br /><br />Mahan’s writings were closely studied by the Imperial Japanese Navy, amid many others. It would now appear that the People’s Republic of China is devoting intensive study to his publications. Nineteenth century America and present day China have much in common. How should Beijing expand its navy without provoking other powers to respond?<br />China’s demand for hydrocarbons and raw materials has forced it to sail the seven seas in pursuit of these sinews of industry. Almost accidentally it has acquired a worldwide reach. Since its imports are strategically important it needs a navy capable of protecting the sea lanes. The last time China had a navy which sailed into such distant waters was 600 years ago. It has a lot of catching up to do to become as professional as other navies.<br /><br />Chinese naval writings emphasise the link between commerce and naval power. A goal is to command strategic passages, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, vital to Chinese trade.<br /><br />Of primary importance is Taiwan. If the Middle Kingdom were to take control over it, China would have a gateway to the western Pacific. The Chinese talk of the First Island Chain which runs from Japan to Indonesia. The declared goal is to expand to the Second Island Chain which would make China potentially master of the western Pacific. Hence Beijing will do its upmost to prevent Taiwan becoming independent. Should Taipei become independent Beijing’s dream of becoming a great Pacific and world sea power would never be realised.<br /><br />The Chinese agree enthusiastically with Mahan’s claim that a nation cannot be great without sea power. China is perceived to be an ‘oceanic nation’ endowed with a long coastline, many islands and a huge sea area under its control. China is building aircraft carriers, probably because it can see how the U.S. uses them to project power.<br /><br />However, Mahan warned that ‘commerce thrives by peace and suffers by war’. He claimed that peace was the ‘superior interest’ of seagoing powers. Hence he did not advocate a race to build the biggest battle fleet. Some Chinese writers appear to have taken this to heart and advocate restricting China’s sea power to the First Island Chain. China’s navy should not be seen as a threat to anyone and its function is to defend the national interest. Others, of course, would like China to expand its influence several hundred miles from its shoreline.<br /><br />If the Chinese leadership decide to learn from Mahan the world will be a safer place.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-42179836321281228712010-02-07T21:20:00.001-08:002010-02-07T21:20:45.560-08:00China Boosts Military SpendingsChina says it is increasing defense spending, this year, to raise the salaries of the world's largest standing army. The announcement Wednesday, came at a news conference to preview the annual legislative session, which begins Thursday.<br /><br />Li Zhaoxing is the spokesman for China's parliament, the National People's Congress, not the spokesman for the Ministry of Defense.<br /><br />But, in what has become a tradition in recent years, the NPC spokesman announced China's proposed military budget.<br /><br />Li says the defense budget is included in the draft national budget that is submitted to the legislature for examination and approval.<br /><br />Li says China's military spending in 2009 will increase nearly 15 percent, to $70 billion.<br /><br />The spokesman describes the increase as "modest" and said the double-digit growth will not pose a threat to any other country. He says much of the extra money will go to salaries for China's more than two-million troops and be spent on raising capabilities in what he described as "non-warfare military operations."<br /><br />Li also said the additional spending is needed to maintain China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.<br /><br />China has maintained its threat to use military force against Taiwan, if Taipei declares formal independence. Beijing considers the separately-governed island a renegade province.<br /><br />The spokesman says China's military expenditures are no secret. He says, since 2007, China has submitted annual military expense reports to the United Nations.<br /><br />Li says there is no such thing as "hidden military expenditure" in China.<br /><br />The United States, Japan and other countries have long expressed concern about China's military build-up.<br /><br />In just concluded Sino-American military talks last week, U.S. Defense Department official David Sedney told reporters Washington sees nothing wrong with China modernizing its military. At the same time, he said the U.S. government just wants more clarity about the Chinese government's intentions.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-64349044138703290092009-12-16T21:20:00.000-08:002009-12-16T21:21:11.535-08:00China And Brazil: A Burgeoning RelationshipBrazil is one of the largest developing countries in the world and China is THE largest developing country. They are members of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) which is regarded as the future powerhouse of the world economy. Brazil and China are members of the G20 and normally participate as observers in G8 summits. The G20 has now emerged as the pacesetter for the transformation of financial relations between the developed and developing countries. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil is now on his second official visit to China.Relations between the two countries go back to the 1840s when several hundred Chinese tea growers were shipped out to Brazil. Entrepreneurs were keen to find a substitute for the emancipated slaves. In 1880 a treaty was signed which established diplomatic relations and the free flow of trade.<br /><br />Brazil and China established diplomatic relations in 1974. The first visit to China by a Brazilian President took place a decade later. Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader, stressed the need to reduce the gap between the developed and developing world. A strategic partnership was then agreed.<br /><br />The two economies complement one another. China has a voracious appetite for natural resources and Brazil needs electronics and other consumer goods. Brazil has almost every raw material needed by industry (bauxite, gold, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, platinum, etc.). For instance, iron ore reserves in Brazil amount to 22.5 per cent of world reserves.<br /><br />Brazil has embarked on an ambitious upgrading of its infrastructure and since China is doing the same Beijing is in a strong position to help. For instance new Chinese roads and highways are world class and their new railways and rolling stock are of high quality. Brazil’s population of 192 million and GDP of $1.66 trillion make it a very attractive market for Chinese goods. China’s 1.3 billion population and GDP of over $4 trillion GDP make it an even more seductive market for Brazil.<br />Trade turnover between the two countries in 2007 almost reached $50 billion. Brazil is now exporting more to China than to the US. The good news for Brasilia is that Beijing runs a trade deficit with it. In 2008 it reached almost $9.3 billion. In 2001 it was only $1 billion. Almost all Brazilian exports are raw materials and commodities. China exports mainly electronics and textiles.<br /><br />China is investing in downstream production. For instance, it is involved in a $3 billion steel plant in southern Brazil. Chinese companies also have stakes in the production of aircraft, compressors, automobile parts and hydroelectric equipment. During Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit in February 2009 an agreement was reached whereby the China Development Bank will lend Brazil $10 billion to explore and exploit huge hydrocarbon reserves off Brazil’s south east coast. Brasilia will supply Beijing with 100,000 barrels of oil a day until the loan is repaid.<br /><br />However, not everything in the garden is rosy. Inevitably Chinese goods compete successfully with domestically produced products. This is a common problem in the developing world. Brazil’s solution has been to accuse China of dumping and impose tariffs. Regulations are in place to restrict the import of Chinese consumer goods until 2013. Criticism of Chinese practices is strongest in São Paulo, the heartland of Brazilian industry.<br /><br />China and Brazil agree on the origins of the present world crisis: unregulated financial markets. Both countries want the developing world to have a greater say in framing the new world financial architecture. This has led to more and more cooperation between the two states.<br />Brazil has realised that it can benefit considerably from a closer relationship with China during the present world economic downturn. The future looks bright for Sino-Brazilian relations.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-10180123870557189482009-12-16T21:18:00.000-08:002009-12-16T21:19:15.281-08:00China's growing thirst for African oilChina has dangled a near open cheque book to Africa's major oil producers in a bid to guarantee supplies for decades to come.<br /><br />It has offered 30 billion dollars to Nigeria and is negotiating for stakes in oil fields in Ghana and Angola and companies that exploit the fields throughout Africa.<br /><br />China's thirst for oil is expected to be a major topic at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meets African leaders and ministers in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh from Sunday.<br /><br />Nigeria, the world's eighth largest producer, appears to be resisting China's approach to buy one sixth of its proven reserves.<br /><br />Nigeria already supplies about one fifth of the United States's oil needs. President Umaru Yar'Adua recently told Peter Voser, chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell, the biggest investor in Nigeria's oil sector, that his country still wants to maintain ties with its "old" partners.<br /><br />Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total, which have been in Nigeria for decades, are in intensive talks with authorities who want to change oil laws, notably the tax regime.<br /><br />Industry sources say the companies are looking at investing around 23 billion dollars (15.6 billion euros) in Nigeria over the next five years.<br /><br />But through its state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Beijing is dangling the prospect of 30 billion dollars for a guaranteed six billion barrels of Nigerian oil.<br /><br />Licences on some of the Nigerian oil blocks are close to expiring but the government has renewed them for one more year.<br /><br />The weak link is the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which the government wants to turn into a financially independent and profitable entity.<br /><br />NNPC, which has been bedevilled by corruption, relies on state money to finance its operations in joint ventures with foreign oil companies. Chinese entities have made big offers.<br /><br />"The Chinese have made a proposal which we are considering," junior oil minister Odein Ajumogobia recently told AFP.<br /><br />"They are asking for six billion barrels of oil from our reserves, but I can tell you that we are not going to give them all of that," he added.<br /><br />More recently Ajumogobia said NNPC could sell some of its blocks to the Chinese firms. "Why not, if the offer is very good? The NNPC has a right to do what it wants with its assets."<br /><br />In Ghana, CNOOC is discussing with the state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) the purchase of 23.5 percent of US-based Kosmos Energy's stake in the Jubilee oil fields, one of the largest oil finds in west Africa in the past decade.<br /><br />Chinese firm SINOPEC recently bought the Canadian oil firm Addax which operates in Nigeria and west Africa, for a mere five billion euros.<br /><br />CNOOC and Sinopec said in July they have agreed to buy a 20 percent stake in an offshore oil block in Angola from US oil company Marathon Oil Corp.<br /><br />"The strength of the Chinese is that they are ready to put lots of cash on the table," said a senior executive in Africa with one international oil firm on condition of anonymity.<br /><br />"So they want to come and work here, there is no problem, there is room for everyone, but not on blocks that are not free," said the oil chief.<br /><br />Shell financial director Simon Henry recently said: "One thing you probably will have seen, and can be sure of, is that both ourselves and the industry will defend our interests."<br /><br />Many African leaders have welcomed China's huge investment in the continent, but some officials have also expressed fears that China is buying diplomatic power that could turn into neo-colonialism.<br /><br />Nine Chinese workers were killed when rebels attacked a SINOPEC oil facility in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 2007. Chinese workers have also been kidnapped in Nigeria's troubled Delta oil region.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-68289316053634945572009-12-11T21:59:00.000-08:002009-12-11T22:00:16.047-08:00China's EU Policy PaperForeword<br /> <br /> <br /><br />The international situation has been undergoing profound changes since the advent of the new century. The trend towards world multipolarity and economic globalization is developing amid twists and turns. Peace and development remain the themes of our era. The world is hardly a tranquil place and mankind is still confronted with many serious challenges. However, preserving world peace, promoting development and strengthening cooperation, which is vital to the well-being of all nations, represents the common aspiration of all peoples and is an irreversible trend of history.<br /><br />China is committed to turning herself into a well-off society in an all-round way and aspires for a favorable international climate. China will continue to pursue its independent foreign policy of peace and work closely with other countries for the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and equitable, and based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. China will, as always, respect diversity in the world and promote democracy in international relations in the interest of world peace and common development.<br />The European Union (EU) is a major force in the world. The Chinese Government appreciates the importance the EU and its members attach to developing relations with China. The present EU Policy Paper of the Chinese Government is the first of its kind and aims to highlight the objectives of China's EU policy, and outline the areas and plans of cooperation and related measures in the next five years so as to enhance China-EU all-round cooperation and promote a long-term and stable development of China-EU relations. <br />Part One: Status and Role of the European Union<br /> <br /> <br /><br />The creation and development of the European Union is an event of far-reaching significance following World War II. Since the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the EU has become what it is today through the stages of the Tax and Customs Union, the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union. Its integration in the foreign policy, defence and social fields has made headway. The Euro has been put to circulation successfully and a single area of justice is taking shape. The EU is now a strong and the most integrated community in the world, taking up 25 and 35 percent of the world's economy and trade respectively and ranking high on the world's list of per capita income and foreign investment.<br /><br />In 2004, the EU will be enlarged to a total membership of 25. The new European Union would then cover much of Eastern and Western Europe with an area of four million square kilometers, a population of 450 million and a GDP of over 10 trillion US Dollars.<br />Despite its difficulties and challenges ahead, the European integration process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs. <br /> <br />Part Two: China's EU Policy<br /> <br /> <br /><br />China attaches importance to the role and influence of the EU in regional and international affairs. History proves that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the European Economic Community in 1975 has served the interests of both sides. Despite their twists and turns, China-EU relations as a whole have been growing stronger and more mature and are now on the track of a comprehensive and sound development. In 1998 China and the EU launched their annual summit mechanism. In 2001, the two sides established a full partnership. China and the EU have developed an ever closer consultation and fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, cultural and educational fields. China-EU relations now are better than any time in history.<br /><br />There is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other. However, given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues. Nevertheless China-EU relations of mutual trust and mutual benefit cannot and will not be affected if the two sides address their disagreements in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.<br /><br />The common ground between China and the EU far outweighs their disagreements. Both China and the EU stand for democracy in international relations and an enhanced role of the UN. Both are committed to combating international terrorism and promoting sustainable development through poverty elimination and environmental protection endeavors. China and the EU are highly complementary economically thanks to their respective advantages. The EU has a developed economy, advanced technologies and strong financial resources while China boasts steady economic growth, a huge market and abundant labor force. There is a broad prospect for bilateral trade and economic and technological cooperation. Both China and the EU member states have a long history and splendid culture each and stand for more cultural exchanges and mutual emulation. The political, economic and cultural common understanding and interaction between China and the EU offer a solid foundation for the continued growth of China-EU relations.<br /><br />To strengthen and enhance China-EU relations is an important component of China's foreign policy. China is committed to a long-term, stable and full partnership with the EU. China's EU policy objectives are:<br /><br />-- To promote a sound and steady development of China-EU political relations under the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and seeking common ground while reserving differences, and contribute to world peace and stability;<br /><br />-- To deepen China-EU economic cooperation and trade under the principles of mutual benefit, reciprocity and consultation on an equal basis, and promote common development;<br />-- To expand China-EU cultural and people-to-people exchanges under the principle of mutual emulation, common prosperity and complementarity, and promote cultural harmony and progress between the East and the West. <br /> <br />Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields<br />I. The Political Aspect<br /> <br /> <br /><br />1. Strengthen the exchange of high-level visits and political dialogue<br /><br />-- Maintain close contacts and timely communication between the two sides at high levels through various means.<br /><br />-- Give full play to the functions of the China-EU annual summit by substantiating its content, stressing its practical results and strengthening bilateral coordination.<br /><br />-- Implement in real earnest China-EU agreement on political dialogue and constantly improve and strengthen mechanisms of regular and irregular consultations at all levels.<br /><br />-- Deepen relations with all EU members, including its new ones so as to maintain stability and continuity in the overall relationship between China and EU.<br /><br />2. Strictly abide by the one-China principle<br /><br />The one-China principle is an important political cornerstone underpinning China-EU relations. The proper handling of the Taiwan question is essential for a steady growth of China-EU relations. China appreciates EU and its members' commitment to the one-China principle and hopes that the EU will continue to respect China's major concerns over the Taiwan question, guard against Taiwan authorities' attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues. In this connection, it is important that the EU<br /><br />-- Prohibit any visit by any Taiwan political figures to the EU or its member countries under whatever name or pretext; not to engage in any contact or exchange of an official or governmental nature with Taiwan authorities.<br /><br />-- Not to support Taiwan's accession to or participation in any international organization whose membership requires statehood. Taiwan's entry into the WTO in the name of "separate customs territory of Taiwan, 'Penghu, Jinmen, Mazu" (or Chinese Taipei for short) does not mean any change in Taiwan's status as part of China. EU exchanges with Taiwan must be strictly unofficial and non-governmental.<br /><br />-- Not to sell to Taiwan any weapon, equipment, goods, materials or technology that can be used for military purposes.<br /><br />3. Encourage Hong Kong and Macao's cooperation with EU<br /><br />The Central Government of China supports and encourages the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions in developing friendly relations and cooperation with the EU in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems" and the provisions of the two Basic Laws and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.<br /><br />4. Promote the EU's understanding of Tibet<br /><br />China encourages personages of various circles in the EU to visit Tibet and welcomes the support of the EU and its members to Tibet's economic, cultural, educational and social development and their cooperation with the autonomous region subject to full respect of China's laws and regulations. The Chinese side requests the EU side not to have any contact with the "Tibetan government in exile" or provide facilities to the separatist activities of the Dalai clique.<br /><br />5. Continue the human rights dialogue<br /><br />There are both consensus and disagreements between China and the EU on the question of human rights. The Chinese side appreciates the EU's persistent position for dialogue and against confrontation and stands ready to continue dialogue, exchange and cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality and mutual respect so as to share information, enhance mutual understanding and deepen cooperation in protecting, inter alia, citizens' social and cultural rights and the rights of the disadvantaged.<br /><br />6. Strengthen international cooperation<br /><br />-- Enhance China-EU consultation and coordination on major international and regional hotspot issues.<br /><br />-- Strengthen China-EU cooperation at the UN and work together to uphold the UN's authority, promote its leading role in safeguarding world peace and facilitating economic and social development, particularly in helping developing countries eliminate poverty, improving global environment and drug control, and support UN's reform.<br /><br />-- Advance the process of Asia-Europe cooperation. China and the EU should work together to make ASEM a role model for inter-continental cooperation on the basis of equality, a channel for exchange between the oriental and occidental civilizations and a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic order.<br /><br />-- Jointly combat terrorism. Both China and the EU are victims of terrorism and are strongly opposed to all forms of terrorism. Both sides are also opposed to any linkage between terrorism and any particular country, nation, ethnic group or religion. China and the EU should keep in close touch and cooperation on counter-terrorism.<br /><br />-- Jointly safeguard the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and step up consultation and coordination on the basis of mutual respect; strengthen exchange and cooperation on non-proliferation and export control and the prevention of weaponization of and arms race in outer space; jointly contribute to the resolution of the issue of anti-personnel landmines and explosive remnants of war; and enhance cooperation in implementing the international arms control treaties.<br /><br />7. Enhance mutual understanding between Chinese and European legislative organs<br /><br />The relations between the National People's Congress of China and the parliaments of EU member countries and the European Parliament are an important link in China-EU ties. The Chinese Government welcomes and supports the enhancement of exchange and dialogue between Chinese and European legislatures on the basis of mutual respect, deeper understanding, seeking common ground while shelving differences and developing cooperation.<br /><br />8. Increase exchanges between political parties in China and the EU<br />The Chinese Government wishes to see an increase of exchange and cooperation between the Communist Party of China and all major EU political parties, parliamentary party groups and regional organizations of political parties on the basis of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. <br /> <br />Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields<br />II. The Economic Aspect<br /> <br /> <br /><br />1. Economic Cooperation and Trade<br /><br />China is committed to developing dynamic, long-term and stable economic cooperation and trade with the EU and expects the latter to become China's largest trading and investment partner.<br /><br />To this end, it is important to:<br /><br />-- Give play to the mechanism of the economic and trade joint committee and step up economic and trade regulatory policy dialogue; give attention to updating the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement Between China and the European Union at an appropriate time; properly address irrational restrictions and technical barriers, ease restrictions on high-tech exports and tap the enormous potential of technological cooperation and trade in line with the WTO rules; grant China a full market economy status at an early date, reduce and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices against China, and apply the Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism (TPSSM) prudently; and compensate the Chinese side for its economic and trade losses which may arise due to the EU enlargement.<br /><br />-- Boost China-EU coordination and cooperation in the new round of WTO negotiations and work together for the success of the negotiations.<br /><br />-- Strengthen dialogue on investment, promote the establishment of bilateral investment-promotion institutions, energetically encourage and guide mutual investments between enterprises of the two sides, and expand cooperation between their small- and medium-sized enterprises; develop processing trade, contractual projects and labor cooperation of various kinds and encourage transnational business operation and internationalized production.<br /><br />-- China welcomes more EU development aid, especially in such fields as the environmental protection, poverty-alleviation, public health and hygiene and education. China also welcomes a stronger and more active role of the EU in human resources development, in particular, personnel training for China's central and western regions and build-up of China's capacity of participating in multilateral trading regime.<br /><br />-- Step up cooperation in the area of quality supervision, inspection and quarantine, establish appropriate consultation mechanisms and, subject to the principle of ensuring safety, security, hygiene, health and environmental protection, promptly address and resolve issues which may adversely affect market access of each other's products.<br /><br />-- Boost the customs cooperation and conclude a China-EU Customs Agreement in due course.<br /><br />2. Financial Cooperation<br /><br />China and the EU should launch a high-level financial dialogue mechanism, expand exchanges between their central banks on policies and deepen cooperation in preventing and managing financial crises and combating the financing of terrorism and money laundering. The Chinese side welcomes an expansion of China-related business by banks of the EU countries and hopes to see an appropriate settlement of the issue of Chinese financial institutions' access to the EU market.<br /><br />The Chinese side will positively examine and consider applications of EU insurance institutions for business operation in China and improve its supervisory and regulatory regime in line with the Chinese insurance laws, regulations and statutes and China's WTO commitments.<br /><br />Cooperation in securities legislation, market supervision and regulation, and investment operation will be strengthened and more EU securities institutions, fund management institutions and other institutional investors will be encouraged to enter into China's market. Chinese securities institutions will be encouraged to enter into the EU's securities market when conditions are ripe. In the meantime, Chinese enterprises will be strongly supported to raise funds in the EU's securities market.<br /><br />3. Agricultural Cooperation<br /><br />Exchanges between China and the EU in such fields as agricultural production, processing technology of agricultural produce and sustainable development will be intensified. The mechanism of the agricultural working group should be given a role to play. Bilateral cooperation between agricultural research institutes, universities and colleges as well as enterprises should be pushed forward. EU Enterprises are encouraged to take an active part in agricultural development in China's central and western regions and invest in such fields as agricultural high and new technologies, intensive processing of agricultural produce and development of agricultural infrastructure.<br /><br />4. Environmental Cooperation<br /><br />China-EU communication and cooperation in environmental protection should be stimulated and a mechanism of dialogue between the Chinese and EU environmental ministers launched. Framework documents on environmental cooperation should be formulated, and discussions held on the establishment of information network on environmental cooperation. Bilateral cooperation should be strengthened on such issues as environmental legislation and management, climate change, bio-diversity protection, bio-safety management, and trade and environment. Efforts should be made to jointly promote the implementation of the follow-up actions of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Non-governmental environmental protection organizations are encouraged to develop mutual exchanges. EU enterprises are encouraged to gain more access to Chinese environmental protection market through fair competition.<br /><br />5. IT Cooperation<br /><br />The Chinese side would like to see the EU participation in China's IT promotion. The mechanism of the EU-China working group on information society will be strengthened. Exchanges and dialogue will be conducted on strategies, policies, rules and regulations of information society. Trade in IT products and industrial and technological cooperation will be actively boosted. Greater exchanges in intellectual property rights and technical standards will be encouraged. Cooperation in the field of "Digital Olympics" will be promoted.<br /><br />6. Energy Cooperation<br /><br />China-EU cooperation will be expanded in such fields as energy structure, clean energy, renewable energy, and energy efficiency and saving. Exchanges on energy development policies will be promoted. Efforts will be made to ensure a successful EU-China Energy Conference. The energy working group mechanism will be strengthened. Training on energy technology and cooperation in demonstration projects will be boosted to promote application and transfer of technology.<br /><br />7. Transport Cooperation<br /><br />A mechanism of China-EU regular meeting will be set up within the framework of the China-EU Agreement on Maritime Transport. Cooperation in maritime transport and other maritime fields will be developed and coordination and cooperation in international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) will be strengthened. Bilateral exchanges will be deepened and broadened in respect of policies of inland river transport, navigation safety and shipping standardization. Cooperation and exchanges in highway technology and management will be expanded. Dialogue and exchanges on highway transport legislation will be strengthened.<br />China-EU exchanges in civil aviation will be deepened. Chinese and EU enterprises are encouraged to strengthen their cooperation on production, technology, management and training. <br /> <br />Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields<br />V. The Military Aspect<br /> <br /> <br /><br />China and the EU will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, develop and improve, step by step, a strategic security consultation mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and expand exchanges in respect of military officers' training and defense studies.<br />The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense industry and technologies.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-45511328569734453232009-12-11T21:56:00.001-08:002009-12-11T21:57:38.587-08:00China: New defense postureChina: New defense posture<br /><br />A new white paper on China's military places sharp focus on the country's international role, signaling a growing confidence in its clout in the world community, writes Adam Wolfe for ISN Security Watch.On the day that Barack Obama was sworn in as US president, China's defense department issued a white paper on the current status and plans of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) - an English-language report aimed primarily at an international audience concerned about China's growing military presence.<br /><br />It is the sixth such white paper since 1998, and the sixth demonstration that the country's attempts at transparency can be maddeningly unclear to western observers.<br /><br />The paper reflects China's growing confidence in its increasingly important role on the world stage, while at the same time downplaying issues that have strained ties with the international community.<br /><br />As with previous reports, is short on specifics about equipment and technology. Also, the US intelligence community remains convinced that China has understated its military budget by about 50 percent and is deliberately hiding its intentions. What is notable about the new paper is that it directly addresses the budget. <br />In one of its longest sections, the paper states that China's military budget has grown by about 20 percent annually in recent years for three reasons: rising salaries and benefits for servicemen; compensation for the rise in food and fuel prices; and modernizing the PLA's equipment. The paper further argues that as a percentage of GDP, China's defense spending remains much lower than that of the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan. Even if the CIA's higher estimates of China's defense budget were accepted, this would remain true.<br /><br />Another shift in tone came in remarks on Taiwan. Previous papers used the threat of Taiwanese independence as one of the main reasons for China's naval build-up. The new white paper all but declares victory on this front: "The attempts of the separatist forces to seek 'de jure Taiwan independence' have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn."<br /><br />Still, US weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are cited as security concerns for China.<br /><br />Whereas previous papers downplayed China's global ambitions, the white paper signals a fresh confidence in China's position in the world. "The Chinese economy has become an important part of the world economy, China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community," the paper argues. From this perspective, the paper highlights China's growing presence in global "military operations other than war," (MOOTW, in military jargon).<br /><br />The white paper notes that China had close to 1,950 military peacekeepers serving in nine UN missions last year. The PLA recently held joint training missions with 14 countries, including the US, India, Australia and the UK. In this regard, the decision to send the Chinese navy to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia is probably more of a sign of things to come than a one-off publicity stunt.<br /><br />Strengthening US ties<br /><br />While the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA. <br /><br />The US-China relations probably hit their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations early in the Bush administration when a Chinese F-8 fighter and a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided near Hainan, China in April 2001. At the time, the Pentagon had put military-to-military communications on hold pending a review. After the incident was resolved, both sides began to take steps to ensure that a dialogue would remain open between their militaries, even if both continued to see each other as potential competitors.<br /><br />Chinese and US forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a US aircraft carrier later that year. There were some hiccups along the road - such as Beijing's refusal to grant a US aircraft carrier a port call in November 2007 - but the both sides continued to pursue a deeper dialogue.<br /><br />In April 2008, a military-to-military hotline was established to prevent any misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its power beyond its littoral waters. Obama's decision to retain Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to indicate that the trend will continue, though there are likely to be further problems along the way.<br /><br />The new white paper also highlights some of the steps that the PLA has taken to improve its transparency on the international stage - one of the main sticking points for the Pentagon.<br /><br />Last year, Beijing launched the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly releases military information and holds press conferences. Also in late 2007, Beijing rejoined the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.<br /><br />Still, the new white paper does not mention China's aircraft carrier program or its missiles aimed at Taiwan - and these are both major concerns for Washington.<br /><br />The PLA's regional ties<br /><br />The PLA has - established strong ties with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has held large-scale joint training exercises in recent years. But the new white paper also stresses improving ties with India and Japan as well.<br /><br />Previous papers emphasized concerns about Japanese attempts to modify its constitution to allow a military build-up. The new paper only mentions mutual visits by the Japanese and Chinese navies, and says the bilateral relationship has improved. The paper also downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build-up and an ongoing border dispute. Instead, the report cites the joint counterterrorism training exercises held in China and India in 2007 and 2008.<br /><br />While Japan and India are sure to appreciate the new tone, concerns remain about China's regional intentions. Japan and China claim overlapping ownership of a section of the East China Sea. Though diplomatic progress has been made on the issue, it remains unresolved and both sides have adjusted their defensive postures in recent years as a result.<br /><br />Negotiations over the disputed border with India have gone nowhere in recent years. Also, China's "string of pearls" strategy, which seeks to establish new naval bases and military ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea, continues to be watched with a wary eye from New Delhi. Just as India is seeking "blue-water status" for its navy, or the ability to project power further away from its coastal region, China appears to be moving into the region with its navy.<br /><br />International spotlight<br /><br />Whereas previous white papers stressed the continued need for training within the PLA, the most recent report's emphasis is clearly on China's new place in the world. It describes the country as an indispensable nation: "China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China."<br /><br />While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the US. The Chinese ships heading to Somalia will be the first test case for what Beijing clearly believes will be a new role for its military.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-7348981544959209622009-12-11T21:56:00.000-08:002009-12-11T21:57:37.209-08:00China: New defense postureChina: New defense posture<br /><br />A new white paper on China's military places sharp focus on the country's international role, signaling a growing confidence in its clout in the world community, writes Adam Wolfe for ISN Security Watch.On the day that Barack Obama was sworn in as US president, China's defense department issued a white paper on the current status and plans of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) - an English-language report aimed primarily at an international audience concerned about China's growing military presence.<br /><br />It is the sixth such white paper since 1998, and the sixth demonstration that the country's attempts at transparency can be maddeningly unclear to western observers.<br /><br />The paper reflects China's growing confidence in its increasingly important role on the world stage, while at the same time downplaying issues that have strained ties with the international community.<br /><br />As with previous reports, is short on specifics about equipment and technology. Also, the US intelligence community remains convinced that China has understated its military budget by about 50 percent and is deliberately hiding its intentions. What is notable about the new paper is that it directly addresses the budget. <br />In one of its longest sections, the paper states that China's military budget has grown by about 20 percent annually in recent years for three reasons: rising salaries and benefits for servicemen; compensation for the rise in food and fuel prices; and modernizing the PLA's equipment. The paper further argues that as a percentage of GDP, China's defense spending remains much lower than that of the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan. Even if the CIA's higher estimates of China's defense budget were accepted, this would remain true.<br /><br />Another shift in tone came in remarks on Taiwan. Previous papers used the threat of Taiwanese independence as one of the main reasons for China's naval build-up. The new white paper all but declares victory on this front: "The attempts of the separatist forces to seek 'de jure Taiwan independence' have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn."<br /><br />Still, US weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are cited as security concerns for China.<br /><br />Whereas previous papers downplayed China's global ambitions, the white paper signals a fresh confidence in China's position in the world. "The Chinese economy has become an important part of the world economy, China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community," the paper argues. From this perspective, the paper highlights China's growing presence in global "military operations other than war," (MOOTW, in military jargon).<br /><br />The white paper notes that China had close to 1,950 military peacekeepers serving in nine UN missions last year. The PLA recently held joint training missions with 14 countries, including the US, India, Australia and the UK. In this regard, the decision to send the Chinese navy to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia is probably more of a sign of things to come than a one-off publicity stunt.<br /><br />Strengthening US ties<br /><br />While the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA. <br /><br />The US-China relations probably hit their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations early in the Bush administration when a Chinese F-8 fighter and a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided near Hainan, China in April 2001. At the time, the Pentagon had put military-to-military communications on hold pending a review. After the incident was resolved, both sides began to take steps to ensure that a dialogue would remain open between their militaries, even if both continued to see each other as potential competitors.<br /><br />Chinese and US forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a US aircraft carrier later that year. There were some hiccups along the road - such as Beijing's refusal to grant a US aircraft carrier a port call in November 2007 - but the both sides continued to pursue a deeper dialogue.<br /><br />In April 2008, a military-to-military hotline was established to prevent any misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its power beyond its littoral waters. Obama's decision to retain Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to indicate that the trend will continue, though there are likely to be further problems along the way.<br /><br />The new white paper also highlights some of the steps that the PLA has taken to improve its transparency on the international stage - one of the main sticking points for the Pentagon.<br /><br />Last year, Beijing launched the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly releases military information and holds press conferences. Also in late 2007, Beijing rejoined the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.<br /><br />Still, the new white paper does not mention China's aircraft carrier program or its missiles aimed at Taiwan - and these are both major concerns for Washington.<br /><br />The PLA's regional ties<br /><br />The PLA has - established strong ties with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has held large-scale joint training exercises in recent years. But the new white paper also stresses improving ties with India and Japan as well.<br /><br />Previous papers emphasized concerns about Japanese attempts to modify its constitution to allow a military build-up. The new paper only mentions mutual visits by the Japanese and Chinese navies, and says the bilateral relationship has improved. The paper also downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build-up and an ongoing border dispute. Instead, the report cites the joint counterterrorism training exercises held in China and India in 2007 and 2008.<br /><br />While Japan and India are sure to appreciate the new tone, concerns remain about China's regional intentions. Japan and China claim overlapping ownership of a section of the East China Sea. Though diplomatic progress has been made on the issue, it remains unresolved and both sides have adjusted their defensive postures in recent years as a result.<br /><br />Negotiations over the disputed border with India have gone nowhere in recent years. Also, China's "string of pearls" strategy, which seeks to establish new naval bases and military ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea, continues to be watched with a wary eye from New Delhi. Just as India is seeking "blue-water status" for its navy, or the ability to project power further away from its coastal region, China appears to be moving into the region with its navy.<br /><br />International spotlight<br /><br />Whereas previous white papers stressed the continued need for training within the PLA, the most recent report's emphasis is clearly on China's new place in the world. It describes the country as an indispensable nation: "China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China."<br /><br />While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the US. The Chinese ships heading to Somalia will be the first test case for what Beijing clearly believes will be a new role for its military.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-35672217136932974122009-12-07T20:59:00.000-08:002009-12-07T21:00:26.216-08:00PRC Missile and Space Forces 8APMT and the Asian Financial Crisis<br /><br />The APMT program is one of the few commercial communications satellite programs that has remained strong despite the Asian financial crisis. Projections of an oversupply problem for Asia, and an accompanying plunge in transponder lease rates, appeared before the 1998 recession began. Asian currencies fell, as did demand for new satellite capacity. This oversupply was compounded when India did not pass legislation as expected to open their nation to the direct-to-home satellite market. That failure left some Asian satellites with empty beams aimed at India. Additional questions arose during this time about whether there are sufficient customers for these satellites to earn revenue. The Asian market is flooded with transponder capacity, creating a buyers' market.109<br /><br />At least ten Asia-Pacific region communications satellite programs have been deferred due to the economic crisis.110 These include the Measat 3, Agila 3, AsiaSat 4, Thaicom 4, LSTAR 1, LSTAR 2, and the M2A communications satellites.111<br /><br />Yet another concern with Hughes' proposed APMT sale is that it could help the PRC learn about the deployment of large antenna structures. This could assist the PRC in the development of future reconnaissance satellites. Mechanisms used to deploy large antenna systems have been protected from PRC scrutiny in the past. Visual access to the satellite, as well as the risk of unauthorized discussion with engineers such as has occurred in the past, could give the PRC access to this sensitive technology for the first time.<br /><br />The Role of PLA General Shen Rongjun and His Son in APMT<br /><br />The complex relationship between the Shen family and the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite has raised concerns about the possible use of the satellite for military intelligence purposes, and the possibility that technology discussed in the technical interchange meetings would be transferred to the People's Liberation Army (PLA).112<br /><br />In May 1994, PLA Lieutenant General Shen Rongjun, the Deputy Director of the People's Republic of China Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), traveled to the United States and attended several business meetings with Hughes. Gen. Shen's responsibilities at COSTIND included the acquisition of satellite systems for the PRC. During this visit to the United States, General Shen's son, Shen Jun, who was living in Canada at the time, attended a business lunch with his father where he was introduced to Frank Taormina of Hughes. Taormina would later assist Shen Jun in obtaining a job at Hughes.113<br /><br />Shen Jun is the older of two sons born to Gen. Shen. He spent 10 of his early years living at the Taiyun Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi province. Shen Jun received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees in computer science from the Changsha Institute of Technology.114 The Changsha Institute of Technology is also known as the National Defense University of Science and Technology and is run by the PLA. For two years, Shen Jun received training and worked in the field of missiles and satellites under PLA supervision.<br /><br />Shen Jun began working in North America in 1989 as a research assistant at the University of Waterloo, where he would later receive his Ph.D. in computer science in 1993.115<br /><br />During his lunch meeting with Taormina in 1994, Shen Jun remarked that he was applying for a job with Hughes Canada. Taormina suggested to Shen Jun that he submit his resume to Taormina at Hughes in Los Angeles, where he could probably get a better job. While Shen Jun says he was not certain whether Taormina had a relationship with his father, he assumes that this was so, since Taormina was a Hughes vice president in charge of marketing and commercial business.116<br /><br />Shen Jun was hired at Hughes in August 1994 after interviewing with Steve Hagers, who would become his boss.117 At the time, a division of Space Systems/Loral was also considering hiring Shen for a position that would have allowed him access to classified information.<br /><br />Originally, Shen Jun was hired at Hughes as a scientist in the information technology division. His primary duty was to investigate new software systems that were available in the commercial market for potential use by Hughes.118 However, by June 1995, Shen Jun was transferred into Hughes' business development unit, where Hughes used him to conduct market research, general marketing of satellites in Asia, and, specifically, marketing of the APMT program.119<br /><br />Another of Shen Jun's roles was to act as an interpreter for Hughes. While Hughes acquired a license from the U.S. State Department for Shen Jun to work as an interpreter in late 1996, Shen says he did not attend any of the preliminary design review meetings for APMT.120 Shen Jun states that he did translate for Hughes during at least one or two meetings in the proposal stage. During this period, Shen Jun had a foreign national badge and did not have access to certain Hughes facilities.121<br /><br />Shen Jun also claims that he did not talk with his father, Gen. Shen Rongjun, on a regular basis and had only discussed the APMT satellite with him on a couple of occasions, and even then only at a very general level. Shen Jun claims he talks infrequently with his father, and that he usually talks with his mother when he talks with his family because his father is busy. Furthermore, Shen Jun claims not to know his father's current occupation since the reorganization of COSTIND. Shen Jun, acknowledges, however, that he has had "very high level" discussions with his father on APMT such as "how is the thing ... nothing deep, because it's a sensitive issue."122<br /><br />Gen. Shen Rongjun's interactions with the APMT program are more obviously extensive. General Shen has been an advocate at COSTIND for purchasing Western satellites for the PLA, especially since the PRC's domestic satellites began failing in the early 1990s. Based on his position and responsibilities, Gen. Shen was directly involved in the decision to choose Hughes to work on the APMT program.<br /><br />Similarities Between the PRC's Ballistic Missile and Rocket Technology<br /><br />Background<br /><br />The technologies used in rockets and ballistic missiles are essentially the same, except in the areas of payload and flight profile.123 The common elements of rockets and ballistic missiles include:<br /><br /> * Propulsion<br /> * Structure<br /> * Staging<br /> * Guidance and control<br /> * Ground support and launch equipment<br /> * Systems integration124<br /><br />These commonalities have led to considerable interaction between rocket and ballistic missile programs. Nations that possess space launch capabilities are considered to have all the essential elements to develop a ballistic missile, and vice versa.<br /><br />Historically, most rockets have been derived from ballistic missiles. In the United States, for example, the current Titan, Atlas, and Delta rockets were derived from ballistic missiles developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Russia's Start rocket is essentially an SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that has been modified with an additional upper stage and a payload fairing in place of its reentry vehicle.125 Some rockets were even launched from silos, such as the Soviet-era SL-7 and SL-8. These Soviet rockets made use of the SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, respectively, as first stages.126<br /><br />Since their origin, the PRC missile and space programs have been tied together. Like the space programs in the United States and the Soviet Union, the PRC space program got its early start by modifying ballistic missiles into rockets. These early attempts set a pattern of cooperation that continues today. The interaction can be seen in the overall design of the ballistic missiles and the rockets and in certain subsystems, such as propulsion.<br /><br />In some areas, however, there are divergences. These divergences will increase in the future as the PRC's rockets and ballistic missiles employ different technologies, such as solid-propellant motors for ICBMs and cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for rockets.<br /><br />The PRC's first rocket, known as the Long March 1, was a derivative of its limited range CSS-3 ICBM. The PRC launched two satellites aboard the Long March 1: one in 1970, and the second in 1971.<br /><br />The PRC's CSS-4 ICBM has been the model for all PRC rockets since 1973. The first, the Long March 2A, has evolved into a family of rockets, including the Long March 2C, 2E, and 3; the Long March 3A family; and the Long March 4. The Long March 2C rocket is the most closely related to the CSS-4 ICBM. Indeed, it was derived directly from it. The two vehicles share the same first stage engines, structure, and dimensions.127<br /><br />The PRC has also modified the CSS-3 into a small satellite launch vehicle known as the Long March 1D. The modifications include improvements to the YF-2 engines, a new second stage engine utilizing the YF-40 engines from the Long March 4, and a solid-propellant third stage similar to the apogee kick motor used on the Long March 3. The PRC has yet to use this new rocket for commercial space launches. The Long March 1D has, however, been used for military purposes.<br /><br />Propulsion Systems<br /><br />The propulsion system requirements for rockets and ballistic missiles are the same. Liquid-propellant engines or solid-propellant motors can be used on either. Both first and second stage engines are interchangeable between ballistic missiles and rockets. The flight environments that ballistic missiles and rockets pass through are the same, thus allowing their engines to be designed similarly. Traditionally, however, rockets use either additional stages or kick motors to place their payloads into orbit. Strap-on boosters can also be used for both rockets and ballistic missiles.<br /><br />For its next generation ballistic missiles, the PRC is moving towards solid propellants. This will offer faster reaction times compared to liquid-propellant missiles. Moreover, solid-propellant missiles tend to be lighter weight. Solid propellants are less commonly used for rocket applications, since they provide less boosting power to place large payloads into orbit. Furthermore, the challenge of restarting solid-propellant motors once stopped makes them unattractive for upper stage use. The light weight of solid propellants, however, does make them useful for placing satellites into geosynchronous orbits, because they may be employed as kick motors and also as strap-on boosters on rockets.<br /><br />The PRC's space program is reported to be moving away from storable liquid-propellant engines to cryogenic liquid-propellant engines. The PRC is reported to be working on a rocket that would use cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for its first and second stages. These engines provide greater boosting power over storable liquid propellants and solid propellants.128<br /><br />Airframes<br /><br />The airframe structure that forms the aerodynamic shell within which all elements of the rocket and ballistic missile are integrated is the same for both rockets and ballistic missiles.129<br /><br />Ballistic missile and rocket structures must use materials that are lightweight and strong.130 Lightweight materials are preferred because the smaller the structural fraction of the weight of the missile or rocket, the more weight can be dedicated to payload or range.131<br /><br />The structure must also be strong enough to withstand the aerodynamic loads that affect the missile or rocket during boost and ground handling operations.132 Because these loads are similar during the boost phase of flight, the structural requirements for ballistic missiles and rockets are the same, placing the same premium on materials, design, and fabrication.133<br /><br />'The Fairing is part of the Launch Vehicle'<br /><br />A rocket's nosecone, which protects the satellite inside, is known as a fairing. The same nosecone, if used on a ballistic missile to protect the nuclear warhead payload, is called a shroud.<br /><br />Whether the launch vehicle is a rocket or a ballistic missile, the function of the nosecone is specialized to protect the payload ? satellite or nuclear warhead ? from external aerodynamic loads, vibration, noise, temperature extremes, and other environments that may be encountered as the vehicle is launched and accelerates through the atmosphere.<br /><br />In the case of rockets, the fairing protects the satellite. In the case of ballistic missiles, the shroud would most likely be used to protect multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). (See the Technical Afterword to the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a description of the similarities between the design and construction of the fairing for a rocket and a shroud for a ballistic missile.)<br /><br />In 1995, Hughes argued to the Commerce Department that the fairing was part of the satellite and, therefore, Hughes' advice to the PRC regarding the fairing did not require a State Department license. A Commerce Department official, without asking any other U.S. Government agency, agreed. The Select Committee requested that the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, CIA, and NASA provide responses to the question: "Is the fairing part of the launch vehicle, or part of the satellite?" Their answers are summarized below.<br /><br />Defense: "The fairing is part of the launch vehicle. It is designed and manufactured by the launch provider to encapsulate payloads (including, but not limited to, satellites). The fairing must be designed as an integral part of the launch vehicle system as its structure, in many respects, determines the success of the launch." 134<br /><br />State: "The Department considers the fairing to be an integral part of the space launch vehicle. The forward end of a space launch vehicle typically has a payload fairing, which protects both the satellite and the space launch vehicle from aerodynamic loading and heating during the launch vehicle's ascent through the densest part of the atmosphere." 135<br /><br />Commerce: "Fairings are regarded as part of the launch vehicle. Under U.S. implementation of multilateral controls, fairings are under the export jurisdiction of the Department of State." 136<br /><br />CIA: "The CIA considers the payload fairing to be part of the space launch vehicle because the fairing is needed to fly the vehicle and satellite through the atmosphere. Furthermore, the fairings are typically designed and built by the launch vehicle provider, not the satellite manufacturer." 137<br /><br />NASA: "The fairing is routinely acquired as a component of the launch vehicle service." 138<br /><br />Ballistic Missile and Rocket Stages<br /><br />The staging mechanisms on ballistic missiles and rockets are the same. In both cases, the purpose of using stages is to carry aloft the smallest amount of weight necessary to accelerate the payload to its target.<br /><br />By discarding parts of the rocket or missiles that are no longer necessary, including unused propellant, stage separation makes space flight more efficient. For ballistic missiles with low accuracy (for example, "city buster" nuclear weapons as opposed to those designed to hit ICBM silos), the mechanisms for payload separation can be similar to those used on rockets.<br /><br />Guidance Systems<br /><br />The guidance and control subsystem of a rocket and of a ballistic missile monitors the flight path and adjusts for the effects of high altitude winds or gravitational attractions. The purpose, in both cases, is to deliver a payload to preselected points, either in orbit or on the earth, at preselected velocities.<br /><br />The accuracy capabilities of a ballistic missile's guidance system may exceed those required for placing satellites into orbit, but the guidance system for a ballistic missile can be used on a rocket. A rocket guidance system, on the other hand, is not usually designed for the same degree of accuracy as is required for ballistic missiles, and therefore may not be suitable for use in some ballistic missile missions where a high degree of accuracy is required. In most cases, however, a rocket guidance system would be sufficiently accurate for delivering nuclear weapons to large targets such as cities.139<br /><br />Many of the PRC's ballistic missiles and rockets share the same guidance systems.<br /><br />The Select Committee has learned from Western scientists participating in the failure review following the 1996 Long March 3B crash that the guidance system used on the Long March 2C, Long March 2E and Long March 3 rockets is also used on the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile.140<br /><br />The strap-down guidance system that is used on the PLA's M-series of ballistic missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9) and CSS-X-7 (also known as the M-11), is also used on the PRC "Smart Dispenser."141 The PRC has used the Smart Dispenser to dispense two Iridium communications satellites on six different occasions.<br /><br />The PRC had proposed to Loral to use this same guidance system on the PRC's "Top Stage" dispenser to dispense twelve Globalstar communications satellites from atop a Long March 2E rocket.142 The PRC marketed the Top Stage to Loral as having a mature guidance system, since its inertial measurement unit had been tested on more than 50 flights of the M-series missiles.143 After the crash of the Long March 3B carrying Loral's Intelsat 708 payload, however, Loral withdrew from its Globalstar contract with the PRC, and the 12-satellite dispenser was never used.<br /><br />The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets use a different inertial measurement unit than do the Long March 2 family of rockets, the Long March 3, and the CSS-4 ICBM. The new guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C was developed in 1985, and is cheaper and lighter than the Long March 2 and Long March 3 guidance system.<br /><br />The Long March 2 and 3 inertial measurement unit, for example, is so heavy that a crane is required to place it into position in the rocket. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C inertial measurement system is sufficiently smaller that it can be manually installed in the rocket.<br /><br />Additionally, the Long March 2 guidance system and the guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C share almost none of the same components. The Long March 2 guidance system uses a double solder for connectors, whereas the Long March 3B uses a single solder. The Long March 2 guidance system is also a three-axis stabilized platform, whereas the Long March 3B is a four-axis stabilized platform.144<br /><br />A relatively small and lightweight inertial measurement unit would be required for the PRC's next generation of ICBMs. While the Long March 3B inertial measurement unit is capable of being used for that purpose, it is considered an unlikely choice. Nonetheless, the experience that the PRC has gained with the Long March 3B in designing a small and lightweight inertial measurement unit that works will almost certainly benefit its designs of ICBM guidance systems in the future.<br /><br />Ground Support<br /><br />Ground support and launch procedures can be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles. The crews that launch ballistic missiles and rockets can be the same (and, indeed, PLA personnel are involved in both rocket and ICBM launches in the PRC).<br /><br />The ground support equipment, such as the launch tower, the missile stand, the propellant handling equipment, and the transportation trains, can all be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.<br /><br />Payload preparation and handling is an area where procedures do differ, since satellites often require a complex checkout sequence before launch which ballistic missile warheads do not.145<br /><br />The various institutes and academies in the PRC involved in the design and production of ballistic missiles also share design and production responsibilities for rockets. The China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) is responsible for research and development of ballistic missiles and rockets. The Beijing Institute of Control Devices is responsible for both ballistic missile and rocket design. Moreover, all of these academies and institutes are managed within the same organizational hierarchy. These common responsibilities will allow the PRC to gain experience for both their ballistic missile and rocket programs through the launching of Western communications satellites.<br /><br />The PRC's launch sites are also used for both military and commercial purposes. The Taiyun Satellite Launch Center was originally designed for launches of the CSS-4 ICBM. Today it launches the Long March 2C/SD rocket carrying Iridium satellites and the Long March 4 into polar orbits.146<br /><br />Systems Integration<br /><br />The system for integrating the propulsion, guidance and control, payload, and structure is the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.147 Analytical and diagnostic tools, such as structural analysis software, are the same for both and are widely available.148<br /><br />Payload<br /><br />The payload is the area of most significant potential difference between rockets and ballistic missiles.<br /><br />Satellites are usually complex, fragile systems that are designed to remain in orbit for fixed periods of time. Satellite payloads usually are not required to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of reentry. Single warheads, on the other hand ? including nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads, as well as conventional bombs ? are designed to survive the intense stresses of atmospheric reentry.<br /><br />Rockets normally use a fairing to protect the satellite payload from the aerodynamics stresses of launch (although a satellite can be designed, in some instances, to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of launch and therefore would not require a fairing). But in many cases, such as in the deployment of multiple warheads, or submarine launched missiles, ballistic missiles can include a shroud that is similar to a fairing. Both fairings and shrouds are aerodynamic shells that are placed over the payload ? satellite or warhead ? to reduce drag and aerodynamic stresses during launch.<br /><br />To place the desired payloads into orbit, rockets generally operate at higher velocities than ballistic missiles. These higher velocities are often attained by high performance third stages, or by kick motors. An ICBM payload, on the other hand, is not intended to achieve orbit around the earth. Rather, the nuclear warhead reentry vehicle is considered to be a rocket whose orbit intersects the earth at the target.<br /><br />Conclusion<br /><br />Because of the many commonalities between rockets and ballistic missiles, the PRC can apply the same system refinements and modifications to both its rockets and ICBMs. It is likely that the failure rates of CSS-4 ICBM test flights, and the remedies the PRC adopts to address technical problems with the CSS-4 ICBM, may be the same as or similar to those of the Long March series of rocketsanjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-42695283114618160302009-12-07T20:57:00.000-08:002009-12-07T20:58:17.083-08:00PRC Missile and Space Forces 7These failures have left the PRC dependent on Western-manufactured satellites, which it purchases through multinational consortia in which the PRC maintains a controlling interest. These include the Asia Pacific Satellite Telecommunications Co., and China Orient Telecomm Satellite Co, Ltd. Satellites acquired by the PRC in this way include the Apstar-1, Apstar-1A, Apstar-2R, and ChinaStar-1.<br /><br />It is likely that these failures have made the PLA dependent on Western communications satellites as well.<br /><br />PRC Use of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs)<br /><br />The PRC has acquired Western-manufactured very small aperture terminals (VSATs) that could be used for military satellite communications.<br /><br />VSATs are small satellite communications antennas used to transmit voice, data, video, fax, and computer-to-computer communications between multiple users. One VSAT terminal can be used to transmit communications from multiple users to different recipients via communications satellites.<br /><br />The small size of VSAT terminals allows easy transportation between different locations and assembly in remote areas. These VSAT networks could improve the PLA's military command and control capabilities, by allowing mobile, reliable communications virtually anywhere.<br /><br />The majority of VSAT terminals in use today in the PRC are U.S. manufactured. Hughes is by far the largest provider of VSAT networks to the PRC. The other significant U.S. supplier is Scientific Atlantic. Other providers include NEC of Japan and Spar of Canada.85<br /><br />The PLA's Reconnaissance Satellite Program<br /><br />The PLA has developed a photo reconnaissance satellite, known as the FSW (for the Fanhui Shi Weixing, or Recoverable Test Satellite). The current version of the Recoverable Test Satellite uses a recoverable capsule similar in concept to those used in the early U.S. Corona program. This PLA reconnaissance satellite provides the PRC with the ability to photograph U.S. military installations.<br /><br />The first version of the satellite was successfully launched on November 26, 1975, using a Long March 2C rocket. After three days in orbit, the satellite capsule reentered and was successfully recovered by the PRC. Subsequent redesigns of the FSW-1 satellites allowed the PRC to increase its on-orbit life to five days before reentry. The PRC launched fifteen FSW-1 satellites, the last occurring in October 1993.86<br /><br />The PRC's current, enhanced version of this satellite is known as the FSW-2. The FSW-2 is larger than the FSW-1 and has a longer on-orbit life. The FSW-2 military reconnaissance satellite has been launched three times since 1992.87 The most recent launch occurred in October 1996.<br /><br />The PRC has also offered the FSW satellites as microgravity research platforms ? that is, scientific experiments are mounted on the military reconnaissance satellite itself. The commercial proceeds from such "piggy back" launches may in turn be used to subsidize the efforts of PRC entities. Starting in 1987, several FSW satellites have carried microgravity experiments for commercial customers including France and Germany.88<br /><br />The PRC has also announced that it is going to deploy a new, more capable military reconnaissance satellite.<br /><br />CBERS: A Prototype of the PRC's Acquisition of Western Technology<br /><br />The CBERS-1 satellite program is an open program that has received considerable publicity. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is interested in promoting Western interest in this presumably civil satellite because it offers a means of acquiring technology that could be useful for future military reconnaissance satellites.<br /><br />CBERS stands for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite. The CBERS-1 satellite is a joint venture with Brazil for the development of a remote imaging satellite that will include a variety of Western technologies.<br /><br />The CBERS remote imagery satellite is designed to include wide field imagery, a charge-coupled device (CCD) camera from the United States manufactured by Fairchild, and an infrared multispectral camera. The satellite is designed to provide global coverage at a variety of spatial resolutions and spectral bands to meet a range of commercial needs.<br /><br />The CBERS-1 satellite, if successfully completed and deployed, will be able to image any location on the Earth within three days in the visible region, and 26 days in the infrared region.<br /><br />The PRC's Other Military Satellite Programs<br /><br />The PRC has developed and deployed a variety of other satellites for military purposes since its first launches in the 1970s.<br /><br />It has been reported that the PRC may have developed a series of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites in the early 1970s.89 These satellites would have been useful for collecting data on Soviet defense, among other purposes.<br /><br />The PRC has also developed two different types of meteorological satellites for military and civil purposes, known as Feng Yun (Wind and Cloud).<br /><br /> * The FY-1 series of satellites, first launched in 1988, are polar-orbiting. The FY-1 satellites have suffered a series of on-orbit failures. The first satellite operated for only 39 days of its one-year planned design life; the second satellite lost attitude control five months into its on-orbit life, was recovered 50 days later, and was again lost due to radiation damage.<br /> * The FY-2 satellites were designed to provide meteorological information from geosynchronous orbit. The first satellite of this class, however, was lost due to an explosion during ground processing.90 The second of this class was launched on June 10, 1997 and was successfully placed into orbit.91<br /><br />While the PLA has, to date, relied on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) navigation satellites, the PRC has announced plans for its own navigation satellite system, known as the Twin Star. The GPS system of satellites, which provides three-dimensional positioning and timing data throughout the globe, consists of 24 satellites with several on-orbit spares. The Russian GLONASS system is intended to use 21 satellites with three on-orbit spares, but the financial crisis in Russia has reduced the number of operational satellites currently on orbit.<br /><br />In comparison, the PRC's proposed Twin Star positioning system program, as planned, would utilize two satellites in geosynchronous orbit for positioning, messaging, and timing services.92 The Twin Star system represents the PRC's attempt to become independent of the United States' GPS and the Russian GLONASS navigation satellites.<br /><br />The Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Satellite<br /><br />Hughes is currently designing a geosynchronous communications satellite for a PRC-controlled consortium, Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications, Ltd. (APMT). The stated purpose is to provide regional mobile communications throughout Asia.93<br /><br />Unlike previous communications satellites, however, this satellite uses a very large antenna array, which has raised concerns that the satellite could be used not simply for telecommunications, but also for space-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.<br /><br />This would give the PRC the capability to eavesdrop electronically on conversations not only in the PRC, but also in neighboring countries. Since the APMT satellite's antenna array is significantly larger than any that has been provided to the PRC by any Western nation, it is likely that the PRC would seek to exploit the APMT design for a future PRC SIGINT satellite.<br /><br />Other concerns have been raised about the participation of the son of a PLA general in the program's technical interchange meetings, as described in greater detail below.<br /><br />When Hughes was awarded this contract, PRC entities had at least a 51 percent share in the international consortium that made up APMT. PRC entities involved included China Aerospace Corporation, China Launch and Tracking Control General, Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and UNICOM, the PRC's second telephone network. Originally, two Singaporean companies, Singapore Telecommunications, Ltd. and Singapore Technologies Telemedia, owned twenty-five percent of APMT.94 In 1998, however, Singapore Telecommunications pulled out of the APMT project, stating that the project no longer met its business requirements.95 Thailand is also listed by Hughes as an "other" shareholder in APMT.96 In 1998, Hughes reported that the shareholders for APMT included:<br /><br /> * China Aerospace Corporation<br /> * China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology<br /> * China Satellite Launch & Tracking Control General<br /> * China Communications Systems Co. Limited<br /> * China Resources Holdings Co. Ltd (PRC)<br /> * Communications Authority of Thailand<br /> * Telephone Organization of Thailand<br /> * China Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite Corporation<br /> * China Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite Co. Ltd.<br /> * Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.<br /> * Sunburst Technologies Investments Pte. Ltd. of Singapore<br /> * Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan<br /> * NTT Mobilecommunications Network Inc. of Japan<br /> * Future Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. of Thailand97<br /><br />In the early 1990s, APMT held a competition among satellite manufacturers for a regional mobile communications satellite system that would use 50,000 small, portable handsets similar to cellular telephones. The system called for a communications satellite in geosynchronous orbit, which would transmit communications between handsets or rout them through "gateways" into the local telephone network.98 Among the competitors were Hughes and Loral.99<br /><br />Hughes won the APMT contract. In 1996, Hughes requested an export license from the Commerce Department for the APMT satellite.100 If approved for export, the APMT satellite was to be launched on a Long March 3B rocket from the PRC.101 Hughes' design proposal, as originally submitted to the Commerce Department, included two HS 601 satellite buses with a 12-year design life. The satellites were to be equipped with a 40 foot L-band antenna.102 The license was originally approved by the Commerce Department in 1996.103<br /><br />In April 1998, Hughes submitted a second license request to the Commerce Department due to changes in the satellite bus design.104 Hughes wanted to use the more powerful HS-GEM bus, in place of the HS 601, which would have permitted them to achieve design commonalities and hence production efficiencies with another satellite sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The design change for the UAE satellite was the result of a requirement by Hughes' Thuraya satellite customer, who wanted to reduce the power used by the handsets when transmitting. This required an increase in the sensitivity and power of the satellites and their antenna.105 The original contract also called for two on-orbit satellites. This was modified to one on-orbit satellite and one spare satellite.106<br /><br />The 40-foot antenna, which uses a truss-like outer ring and mesh reflector surface, is the unique aspect of the APMT satellite design. It has led to concerns that the PRC could use the APMT satellite for signals intelligence collection against a wide spectrum of communications.107<br /><br />The satellite, however, is designed to collect and process only communications in the same bandwidth as is allocated to the handsets.108 Communications satellite antennas are designed to receive their own frequency and reject all others. To do otherwise would add unnecessary expense and complexity to the satellite.<br /><br />In an attempt to reduce interference from other satellites using the same frequency bands, the APMT satellite antenna will use "left-hand circular polarization" which gives its signals a unique signature. The satellite will not collect other signals that use right, vertical, horizontal, or no polarization. These factors thus limit the satellite's ability to engage in signals intelligence to the collection of information transmitted by APMT system users. That volume of information, however, would be substantial.<br /><br />When the handsets in the proposed APMT system are used, even for handset-to-handset conversations that are not bounced off the satellite, copies of the transmissions are downloaded to a central ground station. This capability is typically required of most satellite communications systems. Only Iridium, which uses inter-satellite cross-links, does not downlink its communications to a ground station. This downlink would allow the PRC to monitor the communications of APMT's users across the Asian region.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-1113394438609008552009-12-07T20:55:00.000-08:002009-12-07T20:56:24.591-08:00PRC Missile and Space Forces 6Recently, the PRC has made an effort to sell low-earth orbit satellite launches:<br /><br /> * The PRC has entered into contracts with Motorola for the launch of Iridium satellites, including a contract to launch replacement satellites. Iridium satellites have been successfully launched six times on the Long March 2C/SD (that is, the Long March 2C with a "Smart Dispenser" (SD) stage added). The "Smart Dispenser" allows the PRC to launch two Iridium satellites into orbit at a time.<br /> * The PRC has pursued a contract with Loral for the launch of Globalstar satellites. The PRC offered a version of its Long March 2E equipped with a "Top Stage" (TS) that would dispense twelve Globalstar satellites. While Loral had originally contracted for a launch on the Long March 2E/TS, it cancelled that contract following the crash of the Long March 3B in February 1996.<br /><br />The PRC's Future Space Launch Capabilities<br /><br />The PRC also recognizes the importance of space in future conflicts, for purposes that include both command and control, and military reconnaissance. The PRC is believed to be developing a new, larger rocket that will be able to carry larger payloads into orbit.<br /><br />PRC papers have discussed the use of cryogenic liquid propellant engines for this future rocket. One of the engines the PRC could use is the RD-120. The PRC is known to have acquired at least one of these engines from Russian during the 1990s.69 The RD-120 is a liquid oxygen/kerosene engine that is used on the second stage of the Zenit rocket, which is used on the multinational Sea Launch program.<br /><br />Difficulties with the development of the new engines for this rocket may have prompted the PRC to focus, in the nearer term, on the proposed Long March 2E(A) and Long March 3B(A) versions of the Long March rocket that will utilize improved strap-on boosters to achieve greater payload-to-orbit capability. It should be noted that these are the two systems that were the subject of the failure review investigations in which Loral and Hughes participated. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of how these failure reviews assisted the PRC.<br /><br />PRC Space Weapons<br /><br />The PRC is believed to be developing space-based and ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons. Such weapons would be of exceptional value for the control of space and information. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is moving toward the deployment of such weapons.<br /><br />Based on the significant level of PRC-Russian cooperation on weapons development, it is possible that the PRC will be able to use nuclear reactors to pump lasers with pulse energies high enough to destroy satellites.<br /><br />In addition, Russian cooperation could help the PRC to develop an advanced radar system using lasers to track and image satellites.<br /><br />The Select Committee judges that the PRC has the technical capability to develop direct ascent anti-satellite weapons. The CSS-2 could be modified for use in this role. This would be similar to the approach taken by the Soviets with their SS-9 ASAT system.<br /><br />The PRC's Manned Space Program<br /><br />The PRC has conducted research since the 1950s, including biological and life support research, on placing astronauts into orbit. Pursuant to its 921 Project, the PRC's plans since the 1980s have included concepts for Space Shuttle-like spacecraft, recoverable capsules, and a space station.70<br /><br />In 1996, two PRC astronauts began training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City, Russia. The PRC appears set to launch these two astronauts into space sometime this year to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Communist rule in China.<br /><br />For its manned space program, the PRC will use Soyuz capsules purchased during Yeltsin's visit to the PRC in April 1996. A Soyuz capsule will be carried on top of the Long March 2E, using a payload shroud (that is, a fairing) equipped with a launch escape system. (See Chapter 5, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a discussion of fairing improvements to the Long March 2E.)<br /><br />If the PRC is successful in placing men in orbit, it will be only the third nation, after Russia and the United States, to have done this.<br /><br />The PRC's Communications Satellite Programs<br /><br />Since the beginning of its domestic communications satellite programs, the PRC has suffered a string of problems with the performance of its communications satellites, as well as the rockets designed to place those satellites into orbit.<br /><br />During the mid-to-late 1980s, the PRC was able to place four of its communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. Today, however, the PRC has only one active domestically-manufactured telecommunications satellite on orbit. This satellite has reportedly suffered on-orbit problems that may have reduced its capabilities.71<br /><br />The PRC's inability to place reliable communications satellites (COMSATs) into orbit has created serious gaps in the PRC's satellite communications capabilities, both for civilian and military purposes. The PRC has addressed the greatest part of its satellite communications requirement by leasing communications channels on Western-manufactured communications satellites.<br /><br />The PRC first began developing its own communications satellites in the early 1970s, based on Western technology. All of these satellites were designed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) for military purposes. They have all been operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), which is subordinate to COSTIND.72<br /><br />The PRC's inability to design and produce advanced communications satellites has also led it to seek Western components and technology for its domestic communications satellite industry. The Select Committee judges that the use of Western technology cut in half the time required for the PRC to progress from an experimental communications satellite to the advanced DFH-3 satellites, which were first launched in 1994.<br /><br />The following table shows a chronology of the PRC's history of launching PRC communications satellites.<br /><br /><br /><br />History of the PRC's Domestic<br /><br />Communications Satellite Launches<br /><br />PRC SatelliteDate PRC RocketResult<br /><br />DFH-2Jan. 29, 1984 Long March 3Rocket Failure<br /><br />DFH-2Apr. 8, 1984 Long March 3Success<br /><br />DFH-2Feb. 1, 1986 Long March 3Success<br /><br />DFH-2AMar. 7, 1988 Long March 3Success<br /><br />DFH-2ADec. 22, 1988 Long March 3Success<br /><br />DFH-2AFeb. 4, 1990 Long March 3Success<br /><br />DFH-2ADec. 28, 1991 Long March 3Rocket Failure<br /><br />DFH-3Nov. 29, 1994 Long March 3A Satellite Failure<br /><br />DFH-3May 11, 1997 Long March 3ASatellite Problem<br /><br />The PRC's first generation communications satellite was the Dong Fang Hong-2 ("East is Red"). These satellites were designed to provide the PRC with test experience. The satellite design was similar to that used on the Hughes HS376 satellites, employing a spin-stabilized body and a de-spun horn antenna.<br /><br />The first attempt to launch a DFH-2 satellite, in January 1984, was not successful due to the failure of the Long March 3 rocket that was to carry it into orbit. The second launch attempt on April 8, 1984 successfully placed a communications satellite into orbit. A third DFH-2 satellite was launched on February 1, 1986. This satellite provided communications services until it reached the end of its service life.<br /><br />In 1988, the PRC launched an improved version of this satellite, known as the DFH-2A. The new satellite used the same spin-stabilized body, this time equipped with an improved antenna array that increased the number of communications channels available.<br /><br />These satellites were able to handle five television channels and 3,000 phone calls simultaneously. The first three of these satellites were named "Chinasats" by the PRC, and were successfully launched twice in 1988 and once in 1990. A fourth DFH-2A satellite launch in 1990 was unsuccessful, when the failure of the rocket's third-stage engine left the satellite stranded in an incorrect orbit.<br /><br />The PRC's third generation communications satellites, known as the DFH-3, are the PRC's most modern communication satellites. The DFH-3 is useful for military communications. These satellites have three-axis stabilized bodies, 24 C-band transponders and are designed to have an 8-year on-orbit life. Due to the increased weight of these satellites as compared to the DFH-2A, the DFH-3 satellites are launched on the more capable Long March 3A rocket.<br /><br />The first launch of the DFH-3 satellite on November 29, 1994 was unsuccessful when the satellite failed to attain the proper orbit, rendering it useless for its intended communications function.<br /><br />The PRC's second attempt to launch a DFH-3 satellite on May 11, 1997 successfully placed the satellite into a geosynchronous orbit at 125 degrees east longitude.73 The PRC, however, reportedly may have suffered problems with the satellite.74<br /><br />The PRC's Use of Foreign Components on Communications Satellites<br /><br />The PRC's limited communications satellite construction capabilities led it from the first to seek Western manufacturers for reliable components. Even the PRC's most modern communications satellite, the DFH-3, which was first successfully launched in 1997, contains a large number of Western components:<br /><br /> * The DFH-3 is reported to use a control processor built by Matra-Marconi75<br /> * Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm (MBB) provided the DFH-3 solar panel substrates to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), and CAST-produced solar cells were mounted on them. The solar panel assemblies were then returned to MBB for assembly into deployable solar arrays76<br /> * Daimler Chrysler Aerospace Group provided the DFH-3's antenna assembly, consisting of a deployable dual gridded reflector, feed and interconnecting structure77<br /> * Officine Galileo provided the Infrared Earth sensor to determine pitch/roll in geosynchronous orbit78<br /> * The DFH-3's payload test equipment, according to 1993 reports, consisted of five racks and consoles with 80% U.S. Hewlett Packard and German equipment<br /> * The equipment racks for the test equipment were provided by Germany's Ant Corporation79possible<br /><br />PRC Assistance to North Korea<br /><br />The PRC, through the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), provides complete satellites and technology to other nations. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a three stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. The North Koreans claim to have launched their first satellite, known as Kwangmyongsong No. 1 (Bright Star 1), on this Taepo Dong-1 missile. Comparing the picture of the Kwangmyongsong No. 1 satellite released by North Korea with that of the PRC's Dong Fang Hong 1 satellite. The two bear a striking resemblance.<br /><br />Several U.S. companies have also marketed their communications satellite technologies to the PRC. Loral, for example, offered the PRC a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) capability in 1996 using either a Loral-produced satellite bus or the DFH-3 series satellite bus.80 A 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between Loral and China Aerospace Corporation offered the PRC direct broadcast satellites, regional mobile satellite services systems, and the joint development of an advanced high capacity communications satellite. Under this agreement, Loral would provide design and technical support, while the final integration of the satellite was to have occurred in Germany or the PRC.81<br /><br />Hughes and Loral competed for the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite. APMT is a Singapore-based, PRC controlled company. At least 51% of APMT is owned by PRC Government agencies, including China Aerospace Corporation, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, and Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.82 See the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite section of this chapter, below.<br /><br />The PRC's Reliance on Commercial Communications Satellites<br /><br />Due to the failures of the PRC's rockets, and of its satellites, the PRC has become dependent on Western-manufactured communications satellites.<br /><br />The PRC's dependency began as the early DFH-2A satellites reached the end of their on-orbit lives, while the fourth DFH-2A satellite failed to reach orbit. This created a gap in the PRC's satellite communications capabilities. As a result, the PRC was forced to look to foreign communications satellite manufacturers for supplemental capacity.<br /><br />In December 1992, the PRC purchased Spacenet 1 on-orbit from GTE to replace its aging DFH-2A/1 and DFH-2A/2 satellites. The PRC renamed it "ChinaSat-5." This satellite was to provide supplemental capabilities until the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite was launched in 1994. The failure of the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite to reach orbit, and the imminent expiration of the useful life of ChinaSat-5, forced the PRC to purchase a Hughes HS-376 satellite to provide additional communications channels. But this satellite launch in August 1996, aboard a Long March 3 rocket, was also a failure. The third stage left the satellite stranded in an unusable orbit.83 The second DFH-3 satellite that the PRC launched in May 1997 reportedly has now developed on-orbit problems.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-17147037946358089702009-12-07T20:52:00.000-08:002009-12-07T20:53:34.060-08:00PRC Missile and Space Forces 5Two years after the first successful launch of the Long March 2E, the PRC successfully launched the Long March 3A, a cheaper, higher performance rocket that would better meet both its military and commercial geosynchronous launch requirements. The Long March 3A was the first of a family of Long March 3A, 3B and 3C rockets.<br /><br />The Long March 3A family of rockets uses a strengthened Long March 3 first stage. In the case of the Long March 3B and 3C, this permits the mounting of additional strap-on boosters. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets also use a new, lighter weight, and cheaper inertial measurement unit. Furthermore, these rockets employ large "hammerhead" fairings to protect their satellite payloads. The launch history of the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets is listed below. The failure analysis of the Long March 3B launch carrying the Intelsat 708 satellite manufactured by Loral, is discussed in the chapter of this Report entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral.<br /><br /><br /><br />Comparison of Two Different Inertial Measurement Units<br /><br />Used in Guidance System of Long March Rockets59<br /><br />Features of the Inertial Measurement Unit Used in the Guidance System of:<br /><br />LM 2C/2E/3LM 3A/3B/3C<br /><br />Number of Gimbals34<br /><br />Number of Gyroscopes32<br /><br />Number of Accelerometers33<br /><br />Number of Torque Motors for Each Gimbal21<br /><br />Dimensions (mm)500 x 600 x 800300 x 300 x 400<br /><br />Mass (kg)14048<br /><br />Maiden Flight1974 on Long March 2C1994 on Long March 3A<br /><br />Manufactured by CALT (LM 2C/2E) CALT CAST (LM 3)<br />The PRC's Commercial Space Launch Program<br /><br />The PRC's entry into the commercial space launch market coincided with a dark period for the U.S. launch industry that included the 1985 and 1986 launch failures of several Delta and Titan expendable rockets, and the 1987 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. At the time of the Challenger accident, the U.S. space launch industry was in the midst of a plan to phase out all expendable rockets in favor of the Space Shuttle, which was projected to be more economical.60 But that plan was cancelled with the<br /><br />Challenger explosion. Instead, the United States imposed a hiatus in shuttle launches until September 1988, and a permanent decision that the Space Shuttle would not be used to launch commercial payloads.61<br /><br />The lack of available U.S. commercial space launch capacity forced satellite manufacturers to seek alternative launch providers. The Soviet Union had the capacity to launch commercial satellites, but U.S. policy would not support the launching of U.S.-manufactured satellites on Soviet rockets. The European consortium of Arianespace had a rocket, but no extra capacity. This left the PRC as the only alternative for launching geosynchronous communications satellites.<br /><br />In 1987, the United States viewed the PRC as a counterbalance to Soviet military power in Asia. Accordingly, the "Green Line" policy had been adopted to permit some technology transfers to the PRC, while limiting transfers of technologies that could improve the PLA's ballistic missile and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.62 In 1988, President Reagan agreed to allow the PRC to launch U.S.-manufactured satellites on the condition that the PRC sign three bilateral agreements with the U.S. on competitive pricing, liability, and the protection of U.S. technology. 63<br /><br />The PRC's first success in the commercial market occurred in 1987. In that year, Matra of France contracted with the PRC to place a scientific payload in orbit, using a Long March 2C rocket. These French scientific experiments were launched on August 5, 1987 aboard a PLA military photo-reconnaissance satellite. The recoverable capsules of the PLA's reconnaissance satellites made them an ideal platform for microgravity experiments.64<br /><br />The PRC's first commercial launch of a U.S.-manufactured communications satellite occurred on April 7, 1990. The Asiasat?a Hughes HS 376 model satellite? was launched into orbit aboard a Long March 3 rocket.65<br /><br />From that point, in addition to their military launch schedule, the PRC has attempted 28 launches of Western-manufactured satellites.66 Of these satellites, 27 were U.S-manufactured: only the French-manufactured Sinosat, launched successfully on July 18, 1998, was produced by a non-U.S. manufacturer. 67 Twenty-three of the PRC's attempts to launch U.S. satellites were successful. Four have ended in failure.68 These four failures are detailed below.<br /><br />PRC Commercial Launch Failures<br /><br />SatelliteLaunch DateRocketFailure Mode<br /><br />Optus B2Dec. 21, 1992Long March 2EFairing collapse<br /><br />Apstar-2Jan. 25, 1995Long March 2EFairing collapse<br /><br />Intelsat 708Feb. 15, 1996Long March 3BInertial measurement<br /><br />unit malfunction<br /><br />Chinasat 7Aug. 18, 1996Long March 3Third stage malfunctionanjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-48770069644518824692009-12-07T20:51:00.000-08:002009-12-07T20:52:15.647-08:00PRC Missile and Space Forces 4The Select Committee's classified Final Report contains additional information on PRC proliferation that the Clinton administration has determined cannot be made public.<br /><br />The PRC's Military and Civil Space Program<br /><br />The PRC's military and civilian space launch program began in the 1950s, concurrent with its development of long-range ballistic missiles. At that time, a small research effort was begun at the Chinese Academy of Sciences to develop indigenous space launch and satellite production capabilities.<br /><br />The PRC's early efforts were aided by technology and knowledge transferred from the Soviet Union.<br /><br />From that beginning, the PRC has developed a comprehensive space program that includes a family of rockets, numerous satellites, and a telemetry, tracking, and control network. These efforts have paid off, as the PRC is now a major space power. It offers international launch services and is working on placing men in space.<br /><br />The PRC's first satellite launch occurred on April 24, 1970, using a CSS-3 intercontinental ballistic missile. The ICBM was modified by adding a third stage, which was used to place the satellite into orbit. This new rocket was named the Long March 1.<br /><br />The 380-pound satellite it carried was named Dong Fang Hong-1 (East Is Red 1). The satellite orbited for approximately 26 days, transmitting to Earth the song "The East is Red." 45<br /><br />After the PRC's second successful launch of a satellite on March 3, 1971, again using the modified CSS-3 ICBM, the PRC set out to launch heavier payloads into orbit. For this purpose, the PRC turned to the longer-range, more powerful CSS-4 ICBM. This rocket was named the Long March 2.<br /><br />The first three launches of the Long March 2 rocket, from 1973 through 1974, were failures. Finally, on July 26, 1975, the PRC successfully launched the Long March 2C and placed its third satellite into orbit.<br /><br />During the balance of the 1970s, the PRC launched nearly a dozen satellites on the Long March 2, many of which undoubtedly were for military purposes. Nearly half of these launches were unsuccessful, however, resulting in the destruction of many payloads.<br /><br />The Long March 2 and its derivatives are the main rockets used by the PRC today, in both its military and civilian space programs. Because the Long March 2 was derived directly from the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile, the two share much in common. The Long March 2 rocket and the CSS-4 ICBM use the same airframe structure, the same cluster of four YF-20 engines (known as the YF-21) in the first stage, and the same single YF-22 engine combined with the YF-23 vernier engines that form the YF-24 in the second stage.46 However, unlike the CSS-4, the Long March 2 was modified to deliver payloads to orbit rather than a nuclear weapon to a target.<br /><br />In order to meet space launch requirements for heavier payloads and higher orbits, the PRC improved the performance of the Long March rocket. Among other changes, the PRC increased the amount of propellant the rocket could carry, improved the performance of the first and second stage engines, added new cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage engines, and attached additional boosters that were strapped on to the basic rocket. These changes led to the development of three new modifications to the Long March rocket.<br /><br />The Long March 3 was developed in 1977 to meet the requirements for launching communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. It was the PRC's first rocket built for this purpose.47 The Long March 3 uses the same first and second stages as the Long March 2C, except that aerodynamic fins are added to the base of the first stage.48 It also uses the same YF-21 and YF-24 engines.49 The main change from the Long March 2C is the addition of a restartable, cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage.50 This stage is designed to boost the payload into a geostationary transfer orbit.<br /><br />The Long March 4 was developed by the PRC in the late 1970s to launch meteorological satellites for military and civilian purposes into sun synchronous orbits. The new rocket used improved first and second stage engines, and a first stage that was 13 feet longer than the standard Long March 2 first stage.51<br /><br />When the PRC announced in 1986 that is was entering the commercial satellite launch market, it decided to develop a rocket that could provide heavy-lift capabilities to low earth orbit. However, the majority of commercial payloads at the time were for geosynchronous satellites.52 Moreover, the PRC's operational rockets at the time were limited in their performance compared to Western rockets.<br /><br />The Long March 2C could only place a 1,350-pound payload into low earth orbit. The Long March 3 was only capable of placing an 870-pound payload into geostationary transfer orbit.53 In comparison, the U.S. Delta 3925 rocket could place 2,140 pounds into low earth orbit, and 795 pounds into geosynchronous orbit. The U.S. space shuttle could transport 15,400 pounds into low earth orbit.54 To place heavy payloads into geosynchronous orbit requires either a third stage or a perigee kick motor, which the Long March still lacked.<br /><br />To meet this requirement, the PRC developed the Long March 2E rocket which was first launched successfully in 1992. The Long March 2E uses a stretched version of the Long March 2C first and second stages, increasing the amount of propellant carried, which increases the burn-time of the engines. 55 The Long March 2E also uses improved versions of the YF-20 engines used on the Long March 2C. Known as the YF-20B, these engines offer improved thrust.56 The Long March 2E also uses four strap-on liquid-propellant boosters. These boosters are attached to the rocket's first stage. Each booster is fitted with a YF-20B engine.<br /><br />To permit the Long March 2E to place a satellite into geosynchronous orbit, the PRC mated the satellite payload with a perigee kick motor, which acted as a third stage. Because there was no indigenous PRC kick motor, however, foreign launch customers had to use Western-manufactured kick motors. This required a separate export license. The PRC later developed its own family of kick motors, allowing customers to choose between Western- or PRC-manufactured versions.<br /><br />Finally, the Long March 2E employs an enlarged "hammerhead" fairing to protect the satellite payloads, which exceed the upper stage's diameter. The Long March 2E can place 5,450 pounds into low earth orbit and 2,140 pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit.57<br /><br />The Long March 2E has suffered a series of in-flight failures (see table below). The December 1992 and January 1995 failures resulted in the destruction of two Hughes-manufactured satellites. The results of the failure analyses conducted by Hughes as a result of these launch failures are discussed in the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes.<br /><br /> Launch History of the PRC's Long March 2E58<br /><br />Launch Date Satellite Manufacturer Owner Results<br /><br />Jul. 16, 1990 Dummy AUSSAT Satellite and Badr-1 PRC Dummy AUSSAT Satellite ? PRC Badr-1 ? Pakistan<br /> <br />Perigee kick motor failed in the Dummy AUSSAT Satellite Badr-1 achieved orbit<br />Aug. 31, 1992 Optus-B1 Hughes Optus (Australia) Success<br />Dec. 21, 1992 Optus-B2 Hughes Optus (Australia) Failure - fairing collapse<br />Aug. 24, 1994 Optus-B3 Hughes Optus (Australia) Success<br />Jan. 25, 1995 Apstar-2 Hughes Asia-Pacific Telecom(APT) Failure- fairing collapse<br />Nov. 28, 1995 Asiasat-2 Lockheed-Martin Asiasat (Hong Kong) Success<br />Dec. 28, 1995 Echostar-1 Lockheed-Martin Echostar Inc. (U.S.) Successanjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-47295260961297330172009-11-24T21:23:00.000-08:002009-11-24T21:24:04.666-08:00PRC Missile and Space ForcesPRC Missile and Space Forces<br />page 3<br /><br />The deployment of the PRC's new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine could also lead to a shift in PRC doctrine, as these submarines will likely be deployed with their nuclear warheads already mated to the missiles. The long range of the JL-2 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile will allow the PRC to conduct patrols close to its base, and under the protective cover of the PLA Navy and Air Force. This would provide the PLA submarine fleet with a more survivable nuclear force.<br /><br />The fact that these new nuclear weapons will be far more survivable than the PRC's current silo-based forces could signal a major shift in the PRC's current nuclear strategy and doctrine.<br /><br />The PRC might allow the first use of nuclear weapons on its own territory, which the PRC views as including Taiwan.<br /><br />The PRC has tested an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb) that minimizes blast effects, while maximizing human casualties. The PRC probably originally developed the neutron bomb for use on its own territory against invading Soviet forces. Similarly, the neutron bomb would be useful in a conflict with Taiwan, since the PRC undoubtedly would intend to occupy the territory it was attacking. The PRC may have plans to deploy neutron bombs.<br /><br />These enhancements to the PRC's nuclear forces, together with its expanding economic capabilities, present the PRC with additional options for changes in its strategic doctrine. The PRC's growing economy, for instance, could allow it to produce and deploy more missiles than earlier planned. Additionally, the Select Committee judges that if the PRC made a decision to do so, it could build multiple warheads for its ballistic missiles.<br /><br />Moreover, the PRC's concerns about the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons could lead the PRC to develop an early warning system in order to support a launch-on-warning posture.<br /><br />The secretive nature of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission, as well as the PLA's other decision-making bodies, means that changes in PRC nuclear force doctrine may not be apparent.<br /><br />Clearly, the PRC views its conventional ballistic missile forces as potential weapons for use during regional conflicts. This strategy was implied by the PRC in the course of its CSS-6 short-range ballistic missile exercises during the March 1996 presidential elections in Taiwan. During the exercise, the PRC launched four CSS-6 ballistic missiles towards points north and south of Taiwan's major ports.<br /><br />The PRC's Opposition to U.S. Missile Defenses<br /><br />Statements by PRC Government officials make it clear that the PRC is opposed to the development of either theater or national missile defense systems that could counter Beijing's nuclear forces.<br /><br />If the PRC were intent upon overwhelming these defenses, there are several options it could take in an attempt to preserve the offensive capability of its missile forces.<br /><br />One of the PRC's responses could be to expand the size of its ballistic missile force, to increase the chances that some of its nuclear weapons overcome a nation's defenses. This would be an expensive option requiring the PRC to invest in the production of significant additional missiles and infrastructure.<br /><br />A cheaper response to U.S. missile defenses for the PRC could be the development of penetration aids (PENAIDS) for its ballistic missiles. These PENAIDS could include:<br /><br /> * Decoys that create multiple radar targets, which must be tracked until discrimination of the actual nuclear warhead can be accomplished. Simple decoys are effective during exoatmospheric flight of the nuclear warhead, but burn up during reentry into the atmosphere.<br /> * Chaff consisting of aluminum strips that are designed to reflect radar beams, thereby confusing a radar as to the location of the PLA warhead.<br /> * Jammers used to jam the radar system during the flight of the PLA nuclear warhead.<br /> * Radar absorbing materials, which can also be used to reduce the radar cross section of the PLA nuclear warhead.<br /> * The PLA nuclear warhead itself could be reoriented to present the lowest radar cross section.31<br /><br />The PRC is expected to pursue one or more PENAIDs in connection with its new nuclear missiles.<br /><br />Given the PRC's aggressive opposition to missile defenses, the Select Committee judges that the PRC is collecting information about U.S. missile defense systems in order to help its development of PENAIDS.<br /><br />Another option for countering U.S. missile defenses would be the development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV). The maneuvering capability could be used to complicate hit-to-kill or conventional warhead ballistic missile defense systems.<br /><br />The PRC could also develop multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) platforms. This would effectively increase the size of the PLA's nuclear force without the full expense required to deploy additional missiles. The PRC's theft from the United States of design information for the W-88 miniaturized nuclear warhead makes it possible that existing or future PLA missiles, which might have been too small in diameter to carry multiple warheads, could now do so.<br /><br />Furthermore, existing PLA missiles, including the CSS-4 Mod 2, could be capable of carrying the new, smaller warheads in a MIRV or MRV configuration. Within a short period of time after a decision to proceed, the PRC has the ability to deploy missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs or MRVs). The PRC has demonstrated similar concepts and technologies in the Smart Dispenser that it developed to place multiple Iridium satellites into orbit. The Select Committee did not, however, review sufficient evidence to permit a judgment whether the PRC will in the future decide to deploy a MIRV or MRV system.<br /><br />The Iridium Smart Dispenser Controversy<br /><br />In May 1998, allegations were made that Motorola had provided the PRC with technology that would allow it to build a multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missile-dispensing platform. The allegations were that the Smart Dispenser used by the PRC to place two Iridium communications satellites into orbit would provide the PRC with technology that would be directly applicable to MIRV dispensing.32<br /><br />The Smart Dispenser is an on-orbit maneuvering stage with its own independent guidance system. The Select Committee has determined that Motorola did not provide the PRC with information on how to design the Smart Dispenser; rather, the PRC built the Smart Dispenser indigenously to Motorola's specifications. However, the Select Committee's independent technical expert noted that the PRC has demonstrated all of the techniques that are required for developing a MIRV bus, and that the PRC could develop a MIRV dispensing platform within a short period of time after making a decision to proceed.<br /><br />The PRC's Acquisition of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology<br /><br />The PRC constantly searches for technology for its ballistic missile programs. Any technology or know-how that the PRC can acquire from foreign sources will save the PRC time and money in the development of its future weapons systems.<br /><br />The prospect of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons cooperation between Russia and the PRC would be especially troubling because of the advanced technical capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear forces. Thus far, Russia has been the only nation to deploy a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile force. These missiles include the road-mobile solid-propellant SS-25 ICBM and the rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM. Any cooperation in the area of solid-propellant mobile missiles would clearly benefit the PRC's new road-mobile ICBM programs.<br /><br />Additionally, the Russians have advanced guidance and control capabilities. Assistance in the guidance and control field could help the PRC improve the accuracy of its current and future missile forces.<br /><br />Furthermore, the Russians have the ability to mass-produce large, solid-propellant missiles. The manufacturing capabilities for these missiles could help the PRC produce large numbers of its next generation ICBMs. Russia's use of advanced solid-propellant materials could benefit the PRC's ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile programs, allowing them to build lightweight, longer-range ballistic missiles.<br /><br />The Russian designer of the SS-X-27 has claimed that the missile's advanced penetration capabilities will allow it to defeat any nation's ballistic missile defenses.33 While the validity of such a statement cannot be judged against a U.S. national missile defense system that is not yet deployed, or even finally designed, Russia's provision of these presumably advanced penetration technologies to the PRC could assist PRC efforts to counter a U.S. national missile defense system.<br /><br />While the Select Committee has no evidence that the Russians or any other nation of the former Soviet Union have provided the PRC with complete ballistic missiles or missile subsystems, there have been reported instances of the PRC approaching Russia and Ukraine about acquiring SS-18 and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Reportedly, the PRC was turned down.34<br /><br />The PRC's Indigenous Ballistic Missile Design Capabilities<br /><br />The PRC is judged to have a fairly sophisticated capability to design ballistic missiles and rockets. This assessment is based on the fact that the PRC is able to develop missiles and rockets that are capable of delivering large payloads to their intended destination with reasonable accuracy and reliability. However, these design capabilities are not in all cases as sophisticated as those of Western nations.<br /><br />The Select Committee's independent technical expert noted that while PRC scientists and engineers may have a textbook understanding of problems, there is a difference between a textbook understanding and the application of this knowledge to specific problems. Interactions with U.S. and foreign scientists and engineers, therefor, could assist the PRC engineers and scientists in overcoming these limitations.<br /><br />PRC Missile Proliferation<br /><br />The PRC is one of the world's leading proliferators of complete ballistic missile systems, as well as missile components.<br /><br />Despite the fact that, in 1991, the PRC agreed to adhere to the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines that call for restraint on the sale of missiles capable of delivering a 225-pound payload to 185 miles, the PRC has sold complete ballistic missile systems or missile components to a number of countries, including but not limited to Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.35<br /><br />In 1993, the MTCR States issued new expanded guidelines that called for a "strong presumption to deny" both sales of complete missile systems and sales of components that could be used in ballistic missile systems. Furthermore, the new guidelines call for restrictions on transfers of missiles that can deliver a weapons of mass destruction payload to 185 miles.36 However, the PRC has accepted neither these revised guidelines, nor the annex on the transfer of components and other commodities such as propellants and test equipment.37<br /><br />Notwithstanding the PRC's purported adherence to the MTCR Category I restrictions, the PRC has provided, or is providing, assistance to the missile and space programs of Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. The PRC also continues to offer Category II missile components for sale to international customers. In addition, the PRC has provided assistance to the nuclear programs of Iran and Pakistan.<br /><br />Iran<br /><br />During the 1990s, the PRC sold Iran significant numbers of 90-mile range CSS-8 ballistic missiles, along with associated support equipment. In addition, PRC companies provided Iran with ballistic missile production technology. The PRC also reportedly sold Iran guidance components,38 and more recently telemetry equipment, for ballistic missiles.39 The PRC reportedly is currently providing Iran with solid-propellant missile technology.40 During the 1980s and 1990s, the PRC has transferred C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.41 The PRC has also provided assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons programs.42<br /><br />Pakistan<br /><br />The PRC has provided Pakistan with a wide range of weapons assistance. The PRC has reportedly supplied Pakistan with CSS-X-7 (or M-11) ballistic missiles, mobile missile launchers, and the facilities necessary to produce M-11 missiles. The PRC has also provided Pakistan with assistance on uranium enrichment, ring magnets, and other technologies useful for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.43<br /><br />Saudi Arabia<br /><br />The PRC provided complete CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1987. The conventionally armed missile has a range of 1,500 to 1,800 miles.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-74210519143017788002009-11-24T21:19:00.000-08:002009-11-24T21:20:21.467-08:00PRC Missile and Space Forces 2PRC Missile and Space Forces<br />page 2<br /><br />The PRC first attempted a flight test of the CSS-4 in the 1970s. Following several flight test failures, the PRC continued its development of the CSS-4 through its development of the Long March 2 rocket. Of the next nine Long March 2 launches from 1973 through 1978, five were successful.<br /><br />The CSS-4 uses nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as the oxidizer and a lightweight, aluminum-copper alloy airframe. It is equipped with four YF-20 engines in its first stage, and a single YF-20 engine in its second stage. Unlike previous PRC missiles that use jet vanes in the exhaust for steering control, the CSS-4 uses steerable exhaust nozzles for control. It has been reported to the Select Committee that the CSS-4 uses a gimbaled guidance system for control.22<br /><br />Starting in 1981, the PRC began deploying CSS-4 missiles in silos. Only two operational missiles were deployed in the 1980s, on what the PRC called "trial operational deployments."<br /><br />During the 1990s, the PRC has deployed a total of approximately 20 CSS-4 ICBMs in silos, most of which are targeted on the United States. The Select Committee judges that despite the 1998 announcement that the PRC and the U.S. would no longer target each other with nuclear weapons, the PRC's missiles remain targeted at the United States.<br /><br />Today, the CSS-4 has a range in excess of 7,400 miles. The PRC has begun deploying an improved version of the CSS-4, known as the CSS-4 Mod 2.23 The Mod 2 has improved range capabilities over the CSS-4. The additional range may provide the PRC with greater confidence that the missile will reach long distance targets such as Washington, D.C., although this and other U.S. cities are already within the range of the CSS-4 (see table on previous page).<br /><br />This improved range may also translate into an improved throw-weight that could allow the PRC to deploy multiple warheads on the CSS-4 Mod 2, rather than the single warheads that are currently carried on the CSS-4.<br /><br />The PLA's Future "East Wind" Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles<br /><br />Missiles in silos are vulnerable to attack because their precise location can be known in advance. Concerns about the survivability of its silo-based CSS-4 ballistic missile forces have led the PLA to begin a modernization program that includes the development of road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missiles.<br /><br />The use of a solid-propellant missile in place of the liquid-fueled CSS-4 will permit the PRC to launch its missiles with shorter notice. That is because the liquid fuel for the current CSS-4 must be stored separately from the missile until launch. Then, prior to launch, the CSS-4 missile must be fueled.<br /><br />Substitution of a mobile missile for the silo-based CSS-4 will make it possible to hide the missile's location, thus protecting it from attack.<br /><br />The PLA is currently developing two road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile systems. It also has under development a submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Select Committee judges that within 15 years, this modernization program could result in the deployment of a PLA intercontinental ballistic missile force consisting of up to 100 ICBMs.<br /><br />The PRC's planned new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its planned new submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, require smaller warheads than the large, heavy, 1950s-era warheads developed for the PRC's current silo-based missiles. Because U.S. thermonuclear warheads are significantly smaller, they are capable of use on mobile missiles and submarine-launched missiles. The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen U.S. thermonuclear design information on these new ICBMs.<br /><br />If any of the PRC's planned missiles were to carry multiple warheads, or if the CSS-4 were modified to carry multiple warheads, then a fairing (that is, a covering for the missiles in the nosecone) could be required. See the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a discussion of the PRC's acquisition of fairing technology from the United States.<br /><br />The aggressive development of a MIRV system by the PRC could permit the deployment of upwards of 1,000 thermonuclear warheads on ICBMs by 2015. See the chapter entitled PRC Theft of Nuclear Warhead Design Information for information on the PRC's development of nuclear warheads that may exploit elements of U.S. thermonuclear weapons design information.<br /><br />The first of the three new intercontinental ballistic missiles that are being developed by the PRC is the DF-31 (or East Wind 31). It is estimated that the DF-31 will be a three-stage, mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile. It will be deployed on a mobile erector-launcher.<br /><br />The DF-31's 5,000-mile range will allow it to hit all of Hawaii and Alaska and parts of the state of Washington, but not other parts of the continental United States.24 Due to its limited intercontinental range, the DF-31 is most likely intended as the replacement for the PRC's aging CSS-3 force, rather than for the longer range CSS-4 ICBM.<br /><br />The DF-31 missile may be tested this year. Given a successful flight program, the DF-31 could be ready for deployment as early as 2002.<br /><br />The collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the PRC's strategic outlook, prompting the development of extended range missiles. To this end, the PRC is planning an even longer-range, mobile ICBM to add to its already deployed CSS-4 missiles. This new missile is believed to have a range of more than 7,500 miles, allowing the PRC to target almost all of the United States. These missiles can be deployed anywhere within the PRC, making them significantly more survivable.<br /><br />The JL-2 (Julang 2, or Great Wave 2) is a submarine-launched version of the DF-31. It is believed to have an even longer range, and will be carried on the PLA Navy's Type 094-class submarine. Sixteen JL-2 missiles will be carried on each submarine.25<br /><br />The JL-2's 7,500 mile range will allow it to be launched from the PRC's territorial waters and to strike targets throughout the United States.26<br /><br />This range would allow a significant change in the operation and tactics of the PRC's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Instead of venturing into the open ocean to attack the United States, the Type 094-class submarines could remain near PRC waters, protected by the PLA Navy and Air Force.<br /><br />Additionally, if the JL-2 were to employ a shroud to protect its warhead as do the majority of submarine-launched ballistic missiles today, this would be the first use of a shroud or fairing on a PRC missile.<br /><br />The PRC's Medium- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles<br /><br />The PRC is also deploying, or developing for future deployment, a series of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, including both liquid- and solid-propellant technologies. Some are armed with conventional warheads and others with nuclear warheads. These missiles present a threat to U.S. forces deployed in the region, and to U.S. allies and friends in the region.<br /><br />The PRC's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles include the CSS-6 short-range ballistic missile, the CSS-X-7 short-range ballistic missile, and the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile. The PRC is also developing new versions of its short-range ballistic missiles, and may produce these systems in larger quantities than earlier-generation PRC ballistic missiles.<br /><br />The PLA's CSS-6 (DF-15 or East Wind 15; also known as the M-9) is an advanced, solid-propellant, short-range ballistic missile that uses 1990s technology. It has a range of 375 miles. It is a road-mobile missile, launched from a transporter-erector-launcher. The CSS-6 may be fitted with nuclear warheads or with an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb).<br /><br />According to published reports, the majority of the PRC's CSS-6 missiles are deployed adjacent to Taiwan.<br /><br />The PRC may attempt various means to improve the CSS-6's accuracy. The PRC claims to be planning to use the Global Positioning System (GPS) on its "M" missiles, which likely include the CSS-6, CSS-X-7, and other short-range ballistic missiles.<br /><br />On two recent occasions, the PRC has launched a number of CSS-6 missiles towards Taiwan as a means of political intimidation. In July 1995, the PRC fired CSS-6 missiles to a location north of Taiwan in an attempt to influence Taiwan's parliamentary elections. In March 1996, the PRC again launched CSS-6 missiles to areas north and south of Taiwan's two major ports in an effort to influence its presidential elections.<br /><br />The PRC is also developing the CSS-X-7 (DF-11 or East Wind 11; also known as the M-11) short-range ballistic missile. The CSS-X-7 is a mobile, 185-mile range solid-propellant ballistic missile that is launched from a transporter-erector-launcher. This missile has been exported to Pakistan. The main advantage of the CSS-X-7 over the CSS-6 is its ability to carry a larger payload.<br /><br />The CSS-5 (DF-21, or East Wind 21) medium range ballistic missile is now deployed by the PRC. The CSS-5 is a road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile with a range of 1,100 miles. The CSS-5 is assessed to carry a nuclear warhead payload. An improved version, known as the CSS-5 Mod 2, is under development in the PRC. The range of these missiles, if fitted with a conventional warhead, would be sufficient to hit targets in Japan.<br /><br />The CSS-5 has also been developed in a submarine-launched ballistic missile version. The Western designation of this missile is CSS-NX-3; its PLA designation is JL-1 (Julang 1, or Great Wave 1). This missile is assessed to have a range of 1,200 miles. Missiles of this type will be launched from the PLA Navy Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.<br /><br />While the Xia submarines were completed in 1981, the PRC has yet to deploy the CSS-NX-3 missile.27 Due to the missile's 1,000 mile range, the CSS-NX-3 is best suited for theater targets, although it could threaten the U.S. if the PRC chose to deploy it in open-ocean operations.<br /><br />The PRC has also developed the CSS-8 (8610) short-range ballistic missile. The CSS-8 is derived from the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile. The PRC has sold the missile to Iran.<br /><br />Stolen U.S. Technology Used on PRC Ballistic Missiles<br /><br />The PRC has stolen U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct applicability to the PLA's ballistic missiles and rockets. The stolen guidance technology is used on a variety of U.S. missiles and military aircraft:<br /><br /> * The 90-mile range U.S. Army Tactical Missile System<br /> * The U.S. Navy's Stand-off Land Attack Missile-Extended Range (SLAM-ER)<br /> * The U.S. Navy F-14 fighter jet<br /> * The U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter jet<br /> * The U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter jet<br /> * The U.S. Air Force F-117 fighter jet<br /><br />The PRC's Strategic Forces Doctrine<br /><br />Following the detonation of its first nuclear weapon in 1964, the PRC publicly declared that it would never use nuclear weapons first against the homeland of a nuclear power or a non-nuclear nation. The PRC pointedly does not include Taiwan in this formulation. The PRC's announced strategic doctrine is based on the concept of "limited deterrence," which is defined as the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy in a retaliatory strike.28<br /><br />The PRC's currently deployed ICBMs are so-called "city busters": that is, they are useful for targeting entire cities or large military bases, rather than smaller, hardened targets such as U.S. ICBM silos. The intercontinental-range CSS-4s are deployed in their silos without warheads and without propellants during day-to-day operations.29<br /><br />Strategic doctrine, however, can change, and the PRC's movement towards a nuclear missile force of several kinds of mobile, long-range ballistic missiles will allow it to include a range of options in its nuclear force doctrine. The acknowledged high accuracy of U.S. ballistic missiles, as well as the large number of increasingly accurate Russian missiles, may have left the PRC unsatisfied with the vulnerability of its silo-based forces. The PRC's new mobile missiles will be difficult to locate once they have been dispersed from their garrisons, giving them far better protection from attack. These new, mobile, long-range missiles can also be launched on much shorter notice than the PRC's current force, due to their planned use of solid propellants.<br /><br />Because they will be much more difficult to locate and destroy than the PRC's current silo-based ICBM force, these new mobile ICBMs will present a more credible threat against the U. S. in the event a crisis develops over a regional conflict in East Asia.<br /><br />According to the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States:<br /><br />In a crisis in which the U. S. confronts China's conventional and nuclear forces at the regional level, China's modernized strategic nuclear ballistic missile force would pose a credible threat against the United States.<br /><br />Deterring the U. S. can be important to China's ability to use force to achieve its goal of being the preeminent power in East Asia.<br /><br />China demonstrated a willingness to use ballistic missiles in the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96.<br /><br />The question of a senior Chinese official ó was the U. S. willing to trade Los Angeles for Taiwan ó suggests their understanding of the linkage between China's regional and strategic ballistic missile capabilities.30anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-53587258777130482682009-11-24T21:18:00.000-08:002009-11-24T21:19:14.506-08:00PRC Missile and Space ForcesPRC Missile and Space Forces<br />page 1<br /><br />PRC Missile and Space Forces<br /><br />Since its beginning, the PRC's ballistic missile and space program has received considerable foreign expertise and technology. This support has helped the PRC become a major ballistic missile and space power. The PRC has received considerable assistance from Russia (and previously from the Soviet Union) and the United States, as well as from other nations such as France and Germany.<br /><br />From 1956 to 1960, the Soviet Union was the major supplier of ballistic missile technology and knowledge to the PRC. The Sino-Soviet split in 1960 ended this cooperation. Today, however, Russia is a major supplier of space launch technology to the PRC. This assistance could be expanded to help the PRC in its efforts to develop road-mobile ICBMs, which would provide the PLA with more confidence in the survivability of its retaliatory nuclear force.<br /><br />Technology and knowledge acquired from the United States has also assisted the PRC's missile and space programs, although this assistance was never officially sanctioned. Qian Xuesen was a Chinese citizen who was trained in the United States and who worked on classified programs including the Titan ICBM program. After being accused of spying for the PRC in the 1950s, Qian was permitted to return to the PRC, where he became the "father" of the PRC's ballistic missile and space programs. The illegal acquisition of U.S. technology for the PLA's ballistic missiles and space programs has continued aggressively during the past two decades, up to the present day.<br /><br />The PRC has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons, elements of which could be emulated by the PRC in its next generation ICBMs.<br /><br />The PRC has stolen U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct applicability to the PLA's ballistic missiles.<br /><br />Assistance from U.S. companies has improved the reliability of the PRC's military and civilian rockets, and the transfer of some of these improvements to its ballistic missiles is possible.<br /><br />Western nations, including the United States, Germany, and France, have provided significant support to the PRC's satellite programs. German companies provide the communications package for the PRC's DFH-3 communications satellites. U.S.-manufactured radiation-hardened chips are also used on the PRC's meteorological satellites, used for both military and civilian purposes, to increase the on-orbit life of the satellites.<br /><br />The PRC is a major ballistic missile proliferator. While the PRC agreed in 1991 to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime, the PRC transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Pakistan in 1992, and has provided other nations with ballistic missiles production-related technologies. The PRC has not agreed to the MTCR's revised limits on transfers of ballistic missile components.<br /><br />The PRC has transferred ballistic missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other countries.<br /><br />PRC Missile and Space Forces<br /><br />Introduction<br /><br />"By the next century, as high-tech space technology develops, the deployment of space-based weapons systems will be bound to make 'mastery of space' and 'mastery of outer space' prerequisites for naval victory."<br /><br />PLA Navy Senior Colonel<br /><br />Shen Zhongchang<br /><br />In 1956, advisors from the Soviet Union convinced the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to include ballistic missile development in the PRC's Twelve Year Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (1956-1967). Having just fought a war against the United States in Korea and having come face-to-face with U.S. military supremacy, the PRC decided that combining long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons offered its best chance to build weapons capable of neutralizing the United States' and the Soviet Union's formidable advantage.<br /><br />Since that time, the PRC has embarked on an extensive ballistic missile and space program.<br /><br />From its beginning in the 1950s, the PRC has also adapted its ballistic missile program into a major international space program. Since its first space launch in 1971, the PRC has developed ten variations of rockets that have allowed it to place 44 satellites into orbit.<br /><br />Today, the PRC is embarked on a modernization plan for its ballistic missile and space forces. This expansion includes the exploitation of space-based military reconnaissance and communications satellites and space-based weapons.1 In addition, the PRC has set for itself the goal of putting men in space this year.<br /><br />This chapter provides an analysis of the PRC's missile and space forces, and the impact that Western technology has had on those forces. It details the PRC's ballistic missile forces; its space forces, including its rockets and satellites; and the interaction between the two groups.<br /><br />This chapter also serves as an introduction to the capabilities of the PRC's missile and space programs, and the degree to which foreign assistance and technology may affect the course of their future development.<br /><br />This chapter is derived from an extensive chapter in the Select Committee's classified Report, much of which, due to national security concerns, cannot be reproduced here.<br /><br />The PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces<br /><br />Development of the PLA's Ballistic Missile Forces<br /><br />The early development of the PLA's indigenous ballistic missile programs was marked by Soviet assistance, and by the guidance of a Chinese citizen who had returned to the PRC after working on the U.S. Titan intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.2<br /><br />The Soviet Union's Contribution to the PLA's Ballistic Missile Force<br /><br />The PRC received its first ballistic missiles in 1956, with the acquisition of two Soviet R-1 missiles. These were copies of the German cryogenic liquid-propellant V-2 missiles used in World War II. The PRC quickly acquired more advanced missiles in the form of the R-2 in 1957. The R-2 had considerable technical improvements over the R-1, including a greater range and a larger payload, as well as the use of storable liquid propellants.<br /><br />In addition to the ballistic missiles themselves, the Soviet Union provided the PRC with blueprints for the R-2 missiles, and with advisors to assist in the PRC's development of a copy of the R-2. With this Soviet technical assistance, the PRC was able to produce and deploy these missiles.<br /><br />During this period, PRC engineers and students received training at the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI). While at MAI, these students were trained in aeronautical engineering, and acquired experience with more advanced Soviet missiles such as the SS-3 and the SS-4. In many instances, the information gained about more advanced Soviet missiles came when the students made copies of restricted notes, and quizzed their professors about the Soviet missiles.<br /><br />In 1960, the Sino-Soviet split ended all cooperation, including missile cooperation, between the PRC and the Soviet Union. This left the PRC to continue its missile programs on its own, using the know-how it had gained from the Soviet Union, and the expertise of its American-trained scientists.<br /><br />The Role of Qian Xuesen in the Development Of the PRC's Ballistic Missile and Space Programs<br /><br />The PRC's ballistic missile and space programs received substantial assistance during their early development from Qian Xuesen (also known as Tsien Hsue-Shen), a Chinese citizen who was trained in the United States and had worked on classified U.S. missile programs, including the Titan intercontinental ballistic missile program.<br /><br />Qian Xuesen became instrumental in the PRC's ballistic missiles program, where he is known as the "father of China's ballistic missile force." A biography of Qian published in the PRC states that he "made significant contributions to the rapid development of Chinese rockets [and] missiles, as well as space flight." 3<br /><br />Born in Shanghai in 1911, Qian left China in 1935 during the Japanese occupation. He received his Masters degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and his Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech). At Cal Tech, Qian worked as a member of the rocket research group of the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, and at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).<br /><br />While at the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory he made "pioneering contributions" to aviation engineering theory in the areas of supersonic and transonic aerodynamics, as well as thin shell stability theory for ballistic missile structures.4<br /><br />At JPL, Qian was recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on jet propulsion. During this time, he worked on Private A, which was the first solid propellant missile that performed successfully in the United States.5<br /><br />Based on his rocket work at Cal Tech, Qian was recruited to join the U.S. Army Air Force in the development of its long-range missile programs.6 Commissioned a Colonel in the U.S. Army Air Force,7 he eventually began working on the Titan intercontinental ballistic missile.8<br /><br />During the 1950s, allegations arose that Qian was spying for the PRC. 9 He lost his security clearances and was removed from work on U.S. ballistic missiles. 10 The allegations that he was spying for the PRC are presumed to be true.<br /><br />Qian was invited back to the PRC and, after negotiations between the U.S. Government and the PRC, Qian was allowed to return to the PRC in 1955. Four other Chinese members of Qian's Titan design team also returned with him to the PRC.11 There were additional allegations that Qian attempted to ship classified documents to the PRC before he left in 1955.12<br /><br />Once back in the PRC, Qian became the leading figure in the PRC's ballistic missile effort.13 Qian and his associates were able to apply the knowledge they gained from working on U.S. ballistic missile programs to the PRC's ballistic missile programs.<br /><br />Qian became the chief project manager in all of the PRC's ballistic missile programs, and was the lead designer of the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile. The CSS-4 is the nuclear-armed ICBM currently targeted on the United States. (All but two of the PRC's approximately 20 CSS-4 ICBMs have been deployed during the 1990s.)<br /><br />Qian was also the first director of the PRC's Fifth Academy, which was responsible for aeronautics and missile development research.14 Today, the Fifth Academy is known as the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), and its current Director is PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan.15<br /><br />Qian was also instrumental in the development of the PRC's space program. In 1958, he began presenting his concepts for a satellite to the Communist Party leadership. In 1962, Qian began training PRC scientists in the design and development of satellites. The satellite, which would become known as the Dong Fang Hong-1, was launched on April 24, 1970. Qian was personally commended by Mao Zedong and other PRC leaders for his contributions to the design and launch of the satellite.16<br /><br />The CCP leadership awarded Qian the honorary rank of Lieutenant General in the People's Liberation Army. It is a rank commensurate with his place as a senior scientist in the PRC's ballistic missile program.17<br /><br />In 1991, President Jiang Zemin provided Qian with the "State Scientist of Outstanding Contribution" award, which is the highest honor a scientist in the PRC can achieve.18<br /><br />Development of the PLA's Intermediate- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles<br /><br />The PRC began developing three ballistic missiles in the early 1960s. The first two, which would become known in the West as the CSS-2 and CSS-3, showed strong Soviet design influences, especially in the guidance and propulsion subsystems. The third missile, which would become known as the CSS-4, uses advanced gyroscopes for increased accuracy. The chart on the previous page illustrates current and future PRC ballistic missile systems.<br /><br />The CSS-2 mobile missile is designated by the PLA as the Deng Feng 3 (that is, East Wind 3). It has evolved into a 1,700- to 1,900-mile range single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile. The PLA deploys CSS-2 ballistic missiles on mobile launchers. The PRC sold several dozen of these CSS-2 missiles, armed with conventional warheads, to Saudi Arabia in 1988.<br /><br />The CSS-3 (PLA designation DF-4, or East Wind 4) was the PRC's first missile with "intercontinental" range. The CSS-3 is a two-stage liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile. It has a range of more than 3,400 miles,19 but is considered a "limited range" ICBM because it cannot reach the United States. It uses the medium-range CSS-2 as its first stage. Targets for the PLA's CSS-3 missiles could include:<br /><br /> * India<br /> * Russia<br /> * The U.S. Naval Facility at Diego Garcia<br /> * The U.S. Air Force Base at Guam<br /><br />The CSS-3 missiles are based in silos, and in mountainside tunnels where they are rolled out and erected for launch.20 The CSS-3 missile has been deployed by the PLA since 1980.21<br /><br />The PLA's Current "East Wind" Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles<br /><br />The CSS-4 (PLA designation DF-5, or East Wind 5) is currently the PRC's main ICBM nuclear threat against the United States.<br /><br />The CSS-4 program began in the 1960s. It was originally envisioned that the missile would use liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants, similar to those used in the Soviet R-7 (SS-6) missile and in the U.S. Atlas. In the early 1960s, however, the program transitioned into the use of storable propellant.<br /><br />Progress in the CSS-4 program was slowed by the Great Leap Forward in 1963 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976, which compounded the technical challenges of developing an ICBM. The CSS-4's development program continued to progress over the next 20 years.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-66905101807833795852009-11-24T21:17:00.000-08:002009-11-24T21:18:14.777-08:00New Questions About U.S. Intelligence on China:Summary<br /><br />By locating the original Chinese-language source of this quote, we found that it does not represent an authoritative source on Chinese military space activities. Worse, an examination of the original Chinese shows that the quote is mistranslated in ways that significantly change its meaning.<br />Introduction<br />In its recently released 2005 annual report The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) states that China “plans to field” anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.2 The report offers no evidence to support this assertion, which is noteworthy if true since it appears to be inconsistent with China’s longstanding diplomatic effort to begin negotiations on a new international arms control agreement that would ban attacks on satellites.<br />However, previous DoD claims about Chinese ASAT systems have been called into question. The 2003 and 2004 DoD Chinese Military Power reports referred to an advanced Chinese ASAT system called a “parasitic microsatellite” that had reportedly been “ground tested” and was ready for space-testing. The Union of Concerned Scientists challenged this assertion in an August 2004 analysis of the source of this claim, which showed that the original source was not credible.3 The 2005 DoD report is more circumspect about Chinese capabilities, and has withdrawn the claim about the “parasite satellite,” but it continues to state that China intends to deploy ASAT systems.<br /><br />What is the basis of this claim? As noted above, the 2005 DoD report does not provide evidence or a source. A possible source is the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. NASIC’s website states that it is “The sole national center for integrated intelligence on aerospace systems, forces, and threats.”4<br />NASIC released a report entitled Challenges to U.S. Space Superiority in March 2005,5 which was during the time the DoD report was being prepared. A close evaluation of information in this report raises questions about the quality of the analysis NASIC provides, and more generally about the sources of information on which the DoD relies for its assessments of Chinese military capabilities.<br />Our intent is not to consider the issue of whether or not China is developing or fielding ASAT weapons, but to gain insight into the quality of U.S. intelligence on this issue.<br />Analysis of the March 2005 NASIC Report<br />The NASIC report discusses current uses of space and potential threats to U.S. space assets, but makes few specific claims about the capabilities of various countries.<br />However, the report highlights its concern about anti-satellite threats by including a quote—which is emphasized by being set off from the text in a box—by an official at a Chinese military facility. Its inclusion suggests that it was seen as an important quote that accurately reflects Chinese intentions regarding ASATs.<br />Although the NASIC report does not give a reference for the quote, we conducted a search of Chinese periodical databases and found the Chinese-language article from which it was taken. As we discuss in more detail below, it was written by Liying Zhang (not Zhan, as the NASIC report states) and two colleagues. Zhang was a junior instructor at the Langfang Army Missile Academy, which was closed in July 2004. Its primary responsibility was providing live-fire and simulated training for junior Chinese artillery officers. The article is far from an authoritative source on China’s military space program. More seriously, an examination of the original Chinese sentence shows that NASIC mistranslated the quote in ways that significantly change its meaning.<br />Considering the accuracy of this quote is interesting since it is the most specific claim the NASIC report presents about Chinese intentions regarding ASATs.<br />The quote in question appears on page 21 of the NASIC report. NASIC’s translation clearly states that China is actively developing anti-satellite weapons:<br />“China will monitor closely foreign developments in advanced satellite technology, paying close attention to progress made in military use of space while actively developing ASAT systems.” - Liying Zhan, Langfang Army Missile Academy<br /><br />The quote is taken from the final sentence of the original Chinese article; a more accurate translation of the original is:<br />“While properly following foreign satellite advanced technology, (China) also should actively develop anti-satellite weapons and pay close attention to the progress of international space arms control, in order to facilitate the timely determination of a response.”6<br />The NASIC translation makes several important errors. The first is rendering the Chinese word ying as “will” instead of “should.” Zhang et al. use this sentence to close their essay with a recommendation about what China should do, not a statement of what China intends to do or is currently doing. This is an important distinction. The original text makes clear that the authors believe China has not yet made a decision about proceeding with anti-satellite weapons, and they therefore make a recommendation about China’s course of action..<br />The authors seem to be stating their view that China is currently following developments in foreign satellite technology, and that while it is proper for China to be following these developments,7 they believe China should also be actively developing anti-satellite weapons. The word jiji, which NASIC properly translates as “actively,” also has the meaning of energetically or vigorously, which suggests the authors feel China needs to do more than it is at present. This is very different than the meaning implied by the NASIC version of the quote.<br />The second translation error is the most disturbing. NASIC translates the phrase junbei kongzhi as “military use of space” when it should be translated as “arms control.” It is difficult to imagine how anyone familiar with these issues could make such a mistake.<br />The result is to completely obscure the Chinese authors’ intention, which is to recommend that China should factor developments in international arms control into its decision of how to respond to the escalating competition in military space technology that is described in the body of their article. NASIC compounds this error by omitting the final phrase “to facilitate the timely determination of a response,” which makes clear that the authors are saying that China has not yet made a decision about whether to respond by fielding ASATs. Moreover, it makes clear that Zhang et al. believe that China’s policy toward anti-satellite weapons should depend not only on new technologies, but also on the state of international arms control negotiations (China and Russia have proposed an international agreement at the Conference on Disarmament that would prohibit attacks on satellites). The authors seem to be advocating a hedging strategy, recommending that China should have anti-satellite weapons ready if the diplomatic effort to protect their space assets fails.<br />Implications<br />While there may be ambiguities in the meaning intended by the Chinese authors, NASIC’s translation of this quotation completely changes its meaning. As noted above, since this is the<br />6 The subject in Chinese sentences is often not explicitly stated. As is common practice in translating Chinese to English, we have indicated this by including the word “China” since it is implied but not stated in the original Chinese.<br />3<br />7 NASIC incorrectly translates the Chinese word zhengque as “closely” instead of “properly” or “correctly.” The difference is of some importance since the correct translation implies that the statement is a judgement by the authors, which is consistent with our interpretation of the full sentence.<br />most specific claim presented about Chinese intentions regarding ASATs in the NASIC report, the accuracy of this quote is important.<br />The inclusion of this quote in the NASIC report implies that the authors of the NASIC report either:<br />• are unable to translate Chinese competently and are unable to evaluate the quality of its sources, or are not interested in doing so;<br />• used a translation of the quote supplied by someone else and did not check it for accuracy or relevance; or<br />• were aware that the quote was mistranslated in a way that completely altered its meaning, and decided to use it anyway.<br />All of these possibilities are clearly problematic given the need for accurate intelligence information. It is important to determine whether this a case of poor scholarship, or making a quote fit a particular point of view.<br />Moreover, it is important to understand what this case may imply about about the quality of U.S. intelligence on China more generally.<br />The Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress, and the American public are justifiably interested in the progress of China’s military space program. They deserve high-quality intelligence information, which is necessary for making good policy decisions.<br />While public versions of intelligence reports typically reveal little information about their sources, with the result that those sources and claims are difficult to evaluate, two sources that we have been able to identify and analyze in the past two years have revealed serious problems in the intelligence reports. Our analyses have shown a failure of U.S. intelligence analysts to properly evaluate Chinese sources, and to properly translate and understand these sources. We do not know how widespread these problems are. But these examples indicate inadequacies in the nation’s intelligence that should be addressed immediately.<br />Identifying the Source of the Quote<br />Because the NASIC report does not provide a citation for the quotation about Chinese ASATs, we conducted a full-text search of eight major Chinese periodical databases containing over twenty-three million articles. The search returned 182 publications by authors from the Langfang Army Missile Academy, but none under the surname Zhan. There were, however, six publications by an instructor named Liying Zhang. Since the name “Zhan” is used twice in the NASIC report it does not appear to be a typographical error. Instead, the NASIC translator’s use of “Zhan” is a probably an incorrect Romanization of Ms. Zhang’s surname.8<br />It is worth noting that the Langfang Army Missile Academy was closed in July 2004, by a decision of the Central Military Commission. It was a small institute whose primary responsibility was providing live-fire and simulated training for junior Chinese artillery<br /> We note that many Chinese routinely mispronounce standard Mandarin, and in some regions of China it is common to cut off the “g” sound at the end of words like zhang and shang.<br />officers. Most of these training missions were dispersed to other military facilities and a new branch of the PLA Artillery Command College was established on the old Langfang campus.9 There is no indication that Langfang was an important research or development center for Chinese military aerospace programs at the time the article was written; indeed, the Zhang article is the only article on anti-satellite weapons written by an author from Langfang that we were able to discover in our extensive searches.<br />Ms. Zhang was a junior faculty member in the Ground-to-Ground Missile Control Testing Engineering Teaching and Research Office at Langfang. None of the articles under her name have passages that correspond exactly to the sentence translated by NASIC, but one article, entitled “A Rudimentary Analysis of Anti-Satellite Weapons Technology and Defensive Measures,” published (in Chinese) in the journal Winged Missiles in March 2004 just before Langfang closed,10 is similar to the quotation contained in the NASIC report. Because our extensive searches did not turn up other articles by this author on this subject, and because the phrases are so similar, we assume this is the article the NASIC report used. In addition to Ms. Zhang, this article has two coauthors, Professors Zhang Qixin and Wang Hui, both from the same office at Langfang.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-37493890292512746802009-11-18T21:15:00.001-08:002009-11-18T21:15:49.887-08:00Revolt stirs among China’s nuclear ghosts .Up to 190,000 may have died as a result of China’s weapons tests: now ailing survivors want compensation<br />The nuclear test grounds in the wastes of the Gobi desert have fallen silent but veterans of those lonely places are speaking out for the first time about the terrible price exacted by China’s zealous pursuit of the atomic bomb.<br /><br />They talk of picking up radioactive debris with their bare hands, of sluicing down bombers that had flown through mushroom clouds, of soldiers dying before their time of strange and rare diseases, and children born with mysterious cancers.<br /><br />These were the men and women of Unit 8023, a special detachment charged with conducting atomic tests at Lop Nur in Xinjiang province, a place of utter desolation and – until now – complete secrecy.<br /><br />“I was a member of Unit 8023 for 23 years,” said one old soldier in an interview. “My job was to go into the blast zone to retrieve test objects and monitoring equipment after the explosion.<br />When my daughter was born she was diagnosed with a huge tumour on her spinal cord. The doctors blame nuclear fallout. She’s had two major operations and has lived a life of indescribable hardship. And all we get from the government is 130 yuan [£13] a month.”<br /><br />Hardship and risk counted for little when China was determined to join the nuclear club at any cost.<br /><br />Soldiers galloped on horseback towards mushroom clouds, with only gas masks for protection.<br /><br />Scientists jumped for joy, waving their little red books of Maoist thought, while atomic debris boiled in the sky.<br /><br />Engineers even replicated a full-scale Beijing subway station beneath the sands of the Gobi to test who might survive a Sino-Soviet armageddon.<br /><br />New research suggests the Chinese nuclear tests from 1964 to 1996 claimed more lives than those of any other nation. Professor Jun Takada, a Japanese physicist, has calculated that up to 1.48m people were exposed to fallout and 190,000 of them may have died from diseases linked to radiation.<br /><br />“Nuclear sands” - a mixture of dust and fission products - were blown by prevailing winds from Lop Nur towards towns and villages along the ancient Silk Road from China to the West.<br /><br />The victims included Chinese, Uighur Muslims and Tibetans, who lived in these remote regions. Takada found deformed children as far away as Kazakhstan. No independent scientific study has ever been published inside China.<br /><br />It is the voices of the Chinese veterans, however, that will reso-nate loudest in a nation proud of its nuclear status but ill informed about the costs. One group has boldly published letters to the state council and the central military commission - the two highest government and military bodies - demanding compensation.<br /><br />“Most of us are between 50 and 70 and in bad health,” they said. “We did the most hazardous job of all, retrieving debris from the missile tests.<br /><br />“We were only 10 kilometres [six miles] from the blast. We entered the zone many times with no protective suits, only goggles and gas masks. Afterwards, we just washed ourselves down with plain water.”<br /><br />A woman veteran of Unit 8023 described in an interview how her hair had fallen out. She had lost weight, suffered chronic insomnia and had episodes of confusion.<br /><br />“Between 1993 and 1996 the government speeded up the test programme, so I assisted at 10 underground explosions,” she said. “We had to go into the test zone to check highly radioactive instruments. Now I’m too sick to work - will the government help me?”<br /><br />The price was paid by more than one generation. “My father was in Unit 8023 from 1967 to 1979, when his job was to wash down aircraft that had flown through the mushroom clouds,” said a 37-year-old man.<br /><br />“I’ve been disabled by chronic immune system diseases all my life and my brother’s daughter was born with a heart defect,” he said. “Our family has spent thousands of yuan on operations over the decades. Two and three generations of our family have such illnesses - was it the nuclear tests? Does our government plan any compensation?”<br /><br />In fact, the government has already responded to pressure from veterans’ groups. Last year Li Xueju, the minister of civil affairs, let slip that the state had started to pay “subsidies” to nuclear test personnel but gave no details of the amounts.<br /><br />Such is the legacy of the decision by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, in 1955, to build the bomb in order to make China a great power.<br /><br />Mao was driven by fear of the US and rivalry with the Soviet Union. He coveted the might that would be bestowed by nuclear weapons on a poor agricultural nation. Celebrations greeted the first test explosion on October 16, 1964.<br /><br />The scientists staged a total of 46 tests around the Lop Nur site, 1,500 miles west of Beijing. Of these tests, 23 were in the atmosphere, 22 underground and one failed. They included thermonuclear blasts, neutron bombs and an atomic bomb covertly tested for Pakistan on May 26, 1990.<br /><br />One device, dropped from an aircraft on November 17, 1976, was 320 times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.<br /><br />The last explosion in the air was in 1980, but the last underground test was not until July 29, 1996. Later that year, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, once again, only the sigh of the winds could be heard in the desolation of the Gobi desert.<br /><br />The financial cost remains secret, but the price of the first bomb was roughly equal to more than a third of the entire state budget for 1957 – spending that went on while at least 30m Chinese peasants died of famine and the nuclear scientists themselves lived on hardship rations.<br /><br />Rare was the outsider who gained a glimpse of this huge project. One was Danny Stillman, director of technical intelligence at Los Alamos, New Mexico, home of America’s nuclear weapons. He made 10 visits to secret Chinese nuclear facilities during a period of detente and information exchange from 1990 to 2001.<br /><br />“Some of the videos they showed me were of PLA [People’s Liberation Army] soldiers riding on horses - with gas masks over the noses and mouths of both the horses and the soldiers - as they were riding towards the mushroom cloud of an atmospheric surface detonation,” Stillman recalled.<br /><br />“It was strange because the soldiers had swords raised above their heads as they headed for the radioactive fallout. I have always wondered how many of them survived.”<br /><br />Stillman was also allowed to see the lengths to which the Chinese scientists had gone to experiment with annihilation in the desert.<br /><br />Like the Americans, the Chinese placed caged live animals, tanks, planes, vehicles and buildings around test sites. Such were the remains gathered by the men and women of Unit 8302.<br /><br />“The surprise to me was that they also had a full-scale Beijing subway station with all supporting utilities constructed at an undefined depth directly underneath,” said Stillman.<br /><br />“There were 10,000 animals and a model of a Yangtze River bridge,” recalled Wu Qian, a scientist.<br /><br />Li Yi, a woman doctor, added: “Animals placed two kilometres from the blast centre were burnt to cinders and those eight kilometres away died within a few days.”<br /><br />China had borrowed Soviet blueprints and spied on the West, according to The Nuclear Express, a book by Stillman and Thomas Reed, the former US air force secretary.<br /><br />It explains how China then exploited its human capital to win technological parity with the US for just 4% of the effort - 45 successful test explosions against more than 1,000 American tests.<br /><br />“The Chinese nuclear weapon scientists I met . . . were exceptionally brilliant,” Stillman said.<br /><br />Of China’s top 10 pioneers, two were educated at Edinburgh University - Cheng Kaijia, director of the weapons laboratory, and Peng Huan-wu, designer of the first thermonuclear bomb. Six went to college in the United States, one in France and one in Germany.<br /><br />For all this array of genius, no Chinese scientist has dared to publish a study of the human toll.<br /><br />That taboo has been broken by Takada, a physicist at the faculty of medicine at Sapporo University, who is an adviser on radiation hazards to the government of Japan.<br /><br />He developed a computer simulation model, based on fieldwork at Soviet test sites in Kazakhstan, to calculate that 1.48m people were exposed to contamination during 32 years of Chinese tests.<br /><br />Takada used internationally recognised radiation dosage measurements to estimate that 190,000 have died of cancer or leukaemia. He believes 35,000 foetuses were deformed or miscarried, with cases found as far away as Makanchi, near the Kazakh border with China.<br /><br />To put his findings in perspective, Takada said China’s three biggest tests alone generated 4m times more radioactivity than the Chernobyl reactor accident of 1986. He has called the clouds of fallout “an air tsunami”.<br /><br />Despite the pall of silence inside China, two remarkable proofs of the damage to health have come from official Communist party documents, dated 2007 and available on provincial websites.<br /><br />One is a request to the health ministry from peasants’ and workers’ delegates in Xinjiang province for a special hospital to be built to cope with large numbers of patients who were “exposed to radiation or who wandered into the test zones by mistake”.<br /><br />The other records a call by a party delegate named Xingfu for compensation and a study of “the severe situation of radiation sickness” in the county of Xiaobei, outside the oasis town of Dunhuang.<br /><br />Both claims were rejected. Residents of Xiaobei report an alarming number of cancer deaths and children born with cleft palates, bone deformities and scoliosis, a curvature of the spine.<br /><br />Specialists at hospitals in three cities along the Silk Road all reported a disproportionate number of cancer and leukaemia cases.<br /><br />“I have read the Japanese professor’s work on the internet and I think it is credible,” said one. No cancer statistics for the region are made public.<br /><br />Some memories, though, remain indelible. One man in Dunhuang recalled climbing up a mountain-side to watch a great pillar of dust swirl in from the desert.<br /><br />“For days we were ordered to keep our windows closed and stay inside,” recounted another middle-aged man. “For months we couldn’t eat vegetables or fruits. Then after a while they didn’t bother with that any more.”<br /><br />But they did go on testing. And the truth about the toll may never be known unless, one day, a future Chinese government allows pathologists to search for the answers in the cemeteries of the Silk Road.<br /><br />The dead of Dunhuang lie in a waste ground on the fringe of the desert, at the foot of great dunes where tourists ride on camels. Tombs, cairns and unmarked heaps of earth dot the boundless sands.<br /><br />By local tradition, the clothes of the deceased are thrown away at their funerals. Dresses, suits and children’s garments lie half-buried by dust around the graves.<br /><br />“People don’t live long around here,” said a local man who led me to the graveyard. “Fifty, 60 - then they’re gone.<br /><br />Last month there was an artilce wriiten by some senior Chinese nuclear officials about Indian nuclear.In that article they raised some doubts that Indian nuc arsenal is not safe and Inida is doing proliferation.By the above artilce we cna know how bad and wrost China is.The whole world knows how China proliferted to Pakistan and many othercountires.So my sincere advice to Chinese officials is to better concentrate on thier issues.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-47255300522358996782009-11-18T21:12:00.000-08:002009-11-18T21:14:26.936-08:00Nuclear Facilities redlineChina's numerous "third line" highly secret, remote and difficult to detect nuclear facilities—which were constructed in 1960s in an effort to duplicate critical defense infrastructure—span the entire country; however nuclear facilities, both secret and public, are primarily concentrated in the Sichuan province.The principle nuclear facility is the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) in Mianyang, Sichuan province. CAEP overseas 12 institutesdedicated to nuclear weapons research and design as well as nuclear and non-nuclear component development.In the last 15-20 years, the attention of China's nuclear program has been diverted from nuclear weapons towards civilian commercial energy.Since decommissioning most of China's military nuclear facilities, Chinese nuclear authorities has focused on plutonium and uranium enrichment for civilian nuclear energy. The primary plutonium processing plants for weapons grade plutonium were closed between 1984 and 1990. China has reportedly ceased the processing of plutonium and uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons; the exact volume of China's plutonium stockpiles is unclear. However, experts David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund argue that amount ranges from 1-5 tons.The highly enriched uranium stockpiles are estimated to be 15-25 tons.China's maintained fissile material stockpiles have remained constant since 1991.<br /><br />The Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) is the ultimate authority with regards to China's nuclear weapons, and the management of the relevant facilities.The PLA Second Artillery Corps is responsible for the deployment of nuclear weapons. The Second Artillery Corps answers directly to the CMC General Staff Department (GSD). The GSD is responsible for operational command of nuclear forces. Under the approval of the CMC, the GSD is responsible for the nuclear doctrine. China maintains a doctrine of minimum deterrence, and adheres to a no-first-use (NFU) policy.<br />The CMC has delegated authority over Chinese military nuclear facilities to the General Armaments Department (GAD), which is led by Gen. Chang Wanquan. The GAD is responsible for nuclear weapons research, development, testing, and military application. The nuclear facilities are led directly by the General Armaments Department (GAD) of the CMC; the facilities are operated at the discretion of the Chairman of the CMC. <br />The Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) is the principle governing body managing the civilian reactors. Important bodies within the civilian nuclear power leadership are the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) and Chinese Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA). The CNNC holds authority over many civilian power reactors such as the Yibin Nuclear Fuel Component Plant, which is responsible for plutonium processing for civilian use. The CNNC also maintains authority over the CIAE which remains a principle organization dedicated to plutonium fuel science research and development. Nuclear facilities such as CAEP are directly under the supervision of the GAD, but also work, since 2008, with State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Previously, SASTIND was its own ministry-level organization--the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). Prior to the 2008 reorganization, which saw the entity reduced in rank, COSTIND maintained research and development with the industrial enterprises which are contracted with GAD, such as the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). SASTIND appears to continue in this role.<br />China's first uranium enrichment plant, located in Lanzhou, Gansu province, was developed and made operational in 1964. The Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Plant operated commercially from 1980-1997; it, however, has been decommissioned. Another civilian enrichment plant at the same site, with 500,000 Separate Work Units (SWU) per year capacity, has been developed through Russian-Chinese third phase enrichment plant agreement. China's nuclear fuel cycle facilities have undergone numerous changes since the early 1980s, including the closure of the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex (Gansu province) in 1984 and to the decommissioning Guangyuan Plant 821 in Sichuan province in 1990. The highly enriched uranium (HEU) production facilities at Lanzhou and Heping (Sichuan province) have reportedly ended production of HEU for the military. The Heping Enrichment Plant produced highly enriched uranium for military purposes from 1975-1989; however, it is thought to be decommissioned. A gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Hanzhun was developed in cooperation with a Russian company Tenex, and is under IAEA safeguards. In 1996, Phase I of the Hanzhun Enrichment Plant agreement began where 200,000 SWU per year capacity was installed. In 1998, Phase II of the agreement say Hanzhun upgraded to a total of 500,000 SWU per year capacity. Phase III resulted in the construction of a 500,000 SWU facility in Lanzhou in 2001. Finally, in 2007 Tenex and China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) signed an agreement to provide technical assistance to construct the 500,000 SWU per year capacity for Hanzhun enrichment plant to commence in 2010 as part of phase IV of the Russia-China enrichment plant agreement.<br /><br />Presently, China has 11 commercially operated nuclear power reactors under the leadership of either the CNNC or the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPC). Fourteen more civilian power reactor facilities are under construction, and ten are set to begin construction in 2009.<br /><br />Uranium is mined in several sites including: Fuzhou (Fujian province), Chongyi (Jiangxi province), Yining (Xinjiang Autonomous Region), Lantian (Shaanxi province), and Benxi (Liaoning province). Once the uranium is milled it is transported to the Lanzhou Conversion Plant in Gansu province where it is converted to UF6. After conversion it is enriched at the Lanzhou plant or the Hanzhun facility in Shaanxi province. Both facilities have a 500,000 SWU per year enrichment plants. The enriched uranium is sent to Yibin Nuclear Fuel Complex or the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Complex for fabrication. Spent fuel is stored in nuclear power plants throughout the country. There is a reprocessing plant under construction in Lanzhou, and a wet storage facility under construction in the Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex. HEU would then be placed in a bomb core and assembled.<br /><br />Harbin in Heilongjiang province is the location of a possible warhead production site. Plant 821 site located in Guangyuan, Sichuan province, was a former weapons assembly facility. The warhead production site receives non-nuclear components from either the Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component plant or Institute 905 of the CAEP. The status of Harbin weapons assembly facility is unknown. China halted uranium enrichment for military purposes in 1987 and plutonium production for military purposes in 1991. Many of the military facilities were redirected towards supporting China's civilian power reactors.<br /><br />The CAEP is responsible for nuclear weapons research and design, and is still in operation despite the unofficial moratorium on fissile material production. The CAEP has 12 institutes including the Institute of Applied Physics and Mathematics in Beijing which is responsible for nuclear weapons design computations. Before China halted nuclear weapon testing in 1996, the CAEP likely collaborated with the Northwest Nuclear Technology Institute in Malan, Xinjiang on nuclear research. However, the extent of this interaction is unknown. The Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research engages in nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles development. The CAEP is the primary facility for nuclear weapons research and design, while the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research holds responsibility over China's nuclear missile program.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-12235105614921436312009-11-02T21:33:00.000-08:002009-11-02T21:34:15.841-08:00The Impact of U.S. NMD on Chinese Nuclear ModernizationChinese Nuclear Deterrence<br /><br />The Chinese decision to build its own nuclear weapons was a response to the nuclear threats posed by the United States (U.S.).1 In the 1950s, China perceived constant nuclear threats from the U.S. and felt that the threat could be negated by nuclear deterrence. China chose to develop its own nuclear force rather than accepting the Soviet nuclear umbrella because it did not want to lose its sovereignty and independence in a military alliance with the former Soviet Union. In January 1955, the Chinese leaders made a decision to develop atomic bombs to defeat the U.S. nuclear blackmail and nuclear monopoly.2 The next year, China began to organize research on atomic bombs and the missiles that would carry them.3 After the Soviet Union tried to constrain China from further developing Chinese nuclear weapons, China became more determined to develop an independent nuclear force.4<br /><br />The purpose of the Chinese nuclear development is to defend its vital national security by countering possible nuclear blackmail. China worries that the superpowers would feel free to offend China's vital security interests without apprehension if China did not have nuclear weapons. It expects that its nuclear arsenal would discourage the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of using nuclear weapons against China. The Chinese leaders believed that (1) a modest nuclear force would be able to neutralize nuclear blackmail made by the superpowers and deter their nuclear attacks; and (2) nuclear weapons are not militarily usable and therefore the Chinese nuclear weapons are not for war-fighting.5 Based on Mao Zedong's nuclear strategic thought, China made a no-first-use commitment immediately after its first nuclear test. In this commitment, China pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Since then, the no-first-use commitment has become an important part of the Chinese nuclear strategy.<br /><br />To explore the impact of U.S. National Missile Defense on the Chinese nuclear deterrent, we need to quantitatively understand how the Chinese nuclear deterrent works now. The difficulty here is that the Chinese government has never explicitly explained how to translate the Chinese nuclear strategy into quantitative requirements for its nuclear force. So we have to make some educated guesses in our analysis on the Chinese nuclear deterrent. In addition, all the discussions on the Chinese nuclear deterrence in this paper will be only in the China-U.S. context.<br /><br />Chinese nuclear development may be divided into three stages. In the first stage, China had only a symbolic or existential nuclear deterrence until it acquired the capability of launching Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in 1980.6 After that, the Chinese nuclear deterrence entered into the second stage in which deterrence is based on the quantitative ambiguity of its nuclear force. In general, the creditability of the nuclear deterrent of a country depends on its rivals' perception about its nuclear retaliatory capability. It is widely believed that China has about twenty liquid-fuel silo-based ICBMs that can reach the U.S.7 The two dozen land-based ICBMs that have been detected and located by the U.S. intelligence agencies would have very little chance of surviving a U.S. preemptive nuclear strike. However, because China has neither confirmed nor denied any outside estimates about the size of its long-range nuclear force, it is difficult for the U.S. to rule out some errors in its estimate. If the U.S. considers launching a preemptive nuclear strike against China, the Americans would understand that they may not know the exact number of the Chinese ICBMs. They may have some confidence that they could destroy all the two dozen detected Chinese ICBMs in a preemptive strike, but they would have to worry about a Chinese nuclear retaliation with a few undetected ICBMs. Such a worry would discourage and deter the U.S. from attempting a nuclear strike against China.<br /><br />The total number of the Chinese ICBMs do not make direct contribution to the Chinese nuclear deterrence because multiplying this number does not increase the strength of the deterrence. The error or uncertainty of the American estimate about the size of the Chinese long-range nuclear force forms the perceived Chinese retaliatory capability in the U.S. and the scope of this uncertainty or error is directly relevant to the credibility of Chinese deterrence.<br /><br />To deter a first nuclear strike from the U.S., the Chinese nuclear retaliation must be able to cause an intolerable amount of damage to the U.S. There are different estimations about the minimum number of nuclear warheads needed for causing intolerable damage based on different criteria.8 The criterion used in this paper is drawn from the history of recent U.S. conventional wars. The U.S. ended two wars without winning them in the last half century: the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. There were several reasons for the U.S. withdrawing from these two wars. One important and common reason is that each war had caused tens of thousands of American casualties. So, I assume that the U.S. would choose other options rather than launching a nuclear strike against China in a crisis if the U.S. understands that the strike would initiate a Chinese nuclear retaliation and that the retaliation can cause more American casualties than the above figures: tens of thousands. A nuclear bomb with a yield of about one megaton TNT equivalent exploded over a big city would certainly cause many more casualties than tens of thousands. So, a Chinese retaliatory strike with a few nuclear warheads should be able to deter a first nuclear attack from the U.S.<br /><br />The above discussion shows that the nature of the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrence is quite different from that of the other nuclear states. In its current stage, the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrence comes from the quantitative ambiguity of its nuclear force. As long as this uncertainty is larger than a few ICBMs, the deterrence is stable. Now, Chinese nuclear development is going to enter a third stage, in which China will have credible and visible minimum nuclear deterrence. The Chinese long-range nuclear force could not be saturated by a U.S. preemptive strike, i.e., at least a few Chinese ICBMs or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) would be able to survive a U.S. preemptive strike and could be used in a retaliatory strike no matter how well the U.S. measures the total number of the Chinese nuclear weapons. China has two options to acquire a credible nuclear deterrence: to increase the quantity or to raise the survivability of its nuclear force. Table 1 gives the number of nuclear weapons China needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrence in different Chinese deployment modes and at different levels of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This paper gives one estimate based on the criteria explained above and assumptions listed below. Other estimates might give quantitatively different numbers, but the general pattern would be the same and would not change the argument made in this paper.<br /> <br />It shows to acquire a credible nuclear deterrence, China needs a big expansion of its long-range nuclear arsenal if it does not raise its survivability beyond placing the missiles in hardened silos. If China successfully develops mobile ICBMs or SLBMs, it needs very little, if any, increase in its long-range nuclear force. It is reported that the size of the Chinese long-range nuclear force has been stable over time in the last two decades and that China is working on mobile ICBMs.9 This suggests that China has chosen the second option, that is to build credible minimum deterrence by increasing the survivability rather than the number of its long-range nuclear weapons. If there is no missile defense, this will be the direction of the Chinese nuclear modernization. Nuclear development in this direction is very predictable and stable. This approach to nuclear modernization will increase Chinese security while without increasing the perception of threats in other countries. The National Missile Defense (NMD), if the U.S. decides to deploy it, would force China to consider incorporating approaches that would help defeat the defense and this would make the direction of the Chinese nuclear modernization diverge over a big range of possibilities.<br /><br />Impact of NMD on Chinese nuclear deterrence<br /><br />The effort of current U.S. missile defense development is focusing on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). There are five basic types of BMD: (1) pre-launch attack, meaning attacking the missiles before their launch; (2) boost-phase interception, meaning attacking the missiles while they are being accelerated by their rocket boosters; (3) exoatmospheric interception, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during midcourse in the upper atmosphere or above it; (4)endo-atmospheric interception, meaning attacking the missiles or their warheads during the reentry phase in the lower, denser atmosphere; (5) civil defense, meaning reducing the effects of the missile attacks by strengthening constructions on the ground or hiding personnel and facilities at safe locations. The U.S. BMD effort covers the first four approaches, which may have different impacts on Chinese nuclear deterrence.<br /><br />In its history, the U.S. tried several times to acquire a capability to counter ICBM attacks. The U.S. first developed nuclear-armed anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) in the 1960s but abandoned them later. In the 1980s, the U.S. attempted to develop layered missile defenses with directed energy and kinetic energy weapons under the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI), which was believed later to be too ambitious. Because the SDI technology was far from ready and East-West relations improved in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the SDI program shrank. In the Bush Administration, it was changed to a more limited program referred as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). In the first Clinton Administration, the SDI program officially died and then it was revived in the current BMD programs.<br /><br />The current U.S. BMD effort can be divided into two major parts. The first is the project to develop Theater Missile Defense (TMD), for which the declared goal is to defend U.S. military bases abroad or its allies against attacks by missiles with ranges less than 3,500 kilometers. The second is the project to develop a National Missile Defense (NMD), for which the declared goal is to defend the U.S. territory against ICBM attacks. To defend the entire United States, the U.S. would have to use exoatmospheric or boost-phase interception. Exoatmospheric defense is the emphasis of the current U.S. NMD project as designed by the Clinton Administration, while boost phase defense has also been proposed for discussion.10 The current TMD project includes lower-tier, upper-tier and boost phase systems. The lower-tier systems, e.g., the Patriot antimissiles, are endo-atmospheric defense systems that can defend only small areas. The upper-tier systems, especially the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system, could defend a big area in principle, so they could be used to supplement the U.S. NMD if needed.<br /><br />Before President Clinton decided to leave the decision on NMD deployment for the next president, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) had designed an NMD architecture, calling for initial deployment of interceptors in Alaska. Many Republicans are pushing for a more robust NMD system, while others oppose the idea of NMD based on mid-course interception. At the same time, US-North Korean relations are improving and the perceived DPRK missile threat is declining. All these factors may fundamentally change the structure of NMD. This paper will only consider the Clinton Administration's NMD architecture and analyze its impact on China's nuclear deterrence. This analysis will also be valid if the main technology and structure of the NMD system remains similar in the next administration.<br /><br />According to the Clinton Administration's NMD system design, the U.S. would deploy ground-based launchers and interceptors at two locations. The interceptors would be equipped with Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) that kill incoming warheads by hitting them at high speed (hit-to-kill). The NMD system is designed to work as follows: the early-warning satellites of the NMD systems detect the launch of a missile by seeing the hot and bright plume from its engine. Once the missile is detected, the control center tells different sensors to track the missile or the warhead and decoys it releases and discriminate them. These sensors include some early-warning radars that would be upgraded to have a tracking capability accurate enough to guide interceptors, some X-band tracking and discrimination radars, and satellite-based infrared tracking sensors. The trajectory information obtained by these sensors would be used to launch and guide interceptors toward the target warhead. After the EKV is released, the infrared sensors on the EKV would guide it to approach the target. To increase the kill probability, several interceptors may be launched towards each target warhead.<br /><br />According to the current plan, the U.S. would deploy NMD in several phases. In the first development phase, sometimes referred to as capability 1 (C1), the U.S. would deploy one hundred interceptors in Alaska, upgrade existing early warning radars, and deploy a new X-band tracking radar. The goal of this phase is said to be to defend against an attack by a few tens of missiles with simple or no countermeaures. It is noticeable that C1 system was originally designed to have twenty interceptors and to deal with a few ICBMs. Its proposed size and capability was subsequently enlarged to its current level. In the later phases, the U.S. would deploy more radars, low-orbit and high-orbit missile-tracking satellites, more interceptors and would add a new launch site. The stated goals of these phases are to defend against a few tens of missiles with complex countermeasures.<br /><br />The number of missiles the C1 system is intended to defend against is comparable to the reported size of the whole Chinese long range nuclear force and is obviously larger than the number of the Chinese retaliatory ICBMs. As discussed in the last section, only a few Chinese ICBMs would survive a first U.S. strike and constitute a retaliatory capability if China does not expand the size of its long range nuclear force. So, even a very thin NMD system with very few interceptors would pose a serious threat to the Chinese retaliatory capability. No matter how the U.S. government clarifies its intentions in deploying NMD, many Americans still believe that a NMD designed for "rogue states" would have an inherent capability to defend against Chinese ICBMs.11 Chinese nuclear deterrence depends directly on American perceptions about the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability. The deployment of NMD would change these perceptions and therefore significantly undermine the Chinese deterrent. Without the backup of NMD, the Americans would always worry about a Chinese retaliation with the few Chinese nuclear weapons that might survive a U.S. first nuclear strike against China. The deployment of a NMD system would provide the American public with an illusion that the several surviving retaliatory Chinese ICBMs would be intercepted by the NMD system - since it is both designed and said to be able to defeat attacks by small numbers of missiles. If the Americans tended to believe that a first nuclear strike plus a NMD system would be able to disarm the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability, the U.S. could become incautious in risking nuclear exchanges with China in a crisis. It would therefore disturb the strategic stability between China and the U.S and increase the danger of war between the Chinese and American peoples.<br /><br />China has realized these dangers and its arms control representative, Ambassador Sha Zukang stated that it is evident that the U.S. NMD will seriously undermine the effectiveness of China's limited nuclear capability from the first day of its (NMD) deployment. This can not but cause grave concerns to China."12<br /><br />The structure of the NMD system designed for the Clinton Administration is obviously East Asia-oriented, especially in its first deployment phase, C1. In the C1 phase, the only new missile tracking radar will be deployed on Shemya, an outpost well located to watch missiles from East Asia, including Russian Siberia, Korea, and China. The only NMD launch site in the C1 and C2 phases would be in Central Alaska, which is much closer to East Asia than to the Middle East or the European part of Russia. This geographical structure provides more time and less required defense range for the interceptors in defending against missiles from East Asia than from other places in the world. This may help the U.S. take a strategy of "shoot-look-shoot" in defending against missiles from East Asia. This strategy could raise the kill probability of the NMD system and allow it to operate in a more efficient way. The East-Asia-emphasized structure of the NMD system could leave the Americans with a strong impression that missiles from East Asia would have little chance to penetrate the U.S. defense.<br /><br />The above analyses show that the U.S. NMD system proposed by the Clinton Administration, based on its number of interceptors and geographical structure, would have an inherent potential capability to threaten the Chinese retaliatory nuclear force. This would reduce American perceptions of China's nuclear retaliatory capability and undermine Chinese nuclear deterrence. Besides the problem of the designed capability of NMD, the intention behind NMD in the U.S. is also worrying. As the relations between North and South Korea are improving, the voices in the U.S. calling for aiming the NMD at China are getting stronger. This will cause serious concerns in China and the Chinese will have to explore possible responses in their nuclear development if the U.S. decides to deploy NMD.<br /><br />Requirements for Chinese responses<br /><br />China is now using its diplomatic resources to influence the U.S. on the NMD matter. The hope is that the U.S. would take China's security concerns into account when it considers NMD deployment. But there is a danger that the U.S. would ignore China's concerns when making its deployment decision. If this happens, China will certainly seek possible approaches that help maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As Ambassador Sha Zukang stated, "China has not and will not participate in an arms race with anybody. But neither will we sit on our hands and allow our legitimate security interests to be compromised by any one."13 When China considers the approaches to protect the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence, it is necessary to apply some requirements to these approaches. Our research indicates that four such requirements are fundamental.<br /><br />(1) The approaches China takes should be FEASIBLE in helping defeat the U.S NMD. This is a requirement that takes precedence over all others. Judging the feasibility of proposed approaches is sometimes difficult because of the following four reasons: (a) The BMDO has declared that the NMD system would be able to defeat simple and complicated countermeasures as its development proceeds. It is not clear how the NMD would do this based on all the proposed technology; (b) although the technology of the NMD plan proposed by the Clinton Administration is clear, the plan itself is still uncertain. For example, the Republicans are pushing for a stronger missile defenses; (c) China needs to worry about any scientific surprises in NMD development; (d) different organizations in the Chinese defense industry may have different assessments of the feasibility of different approaches. Due to the uncertainty about the feasibility of various approaches, the Chinese government may want to pursue more than one set of approaches in case one does not work.<br /><br />(2) Some of the approaches should be VISIBLE to the U.S. It is necessary but not sufficient if the Chinese approaches can defeat the U.S. NMD. The reason is that the Chinese deterrence depends on the American perception about the Chinese retaliatory capability rather than its real capability. Thus, some of the Chinese approaches should be visible to the Americans so that they will know that their NMD system will not be able to counter the Chinese retaliatory capability.<br /><br />(3) The approaches should be AFFORDABLE and not constitute a financial burden on China. China is now concentrating on economic development. It does not want a sharp expansion of military expenditure that would disturb its economic progress. The Chinese government's policy takes economic development as its priority and the policy has strong support from the Chinese people.<br /><br />(4) The approaches should be MODERATE and not increase perceptions of a "China threat" in other countries. China is now in the process of fully participating in the international community and it needs a peaceful environment for its economic development. In order to continue this peaceful profile, China would prefer approaches that avoid negative consequences in arms control or that would lead to new tensions.<br /><br />In addition to the above four key requirements, there are some additional factors that could also influence decision-making in selecting possible approaches. These factors are not as critical as the four above, but sometimes they can be important when the potential approaches are assessed in different Chinese organizations. These factors are the following:<br /><br />(5) The decision makers will prefer approaches that are COMPATIBLE with each other. All approaches applied to the missile defense problem must be compatible with each other. On the other hand, decision makers sometimes prefer competition in the early part of the development process, so incompatible approaches may not be excluded in the early Chinese plans.<br /><br />(6) Some PRECAUTIONARY approaches are needed. The U.S. BMDO declares that NMD will defeat simple and complicated countermeasures in different development phases. It is not clear how the current NMD technology will do this. So the Chinese would have to worry about some possible scientific surprises. On the other hand, some people in the U.S. are pushing for stronger missile defenses or even a revival of part of the SDI program. The Chinese may want to have some technical preparation for the approaches that can also deal with a stronger missile defense.<br /><br />(7) Approaches based on CHALLENGING technology could obtain more support. China worries that one of the intentions behind the U.S. NMD is to acquire preemption in military technology in the new century. Chinese scientists would hope that their work could narrow the technical gap between China and the U.S., although some approaches may not be the best option to respond to the U.S. NMD.<br /><br />The above list is not an exhaustive one. There may be some other factors which could sometimes play a role in determining Chinese responses. For example, if an approach has traditional bases in the Chinese defense industry or dual-use industry, it would have more of a chance to be recognized and recommended by the scientists in those industries. Therefore, it would have a better chance to be chosen by the government. However, these factors may not be as important as the seven described above.<br /><br />The U.S. development of missile defenses is forcing China to consider taking approaches to protect its nuclear deterrent. This poses some new requirements and challenges for Chinese nuclear development. As discussed in the first section, if there is no missile defense, China needs to worry only about survivability, reliability and safety in its further nuclear development. The appearance of missile defenses would disturb the process and introduce many uncertainties. The next section will comment on different Chinese approaches based on the above listed seven factors.<br /><br />Comments on possible Chinese responses<br /><br />Many approaches that could help defeat NMD have been discussed.14 These approaches may be divided into four groups. The first group aims to overwhelm the defense. This could be done by (A) building more ICBMs; (B) MIRVing the Chinese ICBMs to multiply the number of warheads; (C) releasing decoys from the missiles; or (D) dispersing chaff to fool the sensors of the defense. The second group aims to lower the observability of the warheads by applying stealth technology. This group includes: (E) radar stealth, meaning that the radar reflection from the warhead is reduced; and (F) infrared stealth, meaning that the infrared radiation emitted by the warheads is reduced. The third group creates a rivalry between the warheads and the interceptors during the flight, for example, (G) by making the warheads maneuver. The fourth group raises the survivability of the Chinese ICBMs by (H) deploying mobile ICBMs and/or SLBMs; (I) building a missile defense; or (J) putting the Chinese nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.<br /><br />There are two very different scenarios in which more ICBMs are built to overwhelm the defense. In the first scenario, China builds more silo-based ICBMs; and in the second scenario, China builds more survivable ICBMs or SLBMs. These two scenarios give very different results.<br /><br />As discussed in the first section, the current Chinese nuclear deterrent is based on quantitative uncertainty in the minds of its rivals. The NMD would strengthen U.S. confidence about being able to counter Chinese retaliatory capability. If China wants to overwhelm the defense by developing more warheads, the size of its retaliatory force should be larger than the sum of the number of warheads intercepted by the defense and the number of warheads that can produce "intolerable damage". Here we assume that two interceptors are used to kill one warhead, so that a C1 system with 100 interceptors is able to kill 50 warheads. Table 2 gives the number of warheads China needs to overwhelm a C1 or C2 system.<br />However, if there is no missile defense, China could maintain its nuclear deterrence by keeping some quantitative ambiguity about its nuclear force before it deploys survivable nuclear weapons. If there is a missile defense, the effect of the quantitative uncertainty would be eliminated by the defense. China would then have to seek a credible deterrent. The conclusion is that it is not economic or efficient for China to enlarge its silo-based nuclear force in response to a U.S. NMD deployment. It would be a more reasonable option for China to overwhelm the defense with fully mobile ICBMs or very survivable SLBMs when these technologies are ready. A key problem here is the timing: If China wants to overwhelm the defense with an enlarged nuclear force, China needs to raise the survivability of its nuclear force before the U.S. finishes the deployment of NMD. If Chinese technology cannot be ready in time, or if China chooses to deploy combined modes of its long-range nuclear force, the number of nuclear warheads China needs to overwhelm the defense varies from one hundred to several thousands. This would create a big uncertainty about the future of Chinese nuclear forces.<br /><br />Enlarging Chinese nuclear forces to overwhelm the defense may have some significant costs for China: (1) it may not be good for China's peaceful profile; (2) it may involve a big financial burden if China chooses to enlarge the silo-based nuclear force; (3) China may need to produce additional fissile materials for the new warheads, especially if China chooses to add silo-based ICBMs. This factor would make China reluctant to join a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) if it wants to keep open the option of such a buildup. Although the costs could be large, the buildup option cannot be ruled out. The reason for this is that the buildup option is so mathematically simple to understand and so certain to work. So, in the Chinese debate this idea would easily win some support from non-technical people. Another advantage is that the buildup would be visible to the outside and would therefore help discourage any first strike against China.<br /><br />An efficient way to enlarge a nuclear force is to deploy Multiple Independently-targeting Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) if the technology is available. In U.S. efforts to persuade Russia to revise the ABM treaty, one inducement has been to allow Russia to keep its MIRVs. This could encourage China to think about this option. However, for China, MIRVing the silo-based ICBMs is not a good idea because its nuclear force is much smaller than Russia's. MIRVing the survivable ICBMs could be better. But this depends on whether the technology is mature.<br /><br />Some Chinese articles mention multiple-warheads as countermeasures,15 but they do not always refer to real warheads. So, multiple warheads in these articles could also mean one real warhead plus many decoys. As discussed in a report made by a group of American scientists (UCS/MIT),16 the proposed NMD sensors cannot differentiate the real warhead from anti-simulation decoys during the midcourse of the flight. This technology is not too complicated for China. This means that the deployment of decoys is a much more efficient and simple way than MIRVs for China to defeat the NMD system.<br /><br />If some metal chaff strands are dispersed around the warheads, they can fool the radars of the defense. This technology should not be difficult for China.<br /><br />Stealth technology can be used to make the warheads less observable during their flights. For example, the radar reflection of a warhead can be reduced by putting the warhead in a reentry vehicle with a pointed cone-sphere shape or painting the reentry vehicle with radar absorbing materials. This countermeasure is based on not too complicated technology and can reduce the effectiveness of the defense. Another stealth technology, which is discussed in UCS/MIT report, is to reduce the infrared radiation of the warhead by cooling the skin of the warhead. This countermeasure is also based on not-too-complicated technology and can completely defeat the defense.<br /><br />The only countermeasure mentioned by the Chinese defense industry is the use of a maneuvering warhead.17 To defeat the interceptor, the maneuver capability of the warhead should be comparable to that of the interceptor. So, the warhead needs to detect the approaching interceptor and start its maneuver at an appropriate time; otherwise, the warhead needs to carry a lot of fuel so that it can maneuver continuously. Either option is a challenge to the designers of the warhead. The first option needs very capable sensors on the warhead that can search for approaching interceptors from all possible directions while the latter needs to reduce considerably the weight of the nuclear device so that the re-entry vehicle can carry additional fuel and an engine. To match the maneuver capability of the interceptor, the warhead may need a new design to tolerate off-axis accelerations during maneuvers. This may require new nuclear tests and therefore create difficulties for China to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The result of the competition between the warhead and interceptor is dependent on the competition of technologies of the defensive and offensive sides, and thus difficult to assess.<br /><br />Raising the survivability of the Chinese nuclear weapons cannot directly defeat the U.S. NMD system; however, it can make some other approaches much more effective and efficient. For example, China would need many fewer nuclear warheads to overwhelm the defense if China can deploy survivable ICBMs rather than silo-based ICBMs. If there is no missile defense, it is the main goal of the Chinese nuclear modernization to build a survivable mobile or/and a sea-based nuclear force. This goal is still important for China even if the factor of a missile defense is added.<br /><br />So-called 'point' missile defenses protecting missile silos may also help raise the survivability of Chinese ICBMs. However, the technology is very challenging and the cost is very high.<br /><br />Another approach to increasing nuclear weapon survivability is to put the Chinese nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. This would mean that China would need to launch its nuclear weapons after it detects a nuclear attack but before the incoming nuclear weapons arrive. This strategy is called "launch on warning" and was cited as a destabilizing factor by American negotiators to their Russian counterparts in their consultations on the ABM Treaty.18 This approach requires advanced and reliable early-warning systems, which China may not currently possess.<br /><br />The above discussions show that there is not one simple choice for China in responding to U.S. NMD deployment. All approaches discussed above and maybe some others would be considered by Chinese decision-makers. An assessment of the priorities of different options for China would be very difficult because the very strict and different requirements listed in the last section may produce different judgements. The competition among these approaches would lead to a big range of uncertainties in China's nuclear modernization.<br /><br />Possible Arms Control Responses<br /><br />China is making diplomatic efforts to dissuade the U.S. from deploying NMD in both bilateral and multilateral forums. In bilateral exchanges, China has expressed its concerns over NMD through official visits and "track two" meetings that include both governmental and non-governmental officials. These bilateral dialogues have helped the two countries understand each other's positions and concerns and are laying the base for possible resolution of the dispute over the NMD issue.<br /><br />China has also spoken out against NMD at two major multilateral meetings. The first was at the First Committee of the United Nations (UN), where China endorsed the Russian proposal to sustain the ABM treaty, a proposal that won the overwhelming support of the UN members. The second forum is the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where China is trying to initiate a negotiation on the prohibition of weapons targeting outer space. In addition to the UN and CD, China also outlines its concerns over NMD (or TMD that could supplement NMD) at several regional forums.19 Chinese diplomats have talked more and more with the western news media, thereby providing more transparency on China's positions to the American people.<br /><br />If this diplomatic effort fails, however, China would make some responses in the area of arms control in addition to its responses in nuclear development.<br /><br />NMD deployment would harm Chinese confidence in arms control. Before China gradually opened its door to the world in the early 1980s, it was skeptical of the utility and effectiveness of international efforts in global arms control and it did not believe that the superpowers would be faithful to their commitments when they feel that they have the power to break them. As it has been involved more and more in international arms control regimes and negotiations, China has learned the importance of participation in international cooperation on arms control and has become very active in this area. U.S. attempts to modify or withdraw from the ABM treaty are reviving old doubts in China about whether the U.S. will be faithful to its arms control commitments and about the sustainability of international arms control cooperation. The Chinese would worry that participating in arms control would reduce, not strengthen, China's self-defense capabilities. In conclusion, China could become less cooperative with the U.S. in the area of arms control and non-proliferation if the U.S. finally revises or abandons the ABM treaty.<br /><br />As discussed in the last section, some approaches may add difficulties for Chinese participation in arms control. For example, China may need some additional fissile materials to saturate the defense by building more nuclear weapons, especially silo-based ICBMs. It will be difficult for China to accept a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, one that puts a ceiling on the size of the Chinese nuclear force and makes China lose an option for countering the NMD, even though China may not take such an option immediately. Another concern would add to the difficulty of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In China, there have been some voices arguing that China lost too much in signing the CTBT.20 If some Chinese feel that a few more nuclear tests are required to develop countermeasures like the maneuvering warhead discussed above, the voices opposing the CTBT would certainly become stronger in China.<br /><br />In the non-proliferation area, China would become less interested in legally accepting the MTCR, including its annexes, as China's export control law if the U.S. does not respond to China's concern over NMD. The U.S. would become less influential in dissuading China to cut its cooperation with some countries if China believes that such cooperation is consistent with existing international law. In the area of nuclear disarmament, NMD will become a new and serious obstacle that blocks China from considering joining global nuclear reduction efforts.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-73575014697705365452009-11-02T21:28:00.000-08:002009-11-02T21:32:19.226-08:00CHINESE MILITARY STATS:CHINESE MILITARY STATS: Top Stats All Stats <br /> Armed forces growth -28 <br />Armed forces personnel 2,810,000 <br />Branches<br />People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines and naval aviation), Air Force (includes airborne forces), and Second Artillery Corps (strategic missile force); People's Armed Police (PAP); PLA Reserve Force<br />Conscription<br />Selective conscription (FWCC).<br />Conventional arms exports $125,000,000.00 <br />Conventional arms imports $2,238,000,000.00 <br />expenditure > % of GDP 1.98 % Time series <br />Expenditures > Dollar figure $67,490,000,000.00 Time series <br />Exports to developing nations $6,372.00 million <br />Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49 375,520,000 <br />Military Capabilities > Active Troops 2,255,000 <br />Military Capabilities > Defense Budget $81,480,000,000.00 <br />Military Capabilities > Military Capabilities > Frigates 43 <br />Military Capabilities > Tanks 7,580 <br />personnel 3,755,000 Time series <br />Service age and obligation<br />18-22 years of age for selective compulsory military service, with 24-month service obligation; no minimum age for voluntary service (all officers are volunteers); 18-19 years of age for women high school graduates who meet requirements for specific military jobs<br />Tanks 11,000 tanks [3rd of 22]<br />Weapon holdings 34,281,000 [2nd of 137]<br />WMD > Missile<br />China has produced and deployed a wide range of ballistic missiles, ranging from short-range missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). China's missiles are operated by the Second Artillery Corps, and include about 650 DF-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) missiles opposite Taiwan; several dozens of DF-3, DF-4, and DF-21 medium-range missiles that can reach Japan, India, and Russia; and 18-24 DF-5 ICBMs that can reach the United States and Europe. A transition is currently underway from relatively inaccurate, liquid-fueled, silo/cave-based missiles (DF-3, DF-4, DF-5) to more accurate, solid-fueled, mobile missiles (DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21, and a new ICBM [the DF-31] and SLBM [the JL-2], which are currently under development). China is replacing its older DF-5 missiles with new DF-5A variants, which may eventually be equipped with multiple warheads. A key question is how US deployment of ballistic missile defense (former known as theater and national missile defense) will affect the pace and scope of Chinese strategic modernization. Chinese missile exports have been a problem for more than a decade. China transferred 36 DF-3 medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and supplied Pakistan with 34 M-11 short-range missiles in 1992. China has provided technology and expertise to the missile programs of several countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. China has not joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but has pledged to abide by its main parameters. In November 2000, China promised not to assist any country in the development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. In August 2002, China issued regulations and a control list restricting the export of missiles and missile technology. Since 2004, China has been engaged in consultation with the MTCR; however, its application for membership was not successful in the regime's latest plenary meeting in Seoul, South Korea, in October 2004. Concerns about Chinese missile technology transfers continue.<br />WMD > Nuclear<br />China's nuclear weapons program began in 1955 and culminated in a successful nuclear test in 1964. Since then, China has conducted 45 nuclear tests, including tests of thermonuclear weapons and a neutron bomb. The series of nuclear tests in 1995-96 prior to China's signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) may have resulted in a smaller and lighter warhead design for the new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) now under development. China is estimated to have about 400 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and stocks of fissile material sufficient to produce a much larger arsenal. China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 as a nuclear weapon state. China provided nuclear reactors and technology to several countries in the 1980s and early 1990s, including design information and fissile material that reportedly helped Pakistan develop nuclear weapons. Since the early 1990s, China has improved its export controls, including the promulgation of regulations on nuclear and nuclear dual-use exports and has pledged to halt exports of nuclear technology to un-safeguarded facilities. In 2002 China ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol, the first and only nuclear weapons state to do so.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-31311382688638908902009-10-28T02:03:00.001-07:002009-10-28T02:03:49.932-07:00North Korea NuclearbaseNorth Korea has completed the construction of its largest and most sophisticated missile base on the west coast, laying the groundwork for improved intercontinental ballistic missiles, senior officials here said Monday. The Dongchang-ri base has been under construction for several years, deepening outside concerns that North Korea is continuing to develop its capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. "The construction is as good as finished," one South Korean official said, asking for anonymity because he was speaking on matters of intelligence. "The necessary facilities are all there" Another official said North Korea has been testing missile parts such as boosters at the site about 200km northwest of Pyongyang and only 70km west of the main nuclear complex in Yongbyon. "It's a leap in North Korea's ballistic missile development," the official said, also speaking on condition of anonymity and adding the construction ended "only recently." Analysts say the Dongchang-ri base is about three times larger than the Musudan-ri site where North Korea launched a long-range rocket in April, claiming that it put a satellite into space. The launch on the east coast drew condemnations worldwide. The U.S. and South Korea denounced it as a thinly veiled test of a Taepodong-2 missile technically capable of reaching the western U.S. Less than a month later, North Korea went ahead with its second nuclear test, triggering U.N. sanctions tougher than those imposed after the first one in 2006. In June, South Korean officials said North Korea transported an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, by train to the Dongchang-ri site from a munitions factory near Pyongyang, fueling tensions already high from the nuclear blast. Nam Sung-wook, who heads a research institute affiliated with South Korea's spy agency, said in July that the Dongchang-ri site would allow for testing of missiles with a range of over 3,000km. The officials said the newest base is for ICBMs, which can fly at least 5,000km. The long-range rocket which the North fired in April is believed to have flown at least 3,000km. North Korea has test-fired a range of short-range and mid-range missiles this year. The country, which has in recent months shown willingness to return to talks on its nuclear program, is believed to have up to 1,000 ballistic missiles, including 700 Scuds.anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-26970610578847607972009-10-26T22:18:00.001-07:002009-10-26T22:18:25.605-07:00anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3462377779446481111.post-14059128145421710992009-10-26T22:14:00.000-07:002009-10-26T22:17:32.731-07:00CHINESEMENACE&ERKINGFORWARIN EASTASIA<p>Triggered by the geopolitical shifts that accompanied the end of the cold war, fueled by the nation’s rapid economic growth, and driven by a mix of insecurity and ambition, today’s buildup has been under way for the better part of two decades. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chinese strategists began to shift their attention from preparing for a massive, all-out “People’s War” against a nuclear-armed northern invader toward what they labeled “local war under high-tech conditions.” Such a war would be fought for limited aims, using only conventional weapons, in the sea and airspace off China’s eastern coasts. It was from this direction that the greatest threats to the nation’s security were expected to come, whether from Taiwanese “separatists,” Japanese “militarists,” American “hegemonists” or, in the most nightmarish scenarios, all three at once.</p><p>Over the course of the past twenty years, this shift in priorities has been reflected in a substantial, sustained military buildup, especially in China’s aerospace and naval capabilities. With the nation’s economy expanding at near double-digit rates, Beijing was able to increase defense budgets even faster without imposing noticeable burdens on society. According to the Defense Department’s latest figures, between 1996 and 2008 China’s officially disclosed<i> </i>(and likely understated) defense budget grew by an average of 12.9 percent per year, while GDP grew at around 9.6 percent.</p><p>Western observers have tended for some time to downplay the significance of these figures. The post-cold-war People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was, after all, backward, poorly equipped and badly in need of modernization. Despite the vast sums being spent on imported and domestically produced weapons, it was widely assumed that the overall quality of China’s armed forces, and the specific capabilities of most of its major military systems, would continue to lag far behind their American counterparts. Throughout the 1990s, most experts also believed that Beijing was focused exclusively on acquiring the means to coerce or attack Taiwan. As the wider scope and potential significance of its military buildup have become more evident, yet another reassuring rationale has emerged. China is a rising nation and, as such, it is just doing what comes naturally: acquiring the capabilities it needs to project its power, extend its influence and defend its increasingly far-flung interests.</p><p>The distribution of long-range nuclear capabilities was also profoundly unbalanced. Even after the superpower arms reductions of the early 1990s the United States retained thousands of nuclear bombs and missile warheads capable of striking China. At that time, the PRC had no more than twenty nuclear-tipped missiles with sufficient range to reach the continental United States, of which only four may actually have been deployed and ready for use at any given moment.</p><p>Because of the severe limits on its ability to project power, virtually the only place that China could have engaged U.S. forces was in its immediate coastal waters, most likely in a conflict over the fate of Taiwan. The outcome of such a struggle would have been a foregone conclusion, with America and its allies quickly clearing the sea and skies of enemy forces. If Beijing refused to end hostilities after having suffered these initial losses, the United States could have imposed a crippling economic embargo backed up by an airtight naval blockade up and down China’s coasts. At the slightest hint that Beijing was preparing for nuclear escalation, Washington could have unleashed a preemptive strike aimed at destroying all of China’s limited long-range nuclear force and at least a portion of its shorter-range systems. In sum, at every level of potential conflict, from limited engagements at sea to transcontinental nuclear war, the Americans held the upper hand.</p>Despite impressive Chinese advances, in maritime East Asia the United States retains military superiority and effective deterrence and war-fighting capacities. But just as the United States cannot base policy on an exaggerated assessment of the China threat, it cannot allow strategic complacency to undermine U.S. security. Washington must maintain those capabilities that underpin U.S. strategic partnerships with the maritime states in China’s neighborhood and a favorable regional balance of power. Respect for Beijing’s strategic potential requires that U.S. defense policy continues to stress advancement of those capabilities that support American power projection in the western Pacific Ocean, even as the United States prepares for a protracted era of counterinsurgency warfare. Short-term contingencies cannot preclude attention to long-term great-power competition. If the United States maintains its focus on the multiple sources of maritime supremacy, including carrier-based power projection, subsurface platforms and information technologies, it can continue to engage the rise of China without undermining U.S. security.<p><br /></p>anjahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08937052748846758571noreply@blogger.com0