Brazil is one of the largest developing countries in the world and China is THE largest developing country. They are members of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) which is regarded as the future powerhouse of the world economy. Brazil and China are members of the G20 and normally participate as observers in G8 summits. The G20 has now emerged as the pacesetter for the transformation of financial relations between the developed and developing countries. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil is now on his second official visit to China.Relations between the two countries go back to the 1840s when several hundred Chinese tea growers were shipped out to Brazil. Entrepreneurs were keen to find a substitute for the emancipated slaves. In 1880 a treaty was signed which established diplomatic relations and the free flow of trade.
Brazil and China established diplomatic relations in 1974. The first visit to China by a Brazilian President took place a decade later. Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader, stressed the need to reduce the gap between the developed and developing world. A strategic partnership was then agreed.
The two economies complement one another. China has a voracious appetite for natural resources and Brazil needs electronics and other consumer goods. Brazil has almost every raw material needed by industry (bauxite, gold, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, platinum, etc.). For instance, iron ore reserves in Brazil amount to 22.5 per cent of world reserves.
Brazil has embarked on an ambitious upgrading of its infrastructure and since China is doing the same Beijing is in a strong position to help. For instance new Chinese roads and highways are world class and their new railways and rolling stock are of high quality. Brazil’s population of 192 million and GDP of $1.66 trillion make it a very attractive market for Chinese goods. China’s 1.3 billion population and GDP of over $4 trillion GDP make it an even more seductive market for Brazil.
Trade turnover between the two countries in 2007 almost reached $50 billion. Brazil is now exporting more to China than to the US. The good news for Brasilia is that Beijing runs a trade deficit with it. In 2008 it reached almost $9.3 billion. In 2001 it was only $1 billion. Almost all Brazilian exports are raw materials and commodities. China exports mainly electronics and textiles.
China is investing in downstream production. For instance, it is involved in a $3 billion steel plant in southern Brazil. Chinese companies also have stakes in the production of aircraft, compressors, automobile parts and hydroelectric equipment. During Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit in February 2009 an agreement was reached whereby the China Development Bank will lend Brazil $10 billion to explore and exploit huge hydrocarbon reserves off Brazil’s south east coast. Brasilia will supply Beijing with 100,000 barrels of oil a day until the loan is repaid.
However, not everything in the garden is rosy. Inevitably Chinese goods compete successfully with domestically produced products. This is a common problem in the developing world. Brazil’s solution has been to accuse China of dumping and impose tariffs. Regulations are in place to restrict the import of Chinese consumer goods until 2013. Criticism of Chinese practices is strongest in São Paulo, the heartland of Brazilian industry.
China and Brazil agree on the origins of the present world crisis: unregulated financial markets. Both countries want the developing world to have a greater say in framing the new world financial architecture. This has led to more and more cooperation between the two states.
Brazil has realised that it can benefit considerably from a closer relationship with China during the present world economic downturn. The future looks bright for Sino-Brazilian relations.
Wednesday, 16 December 2009
China's growing thirst for African oil
China has dangled a near open cheque book to Africa's major oil producers in a bid to guarantee supplies for decades to come.
It has offered 30 billion dollars to Nigeria and is negotiating for stakes in oil fields in Ghana and Angola and companies that exploit the fields throughout Africa.
China's thirst for oil is expected to be a major topic at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meets African leaders and ministers in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh from Sunday.
Nigeria, the world's eighth largest producer, appears to be resisting China's approach to buy one sixth of its proven reserves.
Nigeria already supplies about one fifth of the United States's oil needs. President Umaru Yar'Adua recently told Peter Voser, chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell, the biggest investor in Nigeria's oil sector, that his country still wants to maintain ties with its "old" partners.
Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total, which have been in Nigeria for decades, are in intensive talks with authorities who want to change oil laws, notably the tax regime.
Industry sources say the companies are looking at investing around 23 billion dollars (15.6 billion euros) in Nigeria over the next five years.
But through its state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Beijing is dangling the prospect of 30 billion dollars for a guaranteed six billion barrels of Nigerian oil.
Licences on some of the Nigerian oil blocks are close to expiring but the government has renewed them for one more year.
The weak link is the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which the government wants to turn into a financially independent and profitable entity.
NNPC, which has been bedevilled by corruption, relies on state money to finance its operations in joint ventures with foreign oil companies. Chinese entities have made big offers.
"The Chinese have made a proposal which we are considering," junior oil minister Odein Ajumogobia recently told AFP.
"They are asking for six billion barrels of oil from our reserves, but I can tell you that we are not going to give them all of that," he added.
More recently Ajumogobia said NNPC could sell some of its blocks to the Chinese firms. "Why not, if the offer is very good? The NNPC has a right to do what it wants with its assets."
In Ghana, CNOOC is discussing with the state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) the purchase of 23.5 percent of US-based Kosmos Energy's stake in the Jubilee oil fields, one of the largest oil finds in west Africa in the past decade.
Chinese firm SINOPEC recently bought the Canadian oil firm Addax which operates in Nigeria and west Africa, for a mere five billion euros.
CNOOC and Sinopec said in July they have agreed to buy a 20 percent stake in an offshore oil block in Angola from US oil company Marathon Oil Corp.
"The strength of the Chinese is that they are ready to put lots of cash on the table," said a senior executive in Africa with one international oil firm on condition of anonymity.
"So they want to come and work here, there is no problem, there is room for everyone, but not on blocks that are not free," said the oil chief.
Shell financial director Simon Henry recently said: "One thing you probably will have seen, and can be sure of, is that both ourselves and the industry will defend our interests."
Many African leaders have welcomed China's huge investment in the continent, but some officials have also expressed fears that China is buying diplomatic power that could turn into neo-colonialism.
Nine Chinese workers were killed when rebels attacked a SINOPEC oil facility in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 2007. Chinese workers have also been kidnapped in Nigeria's troubled Delta oil region.
It has offered 30 billion dollars to Nigeria and is negotiating for stakes in oil fields in Ghana and Angola and companies that exploit the fields throughout Africa.
China's thirst for oil is expected to be a major topic at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao meets African leaders and ministers in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh from Sunday.
Nigeria, the world's eighth largest producer, appears to be resisting China's approach to buy one sixth of its proven reserves.
Nigeria already supplies about one fifth of the United States's oil needs. President Umaru Yar'Adua recently told Peter Voser, chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell, the biggest investor in Nigeria's oil sector, that his country still wants to maintain ties with its "old" partners.
Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total, which have been in Nigeria for decades, are in intensive talks with authorities who want to change oil laws, notably the tax regime.
Industry sources say the companies are looking at investing around 23 billion dollars (15.6 billion euros) in Nigeria over the next five years.
But through its state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Beijing is dangling the prospect of 30 billion dollars for a guaranteed six billion barrels of Nigerian oil.
Licences on some of the Nigerian oil blocks are close to expiring but the government has renewed them for one more year.
The weak link is the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which the government wants to turn into a financially independent and profitable entity.
NNPC, which has been bedevilled by corruption, relies on state money to finance its operations in joint ventures with foreign oil companies. Chinese entities have made big offers.
"The Chinese have made a proposal which we are considering," junior oil minister Odein Ajumogobia recently told AFP.
"They are asking for six billion barrels of oil from our reserves, but I can tell you that we are not going to give them all of that," he added.
More recently Ajumogobia said NNPC could sell some of its blocks to the Chinese firms. "Why not, if the offer is very good? The NNPC has a right to do what it wants with its assets."
In Ghana, CNOOC is discussing with the state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) the purchase of 23.5 percent of US-based Kosmos Energy's stake in the Jubilee oil fields, one of the largest oil finds in west Africa in the past decade.
Chinese firm SINOPEC recently bought the Canadian oil firm Addax which operates in Nigeria and west Africa, for a mere five billion euros.
CNOOC and Sinopec said in July they have agreed to buy a 20 percent stake in an offshore oil block in Angola from US oil company Marathon Oil Corp.
"The strength of the Chinese is that they are ready to put lots of cash on the table," said a senior executive in Africa with one international oil firm on condition of anonymity.
"So they want to come and work here, there is no problem, there is room for everyone, but not on blocks that are not free," said the oil chief.
Shell financial director Simon Henry recently said: "One thing you probably will have seen, and can be sure of, is that both ourselves and the industry will defend our interests."
Many African leaders have welcomed China's huge investment in the continent, but some officials have also expressed fears that China is buying diplomatic power that could turn into neo-colonialism.
Nine Chinese workers were killed when rebels attacked a SINOPEC oil facility in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 2007. Chinese workers have also been kidnapped in Nigeria's troubled Delta oil region.
Friday, 11 December 2009
China's EU Policy Paper
Foreword
The international situation has been undergoing profound changes since the advent of the new century. The trend towards world multipolarity and economic globalization is developing amid twists and turns. Peace and development remain the themes of our era. The world is hardly a tranquil place and mankind is still confronted with many serious challenges. However, preserving world peace, promoting development and strengthening cooperation, which is vital to the well-being of all nations, represents the common aspiration of all peoples and is an irreversible trend of history.
China is committed to turning herself into a well-off society in an all-round way and aspires for a favorable international climate. China will continue to pursue its independent foreign policy of peace and work closely with other countries for the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and equitable, and based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. China will, as always, respect diversity in the world and promote democracy in international relations in the interest of world peace and common development.
The European Union (EU) is a major force in the world. The Chinese Government appreciates the importance the EU and its members attach to developing relations with China. The present EU Policy Paper of the Chinese Government is the first of its kind and aims to highlight the objectives of China's EU policy, and outline the areas and plans of cooperation and related measures in the next five years so as to enhance China-EU all-round cooperation and promote a long-term and stable development of China-EU relations.
Part One: Status and Role of the European Union
The creation and development of the European Union is an event of far-reaching significance following World War II. Since the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the EU has become what it is today through the stages of the Tax and Customs Union, the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union. Its integration in the foreign policy, defence and social fields has made headway. The Euro has been put to circulation successfully and a single area of justice is taking shape. The EU is now a strong and the most integrated community in the world, taking up 25 and 35 percent of the world's economy and trade respectively and ranking high on the world's list of per capita income and foreign investment.
In 2004, the EU will be enlarged to a total membership of 25. The new European Union would then cover much of Eastern and Western Europe with an area of four million square kilometers, a population of 450 million and a GDP of over 10 trillion US Dollars.
Despite its difficulties and challenges ahead, the European integration process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs.
Part Two: China's EU Policy
China attaches importance to the role and influence of the EU in regional and international affairs. History proves that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the European Economic Community in 1975 has served the interests of both sides. Despite their twists and turns, China-EU relations as a whole have been growing stronger and more mature and are now on the track of a comprehensive and sound development. In 1998 China and the EU launched their annual summit mechanism. In 2001, the two sides established a full partnership. China and the EU have developed an ever closer consultation and fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, cultural and educational fields. China-EU relations now are better than any time in history.
There is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other. However, given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues. Nevertheless China-EU relations of mutual trust and mutual benefit cannot and will not be affected if the two sides address their disagreements in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.
The common ground between China and the EU far outweighs their disagreements. Both China and the EU stand for democracy in international relations and an enhanced role of the UN. Both are committed to combating international terrorism and promoting sustainable development through poverty elimination and environmental protection endeavors. China and the EU are highly complementary economically thanks to their respective advantages. The EU has a developed economy, advanced technologies and strong financial resources while China boasts steady economic growth, a huge market and abundant labor force. There is a broad prospect for bilateral trade and economic and technological cooperation. Both China and the EU member states have a long history and splendid culture each and stand for more cultural exchanges and mutual emulation. The political, economic and cultural common understanding and interaction between China and the EU offer a solid foundation for the continued growth of China-EU relations.
To strengthen and enhance China-EU relations is an important component of China's foreign policy. China is committed to a long-term, stable and full partnership with the EU. China's EU policy objectives are:
-- To promote a sound and steady development of China-EU political relations under the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and seeking common ground while reserving differences, and contribute to world peace and stability;
-- To deepen China-EU economic cooperation and trade under the principles of mutual benefit, reciprocity and consultation on an equal basis, and promote common development;
-- To expand China-EU cultural and people-to-people exchanges under the principle of mutual emulation, common prosperity and complementarity, and promote cultural harmony and progress between the East and the West.
Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields
I. The Political Aspect
1. Strengthen the exchange of high-level visits and political dialogue
-- Maintain close contacts and timely communication between the two sides at high levels through various means.
-- Give full play to the functions of the China-EU annual summit by substantiating its content, stressing its practical results and strengthening bilateral coordination.
-- Implement in real earnest China-EU agreement on political dialogue and constantly improve and strengthen mechanisms of regular and irregular consultations at all levels.
-- Deepen relations with all EU members, including its new ones so as to maintain stability and continuity in the overall relationship between China and EU.
2. Strictly abide by the one-China principle
The one-China principle is an important political cornerstone underpinning China-EU relations. The proper handling of the Taiwan question is essential for a steady growth of China-EU relations. China appreciates EU and its members' commitment to the one-China principle and hopes that the EU will continue to respect China's major concerns over the Taiwan question, guard against Taiwan authorities' attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues. In this connection, it is important that the EU
-- Prohibit any visit by any Taiwan political figures to the EU or its member countries under whatever name or pretext; not to engage in any contact or exchange of an official or governmental nature with Taiwan authorities.
-- Not to support Taiwan's accession to or participation in any international organization whose membership requires statehood. Taiwan's entry into the WTO in the name of "separate customs territory of Taiwan, 'Penghu, Jinmen, Mazu" (or Chinese Taipei for short) does not mean any change in Taiwan's status as part of China. EU exchanges with Taiwan must be strictly unofficial and non-governmental.
-- Not to sell to Taiwan any weapon, equipment, goods, materials or technology that can be used for military purposes.
3. Encourage Hong Kong and Macao's cooperation with EU
The Central Government of China supports and encourages the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions in developing friendly relations and cooperation with the EU in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems" and the provisions of the two Basic Laws and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
4. Promote the EU's understanding of Tibet
China encourages personages of various circles in the EU to visit Tibet and welcomes the support of the EU and its members to Tibet's economic, cultural, educational and social development and their cooperation with the autonomous region subject to full respect of China's laws and regulations. The Chinese side requests the EU side not to have any contact with the "Tibetan government in exile" or provide facilities to the separatist activities of the Dalai clique.
5. Continue the human rights dialogue
There are both consensus and disagreements between China and the EU on the question of human rights. The Chinese side appreciates the EU's persistent position for dialogue and against confrontation and stands ready to continue dialogue, exchange and cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality and mutual respect so as to share information, enhance mutual understanding and deepen cooperation in protecting, inter alia, citizens' social and cultural rights and the rights of the disadvantaged.
6. Strengthen international cooperation
-- Enhance China-EU consultation and coordination on major international and regional hotspot issues.
-- Strengthen China-EU cooperation at the UN and work together to uphold the UN's authority, promote its leading role in safeguarding world peace and facilitating economic and social development, particularly in helping developing countries eliminate poverty, improving global environment and drug control, and support UN's reform.
-- Advance the process of Asia-Europe cooperation. China and the EU should work together to make ASEM a role model for inter-continental cooperation on the basis of equality, a channel for exchange between the oriental and occidental civilizations and a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic order.
-- Jointly combat terrorism. Both China and the EU are victims of terrorism and are strongly opposed to all forms of terrorism. Both sides are also opposed to any linkage between terrorism and any particular country, nation, ethnic group or religion. China and the EU should keep in close touch and cooperation on counter-terrorism.
-- Jointly safeguard the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and step up consultation and coordination on the basis of mutual respect; strengthen exchange and cooperation on non-proliferation and export control and the prevention of weaponization of and arms race in outer space; jointly contribute to the resolution of the issue of anti-personnel landmines and explosive remnants of war; and enhance cooperation in implementing the international arms control treaties.
7. Enhance mutual understanding between Chinese and European legislative organs
The relations between the National People's Congress of China and the parliaments of EU member countries and the European Parliament are an important link in China-EU ties. The Chinese Government welcomes and supports the enhancement of exchange and dialogue between Chinese and European legislatures on the basis of mutual respect, deeper understanding, seeking common ground while shelving differences and developing cooperation.
8. Increase exchanges between political parties in China and the EU
The Chinese Government wishes to see an increase of exchange and cooperation between the Communist Party of China and all major EU political parties, parliamentary party groups and regional organizations of political parties on the basis of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields
II. The Economic Aspect
1. Economic Cooperation and Trade
China is committed to developing dynamic, long-term and stable economic cooperation and trade with the EU and expects the latter to become China's largest trading and investment partner.
To this end, it is important to:
-- Give play to the mechanism of the economic and trade joint committee and step up economic and trade regulatory policy dialogue; give attention to updating the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement Between China and the European Union at an appropriate time; properly address irrational restrictions and technical barriers, ease restrictions on high-tech exports and tap the enormous potential of technological cooperation and trade in line with the WTO rules; grant China a full market economy status at an early date, reduce and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices against China, and apply the Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism (TPSSM) prudently; and compensate the Chinese side for its economic and trade losses which may arise due to the EU enlargement.
-- Boost China-EU coordination and cooperation in the new round of WTO negotiations and work together for the success of the negotiations.
-- Strengthen dialogue on investment, promote the establishment of bilateral investment-promotion institutions, energetically encourage and guide mutual investments between enterprises of the two sides, and expand cooperation between their small- and medium-sized enterprises; develop processing trade, contractual projects and labor cooperation of various kinds and encourage transnational business operation and internationalized production.
-- China welcomes more EU development aid, especially in such fields as the environmental protection, poverty-alleviation, public health and hygiene and education. China also welcomes a stronger and more active role of the EU in human resources development, in particular, personnel training for China's central and western regions and build-up of China's capacity of participating in multilateral trading regime.
-- Step up cooperation in the area of quality supervision, inspection and quarantine, establish appropriate consultation mechanisms and, subject to the principle of ensuring safety, security, hygiene, health and environmental protection, promptly address and resolve issues which may adversely affect market access of each other's products.
-- Boost the customs cooperation and conclude a China-EU Customs Agreement in due course.
2. Financial Cooperation
China and the EU should launch a high-level financial dialogue mechanism, expand exchanges between their central banks on policies and deepen cooperation in preventing and managing financial crises and combating the financing of terrorism and money laundering. The Chinese side welcomes an expansion of China-related business by banks of the EU countries and hopes to see an appropriate settlement of the issue of Chinese financial institutions' access to the EU market.
The Chinese side will positively examine and consider applications of EU insurance institutions for business operation in China and improve its supervisory and regulatory regime in line with the Chinese insurance laws, regulations and statutes and China's WTO commitments.
Cooperation in securities legislation, market supervision and regulation, and investment operation will be strengthened and more EU securities institutions, fund management institutions and other institutional investors will be encouraged to enter into China's market. Chinese securities institutions will be encouraged to enter into the EU's securities market when conditions are ripe. In the meantime, Chinese enterprises will be strongly supported to raise funds in the EU's securities market.
3. Agricultural Cooperation
Exchanges between China and the EU in such fields as agricultural production, processing technology of agricultural produce and sustainable development will be intensified. The mechanism of the agricultural working group should be given a role to play. Bilateral cooperation between agricultural research institutes, universities and colleges as well as enterprises should be pushed forward. EU Enterprises are encouraged to take an active part in agricultural development in China's central and western regions and invest in such fields as agricultural high and new technologies, intensive processing of agricultural produce and development of agricultural infrastructure.
4. Environmental Cooperation
China-EU communication and cooperation in environmental protection should be stimulated and a mechanism of dialogue between the Chinese and EU environmental ministers launched. Framework documents on environmental cooperation should be formulated, and discussions held on the establishment of information network on environmental cooperation. Bilateral cooperation should be strengthened on such issues as environmental legislation and management, climate change, bio-diversity protection, bio-safety management, and trade and environment. Efforts should be made to jointly promote the implementation of the follow-up actions of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Non-governmental environmental protection organizations are encouraged to develop mutual exchanges. EU enterprises are encouraged to gain more access to Chinese environmental protection market through fair competition.
5. IT Cooperation
The Chinese side would like to see the EU participation in China's IT promotion. The mechanism of the EU-China working group on information society will be strengthened. Exchanges and dialogue will be conducted on strategies, policies, rules and regulations of information society. Trade in IT products and industrial and technological cooperation will be actively boosted. Greater exchanges in intellectual property rights and technical standards will be encouraged. Cooperation in the field of "Digital Olympics" will be promoted.
6. Energy Cooperation
China-EU cooperation will be expanded in such fields as energy structure, clean energy, renewable energy, and energy efficiency and saving. Exchanges on energy development policies will be promoted. Efforts will be made to ensure a successful EU-China Energy Conference. The energy working group mechanism will be strengthened. Training on energy technology and cooperation in demonstration projects will be boosted to promote application and transfer of technology.
7. Transport Cooperation
A mechanism of China-EU regular meeting will be set up within the framework of the China-EU Agreement on Maritime Transport. Cooperation in maritime transport and other maritime fields will be developed and coordination and cooperation in international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) will be strengthened. Bilateral exchanges will be deepened and broadened in respect of policies of inland river transport, navigation safety and shipping standardization. Cooperation and exchanges in highway technology and management will be expanded. Dialogue and exchanges on highway transport legislation will be strengthened.
China-EU exchanges in civil aviation will be deepened. Chinese and EU enterprises are encouraged to strengthen their cooperation on production, technology, management and training.
Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields
V. The Military Aspect
China and the EU will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, develop and improve, step by step, a strategic security consultation mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and expand exchanges in respect of military officers' training and defense studies.
The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense industry and technologies.
The international situation has been undergoing profound changes since the advent of the new century. The trend towards world multipolarity and economic globalization is developing amid twists and turns. Peace and development remain the themes of our era. The world is hardly a tranquil place and mankind is still confronted with many serious challenges. However, preserving world peace, promoting development and strengthening cooperation, which is vital to the well-being of all nations, represents the common aspiration of all peoples and is an irreversible trend of history.
China is committed to turning herself into a well-off society in an all-round way and aspires for a favorable international climate. China will continue to pursue its independent foreign policy of peace and work closely with other countries for the establishment of a new international political and economic order that is fair and equitable, and based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. China will, as always, respect diversity in the world and promote democracy in international relations in the interest of world peace and common development.
The European Union (EU) is a major force in the world. The Chinese Government appreciates the importance the EU and its members attach to developing relations with China. The present EU Policy Paper of the Chinese Government is the first of its kind and aims to highlight the objectives of China's EU policy, and outline the areas and plans of cooperation and related measures in the next five years so as to enhance China-EU all-round cooperation and promote a long-term and stable development of China-EU relations.
Part One: Status and Role of the European Union
The creation and development of the European Union is an event of far-reaching significance following World War II. Since the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the EU has become what it is today through the stages of the Tax and Customs Union, the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union. Its integration in the foreign policy, defence and social fields has made headway. The Euro has been put to circulation successfully and a single area of justice is taking shape. The EU is now a strong and the most integrated community in the world, taking up 25 and 35 percent of the world's economy and trade respectively and ranking high on the world's list of per capita income and foreign investment.
In 2004, the EU will be enlarged to a total membership of 25. The new European Union would then cover much of Eastern and Western Europe with an area of four million square kilometers, a population of 450 million and a GDP of over 10 trillion US Dollars.
Despite its difficulties and challenges ahead, the European integration process is irreversible and the EU will play an increasingly important role in both regional and international affairs.
Part Two: China's EU Policy
China attaches importance to the role and influence of the EU in regional and international affairs. History proves that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the European Economic Community in 1975 has served the interests of both sides. Despite their twists and turns, China-EU relations as a whole have been growing stronger and more mature and are now on the track of a comprehensive and sound development. In 1998 China and the EU launched their annual summit mechanism. In 2001, the two sides established a full partnership. China and the EU have developed an ever closer consultation and fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, cultural and educational fields. China-EU relations now are better than any time in history.
There is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other. However, given their differences in historical background, cultural heritage, political system and economic development level, it is natural that the two sides have different views or even disagree on some issues. Nevertheless China-EU relations of mutual trust and mutual benefit cannot and will not be affected if the two sides address their disagreements in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.
The common ground between China and the EU far outweighs their disagreements. Both China and the EU stand for democracy in international relations and an enhanced role of the UN. Both are committed to combating international terrorism and promoting sustainable development through poverty elimination and environmental protection endeavors. China and the EU are highly complementary economically thanks to their respective advantages. The EU has a developed economy, advanced technologies and strong financial resources while China boasts steady economic growth, a huge market and abundant labor force. There is a broad prospect for bilateral trade and economic and technological cooperation. Both China and the EU member states have a long history and splendid culture each and stand for more cultural exchanges and mutual emulation. The political, economic and cultural common understanding and interaction between China and the EU offer a solid foundation for the continued growth of China-EU relations.
To strengthen and enhance China-EU relations is an important component of China's foreign policy. China is committed to a long-term, stable and full partnership with the EU. China's EU policy objectives are:
-- To promote a sound and steady development of China-EU political relations under the principles of mutual respect, mutual trust and seeking common ground while reserving differences, and contribute to world peace and stability;
-- To deepen China-EU economic cooperation and trade under the principles of mutual benefit, reciprocity and consultation on an equal basis, and promote common development;
-- To expand China-EU cultural and people-to-people exchanges under the principle of mutual emulation, common prosperity and complementarity, and promote cultural harmony and progress between the East and the West.
Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields
I. The Political Aspect
1. Strengthen the exchange of high-level visits and political dialogue
-- Maintain close contacts and timely communication between the two sides at high levels through various means.
-- Give full play to the functions of the China-EU annual summit by substantiating its content, stressing its practical results and strengthening bilateral coordination.
-- Implement in real earnest China-EU agreement on political dialogue and constantly improve and strengthen mechanisms of regular and irregular consultations at all levels.
-- Deepen relations with all EU members, including its new ones so as to maintain stability and continuity in the overall relationship between China and EU.
2. Strictly abide by the one-China principle
The one-China principle is an important political cornerstone underpinning China-EU relations. The proper handling of the Taiwan question is essential for a steady growth of China-EU relations. China appreciates EU and its members' commitment to the one-China principle and hopes that the EU will continue to respect China's major concerns over the Taiwan question, guard against Taiwan authorities' attempt to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues. In this connection, it is important that the EU
-- Prohibit any visit by any Taiwan political figures to the EU or its member countries under whatever name or pretext; not to engage in any contact or exchange of an official or governmental nature with Taiwan authorities.
-- Not to support Taiwan's accession to or participation in any international organization whose membership requires statehood. Taiwan's entry into the WTO in the name of "separate customs territory of Taiwan, 'Penghu, Jinmen, Mazu" (or Chinese Taipei for short) does not mean any change in Taiwan's status as part of China. EU exchanges with Taiwan must be strictly unofficial and non-governmental.
-- Not to sell to Taiwan any weapon, equipment, goods, materials or technology that can be used for military purposes.
3. Encourage Hong Kong and Macao's cooperation with EU
The Central Government of China supports and encourages the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions in developing friendly relations and cooperation with the EU in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems" and the provisions of the two Basic Laws and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
4. Promote the EU's understanding of Tibet
China encourages personages of various circles in the EU to visit Tibet and welcomes the support of the EU and its members to Tibet's economic, cultural, educational and social development and their cooperation with the autonomous region subject to full respect of China's laws and regulations. The Chinese side requests the EU side not to have any contact with the "Tibetan government in exile" or provide facilities to the separatist activities of the Dalai clique.
5. Continue the human rights dialogue
There are both consensus and disagreements between China and the EU on the question of human rights. The Chinese side appreciates the EU's persistent position for dialogue and against confrontation and stands ready to continue dialogue, exchange and cooperation on human rights with the EU on the basis of equality and mutual respect so as to share information, enhance mutual understanding and deepen cooperation in protecting, inter alia, citizens' social and cultural rights and the rights of the disadvantaged.
6. Strengthen international cooperation
-- Enhance China-EU consultation and coordination on major international and regional hotspot issues.
-- Strengthen China-EU cooperation at the UN and work together to uphold the UN's authority, promote its leading role in safeguarding world peace and facilitating economic and social development, particularly in helping developing countries eliminate poverty, improving global environment and drug control, and support UN's reform.
-- Advance the process of Asia-Europe cooperation. China and the EU should work together to make ASEM a role model for inter-continental cooperation on the basis of equality, a channel for exchange between the oriental and occidental civilizations and a driving force behind the establishment of a new international political and economic order.
-- Jointly combat terrorism. Both China and the EU are victims of terrorism and are strongly opposed to all forms of terrorism. Both sides are also opposed to any linkage between terrorism and any particular country, nation, ethnic group or religion. China and the EU should keep in close touch and cooperation on counter-terrorism.
-- Jointly safeguard the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and step up consultation and coordination on the basis of mutual respect; strengthen exchange and cooperation on non-proliferation and export control and the prevention of weaponization of and arms race in outer space; jointly contribute to the resolution of the issue of anti-personnel landmines and explosive remnants of war; and enhance cooperation in implementing the international arms control treaties.
7. Enhance mutual understanding between Chinese and European legislative organs
The relations between the National People's Congress of China and the parliaments of EU member countries and the European Parliament are an important link in China-EU ties. The Chinese Government welcomes and supports the enhancement of exchange and dialogue between Chinese and European legislatures on the basis of mutual respect, deeper understanding, seeking common ground while shelving differences and developing cooperation.
8. Increase exchanges between political parties in China and the EU
The Chinese Government wishes to see an increase of exchange and cooperation between the Communist Party of China and all major EU political parties, parliamentary party groups and regional organizations of political parties on the basis of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields
II. The Economic Aspect
1. Economic Cooperation and Trade
China is committed to developing dynamic, long-term and stable economic cooperation and trade with the EU and expects the latter to become China's largest trading and investment partner.
To this end, it is important to:
-- Give play to the mechanism of the economic and trade joint committee and step up economic and trade regulatory policy dialogue; give attention to updating the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement Between China and the European Union at an appropriate time; properly address irrational restrictions and technical barriers, ease restrictions on high-tech exports and tap the enormous potential of technological cooperation and trade in line with the WTO rules; grant China a full market economy status at an early date, reduce and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices against China, and apply the Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism (TPSSM) prudently; and compensate the Chinese side for its economic and trade losses which may arise due to the EU enlargement.
-- Boost China-EU coordination and cooperation in the new round of WTO negotiations and work together for the success of the negotiations.
-- Strengthen dialogue on investment, promote the establishment of bilateral investment-promotion institutions, energetically encourage and guide mutual investments between enterprises of the two sides, and expand cooperation between their small- and medium-sized enterprises; develop processing trade, contractual projects and labor cooperation of various kinds and encourage transnational business operation and internationalized production.
-- China welcomes more EU development aid, especially in such fields as the environmental protection, poverty-alleviation, public health and hygiene and education. China also welcomes a stronger and more active role of the EU in human resources development, in particular, personnel training for China's central and western regions and build-up of China's capacity of participating in multilateral trading regime.
-- Step up cooperation in the area of quality supervision, inspection and quarantine, establish appropriate consultation mechanisms and, subject to the principle of ensuring safety, security, hygiene, health and environmental protection, promptly address and resolve issues which may adversely affect market access of each other's products.
-- Boost the customs cooperation and conclude a China-EU Customs Agreement in due course.
2. Financial Cooperation
China and the EU should launch a high-level financial dialogue mechanism, expand exchanges between their central banks on policies and deepen cooperation in preventing and managing financial crises and combating the financing of terrorism and money laundering. The Chinese side welcomes an expansion of China-related business by banks of the EU countries and hopes to see an appropriate settlement of the issue of Chinese financial institutions' access to the EU market.
The Chinese side will positively examine and consider applications of EU insurance institutions for business operation in China and improve its supervisory and regulatory regime in line with the Chinese insurance laws, regulations and statutes and China's WTO commitments.
Cooperation in securities legislation, market supervision and regulation, and investment operation will be strengthened and more EU securities institutions, fund management institutions and other institutional investors will be encouraged to enter into China's market. Chinese securities institutions will be encouraged to enter into the EU's securities market when conditions are ripe. In the meantime, Chinese enterprises will be strongly supported to raise funds in the EU's securities market.
3. Agricultural Cooperation
Exchanges between China and the EU in such fields as agricultural production, processing technology of agricultural produce and sustainable development will be intensified. The mechanism of the agricultural working group should be given a role to play. Bilateral cooperation between agricultural research institutes, universities and colleges as well as enterprises should be pushed forward. EU Enterprises are encouraged to take an active part in agricultural development in China's central and western regions and invest in such fields as agricultural high and new technologies, intensive processing of agricultural produce and development of agricultural infrastructure.
4. Environmental Cooperation
China-EU communication and cooperation in environmental protection should be stimulated and a mechanism of dialogue between the Chinese and EU environmental ministers launched. Framework documents on environmental cooperation should be formulated, and discussions held on the establishment of information network on environmental cooperation. Bilateral cooperation should be strengthened on such issues as environmental legislation and management, climate change, bio-diversity protection, bio-safety management, and trade and environment. Efforts should be made to jointly promote the implementation of the follow-up actions of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Non-governmental environmental protection organizations are encouraged to develop mutual exchanges. EU enterprises are encouraged to gain more access to Chinese environmental protection market through fair competition.
5. IT Cooperation
The Chinese side would like to see the EU participation in China's IT promotion. The mechanism of the EU-China working group on information society will be strengthened. Exchanges and dialogue will be conducted on strategies, policies, rules and regulations of information society. Trade in IT products and industrial and technological cooperation will be actively boosted. Greater exchanges in intellectual property rights and technical standards will be encouraged. Cooperation in the field of "Digital Olympics" will be promoted.
6. Energy Cooperation
China-EU cooperation will be expanded in such fields as energy structure, clean energy, renewable energy, and energy efficiency and saving. Exchanges on energy development policies will be promoted. Efforts will be made to ensure a successful EU-China Energy Conference. The energy working group mechanism will be strengthened. Training on energy technology and cooperation in demonstration projects will be boosted to promote application and transfer of technology.
7. Transport Cooperation
A mechanism of China-EU regular meeting will be set up within the framework of the China-EU Agreement on Maritime Transport. Cooperation in maritime transport and other maritime fields will be developed and coordination and cooperation in international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) will be strengthened. Bilateral exchanges will be deepened and broadened in respect of policies of inland river transport, navigation safety and shipping standardization. Cooperation and exchanges in highway technology and management will be expanded. Dialogue and exchanges on highway transport legislation will be strengthened.
China-EU exchanges in civil aviation will be deepened. Chinese and EU enterprises are encouraged to strengthen their cooperation on production, technology, management and training.
Part Three: Strengthen China-EU Cooperation in All Fields
V. The Military Aspect
China and the EU will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, develop and improve, step by step, a strategic security consultation mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and expand exchanges in respect of military officers' training and defense studies.
The EU should lift its ban on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense industry and technologies.
China: New defense posture
China: New defense posture
A new white paper on China's military places sharp focus on the country's international role, signaling a growing confidence in its clout in the world community, writes Adam Wolfe for ISN Security Watch.On the day that Barack Obama was sworn in as US president, China's defense department issued a white paper on the current status and plans of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) - an English-language report aimed primarily at an international audience concerned about China's growing military presence.
It is the sixth such white paper since 1998, and the sixth demonstration that the country's attempts at transparency can be maddeningly unclear to western observers.
The paper reflects China's growing confidence in its increasingly important role on the world stage, while at the same time downplaying issues that have strained ties with the international community.
As with previous reports, is short on specifics about equipment and technology. Also, the US intelligence community remains convinced that China has understated its military budget by about 50 percent and is deliberately hiding its intentions. What is notable about the new paper is that it directly addresses the budget.
In one of its longest sections, the paper states that China's military budget has grown by about 20 percent annually in recent years for three reasons: rising salaries and benefits for servicemen; compensation for the rise in food and fuel prices; and modernizing the PLA's equipment. The paper further argues that as a percentage of GDP, China's defense spending remains much lower than that of the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan. Even if the CIA's higher estimates of China's defense budget were accepted, this would remain true.
Another shift in tone came in remarks on Taiwan. Previous papers used the threat of Taiwanese independence as one of the main reasons for China's naval build-up. The new white paper all but declares victory on this front: "The attempts of the separatist forces to seek 'de jure Taiwan independence' have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn."
Still, US weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are cited as security concerns for China.
Whereas previous papers downplayed China's global ambitions, the white paper signals a fresh confidence in China's position in the world. "The Chinese economy has become an important part of the world economy, China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community," the paper argues. From this perspective, the paper highlights China's growing presence in global "military operations other than war," (MOOTW, in military jargon).
The white paper notes that China had close to 1,950 military peacekeepers serving in nine UN missions last year. The PLA recently held joint training missions with 14 countries, including the US, India, Australia and the UK. In this regard, the decision to send the Chinese navy to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia is probably more of a sign of things to come than a one-off publicity stunt.
Strengthening US ties
While the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA.
The US-China relations probably hit their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations early in the Bush administration when a Chinese F-8 fighter and a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided near Hainan, China in April 2001. At the time, the Pentagon had put military-to-military communications on hold pending a review. After the incident was resolved, both sides began to take steps to ensure that a dialogue would remain open between their militaries, even if both continued to see each other as potential competitors.
Chinese and US forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a US aircraft carrier later that year. There were some hiccups along the road - such as Beijing's refusal to grant a US aircraft carrier a port call in November 2007 - but the both sides continued to pursue a deeper dialogue.
In April 2008, a military-to-military hotline was established to prevent any misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its power beyond its littoral waters. Obama's decision to retain Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to indicate that the trend will continue, though there are likely to be further problems along the way.
The new white paper also highlights some of the steps that the PLA has taken to improve its transparency on the international stage - one of the main sticking points for the Pentagon.
Last year, Beijing launched the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly releases military information and holds press conferences. Also in late 2007, Beijing rejoined the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.
Still, the new white paper does not mention China's aircraft carrier program or its missiles aimed at Taiwan - and these are both major concerns for Washington.
The PLA's regional ties
The PLA has - established strong ties with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has held large-scale joint training exercises in recent years. But the new white paper also stresses improving ties with India and Japan as well.
Previous papers emphasized concerns about Japanese attempts to modify its constitution to allow a military build-up. The new paper only mentions mutual visits by the Japanese and Chinese navies, and says the bilateral relationship has improved. The paper also downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build-up and an ongoing border dispute. Instead, the report cites the joint counterterrorism training exercises held in China and India in 2007 and 2008.
While Japan and India are sure to appreciate the new tone, concerns remain about China's regional intentions. Japan and China claim overlapping ownership of a section of the East China Sea. Though diplomatic progress has been made on the issue, it remains unresolved and both sides have adjusted their defensive postures in recent years as a result.
Negotiations over the disputed border with India have gone nowhere in recent years. Also, China's "string of pearls" strategy, which seeks to establish new naval bases and military ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea, continues to be watched with a wary eye from New Delhi. Just as India is seeking "blue-water status" for its navy, or the ability to project power further away from its coastal region, China appears to be moving into the region with its navy.
International spotlight
Whereas previous white papers stressed the continued need for training within the PLA, the most recent report's emphasis is clearly on China's new place in the world. It describes the country as an indispensable nation: "China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China."
While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the US. The Chinese ships heading to Somalia will be the first test case for what Beijing clearly believes will be a new role for its military.
A new white paper on China's military places sharp focus on the country's international role, signaling a growing confidence in its clout in the world community, writes Adam Wolfe for ISN Security Watch.On the day that Barack Obama was sworn in as US president, China's defense department issued a white paper on the current status and plans of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) - an English-language report aimed primarily at an international audience concerned about China's growing military presence.
It is the sixth such white paper since 1998, and the sixth demonstration that the country's attempts at transparency can be maddeningly unclear to western observers.
The paper reflects China's growing confidence in its increasingly important role on the world stage, while at the same time downplaying issues that have strained ties with the international community.
As with previous reports, is short on specifics about equipment and technology. Also, the US intelligence community remains convinced that China has understated its military budget by about 50 percent and is deliberately hiding its intentions. What is notable about the new paper is that it directly addresses the budget.
In one of its longest sections, the paper states that China's military budget has grown by about 20 percent annually in recent years for three reasons: rising salaries and benefits for servicemen; compensation for the rise in food and fuel prices; and modernizing the PLA's equipment. The paper further argues that as a percentage of GDP, China's defense spending remains much lower than that of the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan. Even if the CIA's higher estimates of China's defense budget were accepted, this would remain true.
Another shift in tone came in remarks on Taiwan. Previous papers used the threat of Taiwanese independence as one of the main reasons for China's naval build-up. The new white paper all but declares victory on this front: "The attempts of the separatist forces to seek 'de jure Taiwan independence' have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn."
Still, US weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are cited as security concerns for China.
Whereas previous papers downplayed China's global ambitions, the white paper signals a fresh confidence in China's position in the world. "The Chinese economy has become an important part of the world economy, China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community," the paper argues. From this perspective, the paper highlights China's growing presence in global "military operations other than war," (MOOTW, in military jargon).
The white paper notes that China had close to 1,950 military peacekeepers serving in nine UN missions last year. The PLA recently held joint training missions with 14 countries, including the US, India, Australia and the UK. In this regard, the decision to send the Chinese navy to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia is probably more of a sign of things to come than a one-off publicity stunt.
Strengthening US ties
While the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA.
The US-China relations probably hit their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations early in the Bush administration when a Chinese F-8 fighter and a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided near Hainan, China in April 2001. At the time, the Pentagon had put military-to-military communications on hold pending a review. After the incident was resolved, both sides began to take steps to ensure that a dialogue would remain open between their militaries, even if both continued to see each other as potential competitors.
Chinese and US forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a US aircraft carrier later that year. There were some hiccups along the road - such as Beijing's refusal to grant a US aircraft carrier a port call in November 2007 - but the both sides continued to pursue a deeper dialogue.
In April 2008, a military-to-military hotline was established to prevent any misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its power beyond its littoral waters. Obama's decision to retain Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to indicate that the trend will continue, though there are likely to be further problems along the way.
The new white paper also highlights some of the steps that the PLA has taken to improve its transparency on the international stage - one of the main sticking points for the Pentagon.
Last year, Beijing launched the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly releases military information and holds press conferences. Also in late 2007, Beijing rejoined the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.
Still, the new white paper does not mention China's aircraft carrier program or its missiles aimed at Taiwan - and these are both major concerns for Washington.
The PLA's regional ties
The PLA has - established strong ties with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has held large-scale joint training exercises in recent years. But the new white paper also stresses improving ties with India and Japan as well.
Previous papers emphasized concerns about Japanese attempts to modify its constitution to allow a military build-up. The new paper only mentions mutual visits by the Japanese and Chinese navies, and says the bilateral relationship has improved. The paper also downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build-up and an ongoing border dispute. Instead, the report cites the joint counterterrorism training exercises held in China and India in 2007 and 2008.
While Japan and India are sure to appreciate the new tone, concerns remain about China's regional intentions. Japan and China claim overlapping ownership of a section of the East China Sea. Though diplomatic progress has been made on the issue, it remains unresolved and both sides have adjusted their defensive postures in recent years as a result.
Negotiations over the disputed border with India have gone nowhere in recent years. Also, China's "string of pearls" strategy, which seeks to establish new naval bases and military ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea, continues to be watched with a wary eye from New Delhi. Just as India is seeking "blue-water status" for its navy, or the ability to project power further away from its coastal region, China appears to be moving into the region with its navy.
International spotlight
Whereas previous white papers stressed the continued need for training within the PLA, the most recent report's emphasis is clearly on China's new place in the world. It describes the country as an indispensable nation: "China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China."
While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the US. The Chinese ships heading to Somalia will be the first test case for what Beijing clearly believes will be a new role for its military.
China: New defense posture
China: New defense posture
A new white paper on China's military places sharp focus on the country's international role, signaling a growing confidence in its clout in the world community, writes Adam Wolfe for ISN Security Watch.On the day that Barack Obama was sworn in as US president, China's defense department issued a white paper on the current status and plans of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) - an English-language report aimed primarily at an international audience concerned about China's growing military presence.
It is the sixth such white paper since 1998, and the sixth demonstration that the country's attempts at transparency can be maddeningly unclear to western observers.
The paper reflects China's growing confidence in its increasingly important role on the world stage, while at the same time downplaying issues that have strained ties with the international community.
As with previous reports, is short on specifics about equipment and technology. Also, the US intelligence community remains convinced that China has understated its military budget by about 50 percent and is deliberately hiding its intentions. What is notable about the new paper is that it directly addresses the budget.
In one of its longest sections, the paper states that China's military budget has grown by about 20 percent annually in recent years for three reasons: rising salaries and benefits for servicemen; compensation for the rise in food and fuel prices; and modernizing the PLA's equipment. The paper further argues that as a percentage of GDP, China's defense spending remains much lower than that of the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan. Even if the CIA's higher estimates of China's defense budget were accepted, this would remain true.
Another shift in tone came in remarks on Taiwan. Previous papers used the threat of Taiwanese independence as one of the main reasons for China's naval build-up. The new white paper all but declares victory on this front: "The attempts of the separatist forces to seek 'de jure Taiwan independence' have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn."
Still, US weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are cited as security concerns for China.
Whereas previous papers downplayed China's global ambitions, the white paper signals a fresh confidence in China's position in the world. "The Chinese economy has become an important part of the world economy, China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community," the paper argues. From this perspective, the paper highlights China's growing presence in global "military operations other than war," (MOOTW, in military jargon).
The white paper notes that China had close to 1,950 military peacekeepers serving in nine UN missions last year. The PLA recently held joint training missions with 14 countries, including the US, India, Australia and the UK. In this regard, the decision to send the Chinese navy to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia is probably more of a sign of things to come than a one-off publicity stunt.
Strengthening US ties
While the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA.
The US-China relations probably hit their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations early in the Bush administration when a Chinese F-8 fighter and a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided near Hainan, China in April 2001. At the time, the Pentagon had put military-to-military communications on hold pending a review. After the incident was resolved, both sides began to take steps to ensure that a dialogue would remain open between their militaries, even if both continued to see each other as potential competitors.
Chinese and US forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a US aircraft carrier later that year. There were some hiccups along the road - such as Beijing's refusal to grant a US aircraft carrier a port call in November 2007 - but the both sides continued to pursue a deeper dialogue.
In April 2008, a military-to-military hotline was established to prevent any misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its power beyond its littoral waters. Obama's decision to retain Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to indicate that the trend will continue, though there are likely to be further problems along the way.
The new white paper also highlights some of the steps that the PLA has taken to improve its transparency on the international stage - one of the main sticking points for the Pentagon.
Last year, Beijing launched the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly releases military information and holds press conferences. Also in late 2007, Beijing rejoined the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.
Still, the new white paper does not mention China's aircraft carrier program or its missiles aimed at Taiwan - and these are both major concerns for Washington.
The PLA's regional ties
The PLA has - established strong ties with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has held large-scale joint training exercises in recent years. But the new white paper also stresses improving ties with India and Japan as well.
Previous papers emphasized concerns about Japanese attempts to modify its constitution to allow a military build-up. The new paper only mentions mutual visits by the Japanese and Chinese navies, and says the bilateral relationship has improved. The paper also downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build-up and an ongoing border dispute. Instead, the report cites the joint counterterrorism training exercises held in China and India in 2007 and 2008.
While Japan and India are sure to appreciate the new tone, concerns remain about China's regional intentions. Japan and China claim overlapping ownership of a section of the East China Sea. Though diplomatic progress has been made on the issue, it remains unresolved and both sides have adjusted their defensive postures in recent years as a result.
Negotiations over the disputed border with India have gone nowhere in recent years. Also, China's "string of pearls" strategy, which seeks to establish new naval bases and military ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea, continues to be watched with a wary eye from New Delhi. Just as India is seeking "blue-water status" for its navy, or the ability to project power further away from its coastal region, China appears to be moving into the region with its navy.
International spotlight
Whereas previous white papers stressed the continued need for training within the PLA, the most recent report's emphasis is clearly on China's new place in the world. It describes the country as an indispensable nation: "China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China."
While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the US. The Chinese ships heading to Somalia will be the first test case for what Beijing clearly believes will be a new role for its military.
A new white paper on China's military places sharp focus on the country's international role, signaling a growing confidence in its clout in the world community, writes Adam Wolfe for ISN Security Watch.On the day that Barack Obama was sworn in as US president, China's defense department issued a white paper on the current status and plans of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) - an English-language report aimed primarily at an international audience concerned about China's growing military presence.
It is the sixth such white paper since 1998, and the sixth demonstration that the country's attempts at transparency can be maddeningly unclear to western observers.
The paper reflects China's growing confidence in its increasingly important role on the world stage, while at the same time downplaying issues that have strained ties with the international community.
As with previous reports, is short on specifics about equipment and technology. Also, the US intelligence community remains convinced that China has understated its military budget by about 50 percent and is deliberately hiding its intentions. What is notable about the new paper is that it directly addresses the budget.
In one of its longest sections, the paper states that China's military budget has grown by about 20 percent annually in recent years for three reasons: rising salaries and benefits for servicemen; compensation for the rise in food and fuel prices; and modernizing the PLA's equipment. The paper further argues that as a percentage of GDP, China's defense spending remains much lower than that of the US, the UK, France, Germany or Japan. Even if the CIA's higher estimates of China's defense budget were accepted, this would remain true.
Another shift in tone came in remarks on Taiwan. Previous papers used the threat of Taiwanese independence as one of the main reasons for China's naval build-up. The new white paper all but declares victory on this front: "The attempts of the separatist forces to seek 'de jure Taiwan independence' have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan Straits has taken a significantly positive turn."
Still, US weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region are cited as security concerns for China.
Whereas previous papers downplayed China's global ambitions, the white paper signals a fresh confidence in China's position in the world. "The Chinese economy has become an important part of the world economy, China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community," the paper argues. From this perspective, the paper highlights China's growing presence in global "military operations other than war," (MOOTW, in military jargon).
The white paper notes that China had close to 1,950 military peacekeepers serving in nine UN missions last year. The PLA recently held joint training missions with 14 countries, including the US, India, Australia and the UK. In this regard, the decision to send the Chinese navy to participate in the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia is probably more of a sign of things to come than a one-off publicity stunt.
Strengthening US ties
While the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA.
The US-China relations probably hit their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations early in the Bush administration when a Chinese F-8 fighter and a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft collided near Hainan, China in April 2001. At the time, the Pentagon had put military-to-military communications on hold pending a review. After the incident was resolved, both sides began to take steps to ensure that a dialogue would remain open between their militaries, even if both continued to see each other as potential competitors.
Chinese and US forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a US aircraft carrier later that year. There were some hiccups along the road - such as Beijing's refusal to grant a US aircraft carrier a port call in November 2007 - but the both sides continued to pursue a deeper dialogue.
In April 2008, a military-to-military hotline was established to prevent any misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its power beyond its littoral waters. Obama's decision to retain Defense Secretary Robert Gates seems to indicate that the trend will continue, though there are likely to be further problems along the way.
The new white paper also highlights some of the steps that the PLA has taken to improve its transparency on the international stage - one of the main sticking points for the Pentagon.
Last year, Beijing launched the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly releases military information and holds press conferences. Also in late 2007, Beijing rejoined the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.
Still, the new white paper does not mention China's aircraft carrier program or its missiles aimed at Taiwan - and these are both major concerns for Washington.
The PLA's regional ties
The PLA has - established strong ties with its Central Asian neighbors through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has held large-scale joint training exercises in recent years. But the new white paper also stresses improving ties with India and Japan as well.
Previous papers emphasized concerns about Japanese attempts to modify its constitution to allow a military build-up. The new paper only mentions mutual visits by the Japanese and Chinese navies, and says the bilateral relationship has improved. The paper also downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build-up and an ongoing border dispute. Instead, the report cites the joint counterterrorism training exercises held in China and India in 2007 and 2008.
While Japan and India are sure to appreciate the new tone, concerns remain about China's regional intentions. Japan and China claim overlapping ownership of a section of the East China Sea. Though diplomatic progress has been made on the issue, it remains unresolved and both sides have adjusted their defensive postures in recent years as a result.
Negotiations over the disputed border with India have gone nowhere in recent years. Also, China's "string of pearls" strategy, which seeks to establish new naval bases and military ties along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea, continues to be watched with a wary eye from New Delhi. Just as India is seeking "blue-water status" for its navy, or the ability to project power further away from its coastal region, China appears to be moving into the region with its navy.
International spotlight
Whereas previous white papers stressed the continued need for training within the PLA, the most recent report's emphasis is clearly on China's new place in the world. It describes the country as an indispensable nation: "China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China."
While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the US. The Chinese ships heading to Somalia will be the first test case for what Beijing clearly believes will be a new role for its military.
Monday, 7 December 2009
PRC Missile and Space Forces 8
APMT and the Asian Financial Crisis
The APMT program is one of the few commercial communications satellite programs that has remained strong despite the Asian financial crisis. Projections of an oversupply problem for Asia, and an accompanying plunge in transponder lease rates, appeared before the 1998 recession began. Asian currencies fell, as did demand for new satellite capacity. This oversupply was compounded when India did not pass legislation as expected to open their nation to the direct-to-home satellite market. That failure left some Asian satellites with empty beams aimed at India. Additional questions arose during this time about whether there are sufficient customers for these satellites to earn revenue. The Asian market is flooded with transponder capacity, creating a buyers' market.109
At least ten Asia-Pacific region communications satellite programs have been deferred due to the economic crisis.110 These include the Measat 3, Agila 3, AsiaSat 4, Thaicom 4, LSTAR 1, LSTAR 2, and the M2A communications satellites.111
Yet another concern with Hughes' proposed APMT sale is that it could help the PRC learn about the deployment of large antenna structures. This could assist the PRC in the development of future reconnaissance satellites. Mechanisms used to deploy large antenna systems have been protected from PRC scrutiny in the past. Visual access to the satellite, as well as the risk of unauthorized discussion with engineers such as has occurred in the past, could give the PRC access to this sensitive technology for the first time.
The Role of PLA General Shen Rongjun and His Son in APMT
The complex relationship between the Shen family and the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite has raised concerns about the possible use of the satellite for military intelligence purposes, and the possibility that technology discussed in the technical interchange meetings would be transferred to the People's Liberation Army (PLA).112
In May 1994, PLA Lieutenant General Shen Rongjun, the Deputy Director of the People's Republic of China Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), traveled to the United States and attended several business meetings with Hughes. Gen. Shen's responsibilities at COSTIND included the acquisition of satellite systems for the PRC. During this visit to the United States, General Shen's son, Shen Jun, who was living in Canada at the time, attended a business lunch with his father where he was introduced to Frank Taormina of Hughes. Taormina would later assist Shen Jun in obtaining a job at Hughes.113
Shen Jun is the older of two sons born to Gen. Shen. He spent 10 of his early years living at the Taiyun Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi province. Shen Jun received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees in computer science from the Changsha Institute of Technology.114 The Changsha Institute of Technology is also known as the National Defense University of Science and Technology and is run by the PLA. For two years, Shen Jun received training and worked in the field of missiles and satellites under PLA supervision.
Shen Jun began working in North America in 1989 as a research assistant at the University of Waterloo, where he would later receive his Ph.D. in computer science in 1993.115
During his lunch meeting with Taormina in 1994, Shen Jun remarked that he was applying for a job with Hughes Canada. Taormina suggested to Shen Jun that he submit his resume to Taormina at Hughes in Los Angeles, where he could probably get a better job. While Shen Jun says he was not certain whether Taormina had a relationship with his father, he assumes that this was so, since Taormina was a Hughes vice president in charge of marketing and commercial business.116
Shen Jun was hired at Hughes in August 1994 after interviewing with Steve Hagers, who would become his boss.117 At the time, a division of Space Systems/Loral was also considering hiring Shen for a position that would have allowed him access to classified information.
Originally, Shen Jun was hired at Hughes as a scientist in the information technology division. His primary duty was to investigate new software systems that were available in the commercial market for potential use by Hughes.118 However, by June 1995, Shen Jun was transferred into Hughes' business development unit, where Hughes used him to conduct market research, general marketing of satellites in Asia, and, specifically, marketing of the APMT program.119
Another of Shen Jun's roles was to act as an interpreter for Hughes. While Hughes acquired a license from the U.S. State Department for Shen Jun to work as an interpreter in late 1996, Shen says he did not attend any of the preliminary design review meetings for APMT.120 Shen Jun states that he did translate for Hughes during at least one or two meetings in the proposal stage. During this period, Shen Jun had a foreign national badge and did not have access to certain Hughes facilities.121
Shen Jun also claims that he did not talk with his father, Gen. Shen Rongjun, on a regular basis and had only discussed the APMT satellite with him on a couple of occasions, and even then only at a very general level. Shen Jun claims he talks infrequently with his father, and that he usually talks with his mother when he talks with his family because his father is busy. Furthermore, Shen Jun claims not to know his father's current occupation since the reorganization of COSTIND. Shen Jun, acknowledges, however, that he has had "very high level" discussions with his father on APMT such as "how is the thing ... nothing deep, because it's a sensitive issue."122
Gen. Shen Rongjun's interactions with the APMT program are more obviously extensive. General Shen has been an advocate at COSTIND for purchasing Western satellites for the PLA, especially since the PRC's domestic satellites began failing in the early 1990s. Based on his position and responsibilities, Gen. Shen was directly involved in the decision to choose Hughes to work on the APMT program.
Similarities Between the PRC's Ballistic Missile and Rocket Technology
Background
The technologies used in rockets and ballistic missiles are essentially the same, except in the areas of payload and flight profile.123 The common elements of rockets and ballistic missiles include:
* Propulsion
* Structure
* Staging
* Guidance and control
* Ground support and launch equipment
* Systems integration124
These commonalities have led to considerable interaction between rocket and ballistic missile programs. Nations that possess space launch capabilities are considered to have all the essential elements to develop a ballistic missile, and vice versa.
Historically, most rockets have been derived from ballistic missiles. In the United States, for example, the current Titan, Atlas, and Delta rockets were derived from ballistic missiles developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Russia's Start rocket is essentially an SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that has been modified with an additional upper stage and a payload fairing in place of its reentry vehicle.125 Some rockets were even launched from silos, such as the Soviet-era SL-7 and SL-8. These Soviet rockets made use of the SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, respectively, as first stages.126
Since their origin, the PRC missile and space programs have been tied together. Like the space programs in the United States and the Soviet Union, the PRC space program got its early start by modifying ballistic missiles into rockets. These early attempts set a pattern of cooperation that continues today. The interaction can be seen in the overall design of the ballistic missiles and the rockets and in certain subsystems, such as propulsion.
In some areas, however, there are divergences. These divergences will increase in the future as the PRC's rockets and ballistic missiles employ different technologies, such as solid-propellant motors for ICBMs and cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for rockets.
The PRC's first rocket, known as the Long March 1, was a derivative of its limited range CSS-3 ICBM. The PRC launched two satellites aboard the Long March 1: one in 1970, and the second in 1971.
The PRC's CSS-4 ICBM has been the model for all PRC rockets since 1973. The first, the Long March 2A, has evolved into a family of rockets, including the Long March 2C, 2E, and 3; the Long March 3A family; and the Long March 4. The Long March 2C rocket is the most closely related to the CSS-4 ICBM. Indeed, it was derived directly from it. The two vehicles share the same first stage engines, structure, and dimensions.127
The PRC has also modified the CSS-3 into a small satellite launch vehicle known as the Long March 1D. The modifications include improvements to the YF-2 engines, a new second stage engine utilizing the YF-40 engines from the Long March 4, and a solid-propellant third stage similar to the apogee kick motor used on the Long March 3. The PRC has yet to use this new rocket for commercial space launches. The Long March 1D has, however, been used for military purposes.
Propulsion Systems
The propulsion system requirements for rockets and ballistic missiles are the same. Liquid-propellant engines or solid-propellant motors can be used on either. Both first and second stage engines are interchangeable between ballistic missiles and rockets. The flight environments that ballistic missiles and rockets pass through are the same, thus allowing their engines to be designed similarly. Traditionally, however, rockets use either additional stages or kick motors to place their payloads into orbit. Strap-on boosters can also be used for both rockets and ballistic missiles.
For its next generation ballistic missiles, the PRC is moving towards solid propellants. This will offer faster reaction times compared to liquid-propellant missiles. Moreover, solid-propellant missiles tend to be lighter weight. Solid propellants are less commonly used for rocket applications, since they provide less boosting power to place large payloads into orbit. Furthermore, the challenge of restarting solid-propellant motors once stopped makes them unattractive for upper stage use. The light weight of solid propellants, however, does make them useful for placing satellites into geosynchronous orbits, because they may be employed as kick motors and also as strap-on boosters on rockets.
The PRC's space program is reported to be moving away from storable liquid-propellant engines to cryogenic liquid-propellant engines. The PRC is reported to be working on a rocket that would use cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for its first and second stages. These engines provide greater boosting power over storable liquid propellants and solid propellants.128
Airframes
The airframe structure that forms the aerodynamic shell within which all elements of the rocket and ballistic missile are integrated is the same for both rockets and ballistic missiles.129
Ballistic missile and rocket structures must use materials that are lightweight and strong.130 Lightweight materials are preferred because the smaller the structural fraction of the weight of the missile or rocket, the more weight can be dedicated to payload or range.131
The structure must also be strong enough to withstand the aerodynamic loads that affect the missile or rocket during boost and ground handling operations.132 Because these loads are similar during the boost phase of flight, the structural requirements for ballistic missiles and rockets are the same, placing the same premium on materials, design, and fabrication.133
'The Fairing is part of the Launch Vehicle'
A rocket's nosecone, which protects the satellite inside, is known as a fairing. The same nosecone, if used on a ballistic missile to protect the nuclear warhead payload, is called a shroud.
Whether the launch vehicle is a rocket or a ballistic missile, the function of the nosecone is specialized to protect the payload ? satellite or nuclear warhead ? from external aerodynamic loads, vibration, noise, temperature extremes, and other environments that may be encountered as the vehicle is launched and accelerates through the atmosphere.
In the case of rockets, the fairing protects the satellite. In the case of ballistic missiles, the shroud would most likely be used to protect multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). (See the Technical Afterword to the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a description of the similarities between the design and construction of the fairing for a rocket and a shroud for a ballistic missile.)
In 1995, Hughes argued to the Commerce Department that the fairing was part of the satellite and, therefore, Hughes' advice to the PRC regarding the fairing did not require a State Department license. A Commerce Department official, without asking any other U.S. Government agency, agreed. The Select Committee requested that the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, CIA, and NASA provide responses to the question: "Is the fairing part of the launch vehicle, or part of the satellite?" Their answers are summarized below.
Defense: "The fairing is part of the launch vehicle. It is designed and manufactured by the launch provider to encapsulate payloads (including, but not limited to, satellites). The fairing must be designed as an integral part of the launch vehicle system as its structure, in many respects, determines the success of the launch." 134
State: "The Department considers the fairing to be an integral part of the space launch vehicle. The forward end of a space launch vehicle typically has a payload fairing, which protects both the satellite and the space launch vehicle from aerodynamic loading and heating during the launch vehicle's ascent through the densest part of the atmosphere." 135
Commerce: "Fairings are regarded as part of the launch vehicle. Under U.S. implementation of multilateral controls, fairings are under the export jurisdiction of the Department of State." 136
CIA: "The CIA considers the payload fairing to be part of the space launch vehicle because the fairing is needed to fly the vehicle and satellite through the atmosphere. Furthermore, the fairings are typically designed and built by the launch vehicle provider, not the satellite manufacturer." 137
NASA: "The fairing is routinely acquired as a component of the launch vehicle service." 138
Ballistic Missile and Rocket Stages
The staging mechanisms on ballistic missiles and rockets are the same. In both cases, the purpose of using stages is to carry aloft the smallest amount of weight necessary to accelerate the payload to its target.
By discarding parts of the rocket or missiles that are no longer necessary, including unused propellant, stage separation makes space flight more efficient. For ballistic missiles with low accuracy (for example, "city buster" nuclear weapons as opposed to those designed to hit ICBM silos), the mechanisms for payload separation can be similar to those used on rockets.
Guidance Systems
The guidance and control subsystem of a rocket and of a ballistic missile monitors the flight path and adjusts for the effects of high altitude winds or gravitational attractions. The purpose, in both cases, is to deliver a payload to preselected points, either in orbit or on the earth, at preselected velocities.
The accuracy capabilities of a ballistic missile's guidance system may exceed those required for placing satellites into orbit, but the guidance system for a ballistic missile can be used on a rocket. A rocket guidance system, on the other hand, is not usually designed for the same degree of accuracy as is required for ballistic missiles, and therefore may not be suitable for use in some ballistic missile missions where a high degree of accuracy is required. In most cases, however, a rocket guidance system would be sufficiently accurate for delivering nuclear weapons to large targets such as cities.139
Many of the PRC's ballistic missiles and rockets share the same guidance systems.
The Select Committee has learned from Western scientists participating in the failure review following the 1996 Long March 3B crash that the guidance system used on the Long March 2C, Long March 2E and Long March 3 rockets is also used on the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile.140
The strap-down guidance system that is used on the PLA's M-series of ballistic missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9) and CSS-X-7 (also known as the M-11), is also used on the PRC "Smart Dispenser."141 The PRC has used the Smart Dispenser to dispense two Iridium communications satellites on six different occasions.
The PRC had proposed to Loral to use this same guidance system on the PRC's "Top Stage" dispenser to dispense twelve Globalstar communications satellites from atop a Long March 2E rocket.142 The PRC marketed the Top Stage to Loral as having a mature guidance system, since its inertial measurement unit had been tested on more than 50 flights of the M-series missiles.143 After the crash of the Long March 3B carrying Loral's Intelsat 708 payload, however, Loral withdrew from its Globalstar contract with the PRC, and the 12-satellite dispenser was never used.
The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets use a different inertial measurement unit than do the Long March 2 family of rockets, the Long March 3, and the CSS-4 ICBM. The new guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C was developed in 1985, and is cheaper and lighter than the Long March 2 and Long March 3 guidance system.
The Long March 2 and 3 inertial measurement unit, for example, is so heavy that a crane is required to place it into position in the rocket. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C inertial measurement system is sufficiently smaller that it can be manually installed in the rocket.
Additionally, the Long March 2 guidance system and the guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C share almost none of the same components. The Long March 2 guidance system uses a double solder for connectors, whereas the Long March 3B uses a single solder. The Long March 2 guidance system is also a three-axis stabilized platform, whereas the Long March 3B is a four-axis stabilized platform.144
A relatively small and lightweight inertial measurement unit would be required for the PRC's next generation of ICBMs. While the Long March 3B inertial measurement unit is capable of being used for that purpose, it is considered an unlikely choice. Nonetheless, the experience that the PRC has gained with the Long March 3B in designing a small and lightweight inertial measurement unit that works will almost certainly benefit its designs of ICBM guidance systems in the future.
Ground Support
Ground support and launch procedures can be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles. The crews that launch ballistic missiles and rockets can be the same (and, indeed, PLA personnel are involved in both rocket and ICBM launches in the PRC).
The ground support equipment, such as the launch tower, the missile stand, the propellant handling equipment, and the transportation trains, can all be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.
Payload preparation and handling is an area where procedures do differ, since satellites often require a complex checkout sequence before launch which ballistic missile warheads do not.145
The various institutes and academies in the PRC involved in the design and production of ballistic missiles also share design and production responsibilities for rockets. The China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) is responsible for research and development of ballistic missiles and rockets. The Beijing Institute of Control Devices is responsible for both ballistic missile and rocket design. Moreover, all of these academies and institutes are managed within the same organizational hierarchy. These common responsibilities will allow the PRC to gain experience for both their ballistic missile and rocket programs through the launching of Western communications satellites.
The PRC's launch sites are also used for both military and commercial purposes. The Taiyun Satellite Launch Center was originally designed for launches of the CSS-4 ICBM. Today it launches the Long March 2C/SD rocket carrying Iridium satellites and the Long March 4 into polar orbits.146
Systems Integration
The system for integrating the propulsion, guidance and control, payload, and structure is the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.147 Analytical and diagnostic tools, such as structural analysis software, are the same for both and are widely available.148
Payload
The payload is the area of most significant potential difference between rockets and ballistic missiles.
Satellites are usually complex, fragile systems that are designed to remain in orbit for fixed periods of time. Satellite payloads usually are not required to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of reentry. Single warheads, on the other hand ? including nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads, as well as conventional bombs ? are designed to survive the intense stresses of atmospheric reentry.
Rockets normally use a fairing to protect the satellite payload from the aerodynamics stresses of launch (although a satellite can be designed, in some instances, to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of launch and therefore would not require a fairing). But in many cases, such as in the deployment of multiple warheads, or submarine launched missiles, ballistic missiles can include a shroud that is similar to a fairing. Both fairings and shrouds are aerodynamic shells that are placed over the payload ? satellite or warhead ? to reduce drag and aerodynamic stresses during launch.
To place the desired payloads into orbit, rockets generally operate at higher velocities than ballistic missiles. These higher velocities are often attained by high performance third stages, or by kick motors. An ICBM payload, on the other hand, is not intended to achieve orbit around the earth. Rather, the nuclear warhead reentry vehicle is considered to be a rocket whose orbit intersects the earth at the target.
Conclusion
Because of the many commonalities between rockets and ballistic missiles, the PRC can apply the same system refinements and modifications to both its rockets and ICBMs. It is likely that the failure rates of CSS-4 ICBM test flights, and the remedies the PRC adopts to address technical problems with the CSS-4 ICBM, may be the same as or similar to those of the Long March series of rockets
The APMT program is one of the few commercial communications satellite programs that has remained strong despite the Asian financial crisis. Projections of an oversupply problem for Asia, and an accompanying plunge in transponder lease rates, appeared before the 1998 recession began. Asian currencies fell, as did demand for new satellite capacity. This oversupply was compounded when India did not pass legislation as expected to open their nation to the direct-to-home satellite market. That failure left some Asian satellites with empty beams aimed at India. Additional questions arose during this time about whether there are sufficient customers for these satellites to earn revenue. The Asian market is flooded with transponder capacity, creating a buyers' market.109
At least ten Asia-Pacific region communications satellite programs have been deferred due to the economic crisis.110 These include the Measat 3, Agila 3, AsiaSat 4, Thaicom 4, LSTAR 1, LSTAR 2, and the M2A communications satellites.111
Yet another concern with Hughes' proposed APMT sale is that it could help the PRC learn about the deployment of large antenna structures. This could assist the PRC in the development of future reconnaissance satellites. Mechanisms used to deploy large antenna systems have been protected from PRC scrutiny in the past. Visual access to the satellite, as well as the risk of unauthorized discussion with engineers such as has occurred in the past, could give the PRC access to this sensitive technology for the first time.
The Role of PLA General Shen Rongjun and His Son in APMT
The complex relationship between the Shen family and the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite has raised concerns about the possible use of the satellite for military intelligence purposes, and the possibility that technology discussed in the technical interchange meetings would be transferred to the People's Liberation Army (PLA).112
In May 1994, PLA Lieutenant General Shen Rongjun, the Deputy Director of the People's Republic of China Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), traveled to the United States and attended several business meetings with Hughes. Gen. Shen's responsibilities at COSTIND included the acquisition of satellite systems for the PRC. During this visit to the United States, General Shen's son, Shen Jun, who was living in Canada at the time, attended a business lunch with his father where he was introduced to Frank Taormina of Hughes. Taormina would later assist Shen Jun in obtaining a job at Hughes.113
Shen Jun is the older of two sons born to Gen. Shen. He spent 10 of his early years living at the Taiyun Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi province. Shen Jun received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees in computer science from the Changsha Institute of Technology.114 The Changsha Institute of Technology is also known as the National Defense University of Science and Technology and is run by the PLA. For two years, Shen Jun received training and worked in the field of missiles and satellites under PLA supervision.
Shen Jun began working in North America in 1989 as a research assistant at the University of Waterloo, where he would later receive his Ph.D. in computer science in 1993.115
During his lunch meeting with Taormina in 1994, Shen Jun remarked that he was applying for a job with Hughes Canada. Taormina suggested to Shen Jun that he submit his resume to Taormina at Hughes in Los Angeles, where he could probably get a better job. While Shen Jun says he was not certain whether Taormina had a relationship with his father, he assumes that this was so, since Taormina was a Hughes vice president in charge of marketing and commercial business.116
Shen Jun was hired at Hughes in August 1994 after interviewing with Steve Hagers, who would become his boss.117 At the time, a division of Space Systems/Loral was also considering hiring Shen for a position that would have allowed him access to classified information.
Originally, Shen Jun was hired at Hughes as a scientist in the information technology division. His primary duty was to investigate new software systems that were available in the commercial market for potential use by Hughes.118 However, by June 1995, Shen Jun was transferred into Hughes' business development unit, where Hughes used him to conduct market research, general marketing of satellites in Asia, and, specifically, marketing of the APMT program.119
Another of Shen Jun's roles was to act as an interpreter for Hughes. While Hughes acquired a license from the U.S. State Department for Shen Jun to work as an interpreter in late 1996, Shen says he did not attend any of the preliminary design review meetings for APMT.120 Shen Jun states that he did translate for Hughes during at least one or two meetings in the proposal stage. During this period, Shen Jun had a foreign national badge and did not have access to certain Hughes facilities.121
Shen Jun also claims that he did not talk with his father, Gen. Shen Rongjun, on a regular basis and had only discussed the APMT satellite with him on a couple of occasions, and even then only at a very general level. Shen Jun claims he talks infrequently with his father, and that he usually talks with his mother when he talks with his family because his father is busy. Furthermore, Shen Jun claims not to know his father's current occupation since the reorganization of COSTIND. Shen Jun, acknowledges, however, that he has had "very high level" discussions with his father on APMT such as "how is the thing ... nothing deep, because it's a sensitive issue."122
Gen. Shen Rongjun's interactions with the APMT program are more obviously extensive. General Shen has been an advocate at COSTIND for purchasing Western satellites for the PLA, especially since the PRC's domestic satellites began failing in the early 1990s. Based on his position and responsibilities, Gen. Shen was directly involved in the decision to choose Hughes to work on the APMT program.
Similarities Between the PRC's Ballistic Missile and Rocket Technology
Background
The technologies used in rockets and ballistic missiles are essentially the same, except in the areas of payload and flight profile.123 The common elements of rockets and ballistic missiles include:
* Propulsion
* Structure
* Staging
* Guidance and control
* Ground support and launch equipment
* Systems integration124
These commonalities have led to considerable interaction between rocket and ballistic missile programs. Nations that possess space launch capabilities are considered to have all the essential elements to develop a ballistic missile, and vice versa.
Historically, most rockets have been derived from ballistic missiles. In the United States, for example, the current Titan, Atlas, and Delta rockets were derived from ballistic missiles developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Russia's Start rocket is essentially an SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that has been modified with an additional upper stage and a payload fairing in place of its reentry vehicle.125 Some rockets were even launched from silos, such as the Soviet-era SL-7 and SL-8. These Soviet rockets made use of the SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, respectively, as first stages.126
Since their origin, the PRC missile and space programs have been tied together. Like the space programs in the United States and the Soviet Union, the PRC space program got its early start by modifying ballistic missiles into rockets. These early attempts set a pattern of cooperation that continues today. The interaction can be seen in the overall design of the ballistic missiles and the rockets and in certain subsystems, such as propulsion.
In some areas, however, there are divergences. These divergences will increase in the future as the PRC's rockets and ballistic missiles employ different technologies, such as solid-propellant motors for ICBMs and cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for rockets.
The PRC's first rocket, known as the Long March 1, was a derivative of its limited range CSS-3 ICBM. The PRC launched two satellites aboard the Long March 1: one in 1970, and the second in 1971.
The PRC's CSS-4 ICBM has been the model for all PRC rockets since 1973. The first, the Long March 2A, has evolved into a family of rockets, including the Long March 2C, 2E, and 3; the Long March 3A family; and the Long March 4. The Long March 2C rocket is the most closely related to the CSS-4 ICBM. Indeed, it was derived directly from it. The two vehicles share the same first stage engines, structure, and dimensions.127
The PRC has also modified the CSS-3 into a small satellite launch vehicle known as the Long March 1D. The modifications include improvements to the YF-2 engines, a new second stage engine utilizing the YF-40 engines from the Long March 4, and a solid-propellant third stage similar to the apogee kick motor used on the Long March 3. The PRC has yet to use this new rocket for commercial space launches. The Long March 1D has, however, been used for military purposes.
Propulsion Systems
The propulsion system requirements for rockets and ballistic missiles are the same. Liquid-propellant engines or solid-propellant motors can be used on either. Both first and second stage engines are interchangeable between ballistic missiles and rockets. The flight environments that ballistic missiles and rockets pass through are the same, thus allowing their engines to be designed similarly. Traditionally, however, rockets use either additional stages or kick motors to place their payloads into orbit. Strap-on boosters can also be used for both rockets and ballistic missiles.
For its next generation ballistic missiles, the PRC is moving towards solid propellants. This will offer faster reaction times compared to liquid-propellant missiles. Moreover, solid-propellant missiles tend to be lighter weight. Solid propellants are less commonly used for rocket applications, since they provide less boosting power to place large payloads into orbit. Furthermore, the challenge of restarting solid-propellant motors once stopped makes them unattractive for upper stage use. The light weight of solid propellants, however, does make them useful for placing satellites into geosynchronous orbits, because they may be employed as kick motors and also as strap-on boosters on rockets.
The PRC's space program is reported to be moving away from storable liquid-propellant engines to cryogenic liquid-propellant engines. The PRC is reported to be working on a rocket that would use cryogenic liquid-propellant engines for its first and second stages. These engines provide greater boosting power over storable liquid propellants and solid propellants.128
Airframes
The airframe structure that forms the aerodynamic shell within which all elements of the rocket and ballistic missile are integrated is the same for both rockets and ballistic missiles.129
Ballistic missile and rocket structures must use materials that are lightweight and strong.130 Lightweight materials are preferred because the smaller the structural fraction of the weight of the missile or rocket, the more weight can be dedicated to payload or range.131
The structure must also be strong enough to withstand the aerodynamic loads that affect the missile or rocket during boost and ground handling operations.132 Because these loads are similar during the boost phase of flight, the structural requirements for ballistic missiles and rockets are the same, placing the same premium on materials, design, and fabrication.133
'The Fairing is part of the Launch Vehicle'
A rocket's nosecone, which protects the satellite inside, is known as a fairing. The same nosecone, if used on a ballistic missile to protect the nuclear warhead payload, is called a shroud.
Whether the launch vehicle is a rocket or a ballistic missile, the function of the nosecone is specialized to protect the payload ? satellite or nuclear warhead ? from external aerodynamic loads, vibration, noise, temperature extremes, and other environments that may be encountered as the vehicle is launched and accelerates through the atmosphere.
In the case of rockets, the fairing protects the satellite. In the case of ballistic missiles, the shroud would most likely be used to protect multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). (See the Technical Afterword to the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a description of the similarities between the design and construction of the fairing for a rocket and a shroud for a ballistic missile.)
In 1995, Hughes argued to the Commerce Department that the fairing was part of the satellite and, therefore, Hughes' advice to the PRC regarding the fairing did not require a State Department license. A Commerce Department official, without asking any other U.S. Government agency, agreed. The Select Committee requested that the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, CIA, and NASA provide responses to the question: "Is the fairing part of the launch vehicle, or part of the satellite?" Their answers are summarized below.
Defense: "The fairing is part of the launch vehicle. It is designed and manufactured by the launch provider to encapsulate payloads (including, but not limited to, satellites). The fairing must be designed as an integral part of the launch vehicle system as its structure, in many respects, determines the success of the launch." 134
State: "The Department considers the fairing to be an integral part of the space launch vehicle. The forward end of a space launch vehicle typically has a payload fairing, which protects both the satellite and the space launch vehicle from aerodynamic loading and heating during the launch vehicle's ascent through the densest part of the atmosphere." 135
Commerce: "Fairings are regarded as part of the launch vehicle. Under U.S. implementation of multilateral controls, fairings are under the export jurisdiction of the Department of State." 136
CIA: "The CIA considers the payload fairing to be part of the space launch vehicle because the fairing is needed to fly the vehicle and satellite through the atmosphere. Furthermore, the fairings are typically designed and built by the launch vehicle provider, not the satellite manufacturer." 137
NASA: "The fairing is routinely acquired as a component of the launch vehicle service." 138
Ballistic Missile and Rocket Stages
The staging mechanisms on ballistic missiles and rockets are the same. In both cases, the purpose of using stages is to carry aloft the smallest amount of weight necessary to accelerate the payload to its target.
By discarding parts of the rocket or missiles that are no longer necessary, including unused propellant, stage separation makes space flight more efficient. For ballistic missiles with low accuracy (for example, "city buster" nuclear weapons as opposed to those designed to hit ICBM silos), the mechanisms for payload separation can be similar to those used on rockets.
Guidance Systems
The guidance and control subsystem of a rocket and of a ballistic missile monitors the flight path and adjusts for the effects of high altitude winds or gravitational attractions. The purpose, in both cases, is to deliver a payload to preselected points, either in orbit or on the earth, at preselected velocities.
The accuracy capabilities of a ballistic missile's guidance system may exceed those required for placing satellites into orbit, but the guidance system for a ballistic missile can be used on a rocket. A rocket guidance system, on the other hand, is not usually designed for the same degree of accuracy as is required for ballistic missiles, and therefore may not be suitable for use in some ballistic missile missions where a high degree of accuracy is required. In most cases, however, a rocket guidance system would be sufficiently accurate for delivering nuclear weapons to large targets such as cities.139
Many of the PRC's ballistic missiles and rockets share the same guidance systems.
The Select Committee has learned from Western scientists participating in the failure review following the 1996 Long March 3B crash that the guidance system used on the Long March 2C, Long March 2E and Long March 3 rockets is also used on the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile.140
The strap-down guidance system that is used on the PLA's M-series of ballistic missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9) and CSS-X-7 (also known as the M-11), is also used on the PRC "Smart Dispenser."141 The PRC has used the Smart Dispenser to dispense two Iridium communications satellites on six different occasions.
The PRC had proposed to Loral to use this same guidance system on the PRC's "Top Stage" dispenser to dispense twelve Globalstar communications satellites from atop a Long March 2E rocket.142 The PRC marketed the Top Stage to Loral as having a mature guidance system, since its inertial measurement unit had been tested on more than 50 flights of the M-series missiles.143 After the crash of the Long March 3B carrying Loral's Intelsat 708 payload, however, Loral withdrew from its Globalstar contract with the PRC, and the 12-satellite dispenser was never used.
The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets use a different inertial measurement unit than do the Long March 2 family of rockets, the Long March 3, and the CSS-4 ICBM. The new guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C was developed in 1985, and is cheaper and lighter than the Long March 2 and Long March 3 guidance system.
The Long March 2 and 3 inertial measurement unit, for example, is so heavy that a crane is required to place it into position in the rocket. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C inertial measurement system is sufficiently smaller that it can be manually installed in the rocket.
Additionally, the Long March 2 guidance system and the guidance system for the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C share almost none of the same components. The Long March 2 guidance system uses a double solder for connectors, whereas the Long March 3B uses a single solder. The Long March 2 guidance system is also a three-axis stabilized platform, whereas the Long March 3B is a four-axis stabilized platform.144
A relatively small and lightweight inertial measurement unit would be required for the PRC's next generation of ICBMs. While the Long March 3B inertial measurement unit is capable of being used for that purpose, it is considered an unlikely choice. Nonetheless, the experience that the PRC has gained with the Long March 3B in designing a small and lightweight inertial measurement unit that works will almost certainly benefit its designs of ICBM guidance systems in the future.
Ground Support
Ground support and launch procedures can be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles. The crews that launch ballistic missiles and rockets can be the same (and, indeed, PLA personnel are involved in both rocket and ICBM launches in the PRC).
The ground support equipment, such as the launch tower, the missile stand, the propellant handling equipment, and the transportation trains, can all be the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.
Payload preparation and handling is an area where procedures do differ, since satellites often require a complex checkout sequence before launch which ballistic missile warheads do not.145
The various institutes and academies in the PRC involved in the design and production of ballistic missiles also share design and production responsibilities for rockets. The China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) is responsible for research and development of ballistic missiles and rockets. The Beijing Institute of Control Devices is responsible for both ballistic missile and rocket design. Moreover, all of these academies and institutes are managed within the same organizational hierarchy. These common responsibilities will allow the PRC to gain experience for both their ballistic missile and rocket programs through the launching of Western communications satellites.
The PRC's launch sites are also used for both military and commercial purposes. The Taiyun Satellite Launch Center was originally designed for launches of the CSS-4 ICBM. Today it launches the Long March 2C/SD rocket carrying Iridium satellites and the Long March 4 into polar orbits.146
Systems Integration
The system for integrating the propulsion, guidance and control, payload, and structure is the same for rockets and ballistic missiles.147 Analytical and diagnostic tools, such as structural analysis software, are the same for both and are widely available.148
Payload
The payload is the area of most significant potential difference between rockets and ballistic missiles.
Satellites are usually complex, fragile systems that are designed to remain in orbit for fixed periods of time. Satellite payloads usually are not required to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of reentry. Single warheads, on the other hand ? including nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads, as well as conventional bombs ? are designed to survive the intense stresses of atmospheric reentry.
Rockets normally use a fairing to protect the satellite payload from the aerodynamics stresses of launch (although a satellite can be designed, in some instances, to withstand the aerodynamic stresses of launch and therefore would not require a fairing). But in many cases, such as in the deployment of multiple warheads, or submarine launched missiles, ballistic missiles can include a shroud that is similar to a fairing. Both fairings and shrouds are aerodynamic shells that are placed over the payload ? satellite or warhead ? to reduce drag and aerodynamic stresses during launch.
To place the desired payloads into orbit, rockets generally operate at higher velocities than ballistic missiles. These higher velocities are often attained by high performance third stages, or by kick motors. An ICBM payload, on the other hand, is not intended to achieve orbit around the earth. Rather, the nuclear warhead reentry vehicle is considered to be a rocket whose orbit intersects the earth at the target.
Conclusion
Because of the many commonalities between rockets and ballistic missiles, the PRC can apply the same system refinements and modifications to both its rockets and ICBMs. It is likely that the failure rates of CSS-4 ICBM test flights, and the remedies the PRC adopts to address technical problems with the CSS-4 ICBM, may be the same as or similar to those of the Long March series of rockets
PRC Missile and Space Forces 7
These failures have left the PRC dependent on Western-manufactured satellites, which it purchases through multinational consortia in which the PRC maintains a controlling interest. These include the Asia Pacific Satellite Telecommunications Co., and China Orient Telecomm Satellite Co, Ltd. Satellites acquired by the PRC in this way include the Apstar-1, Apstar-1A, Apstar-2R, and ChinaStar-1.
It is likely that these failures have made the PLA dependent on Western communications satellites as well.
PRC Use of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs)
The PRC has acquired Western-manufactured very small aperture terminals (VSATs) that could be used for military satellite communications.
VSATs are small satellite communications antennas used to transmit voice, data, video, fax, and computer-to-computer communications between multiple users. One VSAT terminal can be used to transmit communications from multiple users to different recipients via communications satellites.
The small size of VSAT terminals allows easy transportation between different locations and assembly in remote areas. These VSAT networks could improve the PLA's military command and control capabilities, by allowing mobile, reliable communications virtually anywhere.
The majority of VSAT terminals in use today in the PRC are U.S. manufactured. Hughes is by far the largest provider of VSAT networks to the PRC. The other significant U.S. supplier is Scientific Atlantic. Other providers include NEC of Japan and Spar of Canada.85
The PLA's Reconnaissance Satellite Program
The PLA has developed a photo reconnaissance satellite, known as the FSW (for the Fanhui Shi Weixing, or Recoverable Test Satellite). The current version of the Recoverable Test Satellite uses a recoverable capsule similar in concept to those used in the early U.S. Corona program. This PLA reconnaissance satellite provides the PRC with the ability to photograph U.S. military installations.
The first version of the satellite was successfully launched on November 26, 1975, using a Long March 2C rocket. After three days in orbit, the satellite capsule reentered and was successfully recovered by the PRC. Subsequent redesigns of the FSW-1 satellites allowed the PRC to increase its on-orbit life to five days before reentry. The PRC launched fifteen FSW-1 satellites, the last occurring in October 1993.86
The PRC's current, enhanced version of this satellite is known as the FSW-2. The FSW-2 is larger than the FSW-1 and has a longer on-orbit life. The FSW-2 military reconnaissance satellite has been launched three times since 1992.87 The most recent launch occurred in October 1996.
The PRC has also offered the FSW satellites as microgravity research platforms ? that is, scientific experiments are mounted on the military reconnaissance satellite itself. The commercial proceeds from such "piggy back" launches may in turn be used to subsidize the efforts of PRC entities. Starting in 1987, several FSW satellites have carried microgravity experiments for commercial customers including France and Germany.88
The PRC has also announced that it is going to deploy a new, more capable military reconnaissance satellite.
CBERS: A Prototype of the PRC's Acquisition of Western Technology
The CBERS-1 satellite program is an open program that has received considerable publicity. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is interested in promoting Western interest in this presumably civil satellite because it offers a means of acquiring technology that could be useful for future military reconnaissance satellites.
CBERS stands for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite. The CBERS-1 satellite is a joint venture with Brazil for the development of a remote imaging satellite that will include a variety of Western technologies.
The CBERS remote imagery satellite is designed to include wide field imagery, a charge-coupled device (CCD) camera from the United States manufactured by Fairchild, and an infrared multispectral camera. The satellite is designed to provide global coverage at a variety of spatial resolutions and spectral bands to meet a range of commercial needs.
The CBERS-1 satellite, if successfully completed and deployed, will be able to image any location on the Earth within three days in the visible region, and 26 days in the infrared region.
The PRC's Other Military Satellite Programs
The PRC has developed and deployed a variety of other satellites for military purposes since its first launches in the 1970s.
It has been reported that the PRC may have developed a series of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites in the early 1970s.89 These satellites would have been useful for collecting data on Soviet defense, among other purposes.
The PRC has also developed two different types of meteorological satellites for military and civil purposes, known as Feng Yun (Wind and Cloud).
* The FY-1 series of satellites, first launched in 1988, are polar-orbiting. The FY-1 satellites have suffered a series of on-orbit failures. The first satellite operated for only 39 days of its one-year planned design life; the second satellite lost attitude control five months into its on-orbit life, was recovered 50 days later, and was again lost due to radiation damage.
* The FY-2 satellites were designed to provide meteorological information from geosynchronous orbit. The first satellite of this class, however, was lost due to an explosion during ground processing.90 The second of this class was launched on June 10, 1997 and was successfully placed into orbit.91
While the PLA has, to date, relied on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) navigation satellites, the PRC has announced plans for its own navigation satellite system, known as the Twin Star. The GPS system of satellites, which provides three-dimensional positioning and timing data throughout the globe, consists of 24 satellites with several on-orbit spares. The Russian GLONASS system is intended to use 21 satellites with three on-orbit spares, but the financial crisis in Russia has reduced the number of operational satellites currently on orbit.
In comparison, the PRC's proposed Twin Star positioning system program, as planned, would utilize two satellites in geosynchronous orbit for positioning, messaging, and timing services.92 The Twin Star system represents the PRC's attempt to become independent of the United States' GPS and the Russian GLONASS navigation satellites.
The Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Satellite
Hughes is currently designing a geosynchronous communications satellite for a PRC-controlled consortium, Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications, Ltd. (APMT). The stated purpose is to provide regional mobile communications throughout Asia.93
Unlike previous communications satellites, however, this satellite uses a very large antenna array, which has raised concerns that the satellite could be used not simply for telecommunications, but also for space-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.
This would give the PRC the capability to eavesdrop electronically on conversations not only in the PRC, but also in neighboring countries. Since the APMT satellite's antenna array is significantly larger than any that has been provided to the PRC by any Western nation, it is likely that the PRC would seek to exploit the APMT design for a future PRC SIGINT satellite.
Other concerns have been raised about the participation of the son of a PLA general in the program's technical interchange meetings, as described in greater detail below.
When Hughes was awarded this contract, PRC entities had at least a 51 percent share in the international consortium that made up APMT. PRC entities involved included China Aerospace Corporation, China Launch and Tracking Control General, Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and UNICOM, the PRC's second telephone network. Originally, two Singaporean companies, Singapore Telecommunications, Ltd. and Singapore Technologies Telemedia, owned twenty-five percent of APMT.94 In 1998, however, Singapore Telecommunications pulled out of the APMT project, stating that the project no longer met its business requirements.95 Thailand is also listed by Hughes as an "other" shareholder in APMT.96 In 1998, Hughes reported that the shareholders for APMT included:
* China Aerospace Corporation
* China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology
* China Satellite Launch & Tracking Control General
* China Communications Systems Co. Limited
* China Resources Holdings Co. Ltd (PRC)
* Communications Authority of Thailand
* Telephone Organization of Thailand
* China Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite Corporation
* China Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite Co. Ltd.
* Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
* Sunburst Technologies Investments Pte. Ltd. of Singapore
* Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan
* NTT Mobilecommunications Network Inc. of Japan
* Future Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. of Thailand97
In the early 1990s, APMT held a competition among satellite manufacturers for a regional mobile communications satellite system that would use 50,000 small, portable handsets similar to cellular telephones. The system called for a communications satellite in geosynchronous orbit, which would transmit communications between handsets or rout them through "gateways" into the local telephone network.98 Among the competitors were Hughes and Loral.99
Hughes won the APMT contract. In 1996, Hughes requested an export license from the Commerce Department for the APMT satellite.100 If approved for export, the APMT satellite was to be launched on a Long March 3B rocket from the PRC.101 Hughes' design proposal, as originally submitted to the Commerce Department, included two HS 601 satellite buses with a 12-year design life. The satellites were to be equipped with a 40 foot L-band antenna.102 The license was originally approved by the Commerce Department in 1996.103
In April 1998, Hughes submitted a second license request to the Commerce Department due to changes in the satellite bus design.104 Hughes wanted to use the more powerful HS-GEM bus, in place of the HS 601, which would have permitted them to achieve design commonalities and hence production efficiencies with another satellite sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The design change for the UAE satellite was the result of a requirement by Hughes' Thuraya satellite customer, who wanted to reduce the power used by the handsets when transmitting. This required an increase in the sensitivity and power of the satellites and their antenna.105 The original contract also called for two on-orbit satellites. This was modified to one on-orbit satellite and one spare satellite.106
The 40-foot antenna, which uses a truss-like outer ring and mesh reflector surface, is the unique aspect of the APMT satellite design. It has led to concerns that the PRC could use the APMT satellite for signals intelligence collection against a wide spectrum of communications.107
The satellite, however, is designed to collect and process only communications in the same bandwidth as is allocated to the handsets.108 Communications satellite antennas are designed to receive their own frequency and reject all others. To do otherwise would add unnecessary expense and complexity to the satellite.
In an attempt to reduce interference from other satellites using the same frequency bands, the APMT satellite antenna will use "left-hand circular polarization" which gives its signals a unique signature. The satellite will not collect other signals that use right, vertical, horizontal, or no polarization. These factors thus limit the satellite's ability to engage in signals intelligence to the collection of information transmitted by APMT system users. That volume of information, however, would be substantial.
When the handsets in the proposed APMT system are used, even for handset-to-handset conversations that are not bounced off the satellite, copies of the transmissions are downloaded to a central ground station. This capability is typically required of most satellite communications systems. Only Iridium, which uses inter-satellite cross-links, does not downlink its communications to a ground station. This downlink would allow the PRC to monitor the communications of APMT's users across the Asian region.
It is likely that these failures have made the PLA dependent on Western communications satellites as well.
PRC Use of Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs)
The PRC has acquired Western-manufactured very small aperture terminals (VSATs) that could be used for military satellite communications.
VSATs are small satellite communications antennas used to transmit voice, data, video, fax, and computer-to-computer communications between multiple users. One VSAT terminal can be used to transmit communications from multiple users to different recipients via communications satellites.
The small size of VSAT terminals allows easy transportation between different locations and assembly in remote areas. These VSAT networks could improve the PLA's military command and control capabilities, by allowing mobile, reliable communications virtually anywhere.
The majority of VSAT terminals in use today in the PRC are U.S. manufactured. Hughes is by far the largest provider of VSAT networks to the PRC. The other significant U.S. supplier is Scientific Atlantic. Other providers include NEC of Japan and Spar of Canada.85
The PLA's Reconnaissance Satellite Program
The PLA has developed a photo reconnaissance satellite, known as the FSW (for the Fanhui Shi Weixing, or Recoverable Test Satellite). The current version of the Recoverable Test Satellite uses a recoverable capsule similar in concept to those used in the early U.S. Corona program. This PLA reconnaissance satellite provides the PRC with the ability to photograph U.S. military installations.
The first version of the satellite was successfully launched on November 26, 1975, using a Long March 2C rocket. After three days in orbit, the satellite capsule reentered and was successfully recovered by the PRC. Subsequent redesigns of the FSW-1 satellites allowed the PRC to increase its on-orbit life to five days before reentry. The PRC launched fifteen FSW-1 satellites, the last occurring in October 1993.86
The PRC's current, enhanced version of this satellite is known as the FSW-2. The FSW-2 is larger than the FSW-1 and has a longer on-orbit life. The FSW-2 military reconnaissance satellite has been launched three times since 1992.87 The most recent launch occurred in October 1996.
The PRC has also offered the FSW satellites as microgravity research platforms ? that is, scientific experiments are mounted on the military reconnaissance satellite itself. The commercial proceeds from such "piggy back" launches may in turn be used to subsidize the efforts of PRC entities. Starting in 1987, several FSW satellites have carried microgravity experiments for commercial customers including France and Germany.88
The PRC has also announced that it is going to deploy a new, more capable military reconnaissance satellite.
CBERS: A Prototype of the PRC's Acquisition of Western Technology
The CBERS-1 satellite program is an open program that has received considerable publicity. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is interested in promoting Western interest in this presumably civil satellite because it offers a means of acquiring technology that could be useful for future military reconnaissance satellites.
CBERS stands for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite. The CBERS-1 satellite is a joint venture with Brazil for the development of a remote imaging satellite that will include a variety of Western technologies.
The CBERS remote imagery satellite is designed to include wide field imagery, a charge-coupled device (CCD) camera from the United States manufactured by Fairchild, and an infrared multispectral camera. The satellite is designed to provide global coverage at a variety of spatial resolutions and spectral bands to meet a range of commercial needs.
The CBERS-1 satellite, if successfully completed and deployed, will be able to image any location on the Earth within three days in the visible region, and 26 days in the infrared region.
The PRC's Other Military Satellite Programs
The PRC has developed and deployed a variety of other satellites for military purposes since its first launches in the 1970s.
It has been reported that the PRC may have developed a series of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites in the early 1970s.89 These satellites would have been useful for collecting data on Soviet defense, among other purposes.
The PRC has also developed two different types of meteorological satellites for military and civil purposes, known as Feng Yun (Wind and Cloud).
* The FY-1 series of satellites, first launched in 1988, are polar-orbiting. The FY-1 satellites have suffered a series of on-orbit failures. The first satellite operated for only 39 days of its one-year planned design life; the second satellite lost attitude control five months into its on-orbit life, was recovered 50 days later, and was again lost due to radiation damage.
* The FY-2 satellites were designed to provide meteorological information from geosynchronous orbit. The first satellite of this class, however, was lost due to an explosion during ground processing.90 The second of this class was launched on June 10, 1997 and was successfully placed into orbit.91
While the PLA has, to date, relied on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) navigation satellites, the PRC has announced plans for its own navigation satellite system, known as the Twin Star. The GPS system of satellites, which provides three-dimensional positioning and timing data throughout the globe, consists of 24 satellites with several on-orbit spares. The Russian GLONASS system is intended to use 21 satellites with three on-orbit spares, but the financial crisis in Russia has reduced the number of operational satellites currently on orbit.
In comparison, the PRC's proposed Twin Star positioning system program, as planned, would utilize two satellites in geosynchronous orbit for positioning, messaging, and timing services.92 The Twin Star system represents the PRC's attempt to become independent of the United States' GPS and the Russian GLONASS navigation satellites.
The Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) Satellite
Hughes is currently designing a geosynchronous communications satellite for a PRC-controlled consortium, Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications, Ltd. (APMT). The stated purpose is to provide regional mobile communications throughout Asia.93
Unlike previous communications satellites, however, this satellite uses a very large antenna array, which has raised concerns that the satellite could be used not simply for telecommunications, but also for space-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection.
This would give the PRC the capability to eavesdrop electronically on conversations not only in the PRC, but also in neighboring countries. Since the APMT satellite's antenna array is significantly larger than any that has been provided to the PRC by any Western nation, it is likely that the PRC would seek to exploit the APMT design for a future PRC SIGINT satellite.
Other concerns have been raised about the participation of the son of a PLA general in the program's technical interchange meetings, as described in greater detail below.
When Hughes was awarded this contract, PRC entities had at least a 51 percent share in the international consortium that made up APMT. PRC entities involved included China Aerospace Corporation, China Launch and Tracking Control General, Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and UNICOM, the PRC's second telephone network. Originally, two Singaporean companies, Singapore Telecommunications, Ltd. and Singapore Technologies Telemedia, owned twenty-five percent of APMT.94 In 1998, however, Singapore Telecommunications pulled out of the APMT project, stating that the project no longer met its business requirements.95 Thailand is also listed by Hughes as an "other" shareholder in APMT.96 In 1998, Hughes reported that the shareholders for APMT included:
* China Aerospace Corporation
* China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology
* China Satellite Launch & Tracking Control General
* China Communications Systems Co. Limited
* China Resources Holdings Co. Ltd (PRC)
* Communications Authority of Thailand
* Telephone Organization of Thailand
* China Telecommunications Broadcast Satellite Corporation
* China Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite Co. Ltd.
* Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
* Sunburst Technologies Investments Pte. Ltd. of Singapore
* Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan
* NTT Mobilecommunications Network Inc. of Japan
* Future Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. of Thailand97
In the early 1990s, APMT held a competition among satellite manufacturers for a regional mobile communications satellite system that would use 50,000 small, portable handsets similar to cellular telephones. The system called for a communications satellite in geosynchronous orbit, which would transmit communications between handsets or rout them through "gateways" into the local telephone network.98 Among the competitors were Hughes and Loral.99
Hughes won the APMT contract. In 1996, Hughes requested an export license from the Commerce Department for the APMT satellite.100 If approved for export, the APMT satellite was to be launched on a Long March 3B rocket from the PRC.101 Hughes' design proposal, as originally submitted to the Commerce Department, included two HS 601 satellite buses with a 12-year design life. The satellites were to be equipped with a 40 foot L-band antenna.102 The license was originally approved by the Commerce Department in 1996.103
In April 1998, Hughes submitted a second license request to the Commerce Department due to changes in the satellite bus design.104 Hughes wanted to use the more powerful HS-GEM bus, in place of the HS 601, which would have permitted them to achieve design commonalities and hence production efficiencies with another satellite sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The design change for the UAE satellite was the result of a requirement by Hughes' Thuraya satellite customer, who wanted to reduce the power used by the handsets when transmitting. This required an increase in the sensitivity and power of the satellites and their antenna.105 The original contract also called for two on-orbit satellites. This was modified to one on-orbit satellite and one spare satellite.106
The 40-foot antenna, which uses a truss-like outer ring and mesh reflector surface, is the unique aspect of the APMT satellite design. It has led to concerns that the PRC could use the APMT satellite for signals intelligence collection against a wide spectrum of communications.107
The satellite, however, is designed to collect and process only communications in the same bandwidth as is allocated to the handsets.108 Communications satellite antennas are designed to receive their own frequency and reject all others. To do otherwise would add unnecessary expense and complexity to the satellite.
In an attempt to reduce interference from other satellites using the same frequency bands, the APMT satellite antenna will use "left-hand circular polarization" which gives its signals a unique signature. The satellite will not collect other signals that use right, vertical, horizontal, or no polarization. These factors thus limit the satellite's ability to engage in signals intelligence to the collection of information transmitted by APMT system users. That volume of information, however, would be substantial.
When the handsets in the proposed APMT system are used, even for handset-to-handset conversations that are not bounced off the satellite, copies of the transmissions are downloaded to a central ground station. This capability is typically required of most satellite communications systems. Only Iridium, which uses inter-satellite cross-links, does not downlink its communications to a ground station. This downlink would allow the PRC to monitor the communications of APMT's users across the Asian region.
PRC Missile and Space Forces 6
Recently, the PRC has made an effort to sell low-earth orbit satellite launches:
* The PRC has entered into contracts with Motorola for the launch of Iridium satellites, including a contract to launch replacement satellites. Iridium satellites have been successfully launched six times on the Long March 2C/SD (that is, the Long March 2C with a "Smart Dispenser" (SD) stage added). The "Smart Dispenser" allows the PRC to launch two Iridium satellites into orbit at a time.
* The PRC has pursued a contract with Loral for the launch of Globalstar satellites. The PRC offered a version of its Long March 2E equipped with a "Top Stage" (TS) that would dispense twelve Globalstar satellites. While Loral had originally contracted for a launch on the Long March 2E/TS, it cancelled that contract following the crash of the Long March 3B in February 1996.
The PRC's Future Space Launch Capabilities
The PRC also recognizes the importance of space in future conflicts, for purposes that include both command and control, and military reconnaissance. The PRC is believed to be developing a new, larger rocket that will be able to carry larger payloads into orbit.
PRC papers have discussed the use of cryogenic liquid propellant engines for this future rocket. One of the engines the PRC could use is the RD-120. The PRC is known to have acquired at least one of these engines from Russian during the 1990s.69 The RD-120 is a liquid oxygen/kerosene engine that is used on the second stage of the Zenit rocket, which is used on the multinational Sea Launch program.
Difficulties with the development of the new engines for this rocket may have prompted the PRC to focus, in the nearer term, on the proposed Long March 2E(A) and Long March 3B(A) versions of the Long March rocket that will utilize improved strap-on boosters to achieve greater payload-to-orbit capability. It should be noted that these are the two systems that were the subject of the failure review investigations in which Loral and Hughes participated. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of how these failure reviews assisted the PRC.
PRC Space Weapons
The PRC is believed to be developing space-based and ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons. Such weapons would be of exceptional value for the control of space and information. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is moving toward the deployment of such weapons.
Based on the significant level of PRC-Russian cooperation on weapons development, it is possible that the PRC will be able to use nuclear reactors to pump lasers with pulse energies high enough to destroy satellites.
In addition, Russian cooperation could help the PRC to develop an advanced radar system using lasers to track and image satellites.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC has the technical capability to develop direct ascent anti-satellite weapons. The CSS-2 could be modified for use in this role. This would be similar to the approach taken by the Soviets with their SS-9 ASAT system.
The PRC's Manned Space Program
The PRC has conducted research since the 1950s, including biological and life support research, on placing astronauts into orbit. Pursuant to its 921 Project, the PRC's plans since the 1980s have included concepts for Space Shuttle-like spacecraft, recoverable capsules, and a space station.70
In 1996, two PRC astronauts began training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City, Russia. The PRC appears set to launch these two astronauts into space sometime this year to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Communist rule in China.
For its manned space program, the PRC will use Soyuz capsules purchased during Yeltsin's visit to the PRC in April 1996. A Soyuz capsule will be carried on top of the Long March 2E, using a payload shroud (that is, a fairing) equipped with a launch escape system. (See Chapter 5, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a discussion of fairing improvements to the Long March 2E.)
If the PRC is successful in placing men in orbit, it will be only the third nation, after Russia and the United States, to have done this.
The PRC's Communications Satellite Programs
Since the beginning of its domestic communications satellite programs, the PRC has suffered a string of problems with the performance of its communications satellites, as well as the rockets designed to place those satellites into orbit.
During the mid-to-late 1980s, the PRC was able to place four of its communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. Today, however, the PRC has only one active domestically-manufactured telecommunications satellite on orbit. This satellite has reportedly suffered on-orbit problems that may have reduced its capabilities.71
The PRC's inability to place reliable communications satellites (COMSATs) into orbit has created serious gaps in the PRC's satellite communications capabilities, both for civilian and military purposes. The PRC has addressed the greatest part of its satellite communications requirement by leasing communications channels on Western-manufactured communications satellites.
The PRC first began developing its own communications satellites in the early 1970s, based on Western technology. All of these satellites were designed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) for military purposes. They have all been operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), which is subordinate to COSTIND.72
The PRC's inability to design and produce advanced communications satellites has also led it to seek Western components and technology for its domestic communications satellite industry. The Select Committee judges that the use of Western technology cut in half the time required for the PRC to progress from an experimental communications satellite to the advanced DFH-3 satellites, which were first launched in 1994.
The following table shows a chronology of the PRC's history of launching PRC communications satellites.
History of the PRC's Domestic
Communications Satellite Launches
PRC SatelliteDate PRC RocketResult
DFH-2Jan. 29, 1984 Long March 3Rocket Failure
DFH-2Apr. 8, 1984 Long March 3Success
DFH-2Feb. 1, 1986 Long March 3Success
DFH-2AMar. 7, 1988 Long March 3Success
DFH-2ADec. 22, 1988 Long March 3Success
DFH-2AFeb. 4, 1990 Long March 3Success
DFH-2ADec. 28, 1991 Long March 3Rocket Failure
DFH-3Nov. 29, 1994 Long March 3A Satellite Failure
DFH-3May 11, 1997 Long March 3ASatellite Problem
The PRC's first generation communications satellite was the Dong Fang Hong-2 ("East is Red"). These satellites were designed to provide the PRC with test experience. The satellite design was similar to that used on the Hughes HS376 satellites, employing a spin-stabilized body and a de-spun horn antenna.
The first attempt to launch a DFH-2 satellite, in January 1984, was not successful due to the failure of the Long March 3 rocket that was to carry it into orbit. The second launch attempt on April 8, 1984 successfully placed a communications satellite into orbit. A third DFH-2 satellite was launched on February 1, 1986. This satellite provided communications services until it reached the end of its service life.
In 1988, the PRC launched an improved version of this satellite, known as the DFH-2A. The new satellite used the same spin-stabilized body, this time equipped with an improved antenna array that increased the number of communications channels available.
These satellites were able to handle five television channels and 3,000 phone calls simultaneously. The first three of these satellites were named "Chinasats" by the PRC, and were successfully launched twice in 1988 and once in 1990. A fourth DFH-2A satellite launch in 1990 was unsuccessful, when the failure of the rocket's third-stage engine left the satellite stranded in an incorrect orbit.
The PRC's third generation communications satellites, known as the DFH-3, are the PRC's most modern communication satellites. The DFH-3 is useful for military communications. These satellites have three-axis stabilized bodies, 24 C-band transponders and are designed to have an 8-year on-orbit life. Due to the increased weight of these satellites as compared to the DFH-2A, the DFH-3 satellites are launched on the more capable Long March 3A rocket.
The first launch of the DFH-3 satellite on November 29, 1994 was unsuccessful when the satellite failed to attain the proper orbit, rendering it useless for its intended communications function.
The PRC's second attempt to launch a DFH-3 satellite on May 11, 1997 successfully placed the satellite into a geosynchronous orbit at 125 degrees east longitude.73 The PRC, however, reportedly may have suffered problems with the satellite.74
The PRC's Use of Foreign Components on Communications Satellites
The PRC's limited communications satellite construction capabilities led it from the first to seek Western manufacturers for reliable components. Even the PRC's most modern communications satellite, the DFH-3, which was first successfully launched in 1997, contains a large number of Western components:
* The DFH-3 is reported to use a control processor built by Matra-Marconi75
* Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm (MBB) provided the DFH-3 solar panel substrates to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), and CAST-produced solar cells were mounted on them. The solar panel assemblies were then returned to MBB for assembly into deployable solar arrays76
* Daimler Chrysler Aerospace Group provided the DFH-3's antenna assembly, consisting of a deployable dual gridded reflector, feed and interconnecting structure77
* Officine Galileo provided the Infrared Earth sensor to determine pitch/roll in geosynchronous orbit78
* The DFH-3's payload test equipment, according to 1993 reports, consisted of five racks and consoles with 80% U.S. Hewlett Packard and German equipment
* The equipment racks for the test equipment were provided by Germany's Ant Corporation79possible
PRC Assistance to North Korea
The PRC, through the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), provides complete satellites and technology to other nations. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a three stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. The North Koreans claim to have launched their first satellite, known as Kwangmyongsong No. 1 (Bright Star 1), on this Taepo Dong-1 missile. Comparing the picture of the Kwangmyongsong No. 1 satellite released by North Korea with that of the PRC's Dong Fang Hong 1 satellite. The two bear a striking resemblance.
Several U.S. companies have also marketed their communications satellite technologies to the PRC. Loral, for example, offered the PRC a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) capability in 1996 using either a Loral-produced satellite bus or the DFH-3 series satellite bus.80 A 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between Loral and China Aerospace Corporation offered the PRC direct broadcast satellites, regional mobile satellite services systems, and the joint development of an advanced high capacity communications satellite. Under this agreement, Loral would provide design and technical support, while the final integration of the satellite was to have occurred in Germany or the PRC.81
Hughes and Loral competed for the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite. APMT is a Singapore-based, PRC controlled company. At least 51% of APMT is owned by PRC Government agencies, including China Aerospace Corporation, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, and Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.82 See the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite section of this chapter, below.
The PRC's Reliance on Commercial Communications Satellites
Due to the failures of the PRC's rockets, and of its satellites, the PRC has become dependent on Western-manufactured communications satellites.
The PRC's dependency began as the early DFH-2A satellites reached the end of their on-orbit lives, while the fourth DFH-2A satellite failed to reach orbit. This created a gap in the PRC's satellite communications capabilities. As a result, the PRC was forced to look to foreign communications satellite manufacturers for supplemental capacity.
In December 1992, the PRC purchased Spacenet 1 on-orbit from GTE to replace its aging DFH-2A/1 and DFH-2A/2 satellites. The PRC renamed it "ChinaSat-5." This satellite was to provide supplemental capabilities until the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite was launched in 1994. The failure of the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite to reach orbit, and the imminent expiration of the useful life of ChinaSat-5, forced the PRC to purchase a Hughes HS-376 satellite to provide additional communications channels. But this satellite launch in August 1996, aboard a Long March 3 rocket, was also a failure. The third stage left the satellite stranded in an unusable orbit.83 The second DFH-3 satellite that the PRC launched in May 1997 reportedly has now developed on-orbit problems.
* The PRC has entered into contracts with Motorola for the launch of Iridium satellites, including a contract to launch replacement satellites. Iridium satellites have been successfully launched six times on the Long March 2C/SD (that is, the Long March 2C with a "Smart Dispenser" (SD) stage added). The "Smart Dispenser" allows the PRC to launch two Iridium satellites into orbit at a time.
* The PRC has pursued a contract with Loral for the launch of Globalstar satellites. The PRC offered a version of its Long March 2E equipped with a "Top Stage" (TS) that would dispense twelve Globalstar satellites. While Loral had originally contracted for a launch on the Long March 2E/TS, it cancelled that contract following the crash of the Long March 3B in February 1996.
The PRC's Future Space Launch Capabilities
The PRC also recognizes the importance of space in future conflicts, for purposes that include both command and control, and military reconnaissance. The PRC is believed to be developing a new, larger rocket that will be able to carry larger payloads into orbit.
PRC papers have discussed the use of cryogenic liquid propellant engines for this future rocket. One of the engines the PRC could use is the RD-120. The PRC is known to have acquired at least one of these engines from Russian during the 1990s.69 The RD-120 is a liquid oxygen/kerosene engine that is used on the second stage of the Zenit rocket, which is used on the multinational Sea Launch program.
Difficulties with the development of the new engines for this rocket may have prompted the PRC to focus, in the nearer term, on the proposed Long March 2E(A) and Long March 3B(A) versions of the Long March rocket that will utilize improved strap-on boosters to achieve greater payload-to-orbit capability. It should be noted that these are the two systems that were the subject of the failure review investigations in which Loral and Hughes participated. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of how these failure reviews assisted the PRC.
PRC Space Weapons
The PRC is believed to be developing space-based and ground-based anti-satellite laser weapons. Such weapons would be of exceptional value for the control of space and information. The Select Committee judges that the PRC is moving toward the deployment of such weapons.
Based on the significant level of PRC-Russian cooperation on weapons development, it is possible that the PRC will be able to use nuclear reactors to pump lasers with pulse energies high enough to destroy satellites.
In addition, Russian cooperation could help the PRC to develop an advanced radar system using lasers to track and image satellites.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC has the technical capability to develop direct ascent anti-satellite weapons. The CSS-2 could be modified for use in this role. This would be similar to the approach taken by the Soviets with their SS-9 ASAT system.
The PRC's Manned Space Program
The PRC has conducted research since the 1950s, including biological and life support research, on placing astronauts into orbit. Pursuant to its 921 Project, the PRC's plans since the 1980s have included concepts for Space Shuttle-like spacecraft, recoverable capsules, and a space station.70
In 1996, two PRC astronauts began training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City, Russia. The PRC appears set to launch these two astronauts into space sometime this year to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Communist rule in China.
For its manned space program, the PRC will use Soyuz capsules purchased during Yeltsin's visit to the PRC in April 1996. A Soyuz capsule will be carried on top of the Long March 2E, using a payload shroud (that is, a fairing) equipped with a launch escape system. (See Chapter 5, Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes for a discussion of fairing improvements to the Long March 2E.)
If the PRC is successful in placing men in orbit, it will be only the third nation, after Russia and the United States, to have done this.
The PRC's Communications Satellite Programs
Since the beginning of its domestic communications satellite programs, the PRC has suffered a string of problems with the performance of its communications satellites, as well as the rockets designed to place those satellites into orbit.
During the mid-to-late 1980s, the PRC was able to place four of its communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. Today, however, the PRC has only one active domestically-manufactured telecommunications satellite on orbit. This satellite has reportedly suffered on-orbit problems that may have reduced its capabilities.71
The PRC's inability to place reliable communications satellites (COMSATs) into orbit has created serious gaps in the PRC's satellite communications capabilities, both for civilian and military purposes. The PRC has addressed the greatest part of its satellite communications requirement by leasing communications channels on Western-manufactured communications satellites.
The PRC first began developing its own communications satellites in the early 1970s, based on Western technology. All of these satellites were designed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) for military purposes. They have all been operated by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), which is subordinate to COSTIND.72
The PRC's inability to design and produce advanced communications satellites has also led it to seek Western components and technology for its domestic communications satellite industry. The Select Committee judges that the use of Western technology cut in half the time required for the PRC to progress from an experimental communications satellite to the advanced DFH-3 satellites, which were first launched in 1994.
The following table shows a chronology of the PRC's history of launching PRC communications satellites.
History of the PRC's Domestic
Communications Satellite Launches
PRC SatelliteDate PRC RocketResult
DFH-2Jan. 29, 1984 Long March 3Rocket Failure
DFH-2Apr. 8, 1984 Long March 3Success
DFH-2Feb. 1, 1986 Long March 3Success
DFH-2AMar. 7, 1988 Long March 3Success
DFH-2ADec. 22, 1988 Long March 3Success
DFH-2AFeb. 4, 1990 Long March 3Success
DFH-2ADec. 28, 1991 Long March 3Rocket Failure
DFH-3Nov. 29, 1994 Long March 3A Satellite Failure
DFH-3May 11, 1997 Long March 3ASatellite Problem
The PRC's first generation communications satellite was the Dong Fang Hong-2 ("East is Red"). These satellites were designed to provide the PRC with test experience. The satellite design was similar to that used on the Hughes HS376 satellites, employing a spin-stabilized body and a de-spun horn antenna.
The first attempt to launch a DFH-2 satellite, in January 1984, was not successful due to the failure of the Long March 3 rocket that was to carry it into orbit. The second launch attempt on April 8, 1984 successfully placed a communications satellite into orbit. A third DFH-2 satellite was launched on February 1, 1986. This satellite provided communications services until it reached the end of its service life.
In 1988, the PRC launched an improved version of this satellite, known as the DFH-2A. The new satellite used the same spin-stabilized body, this time equipped with an improved antenna array that increased the number of communications channels available.
These satellites were able to handle five television channels and 3,000 phone calls simultaneously. The first three of these satellites were named "Chinasats" by the PRC, and were successfully launched twice in 1988 and once in 1990. A fourth DFH-2A satellite launch in 1990 was unsuccessful, when the failure of the rocket's third-stage engine left the satellite stranded in an incorrect orbit.
The PRC's third generation communications satellites, known as the DFH-3, are the PRC's most modern communication satellites. The DFH-3 is useful for military communications. These satellites have three-axis stabilized bodies, 24 C-band transponders and are designed to have an 8-year on-orbit life. Due to the increased weight of these satellites as compared to the DFH-2A, the DFH-3 satellites are launched on the more capable Long March 3A rocket.
The first launch of the DFH-3 satellite on November 29, 1994 was unsuccessful when the satellite failed to attain the proper orbit, rendering it useless for its intended communications function.
The PRC's second attempt to launch a DFH-3 satellite on May 11, 1997 successfully placed the satellite into a geosynchronous orbit at 125 degrees east longitude.73 The PRC, however, reportedly may have suffered problems with the satellite.74
The PRC's Use of Foreign Components on Communications Satellites
The PRC's limited communications satellite construction capabilities led it from the first to seek Western manufacturers for reliable components. Even the PRC's most modern communications satellite, the DFH-3, which was first successfully launched in 1997, contains a large number of Western components:
* The DFH-3 is reported to use a control processor built by Matra-Marconi75
* Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm (MBB) provided the DFH-3 solar panel substrates to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), and CAST-produced solar cells were mounted on them. The solar panel assemblies were then returned to MBB for assembly into deployable solar arrays76
* Daimler Chrysler Aerospace Group provided the DFH-3's antenna assembly, consisting of a deployable dual gridded reflector, feed and interconnecting structure77
* Officine Galileo provided the Infrared Earth sensor to determine pitch/roll in geosynchronous orbit78
* The DFH-3's payload test equipment, according to 1993 reports, consisted of five racks and consoles with 80% U.S. Hewlett Packard and German equipment
* The equipment racks for the test equipment were provided by Germany's Ant Corporation79possible
PRC Assistance to North Korea
The PRC, through the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), provides complete satellites and technology to other nations. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a three stage Taepo Dong-1 ballistic missile. The North Koreans claim to have launched their first satellite, known as Kwangmyongsong No. 1 (Bright Star 1), on this Taepo Dong-1 missile. Comparing the picture of the Kwangmyongsong No. 1 satellite released by North Korea with that of the PRC's Dong Fang Hong 1 satellite. The two bear a striking resemblance.
Several U.S. companies have also marketed their communications satellite technologies to the PRC. Loral, for example, offered the PRC a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) capability in 1996 using either a Loral-produced satellite bus or the DFH-3 series satellite bus.80 A 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between Loral and China Aerospace Corporation offered the PRC direct broadcast satellites, regional mobile satellite services systems, and the joint development of an advanced high capacity communications satellite. Under this agreement, Loral would provide design and technical support, while the final integration of the satellite was to have occurred in Germany or the PRC.81
Hughes and Loral competed for the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications (APMT) satellite. APMT is a Singapore-based, PRC controlled company. At least 51% of APMT is owned by PRC Government agencies, including China Aerospace Corporation, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, and Chinasat, a subsidiary of the PRC Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.82 See the Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications Satellite section of this chapter, below.
The PRC's Reliance on Commercial Communications Satellites
Due to the failures of the PRC's rockets, and of its satellites, the PRC has become dependent on Western-manufactured communications satellites.
The PRC's dependency began as the early DFH-2A satellites reached the end of their on-orbit lives, while the fourth DFH-2A satellite failed to reach orbit. This created a gap in the PRC's satellite communications capabilities. As a result, the PRC was forced to look to foreign communications satellite manufacturers for supplemental capacity.
In December 1992, the PRC purchased Spacenet 1 on-orbit from GTE to replace its aging DFH-2A/1 and DFH-2A/2 satellites. The PRC renamed it "ChinaSat-5." This satellite was to provide supplemental capabilities until the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite was launched in 1994. The failure of the PRC's first DFH-3 satellite to reach orbit, and the imminent expiration of the useful life of ChinaSat-5, forced the PRC to purchase a Hughes HS-376 satellite to provide additional communications channels. But this satellite launch in August 1996, aboard a Long March 3 rocket, was also a failure. The third stage left the satellite stranded in an unusable orbit.83 The second DFH-3 satellite that the PRC launched in May 1997 reportedly has now developed on-orbit problems.
PRC Missile and Space Forces 5
Two years after the first successful launch of the Long March 2E, the PRC successfully launched the Long March 3A, a cheaper, higher performance rocket that would better meet both its military and commercial geosynchronous launch requirements. The Long March 3A was the first of a family of Long March 3A, 3B and 3C rockets.
The Long March 3A family of rockets uses a strengthened Long March 3 first stage. In the case of the Long March 3B and 3C, this permits the mounting of additional strap-on boosters. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets also use a new, lighter weight, and cheaper inertial measurement unit. Furthermore, these rockets employ large "hammerhead" fairings to protect their satellite payloads. The launch history of the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets is listed below. The failure analysis of the Long March 3B launch carrying the Intelsat 708 satellite manufactured by Loral, is discussed in the chapter of this Report entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral.
Comparison of Two Different Inertial Measurement Units
Used in Guidance System of Long March Rockets59
Features of the Inertial Measurement Unit Used in the Guidance System of:
LM 2C/2E/3LM 3A/3B/3C
Number of Gimbals34
Number of Gyroscopes32
Number of Accelerometers33
Number of Torque Motors for Each Gimbal21
Dimensions (mm)500 x 600 x 800300 x 300 x 400
Mass (kg)14048
Maiden Flight1974 on Long March 2C1994 on Long March 3A
Manufactured by CALT (LM 2C/2E) CALT CAST (LM 3)
The PRC's Commercial Space Launch Program
The PRC's entry into the commercial space launch market coincided with a dark period for the U.S. launch industry that included the 1985 and 1986 launch failures of several Delta and Titan expendable rockets, and the 1987 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. At the time of the Challenger accident, the U.S. space launch industry was in the midst of a plan to phase out all expendable rockets in favor of the Space Shuttle, which was projected to be more economical.60 But that plan was cancelled with the
Challenger explosion. Instead, the United States imposed a hiatus in shuttle launches until September 1988, and a permanent decision that the Space Shuttle would not be used to launch commercial payloads.61
The lack of available U.S. commercial space launch capacity forced satellite manufacturers to seek alternative launch providers. The Soviet Union had the capacity to launch commercial satellites, but U.S. policy would not support the launching of U.S.-manufactured satellites on Soviet rockets. The European consortium of Arianespace had a rocket, but no extra capacity. This left the PRC as the only alternative for launching geosynchronous communications satellites.
In 1987, the United States viewed the PRC as a counterbalance to Soviet military power in Asia. Accordingly, the "Green Line" policy had been adopted to permit some technology transfers to the PRC, while limiting transfers of technologies that could improve the PLA's ballistic missile and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.62 In 1988, President Reagan agreed to allow the PRC to launch U.S.-manufactured satellites on the condition that the PRC sign three bilateral agreements with the U.S. on competitive pricing, liability, and the protection of U.S. technology. 63
The PRC's first success in the commercial market occurred in 1987. In that year, Matra of France contracted with the PRC to place a scientific payload in orbit, using a Long March 2C rocket. These French scientific experiments were launched on August 5, 1987 aboard a PLA military photo-reconnaissance satellite. The recoverable capsules of the PLA's reconnaissance satellites made them an ideal platform for microgravity experiments.64
The PRC's first commercial launch of a U.S.-manufactured communications satellite occurred on April 7, 1990. The Asiasat?a Hughes HS 376 model satellite? was launched into orbit aboard a Long March 3 rocket.65
From that point, in addition to their military launch schedule, the PRC has attempted 28 launches of Western-manufactured satellites.66 Of these satellites, 27 were U.S-manufactured: only the French-manufactured Sinosat, launched successfully on July 18, 1998, was produced by a non-U.S. manufacturer. 67 Twenty-three of the PRC's attempts to launch U.S. satellites were successful. Four have ended in failure.68 These four failures are detailed below.
PRC Commercial Launch Failures
SatelliteLaunch DateRocketFailure Mode
Optus B2Dec. 21, 1992Long March 2EFairing collapse
Apstar-2Jan. 25, 1995Long March 2EFairing collapse
Intelsat 708Feb. 15, 1996Long March 3BInertial measurement
unit malfunction
Chinasat 7Aug. 18, 1996Long March 3Third stage malfunction
The Long March 3A family of rockets uses a strengthened Long March 3 first stage. In the case of the Long March 3B and 3C, this permits the mounting of additional strap-on boosters. The Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets also use a new, lighter weight, and cheaper inertial measurement unit. Furthermore, these rockets employ large "hammerhead" fairings to protect their satellite payloads. The launch history of the Long March 3A, 3B, and 3C rockets is listed below. The failure analysis of the Long March 3B launch carrying the Intelsat 708 satellite manufactured by Loral, is discussed in the chapter of this Report entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral.
Comparison of Two Different Inertial Measurement Units
Used in Guidance System of Long March Rockets59
Features of the Inertial Measurement Unit Used in the Guidance System of:
LM 2C/2E/3LM 3A/3B/3C
Number of Gimbals34
Number of Gyroscopes32
Number of Accelerometers33
Number of Torque Motors for Each Gimbal21
Dimensions (mm)500 x 600 x 800300 x 300 x 400
Mass (kg)14048
Maiden Flight1974 on Long March 2C1994 on Long March 3A
Manufactured by CALT (LM 2C/2E) CALT CAST (LM 3)
The PRC's Commercial Space Launch Program
The PRC's entry into the commercial space launch market coincided with a dark period for the U.S. launch industry that included the 1985 and 1986 launch failures of several Delta and Titan expendable rockets, and the 1987 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger. At the time of the Challenger accident, the U.S. space launch industry was in the midst of a plan to phase out all expendable rockets in favor of the Space Shuttle, which was projected to be more economical.60 But that plan was cancelled with the
Challenger explosion. Instead, the United States imposed a hiatus in shuttle launches until September 1988, and a permanent decision that the Space Shuttle would not be used to launch commercial payloads.61
The lack of available U.S. commercial space launch capacity forced satellite manufacturers to seek alternative launch providers. The Soviet Union had the capacity to launch commercial satellites, but U.S. policy would not support the launching of U.S.-manufactured satellites on Soviet rockets. The European consortium of Arianespace had a rocket, but no extra capacity. This left the PRC as the only alternative for launching geosynchronous communications satellites.
In 1987, the United States viewed the PRC as a counterbalance to Soviet military power in Asia. Accordingly, the "Green Line" policy had been adopted to permit some technology transfers to the PRC, while limiting transfers of technologies that could improve the PLA's ballistic missile and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.62 In 1988, President Reagan agreed to allow the PRC to launch U.S.-manufactured satellites on the condition that the PRC sign three bilateral agreements with the U.S. on competitive pricing, liability, and the protection of U.S. technology. 63
The PRC's first success in the commercial market occurred in 1987. In that year, Matra of France contracted with the PRC to place a scientific payload in orbit, using a Long March 2C rocket. These French scientific experiments were launched on August 5, 1987 aboard a PLA military photo-reconnaissance satellite. The recoverable capsules of the PLA's reconnaissance satellites made them an ideal platform for microgravity experiments.64
The PRC's first commercial launch of a U.S.-manufactured communications satellite occurred on April 7, 1990. The Asiasat?a Hughes HS 376 model satellite? was launched into orbit aboard a Long March 3 rocket.65
From that point, in addition to their military launch schedule, the PRC has attempted 28 launches of Western-manufactured satellites.66 Of these satellites, 27 were U.S-manufactured: only the French-manufactured Sinosat, launched successfully on July 18, 1998, was produced by a non-U.S. manufacturer. 67 Twenty-three of the PRC's attempts to launch U.S. satellites were successful. Four have ended in failure.68 These four failures are detailed below.
PRC Commercial Launch Failures
SatelliteLaunch DateRocketFailure Mode
Optus B2Dec. 21, 1992Long March 2EFairing collapse
Apstar-2Jan. 25, 1995Long March 2EFairing collapse
Intelsat 708Feb. 15, 1996Long March 3BInertial measurement
unit malfunction
Chinasat 7Aug. 18, 1996Long March 3Third stage malfunction
PRC Missile and Space Forces 4
The Select Committee's classified Final Report contains additional information on PRC proliferation that the Clinton administration has determined cannot be made public.
The PRC's Military and Civil Space Program
The PRC's military and civilian space launch program began in the 1950s, concurrent with its development of long-range ballistic missiles. At that time, a small research effort was begun at the Chinese Academy of Sciences to develop indigenous space launch and satellite production capabilities.
The PRC's early efforts were aided by technology and knowledge transferred from the Soviet Union.
From that beginning, the PRC has developed a comprehensive space program that includes a family of rockets, numerous satellites, and a telemetry, tracking, and control network. These efforts have paid off, as the PRC is now a major space power. It offers international launch services and is working on placing men in space.
The PRC's first satellite launch occurred on April 24, 1970, using a CSS-3 intercontinental ballistic missile. The ICBM was modified by adding a third stage, which was used to place the satellite into orbit. This new rocket was named the Long March 1.
The 380-pound satellite it carried was named Dong Fang Hong-1 (East Is Red 1). The satellite orbited for approximately 26 days, transmitting to Earth the song "The East is Red." 45
After the PRC's second successful launch of a satellite on March 3, 1971, again using the modified CSS-3 ICBM, the PRC set out to launch heavier payloads into orbit. For this purpose, the PRC turned to the longer-range, more powerful CSS-4 ICBM. This rocket was named the Long March 2.
The first three launches of the Long March 2 rocket, from 1973 through 1974, were failures. Finally, on July 26, 1975, the PRC successfully launched the Long March 2C and placed its third satellite into orbit.
During the balance of the 1970s, the PRC launched nearly a dozen satellites on the Long March 2, many of which undoubtedly were for military purposes. Nearly half of these launches were unsuccessful, however, resulting in the destruction of many payloads.
The Long March 2 and its derivatives are the main rockets used by the PRC today, in both its military and civilian space programs. Because the Long March 2 was derived directly from the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile, the two share much in common. The Long March 2 rocket and the CSS-4 ICBM use the same airframe structure, the same cluster of four YF-20 engines (known as the YF-21) in the first stage, and the same single YF-22 engine combined with the YF-23 vernier engines that form the YF-24 in the second stage.46 However, unlike the CSS-4, the Long March 2 was modified to deliver payloads to orbit rather than a nuclear weapon to a target.
In order to meet space launch requirements for heavier payloads and higher orbits, the PRC improved the performance of the Long March rocket. Among other changes, the PRC increased the amount of propellant the rocket could carry, improved the performance of the first and second stage engines, added new cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage engines, and attached additional boosters that were strapped on to the basic rocket. These changes led to the development of three new modifications to the Long March rocket.
The Long March 3 was developed in 1977 to meet the requirements for launching communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. It was the PRC's first rocket built for this purpose.47 The Long March 3 uses the same first and second stages as the Long March 2C, except that aerodynamic fins are added to the base of the first stage.48 It also uses the same YF-21 and YF-24 engines.49 The main change from the Long March 2C is the addition of a restartable, cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage.50 This stage is designed to boost the payload into a geostationary transfer orbit.
The Long March 4 was developed by the PRC in the late 1970s to launch meteorological satellites for military and civilian purposes into sun synchronous orbits. The new rocket used improved first and second stage engines, and a first stage that was 13 feet longer than the standard Long March 2 first stage.51
When the PRC announced in 1986 that is was entering the commercial satellite launch market, it decided to develop a rocket that could provide heavy-lift capabilities to low earth orbit. However, the majority of commercial payloads at the time were for geosynchronous satellites.52 Moreover, the PRC's operational rockets at the time were limited in their performance compared to Western rockets.
The Long March 2C could only place a 1,350-pound payload into low earth orbit. The Long March 3 was only capable of placing an 870-pound payload into geostationary transfer orbit.53 In comparison, the U.S. Delta 3925 rocket could place 2,140 pounds into low earth orbit, and 795 pounds into geosynchronous orbit. The U.S. space shuttle could transport 15,400 pounds into low earth orbit.54 To place heavy payloads into geosynchronous orbit requires either a third stage or a perigee kick motor, which the Long March still lacked.
To meet this requirement, the PRC developed the Long March 2E rocket which was first launched successfully in 1992. The Long March 2E uses a stretched version of the Long March 2C first and second stages, increasing the amount of propellant carried, which increases the burn-time of the engines. 55 The Long March 2E also uses improved versions of the YF-20 engines used on the Long March 2C. Known as the YF-20B, these engines offer improved thrust.56 The Long March 2E also uses four strap-on liquid-propellant boosters. These boosters are attached to the rocket's first stage. Each booster is fitted with a YF-20B engine.
To permit the Long March 2E to place a satellite into geosynchronous orbit, the PRC mated the satellite payload with a perigee kick motor, which acted as a third stage. Because there was no indigenous PRC kick motor, however, foreign launch customers had to use Western-manufactured kick motors. This required a separate export license. The PRC later developed its own family of kick motors, allowing customers to choose between Western- or PRC-manufactured versions.
Finally, the Long March 2E employs an enlarged "hammerhead" fairing to protect the satellite payloads, which exceed the upper stage's diameter. The Long March 2E can place 5,450 pounds into low earth orbit and 2,140 pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit.57
The Long March 2E has suffered a series of in-flight failures (see table below). The December 1992 and January 1995 failures resulted in the destruction of two Hughes-manufactured satellites. The results of the failure analyses conducted by Hughes as a result of these launch failures are discussed in the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes.
Launch History of the PRC's Long March 2E58
Launch Date Satellite Manufacturer Owner Results
Jul. 16, 1990 Dummy AUSSAT Satellite and Badr-1 PRC Dummy AUSSAT Satellite ? PRC Badr-1 ? Pakistan
Perigee kick motor failed in the Dummy AUSSAT Satellite Badr-1 achieved orbit
Aug. 31, 1992 Optus-B1 Hughes Optus (Australia) Success
Dec. 21, 1992 Optus-B2 Hughes Optus (Australia) Failure - fairing collapse
Aug. 24, 1994 Optus-B3 Hughes Optus (Australia) Success
Jan. 25, 1995 Apstar-2 Hughes Asia-Pacific Telecom(APT) Failure- fairing collapse
Nov. 28, 1995 Asiasat-2 Lockheed-Martin Asiasat (Hong Kong) Success
Dec. 28, 1995 Echostar-1 Lockheed-Martin Echostar Inc. (U.S.) Success
The PRC's Military and Civil Space Program
The PRC's military and civilian space launch program began in the 1950s, concurrent with its development of long-range ballistic missiles. At that time, a small research effort was begun at the Chinese Academy of Sciences to develop indigenous space launch and satellite production capabilities.
The PRC's early efforts were aided by technology and knowledge transferred from the Soviet Union.
From that beginning, the PRC has developed a comprehensive space program that includes a family of rockets, numerous satellites, and a telemetry, tracking, and control network. These efforts have paid off, as the PRC is now a major space power. It offers international launch services and is working on placing men in space.
The PRC's first satellite launch occurred on April 24, 1970, using a CSS-3 intercontinental ballistic missile. The ICBM was modified by adding a third stage, which was used to place the satellite into orbit. This new rocket was named the Long March 1.
The 380-pound satellite it carried was named Dong Fang Hong-1 (East Is Red 1). The satellite orbited for approximately 26 days, transmitting to Earth the song "The East is Red." 45
After the PRC's second successful launch of a satellite on March 3, 1971, again using the modified CSS-3 ICBM, the PRC set out to launch heavier payloads into orbit. For this purpose, the PRC turned to the longer-range, more powerful CSS-4 ICBM. This rocket was named the Long March 2.
The first three launches of the Long March 2 rocket, from 1973 through 1974, were failures. Finally, on July 26, 1975, the PRC successfully launched the Long March 2C and placed its third satellite into orbit.
During the balance of the 1970s, the PRC launched nearly a dozen satellites on the Long March 2, many of which undoubtedly were for military purposes. Nearly half of these launches were unsuccessful, however, resulting in the destruction of many payloads.
The Long March 2 and its derivatives are the main rockets used by the PRC today, in both its military and civilian space programs. Because the Long March 2 was derived directly from the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile, the two share much in common. The Long March 2 rocket and the CSS-4 ICBM use the same airframe structure, the same cluster of four YF-20 engines (known as the YF-21) in the first stage, and the same single YF-22 engine combined with the YF-23 vernier engines that form the YF-24 in the second stage.46 However, unlike the CSS-4, the Long March 2 was modified to deliver payloads to orbit rather than a nuclear weapon to a target.
In order to meet space launch requirements for heavier payloads and higher orbits, the PRC improved the performance of the Long March rocket. Among other changes, the PRC increased the amount of propellant the rocket could carry, improved the performance of the first and second stage engines, added new cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage engines, and attached additional boosters that were strapped on to the basic rocket. These changes led to the development of three new modifications to the Long March rocket.
The Long March 3 was developed in 1977 to meet the requirements for launching communications satellites into geosynchronous orbit. It was the PRC's first rocket built for this purpose.47 The Long March 3 uses the same first and second stages as the Long March 2C, except that aerodynamic fins are added to the base of the first stage.48 It also uses the same YF-21 and YF-24 engines.49 The main change from the Long March 2C is the addition of a restartable, cryogenic liquid-propellant third stage.50 This stage is designed to boost the payload into a geostationary transfer orbit.
The Long March 4 was developed by the PRC in the late 1970s to launch meteorological satellites for military and civilian purposes into sun synchronous orbits. The new rocket used improved first and second stage engines, and a first stage that was 13 feet longer than the standard Long March 2 first stage.51
When the PRC announced in 1986 that is was entering the commercial satellite launch market, it decided to develop a rocket that could provide heavy-lift capabilities to low earth orbit. However, the majority of commercial payloads at the time were for geosynchronous satellites.52 Moreover, the PRC's operational rockets at the time were limited in their performance compared to Western rockets.
The Long March 2C could only place a 1,350-pound payload into low earth orbit. The Long March 3 was only capable of placing an 870-pound payload into geostationary transfer orbit.53 In comparison, the U.S. Delta 3925 rocket could place 2,140 pounds into low earth orbit, and 795 pounds into geosynchronous orbit. The U.S. space shuttle could transport 15,400 pounds into low earth orbit.54 To place heavy payloads into geosynchronous orbit requires either a third stage or a perigee kick motor, which the Long March still lacked.
To meet this requirement, the PRC developed the Long March 2E rocket which was first launched successfully in 1992. The Long March 2E uses a stretched version of the Long March 2C first and second stages, increasing the amount of propellant carried, which increases the burn-time of the engines. 55 The Long March 2E also uses improved versions of the YF-20 engines used on the Long March 2C. Known as the YF-20B, these engines offer improved thrust.56 The Long March 2E also uses four strap-on liquid-propellant boosters. These boosters are attached to the rocket's first stage. Each booster is fitted with a YF-20B engine.
To permit the Long March 2E to place a satellite into geosynchronous orbit, the PRC mated the satellite payload with a perigee kick motor, which acted as a third stage. Because there was no indigenous PRC kick motor, however, foreign launch customers had to use Western-manufactured kick motors. This required a separate export license. The PRC later developed its own family of kick motors, allowing customers to choose between Western- or PRC-manufactured versions.
Finally, the Long March 2E employs an enlarged "hammerhead" fairing to protect the satellite payloads, which exceed the upper stage's diameter. The Long March 2E can place 5,450 pounds into low earth orbit and 2,140 pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit.57
The Long March 2E has suffered a series of in-flight failures (see table below). The December 1992 and January 1995 failures resulted in the destruction of two Hughes-manufactured satellites. The results of the failure analyses conducted by Hughes as a result of these launch failures are discussed in the chapter entitled Satellite Launches in the PRC: Hughes.
Launch History of the PRC's Long March 2E58
Launch Date Satellite Manufacturer Owner Results
Jul. 16, 1990 Dummy AUSSAT Satellite and Badr-1 PRC Dummy AUSSAT Satellite ? PRC Badr-1 ? Pakistan
Perigee kick motor failed in the Dummy AUSSAT Satellite Badr-1 achieved orbit
Aug. 31, 1992 Optus-B1 Hughes Optus (Australia) Success
Dec. 21, 1992 Optus-B2 Hughes Optus (Australia) Failure - fairing collapse
Aug. 24, 1994 Optus-B3 Hughes Optus (Australia) Success
Jan. 25, 1995 Apstar-2 Hughes Asia-Pacific Telecom(APT) Failure- fairing collapse
Nov. 28, 1995 Asiasat-2 Lockheed-Martin Asiasat (Hong Kong) Success
Dec. 28, 1995 Echostar-1 Lockheed-Martin Echostar Inc. (U.S.) Success
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