A protection and assistance training course jointly sponsored by the Chinese government and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was inaugurated here on may Monday12 2008.
A Foreign Ministry press release said 25 students from 18 countries in the Asia-Pacific region were participating in the five days of training at the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Institute of Chemical Defense.
The course aims to implement the protection and assistance article of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to help relevant nations improve their ability to tackle the possible threat of chemical weapons and chemical accidents.
China has supported the CWC treaty and assisted the OPCW by offering funds and equipment, the release said.
The training course will conclude on Friday, the press release announced.
The CWC took force in 1997 and mandated the OPCW to eliminate chemical weapons and verify the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles within stipulated deadlines.
Saturday, 17 May 2008
China sets up first space station for spacecraft data relay
China successfully established a space station for the data relay of its space vehicles on Thursday. This was accomplished by settling its first data relay satellite, "Tianlian I", at E. 77 degrees over the equator at 4:25 p.m..
The satellite was launched on April 25 on a Long March-3C carrier rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in the southwest Sichuan Province. Since then, the satellite has carried out a series of actions including the unfolding of its solar sail, the ignition of its engine and changing its positioning on four occasions.
The successful positioning has largely increased the coverage of the country's space measuring network, timely transmission of space data and reduced the risk of future space missions. It also improved the efficiency of ground control and its command, and in carrying out problem analysis and space rescue, according to an expert with the Xi'an center.
In the coming days, the center will conduct comprehensive measuring on the satellite. The satellite will be officially handed over to clients after it is confirmed to be operating in a normal and stable manner.
The satellite would not go into operation until the launch of the Shenzhou VII manned space mission, scheduled for the second half of 2008.
The satellite was developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and aimed to increase the communication time of the Shenzhou VII spaceship with ground control, and to improve the amount of data that could be transferred.
The Yuanwang space tracking ships, along with the more than 10 ground observation stations, can only cover 12 percent of the Shenzhou VII spaceship's space orbit. The "Tianlian I" satellite alone covers 50 percent of the orbit of Shenzhou VII or any other Chinese spacecraft.
With the help of the satellite, scientists can collect more data without delay, and can identify earlier when a malfunction is taking place in a spacecraft.
The launch was the 105th mission of China's Long March series of rockets, and the first mission of the Long March-3C carrier rocket.
The 55-meter carrier rocket with two boosters is capable of launching satellites weighing between 2,600 kilograms to 3,800 kg into space.
Seven Long March-3C carrier rockets are currently in production and will carry "several domestic and foreign satellites" into space.
China has planned 10 space launches this year, including the Shenzhou VII spaceship. It will be launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in the northwestern province of Gansu late this year and the astronauts will leave their spacecraft for the first time.
China began its manned space program in 1999 and successfully sent its first astronaut, Yang Liwei, into orbit on the Shenzhou V spacecraft in 2003.
Two years later, Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng completed a new Chinese record with a five-day flight on the Shenzhou VI. All returned safely.
The satellite was launched on April 25 on a Long March-3C carrier rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in the southwest Sichuan Province. Since then, the satellite has carried out a series of actions including the unfolding of its solar sail, the ignition of its engine and changing its positioning on four occasions.
The successful positioning has largely increased the coverage of the country's space measuring network, timely transmission of space data and reduced the risk of future space missions. It also improved the efficiency of ground control and its command, and in carrying out problem analysis and space rescue, according to an expert with the Xi'an center.
In the coming days, the center will conduct comprehensive measuring on the satellite. The satellite will be officially handed over to clients after it is confirmed to be operating in a normal and stable manner.
The satellite would not go into operation until the launch of the Shenzhou VII manned space mission, scheduled for the second half of 2008.
The satellite was developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and aimed to increase the communication time of the Shenzhou VII spaceship with ground control, and to improve the amount of data that could be transferred.
The Yuanwang space tracking ships, along with the more than 10 ground observation stations, can only cover 12 percent of the Shenzhou VII spaceship's space orbit. The "Tianlian I" satellite alone covers 50 percent of the orbit of Shenzhou VII or any other Chinese spacecraft.
With the help of the satellite, scientists can collect more data without delay, and can identify earlier when a malfunction is taking place in a spacecraft.
The launch was the 105th mission of China's Long March series of rockets, and the first mission of the Long March-3C carrier rocket.
The 55-meter carrier rocket with two boosters is capable of launching satellites weighing between 2,600 kilograms to 3,800 kg into space.
Seven Long March-3C carrier rockets are currently in production and will carry "several domestic and foreign satellites" into space.
China has planned 10 space launches this year, including the Shenzhou VII spaceship. It will be launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in the northwestern province of Gansu late this year and the astronauts will leave their spacecraft for the first time.
China began its manned space program in 1999 and successfully sent its first astronaut, Yang Liwei, into orbit on the Shenzhou V spacecraft in 2003.
Two years later, Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng completed a new Chinese record with a five-day flight on the Shenzhou VI. All returned safely.
Thursday, 15 May 2008
China prapring for Nukewar
Defense analysts for the British intelligence service MI6 believe China is preparing for the "eventuality of a nuclear war." The conclusion follows evidence that Beijing has built secretly a major naval base deep inside caverns which even sophisticated satellites cannot penetrate, says a report in Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin.
In an unusual development, the analysts have provided details to the specialist defense periodical, Jane's Intelligence Review, which published satellite images of the base location which is hidden beneath millions of tons of rock on the South China Sea island of Hainan.
The MI6 analysts have confirmed the submarine base hewn out of the rock will contain up to 20 of the latest C94 Jin-Class submarines, each capable of firing anti-satellite missiles and nuclear tipped rockets.
Knocking out the satellites would leave Taiwan, Japan and other countries around the Pacific Rim effectively without a key warning system. An attack also would disrupt vital communications between U.S. battle squadrons in the region and Washington.
Satellite images studied by GCHQ, Britain's spy in the sky intelligence gathering organization based at Cheltenham that works closely with the U.S. National Security Agency, have confirmed the entrance to the base is through no fewer than 11 separate tunnel openings.
A Royal Navy nuclear submarine, one of those in the Typhoon Fleet, now has joined another from the U.S. Pacific Fleet to build up a clear image of what is happening inside the secret base which, as well as China's nuclear subs, could house "a host of aircraft carriers."
Naval intelligence officers in London and Washington have confirmed the discovery of the base will present "a significant challenge to U.S. naval dominance and protection to countries ringing the South China Sea."
The base is sited at Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan island. The island came to the attention of Western intelligence in April 2001, when a U.S. EP-3 spy plane trying to test the island's electronic defenses was forced to land there by Chinese fighters, one of which crashed in the sea killing the pilot.
A Ministry of Defense analyst, who cannot be named for security reasons, believes "this could be the prelude to China preparing for a nuclear response.
In an unusual development, the analysts have provided details to the specialist defense periodical, Jane's Intelligence Review, which published satellite images of the base location which is hidden beneath millions of tons of rock on the South China Sea island of Hainan.
The MI6 analysts have confirmed the submarine base hewn out of the rock will contain up to 20 of the latest C94 Jin-Class submarines, each capable of firing anti-satellite missiles and nuclear tipped rockets.
Knocking out the satellites would leave Taiwan, Japan and other countries around the Pacific Rim effectively without a key warning system. An attack also would disrupt vital communications between U.S. battle squadrons in the region and Washington.
Satellite images studied by GCHQ, Britain's spy in the sky intelligence gathering organization based at Cheltenham that works closely with the U.S. National Security Agency, have confirmed the entrance to the base is through no fewer than 11 separate tunnel openings.
A Royal Navy nuclear submarine, one of those in the Typhoon Fleet, now has joined another from the U.S. Pacific Fleet to build up a clear image of what is happening inside the secret base which, as well as China's nuclear subs, could house "a host of aircraft carriers."
Naval intelligence officers in London and Washington have confirmed the discovery of the base will present "a significant challenge to U.S. naval dominance and protection to countries ringing the South China Sea."
The base is sited at Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan island. The island came to the attention of Western intelligence in April 2001, when a U.S. EP-3 spy plane trying to test the island's electronic defenses was forced to land there by Chinese fighters, one of which crashed in the sea killing the pilot.
A Ministry of Defense analyst, who cannot be named for security reasons, believes "this could be the prelude to China preparing for a nuclear response.
Thursday, 8 May 2008
Biological Overview
China was a victim of large-scale biological warfare during World War II. During the Japanese occupation of China, Japanese forces, led by Unit 731, killed an estimated 250,000 Chinese citizens using a number of biological agents.[1] China is a party to most of the major international agreements regulating biological weapons, including the Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC). China also supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004, which compels states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring biological weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China is not, however, a member of the Australia Group (AG), a voluntary supply-side export control regime focused on chemical and biological weapons, though the issuance of new export control regulations in 2002 has put Beijing's export control policy fully in line with that of the AG. China continues to engage in negotiations with the AG, possibly laying the groundwork for eventual Chinese membership.
While China has publicly declared to be consistently in compliance with the BTWC, past U.S. government reports issued by the Department of State have alleged that China not only has a small-scale offensive biological weapons program, but has also transferred controlled biological weapons-related items to nations of proliferation concern such as Iran. Such transfers have resulted in numerous U.S. nonproliferation sanctions being imposed on Chinese entities, despite vigorous protests by the Chinese government.
China's Official Position on Biological Weapons
Chinese officials have repeatedly stated in formal documents and official speeches that China has never developed biological weapons and does not currently engage in biological activities with offensive military applications. At the 1991 BTWC Preparatory Conference, the Chinese delegation stated:
"Having been caused great harm by biological weapons, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons, and has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained biological agents, toxins, or weapons equipment or means of delivery for them."
A November 1995 white paper on Arms Control and Disarmament issued by the State Council states that "China officially opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country." In 1998, China further clarified its positions and reiterated its previous positions concerning biological weapons in its white paper entitled China's National Defense. This document states:
"In November 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC).[2] As a state party to the BWC, China has, year after year, reported to the United Nations on convention related information and data concerning confidence building measures, in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the BWC."
China and the BTWC
Initially, China did not participate in the negotiations on the BTWC. At the 1972 meeting of the UN General Assembly, China's representative attacked the convention as a "fraud of sham disarmament" concocted by the two superpowers, and criticized it for not prohibiting the use of biological weapons and for not prohibiting chemical weapons.
China did accede to the BTWC in 1984, but with the stipulation that it was binding only in regards to relations with other parties, and will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy states whose armed forces or allies do not observe the convention's provisions. China supports efforts to "establish a fair, reasonable, appropriate and feasible verification mechanism," but believes that these efforts should be tempered to prevent the abuse of the verification mechanism and to protect the business interests of the state parties. At that time, China expressed concern that certain countries could repeatedly request on-site verifications of particular countries. China was also concerned that on-site inspections could be used for industrial espionage to transfer proprietary information to competitors.
China has become increasingly involved with international nonproliferation regimes, which has resulted in a more positive attitude toward multilateral treaties, such as the BTWC. In its 1995 white paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, China stated:
"China has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country. In 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and since that date it has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the convention. Since 1987 China has year after year reported to the United Nations on convention-related information and data in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the convention. China supports measures that help strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It will actively join in discussions of the Ad Hoc Group on promoting international cooperation, enhancing trust, strengthening verification, and other issues."
China provided further details on its position on biological weapons in its July 1998 national defense white paper, stating:
"Having suffered grievously from biological weapons attacks in the past, China supports work that helps comprehensively to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It has actively participated in the work of drawing up a Protocol of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC established in 1994, and has made contributions to the progress of the negotiations on the Protocol. China holds, in view of the complexity of the problems relating to the verification mechanism, that every country should, in a down-to-earth way, seek effective and feasible verification measures, and formulate concrete steps to prevent abuse of verification, and to protect the rightful commercial and security secrets of states parties. China considers that, while improving the convention's verification mechanism, international cooperation and exchanges among states parties in the sphere of bio-technology for peaceful purposes should also be strengthened."
During U.S. President Bill Clinton's trip to China in June 1998, the United States and China underscored their existing commitment to the BTWC by issuing a joint statement that called for more negotiations on a protocol to improve the BTWC's verification provisions.
China's National Defense 2000 white paper further emphasized the need for a verification regime:
"As a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the Convention and has, on an annual basis, provided the United Nations with information on confidence building measures in this regard.
"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner. Upon its accession to the BWC, China pointed out the absence of concrete and effective measures for verification. China holds that, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the BWC, a necessary verification mechanism should be established...At the same time, there should be concrete measures to promote international cooperation and exchanges among State Parties in the field of bio-technology for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. These measures will be conducive to enhancing the universality of the Convention and the future Protocol."
From November 19 through December 7, 2001, the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC was held in Geneva, Switzerland. During these proceedings, Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese delegation, made statements on November 19 praising the overall progress of the BTWC. Those statements of praise were quickly followed by ex-pressions of dissatisfaction and concern regarding the progress of efforts to strengthen the BTWC. In particular, Sha stated that "double or multiple" standards of implementation; the explicit separation of international cooperation and the prevention of proliferation by some countries; and the unilateralist approach by certain countries all were "not conducive to the realization of the purposes and objectives of the Convention and...must be rectified."
A 2002 white paper, entitled "China's National Defense 2002," restated China's overall stance on the BTWC, while expressing disappointment that a protocol had not yet been reached:
"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner, and has actively participated in the work of the ad hoc group of the states parties to the Convention set up for the negotiation of a BWC protocol. China regrets that the protocol has not been reached as scheduled and that the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention has had to adjourn. China holds that the conclusion of a protocol with balanced contents and effective measures through multilateral negotiations remains the best way to enhance the effectiveness of the BWC. China is willing, together with all other parties concerned, to continue to explore measures along this line on the basis of the universal participation of all countries and within a multilateral framework."
Since 2003, China has issued two white papers dealing specifically with Chinese nonproliferation policy. The most recent of these, entitled "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation," was released in September 2005.[3] With respect to biological weapons, the white paper states:
"China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons and firmly opposes proliferation of such weapons. Against the backdrop of [the] increased threat of bio-terrorism and prominence of [the] biosecurity issue, it is of great realistic significance to continue to explore and formulate measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)..."
China further reiterated its support for strengthening of the BWC by encouraging nations to accede to and comply with the BWC and submit declarations as part of the BWC confidence-building measures. Notably, the white paper does not discuss a BWC verification protocol, but rather refers to non-specific strengthening "measures" or "efforts." For example, the white paper states:
"...it is of great significance to continue to explore and formulate measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) under the framework of this convention."
Likewise, the 2006 national defense white paper states:
"China supports multilateral efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention."[4]
Neither document mentions a BWC verification protocol. The shift in policy may be a consequence of the collapse of the BWC verification protocol negotiations at the 5th Review Conference in 2001 and the increasing importance of China's biotechnology sector, which may resist intrusive verification regimes on the grounds that it is necessary to protect its commercial secrets. The protection of potentially lucrative commercial biotechnology interests in the United States is commonly cited as a central reason for U.S. resistance to a BWC verification protocol.
The Sixth Review Conference of the BWC was held from November 20 to December 8, 2006. This review conference produced consensus amongst the States Parties on a number of issues, including the establishment of an Implementation Assistance Unit at the UN and the renewal of annual meetings of States Parties to discuss the future of the BWC. According to Jonathan Tucker, an arms control expert and observer, China and the U.S. differed on aspects of a comprehensive action plan related to Article X of the BWC.[5] Under Article X, States Parties "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange" of biological agents, equipment, and related technology for peaceful purposes. Developing countries, including China, India, and Iran, that seek to develop their fledgling biotechnology industries cite Article X in supporting their right to engage in trade of these potentially dual-use items. On the other hand, the U.S. and other developed nations fear the transfer of sensitive technology to potential proliferant nations, especially Iran, could facilitate a secret biological weapons program. Article III of the BWC expressly forbids the transfer of technology for the purpose of assisting a foreign biological weapons program. Wary of this friction inherent to the dual-use nature of biotechnology, Ambassador Cheng Jingye, the head of the Chinese delegation at the Sixth Review Conference, included in his statement:
"Promotion of international exchanges and cooperation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology remains one of the objectives of the Convention. It should go in parallel with bio-arms control and non-proliferation and prevention of bio-terrorism. China calls upon all parties concerned to attach greater importance to it, explore and adopt [a] practical plan, intensify input and enable States Parties, especially developing countries, to truly get benefit from related international cooperation and materialize their legitimate rights enshrined by the Convention..."
China and Other Nonproliferation Agreements
In its public statements, China has consistently expressed support for the principles of nonproliferation of biological weapons and other WMD. However, China has not embraced every proposal aimed at countering WMD proliferation. For example, China has declined participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a voluntary system of counterproliferation partnerships between states designed to disrupt all modes of WMD trafficking, which was made public in May 2003. The PSI facilitates the interdiction of suspected WMD shipments by enhancing law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing between states, and provides the basis for allowing the interception and search of suspect maritime vessels flying PSI member flags in international waters. While voicing support for the goals of the PSI, China has also expressed fears that it is discriminatory and potentially illegal. In late 2003, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated:
"China understands the concerns of the member nations of the PSI over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...But internationally, the legality of some of the PSI measures have some negative aspects that could result in bad consequences..."[6]
In April 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC), of which China is a permanent member, unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1540, which seeks to prevent non-state actors from acquiring biological weapons and other CBRN weapons.[7] UNSC 1540 requires all UN member states to not assist, and adopt domestic laws designed to prevent, non-state actors from developing, acquiring, producing, transporting, or using WMD and their means of delivery. The resolution also calls for states to develop effective accounting measures to quantify and track sensitive materials, maintain adequate physical protection and border security, and establish export controls governing the export and trans-shipment of sensitive items. While China voted in favor of the resolution, according to a 2005 article appearing in the journal "Disarmament Diplomacy" it was the last of the permanent UNSC members to agree to the draft resolution language, after specific reference to interdiction was removed.[8]
The U.S. Response
U.S. government reports, however, suggest that China's claims regarding its biological weapons program, or lack thereof, may not be entirely accurate. China may have operated an offensive biological weapons program in the 1980s and various reports have indicated that some of these efforts may be ongoing. In its 1998 annual report on arms control compliance, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:
"The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations."
In a January 2001 report entitled "Proliferation: Threat and Response," the U.S. Department of Defense agreed with ACDA's earlier statement:
"China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have started in the 1950s. China possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop and produce biological agents ... China is believed to possess an offensive biological warfare capability based on technology developed prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984.
"Since 1984, China consistently has claimed that it never researched, produced, or possessed any biological weapons and never would do so. Nevertheless, China's declarations under the voluntary BWC declarations for confidence building purposes are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete, and there are some reports that China may retain elements of its biological warfare program."
In July 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in testimony before the U.S.-China Commission:
"the U.S. believes that despite being a member of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China maintains a BW program in violation of its BWC obligations. The United States believes that China's consistent claims that it has never researched, produced or possessed BW are simply not true-and that China still retains its BW program...Given the failure to enforce its stated nonproliferation goals with regard to missile technology, nuclear related items and its chemical weapons program, we must be concerned about the possibility of undetected proliferation of its dual-use items or actual elements of a BW program."[9]
More recently, the U.S. has continued to allege that China maintains an offensive BW capability in violation of the BWC, although whether or not a BW program is currently active is less certain. For example, in an August 2005 report issued by the U.S. Department of State entitled "Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," the U.S. found with respect to China's BW program:
"The United States reaffirms its judgment that China maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability in violation of its BWC obligations. Despite China's BWC CBM declarations to the contrary, indications suggest that China maintained an offensive BW program prior to acceding to the Convention in 1984."[10]
Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter returned in September 2006 to once again testify before the U.S.-China Commission regarding China's proliferation activities. Although retaining a skeptical outlook, in comparison to her July 2003 testimony DeSutter's specific language belied U.S. uncertainty with respect to China's current BW program:
"We maintain reservations about China's current research activities and dual-use capabilities, which raise the possibility that sophisticated BW and CW work could be underway. For example, because of the possible offensive capabilities of aerosolization techniques, the United States' concerns are underscored by publications indicating military involvement in such research. We also continue to believe that China maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability in violation of its BWC obligations...China has adopted export controls mirroring the Australia Group (AG) control list...Nonetheless, we continue to have concerns that Chinese entities are transferring AG-controlled items and technology to countries of concern."[11]
In recent years, China has vigorously protested both U.S. assertions that it engages in or fails to stop WMD proliferation, as well as the recent sanctions imposed by the U.S. on its companies. The Chinese response to DeSutter's 2006 testimony was particularly strong, characterizing her comments as "completely without basis and are irresponsible." The U.S. has not produced public evidence of Chinese BWC violations.
China's Biological Export Controls
In a positive move, China released on 14 October 2002 its Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies and Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List. The regulations, which went into effect on 1 December 2002, contain measures to strengthen export controls to prevent diversion of dual-use biological agents, related equipment, and technologies toward production of biological weapons. Domestic measures include an export licensing system, application process, and criminal prosecution for violations. The regulations also cover the receiving party and require guarantees that biological materials will not be diverted toward weapon production and unapproved third parties. The export control list provides an extensive and well-defined list of pathogens and toxins covered by the new set of export control regulations, and puts China fully in-line with AG control lists. Negotiations between China and the AG are ongoing, with a round of meetings between an AG delegation and representatives of several Chinese government ministries held in June 2006. In July 2006, China updated its list of dual-use biological materials (List of Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and Affiliated Equipment and Technologies). Thirteen items were added to the list, while other pathogens were re-categorized for stricter export control.
The 2005 white paper on nonproliferation provides an overview of other recent efforts on the part of the Chinese government to further strengthen its export control system and harmonize it with international standards. With respect to the export of dual-use biological agents and technologies, exports are regulated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), in coordination with other agencies depending on the specific nature of the biological export. MOFCOM coordinates with the Ministry of Agriculture to control exports of technologies related to animals and plants, while MOFCOM controls the export of technologies and agents related to humans with assistance by the Ministry of Health. The white paper also highlights specific measures undertaken since 2002 to strengthen the implementation of the export control system, including: the formulation of measures for export license administration in 2003, a computerized interagency control system, and an interagency contingency mechanism for emergency cases. China also noted several outreach efforts designed to educate law enforcement officials and relevant private enterprises regarding the strengthened export control regime. In describing the enforcement of export control laws, China claims to have "dealt with scores of cases...concerning illegal export of sensitive items and technologies" since 2002. Notably, China also appeared to acknowledge that its export control system remains a work in progress, despite the gains claimed in the white paper:
"The nonproliferation export control [sic] is a long-term task. The Chinese government will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international nonproliferation endeavor."
China's Possible Biological Weapons-Related Exports
There have been concerns over possible Chinese biological weapons-related transfers to countries such as Iran. The first such statement was made by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in her 8 January 1997 written answers to questions by Senator Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah). According to the Washington Times, Albright's response stated: "We have received reporting regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to Iranian government entities which raise concern," and that the United States has "encouraged China to adopt comprehensive and rigorous export controls" to prevent assistance to Iran's biological weapons program.[12] According to a U.S. intelligence official, China sold Iran dual-use equipment and vaccines with both civilian medical applications and biological weapons applications.
On 16 January 2002, the United States imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.[13] According to U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, restrictions were placed on Liyang Chemical Equipment company, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, and an individual broker and agent named as Q.C. Chen "for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology that's used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons; equipment that's controlled under what's called the Australia Group."[14],[15]
In response to these and other sanctions introduced in July 2002, China reiterated its opposition to biochemical weapon development and stated that "the US decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies using so-called domestic laws and country-specific policy is unreasonable and should be cancelled."
While China has publicly declared to be consistently in compliance with the BTWC, past U.S. government reports issued by the Department of State have alleged that China not only has a small-scale offensive biological weapons program, but has also transferred controlled biological weapons-related items to nations of proliferation concern such as Iran. Such transfers have resulted in numerous U.S. nonproliferation sanctions being imposed on Chinese entities, despite vigorous protests by the Chinese government.
China's Official Position on Biological Weapons
Chinese officials have repeatedly stated in formal documents and official speeches that China has never developed biological weapons and does not currently engage in biological activities with offensive military applications. At the 1991 BTWC Preparatory Conference, the Chinese delegation stated:
"Having been caused great harm by biological weapons, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons, and has never developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained biological agents, toxins, or weapons equipment or means of delivery for them."
A November 1995 white paper on Arms Control and Disarmament issued by the State Council states that "China officially opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country." In 1998, China further clarified its positions and reiterated its previous positions concerning biological weapons in its white paper entitled China's National Defense. This document states:
"In November 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC).[2] As a state party to the BWC, China has, year after year, reported to the United Nations on convention related information and data concerning confidence building measures, in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the BWC."
China and the BTWC
Initially, China did not participate in the negotiations on the BTWC. At the 1972 meeting of the UN General Assembly, China's representative attacked the convention as a "fraud of sham disarmament" concocted by the two superpowers, and criticized it for not prohibiting the use of biological weapons and for not prohibiting chemical weapons.
China did accede to the BTWC in 1984, but with the stipulation that it was binding only in regards to relations with other parties, and will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy states whose armed forces or allies do not observe the convention's provisions. China supports efforts to "establish a fair, reasonable, appropriate and feasible verification mechanism," but believes that these efforts should be tempered to prevent the abuse of the verification mechanism and to protect the business interests of the state parties. At that time, China expressed concern that certain countries could repeatedly request on-site verifications of particular countries. China was also concerned that on-site inspections could be used for industrial espionage to transfer proprietary information to competitors.
China has become increasingly involved with international nonproliferation regimes, which has resulted in a more positive attitude toward multilateral treaties, such as the BTWC. In its 1995 white paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, China stated:
"China has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country. In 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and since that date it has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the convention. Since 1987 China has year after year reported to the United Nations on convention-related information and data in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences of the convention. China supports measures that help strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It will actively join in discussions of the Ad Hoc Group on promoting international cooperation, enhancing trust, strengthening verification, and other issues."
China provided further details on its position on biological weapons in its July 1998 national defense white paper, stating:
"Having suffered grievously from biological weapons attacks in the past, China supports work that helps comprehensively to strengthen the effectiveness of the convention. It has actively participated in the work of drawing up a Protocol of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC established in 1994, and has made contributions to the progress of the negotiations on the Protocol. China holds, in view of the complexity of the problems relating to the verification mechanism, that every country should, in a down-to-earth way, seek effective and feasible verification measures, and formulate concrete steps to prevent abuse of verification, and to protect the rightful commercial and security secrets of states parties. China considers that, while improving the convention's verification mechanism, international cooperation and exchanges among states parties in the sphere of bio-technology for peaceful purposes should also be strengthened."
During U.S. President Bill Clinton's trip to China in June 1998, the United States and China underscored their existing commitment to the BTWC by issuing a joint statement that called for more negotiations on a protocol to improve the BTWC's verification provisions.
China's National Defense 2000 white paper further emphasized the need for a verification regime:
"As a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under the Convention and has, on an annual basis, provided the United Nations with information on confidence building measures in this regard.
"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner. Upon its accession to the BWC, China pointed out the absence of concrete and effective measures for verification. China holds that, in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the BWC, a necessary verification mechanism should be established...At the same time, there should be concrete measures to promote international cooperation and exchanges among State Parties in the field of bio-technology for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. These measures will be conducive to enhancing the universality of the Convention and the future Protocol."
From November 19 through December 7, 2001, the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC was held in Geneva, Switzerland. During these proceedings, Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese delegation, made statements on November 19 praising the overall progress of the BTWC. Those statements of praise were quickly followed by ex-pressions of dissatisfaction and concern regarding the progress of efforts to strengthen the BTWC. In particular, Sha stated that "double or multiple" standards of implementation; the explicit separation of international cooperation and the prevention of proliferation by some countries; and the unilateralist approach by certain countries all were "not conducive to the realization of the purposes and objectives of the Convention and...must be rectified."
A 2002 white paper, entitled "China's National Defense 2002," restated China's overall stance on the BTWC, while expressing disappointment that a protocol had not yet been reached:
"China supports the enhancement of the effectiveness of the BWC in a comprehensive manner, and has actively participated in the work of the ad hoc group of the states parties to the Convention set up for the negotiation of a BWC protocol. China regrets that the protocol has not been reached as scheduled and that the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention has had to adjourn. China holds that the conclusion of a protocol with balanced contents and effective measures through multilateral negotiations remains the best way to enhance the effectiveness of the BWC. China is willing, together with all other parties concerned, to continue to explore measures along this line on the basis of the universal participation of all countries and within a multilateral framework."
Since 2003, China has issued two white papers dealing specifically with Chinese nonproliferation policy. The most recent of these, entitled "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation," was released in September 2005.[3] With respect to biological weapons, the white paper states:
"China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons and firmly opposes proliferation of such weapons. Against the backdrop of [the] increased threat of bio-terrorism and prominence of [the] biosecurity issue, it is of great realistic significance to continue to explore and formulate measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)..."
China further reiterated its support for strengthening of the BWC by encouraging nations to accede to and comply with the BWC and submit declarations as part of the BWC confidence-building measures. Notably, the white paper does not discuss a BWC verification protocol, but rather refers to non-specific strengthening "measures" or "efforts." For example, the white paper states:
"...it is of great significance to continue to explore and formulate measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) under the framework of this convention."
Likewise, the 2006 national defense white paper states:
"China supports multilateral efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention."[4]
Neither document mentions a BWC verification protocol. The shift in policy may be a consequence of the collapse of the BWC verification protocol negotiations at the 5th Review Conference in 2001 and the increasing importance of China's biotechnology sector, which may resist intrusive verification regimes on the grounds that it is necessary to protect its commercial secrets. The protection of potentially lucrative commercial biotechnology interests in the United States is commonly cited as a central reason for U.S. resistance to a BWC verification protocol.
The Sixth Review Conference of the BWC was held from November 20 to December 8, 2006. This review conference produced consensus amongst the States Parties on a number of issues, including the establishment of an Implementation Assistance Unit at the UN and the renewal of annual meetings of States Parties to discuss the future of the BWC. According to Jonathan Tucker, an arms control expert and observer, China and the U.S. differed on aspects of a comprehensive action plan related to Article X of the BWC.[5] Under Article X, States Parties "undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange" of biological agents, equipment, and related technology for peaceful purposes. Developing countries, including China, India, and Iran, that seek to develop their fledgling biotechnology industries cite Article X in supporting their right to engage in trade of these potentially dual-use items. On the other hand, the U.S. and other developed nations fear the transfer of sensitive technology to potential proliferant nations, especially Iran, could facilitate a secret biological weapons program. Article III of the BWC expressly forbids the transfer of technology for the purpose of assisting a foreign biological weapons program. Wary of this friction inherent to the dual-use nature of biotechnology, Ambassador Cheng Jingye, the head of the Chinese delegation at the Sixth Review Conference, included in his statement:
"Promotion of international exchanges and cooperation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology remains one of the objectives of the Convention. It should go in parallel with bio-arms control and non-proliferation and prevention of bio-terrorism. China calls upon all parties concerned to attach greater importance to it, explore and adopt [a] practical plan, intensify input and enable States Parties, especially developing countries, to truly get benefit from related international cooperation and materialize their legitimate rights enshrined by the Convention..."
China and Other Nonproliferation Agreements
In its public statements, China has consistently expressed support for the principles of nonproliferation of biological weapons and other WMD. However, China has not embraced every proposal aimed at countering WMD proliferation. For example, China has declined participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a voluntary system of counterproliferation partnerships between states designed to disrupt all modes of WMD trafficking, which was made public in May 2003. The PSI facilitates the interdiction of suspected WMD shipments by enhancing law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing between states, and provides the basis for allowing the interception and search of suspect maritime vessels flying PSI member flags in international waters. While voicing support for the goals of the PSI, China has also expressed fears that it is discriminatory and potentially illegal. In late 2003, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated:
"China understands the concerns of the member nations of the PSI over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...But internationally, the legality of some of the PSI measures have some negative aspects that could result in bad consequences..."[6]
In April 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC), of which China is a permanent member, unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1540, which seeks to prevent non-state actors from acquiring biological weapons and other CBRN weapons.[7] UNSC 1540 requires all UN member states to not assist, and adopt domestic laws designed to prevent, non-state actors from developing, acquiring, producing, transporting, or using WMD and their means of delivery. The resolution also calls for states to develop effective accounting measures to quantify and track sensitive materials, maintain adequate physical protection and border security, and establish export controls governing the export and trans-shipment of sensitive items. While China voted in favor of the resolution, according to a 2005 article appearing in the journal "Disarmament Diplomacy" it was the last of the permanent UNSC members to agree to the draft resolution language, after specific reference to interdiction was removed.[8]
The U.S. Response
U.S. government reports, however, suggest that China's claims regarding its biological weapons program, or lack thereof, may not be entirely accurate. China may have operated an offensive biological weapons program in the 1980s and various reports have indicated that some of these efforts may be ongoing. In its 1998 annual report on arms control compliance, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:
"The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC, and maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of BW agents. China's CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program, and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations."
In a January 2001 report entitled "Proliferation: Threat and Response," the U.S. Department of Defense agreed with ACDA's earlier statement:
"China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have started in the 1950s. China possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop and produce biological agents ... China is believed to possess an offensive biological warfare capability based on technology developed prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984.
"Since 1984, China consistently has claimed that it never researched, produced, or possessed any biological weapons and never would do so. Nevertheless, China's declarations under the voluntary BWC declarations for confidence building purposes are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete, and there are some reports that China may retain elements of its biological warfare program."
In July 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in testimony before the U.S.-China Commission:
"the U.S. believes that despite being a member of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), China maintains a BW program in violation of its BWC obligations. The United States believes that China's consistent claims that it has never researched, produced or possessed BW are simply not true-and that China still retains its BW program...Given the failure to enforce its stated nonproliferation goals with regard to missile technology, nuclear related items and its chemical weapons program, we must be concerned about the possibility of undetected proliferation of its dual-use items or actual elements of a BW program."[9]
More recently, the U.S. has continued to allege that China maintains an offensive BW capability in violation of the BWC, although whether or not a BW program is currently active is less certain. For example, in an August 2005 report issued by the U.S. Department of State entitled "Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," the U.S. found with respect to China's BW program:
"The United States reaffirms its judgment that China maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability in violation of its BWC obligations. Despite China's BWC CBM declarations to the contrary, indications suggest that China maintained an offensive BW program prior to acceding to the Convention in 1984."[10]
Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter returned in September 2006 to once again testify before the U.S.-China Commission regarding China's proliferation activities. Although retaining a skeptical outlook, in comparison to her July 2003 testimony DeSutter's specific language belied U.S. uncertainty with respect to China's current BW program:
"We maintain reservations about China's current research activities and dual-use capabilities, which raise the possibility that sophisticated BW and CW work could be underway. For example, because of the possible offensive capabilities of aerosolization techniques, the United States' concerns are underscored by publications indicating military involvement in such research. We also continue to believe that China maintains some elements of an offensive BW capability in violation of its BWC obligations...China has adopted export controls mirroring the Australia Group (AG) control list...Nonetheless, we continue to have concerns that Chinese entities are transferring AG-controlled items and technology to countries of concern."[11]
In recent years, China has vigorously protested both U.S. assertions that it engages in or fails to stop WMD proliferation, as well as the recent sanctions imposed by the U.S. on its companies. The Chinese response to DeSutter's 2006 testimony was particularly strong, characterizing her comments as "completely without basis and are irresponsible." The U.S. has not produced public evidence of Chinese BWC violations.
China's Biological Export Controls
In a positive move, China released on 14 October 2002 its Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies and Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List. The regulations, which went into effect on 1 December 2002, contain measures to strengthen export controls to prevent diversion of dual-use biological agents, related equipment, and technologies toward production of biological weapons. Domestic measures include an export licensing system, application process, and criminal prosecution for violations. The regulations also cover the receiving party and require guarantees that biological materials will not be diverted toward weapon production and unapproved third parties. The export control list provides an extensive and well-defined list of pathogens and toxins covered by the new set of export control regulations, and puts China fully in-line with AG control lists. Negotiations between China and the AG are ongoing, with a round of meetings between an AG delegation and representatives of several Chinese government ministries held in June 2006. In July 2006, China updated its list of dual-use biological materials (List of Export Control of Dual-use Biological Products and Affiliated Equipment and Technologies). Thirteen items were added to the list, while other pathogens were re-categorized for stricter export control.
The 2005 white paper on nonproliferation provides an overview of other recent efforts on the part of the Chinese government to further strengthen its export control system and harmonize it with international standards. With respect to the export of dual-use biological agents and technologies, exports are regulated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), in coordination with other agencies depending on the specific nature of the biological export. MOFCOM coordinates with the Ministry of Agriculture to control exports of technologies related to animals and plants, while MOFCOM controls the export of technologies and agents related to humans with assistance by the Ministry of Health. The white paper also highlights specific measures undertaken since 2002 to strengthen the implementation of the export control system, including: the formulation of measures for export license administration in 2003, a computerized interagency control system, and an interagency contingency mechanism for emergency cases. China also noted several outreach efforts designed to educate law enforcement officials and relevant private enterprises regarding the strengthened export control regime. In describing the enforcement of export control laws, China claims to have "dealt with scores of cases...concerning illegal export of sensitive items and technologies" since 2002. Notably, China also appeared to acknowledge that its export control system remains a work in progress, despite the gains claimed in the white paper:
"The nonproliferation export control [sic] is a long-term task. The Chinese government will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international nonproliferation endeavor."
China's Possible Biological Weapons-Related Exports
There have been concerns over possible Chinese biological weapons-related transfers to countries such as Iran. The first such statement was made by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in her 8 January 1997 written answers to questions by Senator Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah). According to the Washington Times, Albright's response stated: "We have received reporting regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to Iranian government entities which raise concern," and that the United States has "encouraged China to adopt comprehensive and rigorous export controls" to prevent assistance to Iran's biological weapons program.[12] According to a U.S. intelligence official, China sold Iran dual-use equipment and vaccines with both civilian medical applications and biological weapons applications.
On 16 January 2002, the United States imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.[13] According to U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, restrictions were placed on Liyang Chemical Equipment company, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, and an individual broker and agent named as Q.C. Chen "for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology that's used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons; equipment that's controlled under what's called the Australia Group."[14],[15]
In response to these and other sanctions introduced in July 2002, China reiterated its opposition to biochemical weapon development and stated that "the US decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies using so-called domestic laws and country-specific policy is unreasonable and should be cancelled."
China Embraces Nuclear Future
Not far from the old Silk Road, Chinese government scientists have begun boring holes deep into granite in the first steps toward building what could become the world's largest tomb for nuclear waste.As governments worldwide look at nuclear power as a possible answer to global warming, China has embarked on a nuclear-plant construction binge that eventually could exceed the one the United States undertook during the technology's heyday in the 1960s.
Under plans already announced, China intends to spend $50 billion to build 32 nuclear plants by 2020. Some analysts say the country will build 300 more by the middle of the century. That's not much less than the generating power of all the nuclear plants in the world today.By that point, the Chinese economy is expected to be the world's largest, and the idea that it may get most of its electricity from nuclear fission is being met with both optimism and concern.
Nuclear power plants, unlike those that run on fossil fuels, release few greenhouse gases. But they produce waste that can be dangerously radioactive for thousands of years.
China's plans already have been felt in world markets. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has been traveling the world to secure contracts for the uranium needed to power nuclear reactors, striking deals recently with Australia and Niger. Higher worldwide demand and a fear of future
shortages have driven the price of processed uranium ore from $10 a pound in 2003 to $120 this month.
A big reason Toshiba of Japan spent $5.4 billion last year to acquire Westinghouse Electric of Pennsylvania is expectations that China will buy into the company's nuclear technology in a big way over the next 20 to 30 years.Even by the standards of China, where economic growth has been running at blistering double-digit-percentage rates for four years, the nuclear plans are ambitious. The country derives only 2.3 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, compared with about 20 percent in the United States and nearly 80 percent in France. Nine countries get 40 percent or more of their electricity from nuclear power, but worldwide, it supplies only 17 percent of the total.
To satisfy exploding demand for electricity, Chinese local governments and entrepreneurs have for years been throwing up rattletrap coal-fired power plants. They are so inefficient and dirty -- spewing greenhouse gases, soot and toxins including mercury into the air -- that the
central government has been trying to limit construction of new ones, with limited success.
"Our irrational energy structure is causing serious pollution and greenhouse problems," said Gu Zhongmao, a professor at the China Institute of Atomic Energy, a government-affiliated research center. The situation provoked years of internal debate about nuclear power as
an answer, he said, before the country's leaders finally came to a consensus.
In the Chinese context, he said, "nuclear power is regarded as a clean energy."Yetenvironmental advocacy groups and outside safety experts are less than sanguine about the idea of hundreds of new nuclear plants being constructed by a secretive Communist government. The Chinese government has a poor public-safety record on issues far simpler than nuclearpower, such as food and drug purity.
Another communist state, the Soviet Union, seized on nuclear power in the 1970s and '80s as an answer to its energy problems, putting up about a dozen poorly designed plants. That culminated in the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which spread radiation across Europe in the world's worst nuclear accident."The safety issue is simply not something the Chinese government can afford to overlook," said Ailun Yang, climate and energy campaign manager for Greenpeace China. "The situation in China is that there will be huge populations around. What will happen if there is a Chernobyl in China?"
The Chinese government has emphasized a commitment to safety and is relying heavily on Western contractors such as Westinghouse to teach its engineers to build and operate plants.
China has nine working nuclear power plants, most on the coast. Two other plants were recently completed and will be hooked up to the electricity grid later this year. Dozens more are in the planning stage.
A Massachusetts Institute of Technology report said China may have toadd as many as 200 nuclear power plants by 2050 to meet its needs.Academics from China's leading technical university, Tsinghua University, said the country might need more, equivalent to the output
of 300 plants.In comparison, the United States has just more than 100 operating nuclear plants. Nuclear power has effectively been on hold in the United States since the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, but, with encouragement from the Bush administration, companies are thinking about ordering new plants.
Leon Reiter, a former member of the U.S. Nuclear, said countries are converging on the same conclusion as the world's supply of energy resources such as coal and oil grow scarcer and costlier."It is hard to imagine any way for us to come up with the energy we need without nuclear power," Reiter said.
China is talking about addressing the safety issue with a cookie-cutter plant of its own design that would be built in dozens of places. As in the United States, engineers in China want to build a plant whose fuel core cannot melt down and release radioactivity into the environment.
Groundbreaking for an experimental $416 million Chinese plant is scheduled for 2009.Even if the safety issue in China is solved, the country will confront a problem that has bedeviled nuclear power everywhere: what to do with the radioactive waste.In a conventional power plant, fossil fuels that have been trapped underground for millions of years are burned, generating heat that can be used to run electricity-generating turbines. The burning releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Scientists have concluded that the gas, by trapping extra heat from the sun, is warming the Earth and is likely to create severe environmental problems.
Nuclear plants generate heat by splitting atoms of uranium. They give off no greenhouse gases, but as the nuclear reaction proceeds, the uranium is transformed into other elements, some of which remain radioactive for many centuries.As a rule, the spent fuel is stored temporarily in water-filled tanks near nuclear plants. In democratic countries, the question of final disposal has provoked huge, seemingly endless fights, including one in the United States over whether to dispose of the spent fuel at an underground site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.
The idea behind a disposal site is simple: Stick the waste in a sealed container, place it deep underground, and leave it there until the radiation goes away. But in practice, finding appropriate sites has been difficult because of worries about earthquakes or ground water spreading the radiation.In the desert of Central Asia, China is planning its own version of
Yucca Mountain, albeit without serious opposition. Some local leaders have protested the Beishan Mountain disposal project, but their concerns have been muted.The Beishan Mountains are a lonely outpost, with the closest permanent residents more than 60 miles away. The only people who venture here are nomadic Mongolian herdsmen with goats and camels. They move from one small oasis to another in what is otherwise a desolate, gray desert for hundreds of miles around. The only signs of the nuclear waste site to come are the dark tents that scientists put up and take down as they test rock layers to find the best place for disposal.
Chinese officials have not announced specifics of the Beishan waste disposal site, but Wang Ju, head of the waste repository project for the Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology of the state-run China National Nuclear Corp., said the schedule for construction had been sped up to match the country's increasing use of nuclear power.Xu Mingqi, deputy director of the Institute of World Economy at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, who researches energy issues, said the Chinese government is well aware of the stakes."If we do not bury it properly," Xu said, " it could be an even bigger problem than the pollution problem we have now."
Under plans already announced, China intends to spend $50 billion to build 32 nuclear plants by 2020. Some analysts say the country will build 300 more by the middle of the century. That's not much less than the generating power of all the nuclear plants in the world today.By that point, the Chinese economy is expected to be the world's largest, and the idea that it may get most of its electricity from nuclear fission is being met with both optimism and concern.
Nuclear power plants, unlike those that run on fossil fuels, release few greenhouse gases. But they produce waste that can be dangerously radioactive for thousands of years.
China's plans already have been felt in world markets. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has been traveling the world to secure contracts for the uranium needed to power nuclear reactors, striking deals recently with Australia and Niger. Higher worldwide demand and a fear of future
shortages have driven the price of processed uranium ore from $10 a pound in 2003 to $120 this month.
A big reason Toshiba of Japan spent $5.4 billion last year to acquire Westinghouse Electric of Pennsylvania is expectations that China will buy into the company's nuclear technology in a big way over the next 20 to 30 years.Even by the standards of China, where economic growth has been running at blistering double-digit-percentage rates for four years, the nuclear plans are ambitious. The country derives only 2.3 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, compared with about 20 percent in the United States and nearly 80 percent in France. Nine countries get 40 percent or more of their electricity from nuclear power, but worldwide, it supplies only 17 percent of the total.
To satisfy exploding demand for electricity, Chinese local governments and entrepreneurs have for years been throwing up rattletrap coal-fired power plants. They are so inefficient and dirty -- spewing greenhouse gases, soot and toxins including mercury into the air -- that the
central government has been trying to limit construction of new ones, with limited success.
"Our irrational energy structure is causing serious pollution and greenhouse problems," said Gu Zhongmao, a professor at the China Institute of Atomic Energy, a government-affiliated research center. The situation provoked years of internal debate about nuclear power as
an answer, he said, before the country's leaders finally came to a consensus.
In the Chinese context, he said, "nuclear power is regarded as a clean energy."Yetenvironmental advocacy groups and outside safety experts are less than sanguine about the idea of hundreds of new nuclear plants being constructed by a secretive Communist government. The Chinese government has a poor public-safety record on issues far simpler than nuclearpower, such as food and drug purity.
Another communist state, the Soviet Union, seized on nuclear power in the 1970s and '80s as an answer to its energy problems, putting up about a dozen poorly designed plants. That culminated in the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, which spread radiation across Europe in the world's worst nuclear accident."The safety issue is simply not something the Chinese government can afford to overlook," said Ailun Yang, climate and energy campaign manager for Greenpeace China. "The situation in China is that there will be huge populations around. What will happen if there is a Chernobyl in China?"
The Chinese government has emphasized a commitment to safety and is relying heavily on Western contractors such as Westinghouse to teach its engineers to build and operate plants.
China has nine working nuclear power plants, most on the coast. Two other plants were recently completed and will be hooked up to the electricity grid later this year. Dozens more are in the planning stage.
A Massachusetts Institute of Technology report said China may have toadd as many as 200 nuclear power plants by 2050 to meet its needs.Academics from China's leading technical university, Tsinghua University, said the country might need more, equivalent to the output
of 300 plants.In comparison, the United States has just more than 100 operating nuclear plants. Nuclear power has effectively been on hold in the United States since the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, but, with encouragement from the Bush administration, companies are thinking about ordering new plants.
Leon Reiter, a former member of the U.S. Nuclear, said countries are converging on the same conclusion as the world's supply of energy resources such as coal and oil grow scarcer and costlier."It is hard to imagine any way for us to come up with the energy we need without nuclear power," Reiter said.
China is talking about addressing the safety issue with a cookie-cutter plant of its own design that would be built in dozens of places. As in the United States, engineers in China want to build a plant whose fuel core cannot melt down and release radioactivity into the environment.
Groundbreaking for an experimental $416 million Chinese plant is scheduled for 2009.Even if the safety issue in China is solved, the country will confront a problem that has bedeviled nuclear power everywhere: what to do with the radioactive waste.In a conventional power plant, fossil fuels that have been trapped underground for millions of years are burned, generating heat that can be used to run electricity-generating turbines. The burning releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Scientists have concluded that the gas, by trapping extra heat from the sun, is warming the Earth and is likely to create severe environmental problems.
Nuclear plants generate heat by splitting atoms of uranium. They give off no greenhouse gases, but as the nuclear reaction proceeds, the uranium is transformed into other elements, some of which remain radioactive for many centuries.As a rule, the spent fuel is stored temporarily in water-filled tanks near nuclear plants. In democratic countries, the question of final disposal has provoked huge, seemingly endless fights, including one in the United States over whether to dispose of the spent fuel at an underground site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.
The idea behind a disposal site is simple: Stick the waste in a sealed container, place it deep underground, and leave it there until the radiation goes away. But in practice, finding appropriate sites has been difficult because of worries about earthquakes or ground water spreading the radiation.In the desert of Central Asia, China is planning its own version of
Yucca Mountain, albeit without serious opposition. Some local leaders have protested the Beishan Mountain disposal project, but their concerns have been muted.The Beishan Mountains are a lonely outpost, with the closest permanent residents more than 60 miles away. The only people who venture here are nomadic Mongolian herdsmen with goats and camels. They move from one small oasis to another in what is otherwise a desolate, gray desert for hundreds of miles around. The only signs of the nuclear waste site to come are the dark tents that scientists put up and take down as they test rock layers to find the best place for disposal.
Chinese officials have not announced specifics of the Beishan waste disposal site, but Wang Ju, head of the waste repository project for the Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology of the state-run China National Nuclear Corp., said the schedule for construction had been sped up to match the country's increasing use of nuclear power.Xu Mingqi, deputy director of the Institute of World Economy at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, who researches energy issues, said the Chinese government is well aware of the stakes."If we do not bury it properly," Xu said, " it could be an even bigger problem than the pollution problem we have now."
Chemical Overview
China is a party to most of the major international agreements regulating chemical weapons, including the Geneva Protocol and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). China also supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004, which compels states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China is not, however, a member of the Australia Group (AG), a voluntary supply-side export control regime focusing on chemical and biological weapons (CBW), though the issuance of new CW-specific export controls in 2002 has put Beijing's export control policy fully in line with that of the AG. In recent years, China has begun informal discussions with the AG.
While China declared upon ratification of the CWC in 1997 that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes, it has consistently maintained that the program has since been dismantled. Even though the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has conducted over 100 inspections in China to confirm Beijing's declarations, the United States has stated on numerous occasions that China has not declared the full extent of its chemical weapons program. Additionally, the United States has expressed concern over the transfer of controlled chemicals from Chinese entities to nations of proliferation concern, most notably Iran.
China's Official Position on Chemical Weapons
Officially, China supports the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In November 1995, Beijing's White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament stated that China supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament, "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons)." The document also stated that China "has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons," and that "it does not produce or possess chemical weapons."
In 1998, China further clarified its positions and reiterated its previous positions concerning chemical weapons in its white paper entitled China's National Defense. This document states:
"China signed the CWC in January 1993, ratified the convention in December 1996 and deposited instruments of ratification on April 25, 1997, thus becoming an original signatory state to the CWC...China holds that the convention should promote international economic, trade, scientific and technological exchanges in the field of chemical industry, ensuring that chemical industry technology truly benefits mankind..."
In a 2000 white paper, China's National Defense reiterated the policies of the earlier white papers, and added:
"It is the view of the Chinese government that the implementation of the CWC has been, on the whole, satisfactory, since it entered into force three years ago. However, there are problems which should not be ignored: The universality of the Convention leaves a lot to be desired; a certain State Party has made de facto reservations regarding the provisions of the Convention in the form of domestic legislation; and some State Parties have been very slow in destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. These problems should be put right as soon as possible."
In the 2005 white paper, "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," China emphasized the problem of the continued presence of abandoned Japanese chemical weapons in China:
"China suffered a lot from the use of biological and chemical weapons by foreign countries in history. The chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on Chinese soil are still posing a grave and real threat to the lives and property of the Chinese people, and to the ecological environment."
As part of its CWC obligations, in 1997 China reportedly declared small-scale chemical agent production facilities, which have since been destroyed. These declarations have been verified by on-site inspections carried out by the OPCW. China has also declared that it has maintained a defensive chemical warfare program to protect itself against chemical attack, which is not in conflict with the CWC. In 1950, China established an anti-chemical warfare school, and in 1956, established the Anti-Chemical Warfare Department with the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Currently, China conducts research on chemical weapons defense at its Research Institute of Chemical Defense and has two schools for its anti-chemical warfare corps. It is not known publicly whether China declared a chemical weapons stockpile. According to the Chinese white paper "China's National Defense in 2006," since the CWC entered into force, China has had over 100 on-site inspections by OPCW personnel to verify submitted declarations.
China and Other Nonproliferation Agreements
In its public statements, China has consistently expressed support for the principles of nonproliferation of chemical weapons and other WMD. However, China has not embraced every proposal aimed at countering WMD proliferation. For example, China has declined participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a voluntary system of counterproliferation partnerships between states designed to disrupt all modes of WMD trafficking, which was made public in May 2003. The PSI facilitates the interdiction of suspected WMD shipments by enhancing law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing between states, and provides the basis for allowing the interception and search of suspect maritime vessels flying PSI member flags in international waters. While voicing support for the goals of the PSI, China has also expressed fears that it is discriminatory and potentially illegal. In late 2003, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated:
"China understands the concerns of the member nations of the PSI over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...But internationally, the legality of some of the PSI measures have some negative aspects that could result in bad consequences..."
In April 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC), of which China is a permanent member, unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1540, which seeks to prevent non-state actors from acquiring chemical weapons and other CBRN weapons. UNSC 1540 requires all UN member states to not assist, and adopt domestic laws designed to prevent, non-state actors from developing, acquiring, producing, transporting, or using WMD and their means of delivery. The resolution also calls for states to develop effective accounting measures to quantify and track sensitive materials, maintain adequate physical protection and border security, and establish export controls governing the export and trans-shipment of sensitive items. While China voted in favor of the resolution, according to a 2005 article appearing in the journal "Disarmament Diplomacy" it was the last of the permanent UNSC members to agree to the draft resolution language, after specific reference to interdiction was removed.
The U.S. Response
Despite China's official position, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing chemical weapons programs, in violation of its CWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States, though they have not yet led to any official action against China. (Under the provisions of the CWC, allegations of active CW programs can be brought before the OPCW and a challenge inspection can be called.)
In its January 2001 report entitled Proliferation: Threat and Response, the U.S. Department of Defense stated:
"Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. China's chemical industry has the capability to produce many chemicals, some of which have been sought by states trying to develop a chemical warfare capability. Foreign sales of such chemicals have been a source of foreign exchange for China. The Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the sale of some chemical precursors and its enforcement activities generally have yielded mixed results.
"While China claims it possesses no chemical agent inventory, it is believed to possess a moderate inventory of traditional agents...Chinese military forces most likely have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, and its forces routinely conduct defensive chemical warfare training. Even though China has ratified the CWC, made its declaration, and subjected its declared chemical weapons facilities to inspections, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program."
In July 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in testimony before the U.S.-China Commission:
"China's maintenance of a chemical weapons program is a matter of serious concern to us. We are no less concerned about certain Chinese entities' continued transfers overseas of dual-use chemical agents and technologies and equipment that can be used in chemical weapons programs. The United States believes that, despite being a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), China has an advanced chemical weapons research and development program. Although China has declared that it does not possess chemical weapons, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its CW program. We also believe that China possesses an inventory of traditional CW agents. Moreover, a number of China's chemical industrial facilities are highly capable - giving it the ability to produce many dual-use chemicals...The U.S. remains concerned, however, about the role of Chinese entities providing CW-related equipment, technology, and precursor materials to Iran. The U.S. continues diplomatic efforts to encourage China to prevent exports to CW-related end-users, particularly in Iran."
In more recent years, the U.S. continues to express concern regarding China's CW program, although the U.S. is less certain of the current status of the program. In August 2005, a report issued by the U.S. Department of State entitled "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" stated:
"The United States judges that China maintains a CW production mobilization capability, although there is insufficient information available to determine whether it maintains an active offensive CW research and development program. Moreover, in violation of its CWC obligations, China has not acknowledged past transfers of chemical weapons and it may not have declared the full extent of its CW-related facilities."
In September 2006, Assistant Secretary of State DeSutter again testified before Congress regarding Chinese WMD proliferation. While acknowledging recent Chinese efforts to strengthen nonproliferation regimes, DeSutter expressed dissatisfaction with China's ability to control exports of sensitive materials and chemicals to countries of concern, including Iran and North Korea:
"...we remain disappointed in the continuing proliferant behavior of certain Chinese entities, and we remain deeply concerned about the Chinese government's commitment towards its nonproliferation obligations. Quite simply, we believe that the Chinese government should do more to consistently enforce its nonproliferation regulations."
In discussing a putative Chinese CW program, DeSutter stated:
"We maintain reservations about China's current research activities and dual-use capabilities, which raise the possibility that BW and CW work could be underway. For example, because of the possible offensive capabilities of aerosolization techniques, the United States' concerns are underscored by publications indicating military involvement in such research...the United States believes that China maintains a CW production mobilization capability, although we simply do not have enough information to determine whether China maintains an active offensive CW research and development program."
The U.S. has not publicly disclosed specific evidence to support its contentions regarding the Chinese CW program.
China's CW Export Controls
China's chemical industry is large and diffuse, and seen as one of the core industries involved in China's overall economic development. This, combined with the fact that export control laws have only come into force in the last few years, has made domestic enforcement of these laws difficult, resulting in inconsistent implementation.
The Chinese government has consistently insisted that it has never violated the CWC, and points out that that the convention explicitly allows for normal trade and cooperation between State Parties (of which Iran is one) in the chemical industrial field.
China's current chemical export controls consist of five main components:
* December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals (based on the regulations contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention);
* March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations, issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC;
* August 1997 Ministerial Circular on strengthened chemical export controls;
* June 1998 Decree expanding the scope of its chemical controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group, of which China is not a member; and
* October 2002 regulations, with corresponding control lists, on chemical and biological agent related exports, which includes extensive licensing and registration procedures for CBW-related materials, equipment and technologies. With the 2002 regulations, China's export controls now fully cover requirements under the CWC, as well as the control lists of the Australia Group.
Negotiations between China and the AG are ongoing, with a round of meetings between an AG delegation and representatives of several Chinese government ministries held in June 2006. The October 2002 regulations, formally known as the Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies and Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, have the stated intention of further strengthening control over the export of dual-use chemicals and their related equipment and technologies. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) spokeswoman Gao Yan stated:
"As an important component of China's export control legal system, the measures are significant to implementing the country's nonproliferation policy, to fulfilling its international obligations, to safeguarding its national security as well as social and public interests, to standardizing its export control of sensitive items, and to maintaining the normal order of foreign trade."
The 2005 white paper on arms control and nonproliferation offered a relatively detailed description of China's export control system. For chemical weapons-related export controls, the export of "certain chemicals" is regulated by the Ministry of Commerce in coordination with the State Development and Reform Commission. The white paper provided an overview of efforts on the part of the Chinese government to further strengthen its export control system and harmonize it with international standards. Among the specific measures cited were: the formulation of measures for export license administration in 2003, a computerized interagency control system, and an interagency contingency mechanism for emergency cases. With respect to the enforcement of export control laws, China claimed to have "dealt with scores of cases...concerning illegal export of sensitive items and technologies" since the implementation of the 2002 regulations. The white paper also highlighted Chinese efforts to train law enforcement officials and private enterprises in Chinese export control policy. As a significant final note, China appeared to acknowledge that its export control system remains a work in progress:
"The nonproliferation export control [sic] is a long-term task. The Chinese government will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international nonproliferation endeavor."
China's CW Exports
Since the early 1990's, China was repeatedly accused, primarily by the United States, of exporting dual-use chemical weapons-related materials and technology, such as dual-use chemical precursors, vaccines and production equipment, to countries of concern in the developing world, including Iran, Libya, and Iraq. Chinese chemical and biological weapon-related exports to Iran raised particular concerns.
One of the earliest and most controversial incidents involved the 1993 search of the Chinese ship Yinhe (Galaxy). The search came as a result of U.S. intelligence reports, which charged that the ship was carrying chemical precursors to Iran. The search of the ship, however, revealed no such items. Following the Yinhe incident, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 4 September 1993 that said:
"As a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China is very serious about its international obligations thereunder. Despite the fact that the Convention has yet to take effect, China has committed itself publicly not to produce or possess chemical weapons, nor does it export chemical products that may be used for the purpose of making chemical weapons. In order to ensure that the chemicals it exports will not be used for chemical weapons, the Chinese Government has formulated extremely stringent measures to control its chemical export. As to the two chemicals referred to by the U.S. side, the Chinese Government has clear-cut orders against their export to certain regions. The Chinese Government will, as always, strictly observe its international obligations and make its contribution to safeguarding international peace and security and promoting normal economic and trade exchanges among countries."
In 1997 and 2001, the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese entities for exporting dual-use chemical precursors and chemical production equipment to Iran in support of Tehran's suspected chemical weapons program. On January 16, 2002, sanctions were again imposed on three Chinese companies by the United States under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000--U.S. legislation that prohibits the sale of chemical and biological weapons components and missile technology to Iran, designed to stop Tehran acquiring weapons of mass destruction. According to U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, restrictions were placed on Liyang Chemical Equipment company, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, and an individual broker and agent named as Q.C. Chen "for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology that's used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons; equipment that's controlled under what's called the Australia Group."
In response to the sanctions, China reiterated its opposition to chemical weapon development, stating "China is opposed to any country developing chemical weapons, and furthermore does not help any country develop chemical weapons." Furthermore, "the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies using so-called domestic laws and country-specific policy is unreasonable and should be cancelled."
Since 2002, numerous Chinese entities have been sanctioned by the United States for illicit transfers of controlled goods to third parties, often Iran. While the nature of the goods is frequently undisclosed, many of the entities--such as Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, Q.C. Chen, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company, and Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant--engage primarily in the trade of chemicals, prompting speculation that many of the sanctions were for violations of the parameters of the AG or the CWC. This is supported by Assistant Secretary of State DeSutter's 2006 Congressional testimony, where she stated:
"China has adopted export controls mirroring the Australia Group (AG) control list and on chemicals listed on the CWC Schedules...Nonetheless, we continue to have concerns that Chinese entities are transferring AG-controlled items and technology to countries of concern."
Further, a June 2007 media report suggested that U.S. officials were particularly concerned about the activities of the Chinese national Q.C. Chen, whom one unnamed official described as "a serial proliferator of chemical weapons capabilities" and "the A.Q. Khan of chemical weapons." [A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, oversaw a clandestine smuggling ring which sold nuclear equipment and technology to several countries beginning in the 1980s and lasting until his public confession in 2004.] Despite having no economic impact, the U.S. has repeatedly imposed sanctions on Chen, apparently in an effort to call attention to his activities.
In recent years, China has vigorously protested both U.S. assertions that it engages in or fails to stop WMD proliferation, as well as the recent sanctions imposed by the U.S. on its companies. The Chinese response to DeSutter's 2006 testimony was particularly strong, characterizing her comments as "completely without basis and are irresponsible." In January 2007, in response to sanctions imposed on three Chinese companies under the 2005 Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, including the Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated Chinese opposition to the Bush Administration's frequent implementation of sanctions:
"It is unreasonable for the American government to invoke its domestic law to sanction Chinese companies without providing any evidence...We express resolute opposition and strongly urge the U.S. to correct its wrong practice."
Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China
At the end of World War II, the Japanese army abandoned a large amount of chemical weapons on Chinese territory. China estimates the number of shells to be disposed of at 2 million, while Japan estimates the number to be about 700,000. Under the CWC, Japan is responsible for the proper destruction of these abandoned munitions, and both China and Japan were tasked with negotiating the arrangements for destruction. After many years of negotiation, the two governments in July 1999 signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a "basic framework of the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China, based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)." Under the agreement, Japan is to provide the necessary facilities, experts, expertise, and funds to complete the destruction of the munitions. The clean-up commenced in 2000 and according to CWC guidelines, should be completed by 2007, 10 years after the convention's entry into force. Due to the immense scale of the operation, Japan has repeatedly stated that this deadline is unrealistic and has expressed interest in a five-year extension, which, according to the OPCW, would require China's consent. In April 2006, China and Japan jointly filed a request with the OPCW for five more years to complete the removal and destruction of the weapons.
Japan estimates that clean-up costs will be around $1.6 billion dollars (200 billion yen). However, this figure is based on the Japanese estimate of 700,000 abandoned shells and not the Chinese estimate of 2 million abandoned shells. In February 2000, over 17,600 chemical weapons of Japanese origin were discovered in Nanjing. Japan sent investigators to China in an attempt to find a way to destroy the weapons. In September 2000, in Bei'an China, scientists and workmen from both Japan and China conducted the "first large scale joint operation" for the excavation and recovery of abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs). Cooperative efforts have also included joint site investigations, studies on weapon destruction, as well as research on security systems protecting both humans and the environment. In addition to major strides in cooperation, the beginning of 2001 ushered in the introduction of management consultants engaged in experimentation and evaluation of weapon destruction devices. Furthermore, plans are currently underway for a program of weapon removal at Haerbaling, where the majority of buried ACWs are located. The eradication of these stockpiles will mark a significant step in eliminating ACWs on Chinese soil.
However, the elimination of ACWs has not progressed fast enough for the Chinese side. In its 2002 white paper, China's National Defense, China expressed its dissatisfaction with the pace of Japanese efforts to recover and destroy ACWs:
"Today, large quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese invaders still remain on Chinese soil. China urges Japan to earnestly implement the obligations under the CWC for the destruction of these weapons, and expedite the pace of the relevant work in accordance with the Memorandum on the Destruction of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China between the governments of China and Japan, so as to commence as soon as possible the substantive part of the destruction process."
As noted above, China reiterated this general sentiment in its 2005 white paper on arms control and nonproliferation. The sluggish pace of ACW removal continues to generate frustration on the Chinese side. In September 2007 at the 50th session of the OPCW Executive Council, China's permanent representative to the OPCW noted that Japan had not yet disposed of "a single" ACW. ACWs continue to be unearthed in China with some frequency, and Chinese citizens have sued repeatedly in Japanese courts for compensation for the injuries and associated damages caused by Japanese ACWs, despite several rulings in favor of the Japanese government. In July 2007, for example, the Tokyo High Court overturned a September 2003 lower court ruling which had awarded a $1.6 million settlement to 13 Chinese victims of Japanese ACW exposure and their families. Finally, the cleanup effort has been slowed by allegations of corruption on the part of Japanese companies involved in ACW removal. In October 2007, Japanese investigators raided the offices of two companies, Abandoned Chemical Weapons Disposal Corporation and Pacific Consultants International, who were accused of illegally diverting funds intended for ACW cleanup.
Despite these misgivings, joint China-Japan efforts to locate and recover ACWs continue. In December 2006, China and Japan agreed to create a joint body, centered in China's Jilin province, to recover and dispose of Japanese ACWs. China's 2006 national defense white paper states:
"Since 2005, China has assisted Japan in 24 on-site verifications, and recovered over 3,100 chemical weapons abandoned by Japan...These chemical weapons will be destroyed by Japan in the future."
While China declared upon ratification of the CWC in 1997 that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes, it has consistently maintained that the program has since been dismantled. Even though the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has conducted over 100 inspections in China to confirm Beijing's declarations, the United States has stated on numerous occasions that China has not declared the full extent of its chemical weapons program. Additionally, the United States has expressed concern over the transfer of controlled chemicals from Chinese entities to nations of proliferation concern, most notably Iran.
China's Official Position on Chemical Weapons
Officially, China supports the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In November 1995, Beijing's White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament stated that China supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament, "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons)." The document also stated that China "has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons," and that "it does not produce or possess chemical weapons."
In 1998, China further clarified its positions and reiterated its previous positions concerning chemical weapons in its white paper entitled China's National Defense. This document states:
"China signed the CWC in January 1993, ratified the convention in December 1996 and deposited instruments of ratification on April 25, 1997, thus becoming an original signatory state to the CWC...China holds that the convention should promote international economic, trade, scientific and technological exchanges in the field of chemical industry, ensuring that chemical industry technology truly benefits mankind..."
In a 2000 white paper, China's National Defense reiterated the policies of the earlier white papers, and added:
"It is the view of the Chinese government that the implementation of the CWC has been, on the whole, satisfactory, since it entered into force three years ago. However, there are problems which should not be ignored: The universality of the Convention leaves a lot to be desired; a certain State Party has made de facto reservations regarding the provisions of the Convention in the form of domestic legislation; and some State Parties have been very slow in destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. These problems should be put right as soon as possible."
In the 2005 white paper, "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," China emphasized the problem of the continued presence of abandoned Japanese chemical weapons in China:
"China suffered a lot from the use of biological and chemical weapons by foreign countries in history. The chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on Chinese soil are still posing a grave and real threat to the lives and property of the Chinese people, and to the ecological environment."
As part of its CWC obligations, in 1997 China reportedly declared small-scale chemical agent production facilities, which have since been destroyed. These declarations have been verified by on-site inspections carried out by the OPCW. China has also declared that it has maintained a defensive chemical warfare program to protect itself against chemical attack, which is not in conflict with the CWC. In 1950, China established an anti-chemical warfare school, and in 1956, established the Anti-Chemical Warfare Department with the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Currently, China conducts research on chemical weapons defense at its Research Institute of Chemical Defense and has two schools for its anti-chemical warfare corps. It is not known publicly whether China declared a chemical weapons stockpile. According to the Chinese white paper "China's National Defense in 2006," since the CWC entered into force, China has had over 100 on-site inspections by OPCW personnel to verify submitted declarations.
China and Other Nonproliferation Agreements
In its public statements, China has consistently expressed support for the principles of nonproliferation of chemical weapons and other WMD. However, China has not embraced every proposal aimed at countering WMD proliferation. For example, China has declined participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a voluntary system of counterproliferation partnerships between states designed to disrupt all modes of WMD trafficking, which was made public in May 2003. The PSI facilitates the interdiction of suspected WMD shipments by enhancing law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing between states, and provides the basis for allowing the interception and search of suspect maritime vessels flying PSI member flags in international waters. While voicing support for the goals of the PSI, China has also expressed fears that it is discriminatory and potentially illegal. In late 2003, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated:
"China understands the concerns of the member nations of the PSI over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...But internationally, the legality of some of the PSI measures have some negative aspects that could result in bad consequences..."
In April 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC), of which China is a permanent member, unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1540, which seeks to prevent non-state actors from acquiring chemical weapons and other CBRN weapons. UNSC 1540 requires all UN member states to not assist, and adopt domestic laws designed to prevent, non-state actors from developing, acquiring, producing, transporting, or using WMD and their means of delivery. The resolution also calls for states to develop effective accounting measures to quantify and track sensitive materials, maintain adequate physical protection and border security, and establish export controls governing the export and trans-shipment of sensitive items. While China voted in favor of the resolution, according to a 2005 article appearing in the journal "Disarmament Diplomacy" it was the last of the permanent UNSC members to agree to the draft resolution language, after specific reference to interdiction was removed.
The U.S. Response
Despite China's official position, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing chemical weapons programs, in violation of its CWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States, though they have not yet led to any official action against China. (Under the provisions of the CWC, allegations of active CW programs can be brought before the OPCW and a challenge inspection can be called.)
In its January 2001 report entitled Proliferation: Threat and Response, the U.S. Department of Defense stated:
"Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. China's chemical industry has the capability to produce many chemicals, some of which have been sought by states trying to develop a chemical warfare capability. Foreign sales of such chemicals have been a source of foreign exchange for China. The Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the sale of some chemical precursors and its enforcement activities generally have yielded mixed results.
"While China claims it possesses no chemical agent inventory, it is believed to possess a moderate inventory of traditional agents...Chinese military forces most likely have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, and its forces routinely conduct defensive chemical warfare training. Even though China has ratified the CWC, made its declaration, and subjected its declared chemical weapons facilities to inspections, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program."
In July 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in testimony before the U.S.-China Commission:
"China's maintenance of a chemical weapons program is a matter of serious concern to us. We are no less concerned about certain Chinese entities' continued transfers overseas of dual-use chemical agents and technologies and equipment that can be used in chemical weapons programs. The United States believes that, despite being a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), China has an advanced chemical weapons research and development program. Although China has declared that it does not possess chemical weapons, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its CW program. We also believe that China possesses an inventory of traditional CW agents. Moreover, a number of China's chemical industrial facilities are highly capable - giving it the ability to produce many dual-use chemicals...The U.S. remains concerned, however, about the role of Chinese entities providing CW-related equipment, technology, and precursor materials to Iran. The U.S. continues diplomatic efforts to encourage China to prevent exports to CW-related end-users, particularly in Iran."
In more recent years, the U.S. continues to express concern regarding China's CW program, although the U.S. is less certain of the current status of the program. In August 2005, a report issued by the U.S. Department of State entitled "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" stated:
"The United States judges that China maintains a CW production mobilization capability, although there is insufficient information available to determine whether it maintains an active offensive CW research and development program. Moreover, in violation of its CWC obligations, China has not acknowledged past transfers of chemical weapons and it may not have declared the full extent of its CW-related facilities."
In September 2006, Assistant Secretary of State DeSutter again testified before Congress regarding Chinese WMD proliferation. While acknowledging recent Chinese efforts to strengthen nonproliferation regimes, DeSutter expressed dissatisfaction with China's ability to control exports of sensitive materials and chemicals to countries of concern, including Iran and North Korea:
"...we remain disappointed in the continuing proliferant behavior of certain Chinese entities, and we remain deeply concerned about the Chinese government's commitment towards its nonproliferation obligations. Quite simply, we believe that the Chinese government should do more to consistently enforce its nonproliferation regulations."
In discussing a putative Chinese CW program, DeSutter stated:
"We maintain reservations about China's current research activities and dual-use capabilities, which raise the possibility that BW and CW work could be underway. For example, because of the possible offensive capabilities of aerosolization techniques, the United States' concerns are underscored by publications indicating military involvement in such research...the United States believes that China maintains a CW production mobilization capability, although we simply do not have enough information to determine whether China maintains an active offensive CW research and development program."
The U.S. has not publicly disclosed specific evidence to support its contentions regarding the Chinese CW program.
China's CW Export Controls
China's chemical industry is large and diffuse, and seen as one of the core industries involved in China's overall economic development. This, combined with the fact that export control laws have only come into force in the last few years, has made domestic enforcement of these laws difficult, resulting in inconsistent implementation.
The Chinese government has consistently insisted that it has never violated the CWC, and points out that that the convention explicitly allows for normal trade and cooperation between State Parties (of which Iran is one) in the chemical industrial field.
China's current chemical export controls consist of five main components:
* December 1995 Regulations on Controlled Chemicals (based on the regulations contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention);
* March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations, issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC;
* August 1997 Ministerial Circular on strengthened chemical export controls;
* June 1998 Decree expanding the scope of its chemical controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group, of which China is not a member; and
* October 2002 regulations, with corresponding control lists, on chemical and biological agent related exports, which includes extensive licensing and registration procedures for CBW-related materials, equipment and technologies. With the 2002 regulations, China's export controls now fully cover requirements under the CWC, as well as the control lists of the Australia Group.
Negotiations between China and the AG are ongoing, with a round of meetings between an AG delegation and representatives of several Chinese government ministries held in June 2006. The October 2002 regulations, formally known as the Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies and Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, have the stated intention of further strengthening control over the export of dual-use chemicals and their related equipment and technologies. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) spokeswoman Gao Yan stated:
"As an important component of China's export control legal system, the measures are significant to implementing the country's nonproliferation policy, to fulfilling its international obligations, to safeguarding its national security as well as social and public interests, to standardizing its export control of sensitive items, and to maintaining the normal order of foreign trade."
The 2005 white paper on arms control and nonproliferation offered a relatively detailed description of China's export control system. For chemical weapons-related export controls, the export of "certain chemicals" is regulated by the Ministry of Commerce in coordination with the State Development and Reform Commission. The white paper provided an overview of efforts on the part of the Chinese government to further strengthen its export control system and harmonize it with international standards. Among the specific measures cited were: the formulation of measures for export license administration in 2003, a computerized interagency control system, and an interagency contingency mechanism for emergency cases. With respect to the enforcement of export control laws, China claimed to have "dealt with scores of cases...concerning illegal export of sensitive items and technologies" since the implementation of the 2002 regulations. The white paper also highlighted Chinese efforts to train law enforcement officials and private enterprises in Chinese export control policy. As a significant final note, China appeared to acknowledge that its export control system remains a work in progress:
"The nonproliferation export control [sic] is a long-term task. The Chinese government will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international nonproliferation endeavor."
China's CW Exports
Since the early 1990's, China was repeatedly accused, primarily by the United States, of exporting dual-use chemical weapons-related materials and technology, such as dual-use chemical precursors, vaccines and production equipment, to countries of concern in the developing world, including Iran, Libya, and Iraq. Chinese chemical and biological weapon-related exports to Iran raised particular concerns.
One of the earliest and most controversial incidents involved the 1993 search of the Chinese ship Yinhe (Galaxy). The search came as a result of U.S. intelligence reports, which charged that the ship was carrying chemical precursors to Iran. The search of the ship, however, revealed no such items. Following the Yinhe incident, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 4 September 1993 that said:
"As a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, China is very serious about its international obligations thereunder. Despite the fact that the Convention has yet to take effect, China has committed itself publicly not to produce or possess chemical weapons, nor does it export chemical products that may be used for the purpose of making chemical weapons. In order to ensure that the chemicals it exports will not be used for chemical weapons, the Chinese Government has formulated extremely stringent measures to control its chemical export. As to the two chemicals referred to by the U.S. side, the Chinese Government has clear-cut orders against their export to certain regions. The Chinese Government will, as always, strictly observe its international obligations and make its contribution to safeguarding international peace and security and promoting normal economic and trade exchanges among countries."
In 1997 and 2001, the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese entities for exporting dual-use chemical precursors and chemical production equipment to Iran in support of Tehran's suspected chemical weapons program. On January 16, 2002, sanctions were again imposed on three Chinese companies by the United States under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000--U.S. legislation that prohibits the sale of chemical and biological weapons components and missile technology to Iran, designed to stop Tehran acquiring weapons of mass destruction. According to U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, restrictions were placed on Liyang Chemical Equipment company, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, and an individual broker and agent named as Q.C. Chen "for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology that's used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons; equipment that's controlled under what's called the Australia Group."
In response to the sanctions, China reiterated its opposition to chemical weapon development, stating "China is opposed to any country developing chemical weapons, and furthermore does not help any country develop chemical weapons." Furthermore, "the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies using so-called domestic laws and country-specific policy is unreasonable and should be cancelled."
Since 2002, numerous Chinese entities have been sanctioned by the United States for illicit transfers of controlled goods to third parties, often Iran. While the nature of the goods is frequently undisclosed, many of the entities--such as Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, Q.C. Chen, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company, and Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant--engage primarily in the trade of chemicals, prompting speculation that many of the sanctions were for violations of the parameters of the AG or the CWC. This is supported by Assistant Secretary of State DeSutter's 2006 Congressional testimony, where she stated:
"China has adopted export controls mirroring the Australia Group (AG) control list and on chemicals listed on the CWC Schedules...Nonetheless, we continue to have concerns that Chinese entities are transferring AG-controlled items and technology to countries of concern."
Further, a June 2007 media report suggested that U.S. officials were particularly concerned about the activities of the Chinese national Q.C. Chen, whom one unnamed official described as "a serial proliferator of chemical weapons capabilities" and "the A.Q. Khan of chemical weapons." [A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, oversaw a clandestine smuggling ring which sold nuclear equipment and technology to several countries beginning in the 1980s and lasting until his public confession in 2004.] Despite having no economic impact, the U.S. has repeatedly imposed sanctions on Chen, apparently in an effort to call attention to his activities.
In recent years, China has vigorously protested both U.S. assertions that it engages in or fails to stop WMD proliferation, as well as the recent sanctions imposed by the U.S. on its companies. The Chinese response to DeSutter's 2006 testimony was particularly strong, characterizing her comments as "completely without basis and are irresponsible." In January 2007, in response to sanctions imposed on three Chinese companies under the 2005 Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, including the Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated Chinese opposition to the Bush Administration's frequent implementation of sanctions:
"It is unreasonable for the American government to invoke its domestic law to sanction Chinese companies without providing any evidence...We express resolute opposition and strongly urge the U.S. to correct its wrong practice."
Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China
At the end of World War II, the Japanese army abandoned a large amount of chemical weapons on Chinese territory. China estimates the number of shells to be disposed of at 2 million, while Japan estimates the number to be about 700,000. Under the CWC, Japan is responsible for the proper destruction of these abandoned munitions, and both China and Japan were tasked with negotiating the arrangements for destruction. After many years of negotiation, the two governments in July 1999 signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a "basic framework of the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China, based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)." Under the agreement, Japan is to provide the necessary facilities, experts, expertise, and funds to complete the destruction of the munitions. The clean-up commenced in 2000 and according to CWC guidelines, should be completed by 2007, 10 years after the convention's entry into force. Due to the immense scale of the operation, Japan has repeatedly stated that this deadline is unrealistic and has expressed interest in a five-year extension, which, according to the OPCW, would require China's consent. In April 2006, China and Japan jointly filed a request with the OPCW for five more years to complete the removal and destruction of the weapons.
Japan estimates that clean-up costs will be around $1.6 billion dollars (200 billion yen). However, this figure is based on the Japanese estimate of 700,000 abandoned shells and not the Chinese estimate of 2 million abandoned shells. In February 2000, over 17,600 chemical weapons of Japanese origin were discovered in Nanjing. Japan sent investigators to China in an attempt to find a way to destroy the weapons. In September 2000, in Bei'an China, scientists and workmen from both Japan and China conducted the "first large scale joint operation" for the excavation and recovery of abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs). Cooperative efforts have also included joint site investigations, studies on weapon destruction, as well as research on security systems protecting both humans and the environment. In addition to major strides in cooperation, the beginning of 2001 ushered in the introduction of management consultants engaged in experimentation and evaluation of weapon destruction devices. Furthermore, plans are currently underway for a program of weapon removal at Haerbaling, where the majority of buried ACWs are located. The eradication of these stockpiles will mark a significant step in eliminating ACWs on Chinese soil.
However, the elimination of ACWs has not progressed fast enough for the Chinese side. In its 2002 white paper, China's National Defense, China expressed its dissatisfaction with the pace of Japanese efforts to recover and destroy ACWs:
"Today, large quantities of chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese invaders still remain on Chinese soil. China urges Japan to earnestly implement the obligations under the CWC for the destruction of these weapons, and expedite the pace of the relevant work in accordance with the Memorandum on the Destruction of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China between the governments of China and Japan, so as to commence as soon as possible the substantive part of the destruction process."
As noted above, China reiterated this general sentiment in its 2005 white paper on arms control and nonproliferation. The sluggish pace of ACW removal continues to generate frustration on the Chinese side. In September 2007 at the 50th session of the OPCW Executive Council, China's permanent representative to the OPCW noted that Japan had not yet disposed of "a single" ACW. ACWs continue to be unearthed in China with some frequency, and Chinese citizens have sued repeatedly in Japanese courts for compensation for the injuries and associated damages caused by Japanese ACWs, despite several rulings in favor of the Japanese government. In July 2007, for example, the Tokyo High Court overturned a September 2003 lower court ruling which had awarded a $1.6 million settlement to 13 Chinese victims of Japanese ACW exposure and their families. Finally, the cleanup effort has been slowed by allegations of corruption on the part of Japanese companies involved in ACW removal. In October 2007, Japanese investigators raided the offices of two companies, Abandoned Chemical Weapons Disposal Corporation and Pacific Consultants International, who were accused of illegally diverting funds intended for ACW cleanup.
Despite these misgivings, joint China-Japan efforts to locate and recover ACWs continue. In December 2006, China and Japan agreed to create a joint body, centered in China's Jilin province, to recover and dispose of Japanese ACWs. China's 2006 national defense white paper states:
"Since 2005, China has assisted Japan in 24 on-site verifications, and recovered over 3,100 chemical weapons abandoned by Japan...These chemical weapons will be destroyed by Japan in the future."
Missile Overview
China is continuing to increase both the quantity and capability of its cruise and ballistic missiles. The vast majority of this arsenal consists of short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) deployed in Fujian province across the Taiwan Straits. The Pentagon's 2007 report on China's military power states that the PRC's SRBMs number roughly 900 and are increasing at a rate of approximately 100 per year. Furthermore, the report notes the fact that China has developed several enhanced variants of its DF-15 missile as one example of how Beijing is improving its arsenal in order to secure greater tactical flexibility.
China is actively modernizing its nuclear delivery systems which include ballistic missiles, bombers and new-generation submarines. The 2006 Chinese Defense White Paper outlines the PRC overall nuclear doctrine, saying: "China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force." Most of China's existing delivery systems were designed in the 1960s and 1970s and have been in service for decades. In this sense, upgrading its missile force can be seen as a natural evolution and modernization of China's existing arsenals.
Beyond the modernization of its missile arsenals, U.S. policymakers have often voiced concern over China's transfers of missile components and related technology to nations of concern, most notably to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. The U.S. government has placed dozens of sanctions on Chinese entities over the past decade for illicit transfers of these technologies and for violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
In response to U.S. sanctions and diplomatic demarches and as a result of its own changing perceptions on national security and assessment of proliferation risks, China over the past few years has introduced and strengthened domestic regulations on missile-related transfers. It has also engaged in consultation with the MTCR and in 2004 applied to join the regime; however Beijing's application has so far been blocked by current members who believe that China's missile-related export controls are still too weak. While transfers of complete missiles to nations of concern seem to be a thing of the past, the sale of key missile or dual-use technologies by entities in China's increasingly privatized economy still raise questions - particularly in the U.S. government - about Beijing's ability to enforce its export control laws.
China's Ballistic Missile Inventory
China has six types of operational land-based ballistic missiles that are nuclear-capable: the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5/5A, DF-11, DF-15, and the DF-21/21X. Perhaps the most high profile recent Chinese ballistic missile-related incident is the January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test. On 11 January (12 January local time) China successfully tested a direct ascent ASAT weapon launched from its Xichang Space Center in Sichuan Province. The test raised anxieties within the United States and neighboring Asian countries about China's military intentions with regards to space and as recently as 5 November 2007, U.S. Secretary of Defense expressed his concerns over the test in a meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchun. The ASAT is believed to have employed either a modified DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) or a KT-1 space launch vehicle (SLV), although this has not been officially confirmed. [Are they developmentally related?] China received much criticism for the massive amount of debris the test generated (an estimated 950 pieces at or larger than 4 inches and thousands of smaller pieces as well) which jeopardizes satellites currently in low earth orbit (LEO).
China flight tested the DF-31 inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1999 and the Pentagon's 2007 report on China's military power states that the DF-31 has reached "initial threat availability," meaning that the system is currently available but may not yet be fully operational. A longer range, road mobile version--the DF-31A--is also in the development stage, with an expected operational capacity by 2007-2009. The DF-41 had been under development but work has reportedly been halted if not completely cancelled, possibly being supplanted by the DF-31A. Although previous reports indicated that the development of the DF-25 MRBM was cancelled during the mid-1990s, there has been recent speculation that the Chinese are continuing work on this missile.
China has only one type of operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Julang-1. Twelve Julang-1s are deployed on China's single Xia-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN). The warheads for the Julang-1 are believed to be stored at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base. China is developing a longer range SLBM known as the JL-2 that is the sea-based version of the DF-31. On 16 June 2005, China test fired a long-range SLBM that is believed to be the JL-2. According to various reports, the missile was fired by a nuclear submarine off the coast from the port city Qingdao, and landed in a Chinese desert several thousand kilometers away. However, the JL-2 is not expected to have operational capacity until between 2008 and 2010. On 3 May 2007 satellite images available on Google Earth showed two Jin-class SSBNs docked at the Bohai shipyard at Huludao. It is believed that the new Jin-class SSBNs have 12 launch tubes each.
The vast majority of China's nuclear-capable missile force is land-based, and much of China's nuclear delivery system modernization has been in this area. The DF-31 and the DF-31A are intended to replace China's aging DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5/5A missiles. Both were designed to be road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles and have shortened launch preparation times. Some reports say China had hoped to make both missiles MRV- (multiple re-entry vehicles) or MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) -capable. In addition, there is speculation that China could use a DF-31-type re-entry vehicle for a MRV payload for the DF-5 sometime in the near future. The DF-31 and JL-2 will also likely employ GPS technology for improved accuracy.
Under development; sea-based version of the DF-31; projected to be operational around 2008; warhead awaits certification; to be deployed on new 094 SSBN which is also currently under development
Notes:
"DF" stands for "Dong Feng" ("East Wind")
"JL" stands for "Julang" ("Great Wave")
"CSS" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface"
"CSS-N" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Naval"
"CSST" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Tactical"
*Under development
**Probably Cancelled
Cruise Missiles
China is currently developing and testing several different models of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). However, lack of publicly disclosed information and contradictory reports from various news sources make it difficult to determine whether or not any of these missiles have actually been deployed yet. The Pentagon's 2007 report to Congress on China's military power states that "first and second-generation LACMs may be deployed in the near future." China has also relied on foreign missile technology to assist with its LACM program. For example, according to Sinodefence.com, there have been recent reports that China received 18 examples of the 3000km Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) nuclear-capable strategic cruise missiles from Ukraine between 1999 and 2001 and also may have received the design for the shorter range Kh-65SE from Russia as well.
According to a DATE report in Jane's Defence Weekly, China's first LACM was ground launched. The Hong Niao-1 (HN-1) has a range of 600 km and can carry a 300 to 400 kg conventional warhead or a 90 kT nuclear warhead. The HN-1 is believed to use inertial guidance with terrain comparison or GPS updates. An improved version, the HN-2, is believed to have entered into operational status in 1998 with an increased range of 1,500 to 2,000 km and can be ground or ship launched.
The Dong-Hai-10 (DH-10), the Ying Ji-63 (YJ-63) and the Tianjin-1 are three more types of LACMs China is believed to be working on. Jane's Missiles and Rockets magazine reports that DH-10 will be a second-generation LACM with an integrated inertial navigation system which will be supplemented by a terrain contour mapping system and digital scene-matching terminal homing system. The DH-10 will likely have a range of more than 1500km and a circular error probable (CEP) of 10m. The YJ-63 will be a first-generation LACM with a range of 400-500km and will have a CEP of 10-15m, though its accuracy may be limited by weather. The YJ-63 will likely have a combined inertial and GPS-midcourse guidance system and some form of electro-optical terminal guidance. Much less detail about the specifications of the Tianjin-1 has been released thus far. It will have a butterfly v-tail with dorsal air intake and extending wings similar to the U.S. Tomahawk. The Tianjin-1 was displayed at the Chinese International Defense Exhibition (CIDEX) in 2006.
With regards to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), the 2007 Pentagon report states that "the PLA Navy and Naval Air Force have or are acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs, from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-27/SIZZLER." The first lot of 24 SS-N-22/Sunburn ASCM was shipped to China on 16 May 2000. In total, China has purchased over 100 SS-N-22 ASCMs from Russia for their Sovremenny-class destroyers. While the delivered missiles are conventionally equipped, Russia does manufacture nuclear-equipped Sunburn missiles. This has led to some speculation that Russia might supply or China might develop technology that would enable these missiles to deliver a Chinese nuclear warhead.
Chinese Missile Exports and the MTCR
While China in the past has transferred missile technology capable of being used by countries of proliferation concern such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, recently Beijing has taken steps to increase its export control legal infrastructure. Nevertheless, as Evan S. Medeiros's 2005 report on China's export control system points out, concerns still remain about Chinese enforcement of these new rules.
In its missile sales, as with its conventional arms sales in general, China has followed three arms export principles:
(1) The weapons exported must be meant for legitimate self-defense;
(2) The weapons must contribute to regional stability; and
(3) The weapons must not be intended for interference in another country's internal affairs.
In the past, China stated that the focus of nonproliferation efforts should be on the restriction of WMD themselves, not on their delivery systems. China has also argued that if one type of delivery system is to be restricted (e.g. ballistic missiles), then other delivery systems, such as combat aircraft, ought to be restricted as well. China previously criticized the MTCR on these grounds.
However, in the 1990's China's views on missile nonproliferation slowly began to change. In response to U.S. pressure, including sanctions imposed in 1991 for alleged agreements to transfer M-11 missiles and technology to Pakistan, as well as M-9 missiles and technology to Syria, China issued a unilateral pledge to abide by MTCR guidelines. This pledge was called into question in 1993, when the United States again imposed MTCR-related sanctions on China for M-11 technology transfers to Pakistan. The United States agreed to lift these sanctions in October 1994, when China reaffirmed and clarified its commitment to MTCR guidelines. However, through the late 1990's reports from the U.S. government continued to allege that China was possibly still involved in certain transfers of missile production technology to countries of proliferation concern.
On 21 November 2000, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a policy statement on missile nonproliferation pledging that new stringent laws would be issued that would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. On the same day, the State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan and resuming discussions with China on extending the 1995 U.S.-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. Despite the November 2000 pledge, Beijing and Washington continue to have some disagreements. The U.S. government claimed that a Chinese company--China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation--had shipped missile technology to Pakistan in violation of the bilateral agreement. In September 2001, the U.S. government again imposed economic sanctions on the accused Chinese company, which effectively banned new licenses for U.S. companies to put their satellites on Chinese rockets or transfer satellite technology for two years.
In a major policy development, China promulgated the long-awaited regulations on missile-related transfers in August 2002 entitled Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List. These regulations appeared to demonstrate Beijing's increasing willingness to abide by international norms at controlling missile trade. The 2002 regulations and control list were relatively comprehensive and in some fields are stricter than MTCR guidelines. The regulations also follow the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, requiring specific approval and an export license for exports to authorized end-users. In September 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing clearly indicated to the chair of the MTCR that China was ready to positively consider membership in the MTCR. In a statement at the Plenary for the 2004 session of the Conference for Disarmament, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi announced the start of the first round of China-MTCR dialogues in Paris.
However, in October 2004 (and then again in 2005), at the MTCR plenary in Seoul, Korea, the member states announced that all membership issues were to be discussed at a later date, apparently reflecting some member states' concern, most notably from the United States, that China was not ready to join the regime. The United States' hesitation to admit China to the MTCR stems from anxiety about Beijing's unwillingness or inability to fully enforce their domestic laws. Between 2002 and 2007, the U.S. State Department issued sanctions on numerous Chinese companies on over a dozen occasions. Although few details are publicly released as to the nature of the transfer that was the impetus of the punishment, a number of the sanctions were reportedly brought about by alleged transfers of missile-related items to Iran.
China is actively modernizing its nuclear delivery systems which include ballistic missiles, bombers and new-generation submarines. The 2006 Chinese Defense White Paper outlines the PRC overall nuclear doctrine, saying: "China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force." Most of China's existing delivery systems were designed in the 1960s and 1970s and have been in service for decades. In this sense, upgrading its missile force can be seen as a natural evolution and modernization of China's existing arsenals.
Beyond the modernization of its missile arsenals, U.S. policymakers have often voiced concern over China's transfers of missile components and related technology to nations of concern, most notably to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. The U.S. government has placed dozens of sanctions on Chinese entities over the past decade for illicit transfers of these technologies and for violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
In response to U.S. sanctions and diplomatic demarches and as a result of its own changing perceptions on national security and assessment of proliferation risks, China over the past few years has introduced and strengthened domestic regulations on missile-related transfers. It has also engaged in consultation with the MTCR and in 2004 applied to join the regime; however Beijing's application has so far been blocked by current members who believe that China's missile-related export controls are still too weak. While transfers of complete missiles to nations of concern seem to be a thing of the past, the sale of key missile or dual-use technologies by entities in China's increasingly privatized economy still raise questions - particularly in the U.S. government - about Beijing's ability to enforce its export control laws.
China's Ballistic Missile Inventory
China has six types of operational land-based ballistic missiles that are nuclear-capable: the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5/5A, DF-11, DF-15, and the DF-21/21X. Perhaps the most high profile recent Chinese ballistic missile-related incident is the January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test. On 11 January (12 January local time) China successfully tested a direct ascent ASAT weapon launched from its Xichang Space Center in Sichuan Province. The test raised anxieties within the United States and neighboring Asian countries about China's military intentions with regards to space and as recently as 5 November 2007, U.S. Secretary of Defense expressed his concerns over the test in a meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchun. The ASAT is believed to have employed either a modified DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) or a KT-1 space launch vehicle (SLV), although this has not been officially confirmed. [Are they developmentally related?] China received much criticism for the massive amount of debris the test generated (an estimated 950 pieces at or larger than 4 inches and thousands of smaller pieces as well) which jeopardizes satellites currently in low earth orbit (LEO).
China flight tested the DF-31 inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1999 and the Pentagon's 2007 report on China's military power states that the DF-31 has reached "initial threat availability," meaning that the system is currently available but may not yet be fully operational. A longer range, road mobile version--the DF-31A--is also in the development stage, with an expected operational capacity by 2007-2009. The DF-41 had been under development but work has reportedly been halted if not completely cancelled, possibly being supplanted by the DF-31A. Although previous reports indicated that the development of the DF-25 MRBM was cancelled during the mid-1990s, there has been recent speculation that the Chinese are continuing work on this missile.
China has only one type of operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Julang-1. Twelve Julang-1s are deployed on China's single Xia-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN). The warheads for the Julang-1 are believed to be stored at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base. China is developing a longer range SLBM known as the JL-2 that is the sea-based version of the DF-31. On 16 June 2005, China test fired a long-range SLBM that is believed to be the JL-2. According to various reports, the missile was fired by a nuclear submarine off the coast from the port city Qingdao, and landed in a Chinese desert several thousand kilometers away. However, the JL-2 is not expected to have operational capacity until between 2008 and 2010. On 3 May 2007 satellite images available on Google Earth showed two Jin-class SSBNs docked at the Bohai shipyard at Huludao. It is believed that the new Jin-class SSBNs have 12 launch tubes each.
The vast majority of China's nuclear-capable missile force is land-based, and much of China's nuclear delivery system modernization has been in this area. The DF-31 and the DF-31A are intended to replace China's aging DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5/5A missiles. Both were designed to be road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles and have shortened launch preparation times. Some reports say China had hoped to make both missiles MRV- (multiple re-entry vehicles) or MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) -capable. In addition, there is speculation that China could use a DF-31-type re-entry vehicle for a MRV payload for the DF-5 sometime in the near future. The DF-31 and JL-2 will also likely employ GPS technology for improved accuracy.
Under development; sea-based version of the DF-31; projected to be operational around 2008; warhead awaits certification; to be deployed on new 094 SSBN which is also currently under development
Notes:
"DF" stands for "Dong Feng" ("East Wind")
"JL" stands for "Julang" ("Great Wave")
"CSS" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface"
"CSS-N" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Naval"
"CSST" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Tactical"
*Under development
**Probably Cancelled
Cruise Missiles
China is currently developing and testing several different models of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). However, lack of publicly disclosed information and contradictory reports from various news sources make it difficult to determine whether or not any of these missiles have actually been deployed yet. The Pentagon's 2007 report to Congress on China's military power states that "first and second-generation LACMs may be deployed in the near future." China has also relied on foreign missile technology to assist with its LACM program. For example, according to Sinodefence.com, there have been recent reports that China received 18 examples of the 3000km Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent) nuclear-capable strategic cruise missiles from Ukraine between 1999 and 2001 and also may have received the design for the shorter range Kh-65SE from Russia as well.
According to a DATE report in Jane's Defence Weekly, China's first LACM was ground launched. The Hong Niao-1 (HN-1) has a range of 600 km and can carry a 300 to 400 kg conventional warhead or a 90 kT nuclear warhead. The HN-1 is believed to use inertial guidance with terrain comparison or GPS updates. An improved version, the HN-2, is believed to have entered into operational status in 1998 with an increased range of 1,500 to 2,000 km and can be ground or ship launched.
The Dong-Hai-10 (DH-10), the Ying Ji-63 (YJ-63) and the Tianjin-1 are three more types of LACMs China is believed to be working on. Jane's Missiles and Rockets magazine reports that DH-10 will be a second-generation LACM with an integrated inertial navigation system which will be supplemented by a terrain contour mapping system and digital scene-matching terminal homing system. The DH-10 will likely have a range of more than 1500km and a circular error probable (CEP) of 10m. The YJ-63 will be a first-generation LACM with a range of 400-500km and will have a CEP of 10-15m, though its accuracy may be limited by weather. The YJ-63 will likely have a combined inertial and GPS-midcourse guidance system and some form of electro-optical terminal guidance. Much less detail about the specifications of the Tianjin-1 has been released thus far. It will have a butterfly v-tail with dorsal air intake and extending wings similar to the U.S. Tomahawk. The Tianjin-1 was displayed at the Chinese International Defense Exhibition (CIDEX) in 2006.
With regards to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), the 2007 Pentagon report states that "the PLA Navy and Naval Air Force have or are acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs, from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-27/SIZZLER." The first lot of 24 SS-N-22/Sunburn ASCM was shipped to China on 16 May 2000. In total, China has purchased over 100 SS-N-22 ASCMs from Russia for their Sovremenny-class destroyers. While the delivered missiles are conventionally equipped, Russia does manufacture nuclear-equipped Sunburn missiles. This has led to some speculation that Russia might supply or China might develop technology that would enable these missiles to deliver a Chinese nuclear warhead.
Chinese Missile Exports and the MTCR
While China in the past has transferred missile technology capable of being used by countries of proliferation concern such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, recently Beijing has taken steps to increase its export control legal infrastructure. Nevertheless, as Evan S. Medeiros's 2005 report on China's export control system points out, concerns still remain about Chinese enforcement of these new rules.
In its missile sales, as with its conventional arms sales in general, China has followed three arms export principles:
(1) The weapons exported must be meant for legitimate self-defense;
(2) The weapons must contribute to regional stability; and
(3) The weapons must not be intended for interference in another country's internal affairs.
In the past, China stated that the focus of nonproliferation efforts should be on the restriction of WMD themselves, not on their delivery systems. China has also argued that if one type of delivery system is to be restricted (e.g. ballistic missiles), then other delivery systems, such as combat aircraft, ought to be restricted as well. China previously criticized the MTCR on these grounds.
However, in the 1990's China's views on missile nonproliferation slowly began to change. In response to U.S. pressure, including sanctions imposed in 1991 for alleged agreements to transfer M-11 missiles and technology to Pakistan, as well as M-9 missiles and technology to Syria, China issued a unilateral pledge to abide by MTCR guidelines. This pledge was called into question in 1993, when the United States again imposed MTCR-related sanctions on China for M-11 technology transfers to Pakistan. The United States agreed to lift these sanctions in October 1994, when China reaffirmed and clarified its commitment to MTCR guidelines. However, through the late 1990's reports from the U.S. government continued to allege that China was possibly still involved in certain transfers of missile production technology to countries of proliferation concern.
On 21 November 2000, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a policy statement on missile nonproliferation pledging that new stringent laws would be issued that would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. On the same day, the State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan and resuming discussions with China on extending the 1995 U.S.-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. Despite the November 2000 pledge, Beijing and Washington continue to have some disagreements. The U.S. government claimed that a Chinese company--China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation--had shipped missile technology to Pakistan in violation of the bilateral agreement. In September 2001, the U.S. government again imposed economic sanctions on the accused Chinese company, which effectively banned new licenses for U.S. companies to put their satellites on Chinese rockets or transfer satellite technology for two years.
In a major policy development, China promulgated the long-awaited regulations on missile-related transfers in August 2002 entitled Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List. These regulations appeared to demonstrate Beijing's increasing willingness to abide by international norms at controlling missile trade. The 2002 regulations and control list were relatively comprehensive and in some fields are stricter than MTCR guidelines. The regulations also follow the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, requiring specific approval and an export license for exports to authorized end-users. In September 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing clearly indicated to the chair of the MTCR that China was ready to positively consider membership in the MTCR. In a statement at the Plenary for the 2004 session of the Conference for Disarmament, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi announced the start of the first round of China-MTCR dialogues in Paris.
However, in October 2004 (and then again in 2005), at the MTCR plenary in Seoul, Korea, the member states announced that all membership issues were to be discussed at a later date, apparently reflecting some member states' concern, most notably from the United States, that China was not ready to join the regime. The United States' hesitation to admit China to the MTCR stems from anxiety about Beijing's unwillingness or inability to fully enforce their domestic laws. Between 2002 and 2007, the U.S. State Department issued sanctions on numerous Chinese companies on over a dozen occasions. Although few details are publicly released as to the nature of the transfer that was the impetus of the punishment, a number of the sanctions were reportedly brought about by alleged transfers of missile-related items to Iran.
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