Late in June 2004, Hong Kong media revealed that in a resolution recently passed at the PLA-AF's internal session of the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, the PLA-AF would seek to become a “strategic air force.” Acquiring the Russian Tu-22M-3 Backfire was noted as vital to this unprecedented policy change.
The media report also stressed that acquiring long-range bombers would be the main challenge. The Backfire was cited repeatedly. This report, unlike many out of Hong Kong, was replete with citations of characteristic CPC language and is remarkably detailed, covering issues of training, doctrine and force structure.
The large-scale build-up in PLA-AF capabilities over the last decade has been and is clear evidence of several fundamental changes in strategic thinking. A large measure of the investment was put into long-range assets. The Su-27SK, Su-30MKK, Su-30MK2, A-50 AWACS, H-6U tankers and Il-78MKK tankers—to name a few examples—are all designed to achieve control of the air and strike capability of beyond 1,000 nautical miles. Until now there has been no stated doctrinal shift in the role of the PLA-AF, which historically was intended to defend Chinese airspace and support PLA land armies and the PLA-N in combat. The 10th CPC Congress announcement does more than formalize the change in the PLA-AF role. It also sets the PLA-AF apart from Army and Navy forces as a service with a unique and independent role—an important shift given the historical early Soviet-like doctrinal basis in PLA-AF thinking. Given these circumstances, there is every reason to regard the 10th Congress report to be accurate. If so, the implications are far reaching.
Recent reports that the chief of the PLA-AF has been elevated to the CMC level of the command heirarchy strongly support this evidence of a deep doctrinal shift in PLA thinking and an increasingly important role for the PLA-AF.
China first attempted to acquire Backfires during the first round of Russian equipment acquisitions after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia at that time was still uncertain about its future global position and courted Western investment on a large scale. Russian reports claimed the rejection was the result of intensive Japanese and U.S. lobbying.
Much has changed since then: China has become Russia’s largest export client for weapons; Western investment in Russia has dried up; Russia’s relationship with the United States cooled off since the Iraq War; and the Russian Air Force still faces serious funding difficulties. Most of its Backfire fleet is grounded for lack of funds: it cannot afford needed upgrades. India was to lease four Backfires, so an export precedent has been set. The Russians have encouraged competition between India and China, reflected in tit-for-tat acquisitions of Su-30MK, R-77, 3M-54/3M-14E missiles, A-50 AWACS, Il-78 tankers and submarines.
The political and strategic impediments to the mid-1990s Backfire export are now gone. The Sukhoi exports to China and India are, for Rosoboronexport and Tupolev, a prime example of decades of support and upgrade funding. By limiting the weapons package on Backfires targeted for export to China and not fitting internal fuel system plumbing for aerial refuelling probes, Russia can truthfully argue that it is exporting a regional rather than a strategic weapon.
In practical terms it is now inevitable that China will eventually acquire Backfires. The only issue will be how soon, how many and with what weapons package and upgrades.
China has strong strategic incentives to deploy the Backfire. For one, it is competing with India for strategic primacy on the Asian mainland, and several squadrons of Backfires add significant potency to China's position. Closer to home, simmering tensions with Taiwan put a high premium on assets capable of deterring U.S. Navy CVB Gs.
It is reasonable to surmise that increasing tensions over Taiwan have intensified interservice competition for funding in the PLA. The Backfire, which would be instrumental in deterring U.S. CVBGs and blockading Taiwanese shipping lanes, is a good and affordable near-term choice for the PLA-AF, given the monies long earmarked for PLA-N submarines and aircraft carriers. Acquiring the Backfire would also strengthen Beijing’s hand against Washington’s. The United States is now restructuring its PacRim forces by increasing more responsive air and naval power at the expense of ground forces. Deploying the Backfire would effectively frustrate—that is, counterbalance—this U.S. effort.
The likely PLA-AF units to first receive Backfires would be those elements of the 8th (merged with the 48th), 10th and 36th Bomber Divisions, flying the oldest H-6 Badgers in the fleet. The displaced Badgers could be converted to H-6U tankers and assigned to the 2nd and 9th Bomber Divisions, or used as reserve airframes for remaining Badger squadrons. Should a firm Backfire sale be concluded in the next two years, a credible Initial Operational Capability could be achieved around 2010.
Sizing up the Tupolev Tu-22M-3 Backfire C
The latest variant of the Backfire is the third-generation Tu-22M-3 Backfire C model, which remained in production until 1993.
This is a major evolution from the Backfire B, and includes some use of titanium to further reduce weight. The effort was led by the Tupolev Bureau's Deputy Chief Designer Boris E Levanovich.
The weapons suite for the Backfire C reflects its late Cold War Soviet tasking. The primary weapon for Aviatsiya Voenno-Morskovo Flota Backfires were antishipping, antiradiation and nuclear variants of the Raduga Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchen. Antiradiation and nuclear variants were also carried by Dal'naya Aviatsia Backfire C aircraft as defence suppression weapons. Mixes of one, two or three of these capable missiles can be carried.
The bomb bay can also be fitted with a rotary launcher for six Kh-15/AS-16 Kickback defense suppression missiles, a Soviet analogue to the U.S. AGM-69 SRAM. Four rounds can be carried externally, for a total of ten weapons.
Like U.S. heavy bombers in the era predating precision bombs, the Backfire C can also carry a large payload of dumb bombs. External beam racks can be fitted to carry a total of up to 69 500-lb FAB-250 rounds. The external stations can also be used to carry FAB-1500 3,000-lb dumb bombs, for a total of eight rounds.
In terms of performance, the Backfire C compares closely to the now retired SAC FB-111A, but is much larger, carrying around 120,000 pounds of internal fuel. It has Mach 2 class dash speed and a combat radius of between 2,000 and 2,500 nautical miles, subject to weapon payload and profile. Tupolev data indicates that the aircraft is compatible with any runway capable of supporting a later Boeing 767 transport.
The Tu-22M-3 remained in production until 1993, and various sources claim that up to 268 units were built. As IOC was achieved in 1989 and operational flying rapidly curtailed after 1991, the average number of fatigue hours accumulated by the Backfire C fleet is very low, especially for the last aircraft built, which have a calendar age of only 11 years. U.S. sources put Russian Air Force inventory numbers at 70 to 105, Russian naval aviation numbers at 105, and Ukrainian Air Force numbers at 14 (with 16 Backfire B).
Arming China's Backfire C
Sources in Eastern Europe observe that the Russian Air Force has planned for some time to equip the Backfire C with a conventional precision weapons capability, emulating the U.S. heavy bomber fleet. There are no reports as yet that this has materialized, due to the budgetary situation the Russians face.
Russia would not export the Kh-55 / AS-15 Kent strategic cruise missile or the Kh-15A/R/S / AS-16 SRAM-ski as part of an export package.
Conventional variants of the supersonic Kh-22 were apparently offered to India. As the PLA-AF and PLA-N both operate variants of the Silkworm which use a closely related rocket engine and the same propellants, the Kh-22 would be very easy for the PLA to assimilate.
Integrating the 1,000-lb KAB-500L and 3,000-lb KAB-1500L laser guided bombs would be relatively simple, exploiting hardware for the FAB-1500. A FLIR / laser targeting pod like the Sapsan-E could be carried externally, but also repackaged into the existing bombsight fairing under the flight deck.
Clearance of the electro-optical KAB-500Kr/1500Kr would present little difficulty, but inflight retargeting would require an avionic upgrade. The KAB-1500TK would require integration of the APK-9 Tekon pod, already carried by the PLA Su-30MKK.
The satellite-aided inertially guided KAB-500S-E “JDAM-ski” is now being integrated on the Su-27SKM and Su-30MK, with KAB-1500S-E integration—software and wiring changes—now planned. There are no fundamental obstacles to integrating the KAB family weapons on the Backfire C, and the prospect of the PLA funding such long sought developments is likely to be very attractive to the cash strapped RuAF.
Indian sources claimed that integrating the Kh-31/AS-17 Krypton series of supersonic anti-radiation and anti-shipping missiles, which the PLA-AF adopted for the Su-30MKK and already has in inventory, was a likely prospect for the planned Indian Backfire C lease. Similar claims were also made for the Kh-35U Kharpunski anti-ship cruise missile, which could also be integrated on suitable launchers.
It is to be expected that the PLA-AF would seek to carry its planned strategic Air Launch Cruise Missiles (ALCM) on the Backfire C. Because the Chinese ALCM will have unique software requirements, it would likely be a later rather than earlier addition to the aircraft.
The Strategic Impact of a PLA-AF Backfire
China's claimed intention to field the Backfire reflects multiple agendas and, accordingly, roles. At the upper end of the spectrum, the Backfire, using a range of supersonic and subsonic precision-guided weapons, provides a strategic regional, strike capability. It replicates the formidable sea control capability of the former Soviet AV-MF. Yet with a precision-guided bomb capability, it also provides battlefield interdiction and close air support capabilities much like that of U.S. heavy bombers.
Given the age and fatigue hours in the existing Russian stock of Backfire Cs, a service life into the 2040 timescale is a reasonable expectation for factory refurbished and well maintained aircraft. In terms of survivability, the Backfire compares closely to the SAC FB-111A and current B-1B. Its supersonic high altitude penetration profile remains very difficult to stop. Armed with even a 200-nautical mile class stand-off weapon, it provides limited opportunities for defending interceptors to successfully engage it.
The useful footprint of the Backfire, operating from Hainan Island and Meiktila (in Burma), extends almost to Diego Garcia to the west, northern Australia to the south and Guam to the east. The Backfire can hold at risk any surface target within this footprint, without aerial refuelling support.
In any confrontation with the United States, the Backfire is a tool to threaten navy surface fleet assets in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific Ocean, as well as air force basing in Okinawa, Guam and South Korea. The impending loss of the F-14 leaves the United States Navy without a competitive interceptor to challenge the Backfire – the United States Air Force F-15 and new F/A-22A will provide a highly credible interception capability but constrained to land basing.
In a standoff with India, the Backfire is a tool to attack strategic targets and to deter India's growing surface fleet, especially its carrier forces. A secondary, but no less important capability, derives from the Backfire's ability to inflict heavy losses on maritime traffic, especially vital tanker traffic carrying crude oil to Indian shipping terminals. Without self-sufficiency in fossil fuels, India is extremely vulnerable to naval blockade operations.
Against smaller Pacrim nations, the Backfire can threaten strategic targets, naval targets and commercial sea lanes throughout the Far East and South East Asia. It provides a means of blockading Taiwan's sea lanes using missiles and naval mines, and doing so with a very large exclusion zone around the island. Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia could be subjected to similar coercion.
How much of this strategic potential China can develop will depend on how many Backfires it can acquire and on what weapons package and avionics upgrades it applies to them.
Thursday, 19 February 2009
Friday, 13 February 2009
CHINESEDEFENCEWHITEPAPER ON NUKEFORCE
Chinese govtpaper for the first time describes how China’s nuclear forces would gradually be brought to increased levels of alert during a crisis to deter an adversary and retaliate to nuclear attack.
The paper describes a growing portfolio of deterrence and counterattack capabilities with an ambitious agenda to control war situations with a more flexible deterrent and strategy.
Despite shortcomings, the paper provides a new level of Chinese transparency about its forces and planning.
Nuclear Escalation Phases
The white paper describes how the Second Artillery Corps (or Force, the term used by the paper) would change the operational status of the nuclear forces at different levels of crisis and conflict. Three levels of escalation are described:
Peacetime: Under normal circumstances – “in peacetime” – China’s nuclear missiles are “not aimed at any country.” The term “not aimed at any country” seems borrowed from U.S. terminology where it refers to the absence of targeting data in a missile’s guidance system rather than the alert level of the weapon. It has been assumed for many years that Chinese warheads were not mated with liquid-fuel missiles under normal circumstances (The situation with solid-fuel missiles has been less clear but might be similar).
Nuclear crisis: If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Corps “will go into a state of alert, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China.” In this phase, depending on the situation, mobile missiles would probably be dispersed to their deployments areas and presumably be aimed at the particular threat. If nuclear warheads were not already mated, they would be so too.
Nuclear attack: If China is attacked with nuclear weapons, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Corps “will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services.” The “nuclear forces of other services” probably refers to the navy’s SSBNs and the Air Force’s bombers (see below).
Nuclear Missile Submarines
The submarine force is said to be equipped with “nuclear-powered strategic missile submarines,” a vague reference to the small fleet of perhaps 3-4 Jin-class SSBNs under construction.
The first was spotted at Xiaopingdao Submarine Base in 2007 and Hainan Island in 2008, the old Xia ended a multi-year overhaul at Jianggezhuang Submarine Base in 2008, although its operational condition is unknown.
The mission of the SSBNs is said to be “strategic deterrence and strategic counterattack,” which probably means non-alert operations in peacetime, increased readiness in a crisis, and the ability to counterattack in wartime. The paper states that the ability to counterattack is being improved, probably a reference to the new JL-2 SLBM on the Jin-class.
The mission description is vague and inconsistent. Whereas the section describing the navy’s development history uses the term “strategic deterrence and strategic counterattack,” the general force building section states that, “the submarine force possesses underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities.”
Why the authors have used “strategic deterrence” in one part but only “nuclear counterattack capabilities” in the second part is unclear. Whether it is a vague reference to a nuclear cruise missile capability being added to some attack submarines is unknown, but absent any additional information might just be a matter of language.
A New Air Force Capability?
The Air Force section is interesting because it describes a “transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations.” While much of this has to do with the introduction of new and more capable fighter and bomber aircraft and new concepts of operations, the white paper also describes “certain capabilities to execute long-range precision strikes and strategic projection operations.”
The force building section adds that in addition to traditional air force missions such as strikes and air defense, the transition involves increasing the capabilities for “strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force.”
A small portion of China’s H-6 bombers have for decades been thought to have a secondary nuclear mission with gravity bombs, but the language in the white paper appears to go beyond that and might refer to some of the H-6 bombers being upgraded to carry a new long-range cruise missile intended for land-attack missions.
Most new cruise missiles will carry conventional explosives, but at least one – possibly the DH-10 – might also have a nuclear capability. The operational status of a nuclear cruise missile is highly uncertain and may initially be ground-launched, yet the U.S. Defense Department’s 2008 projection for Chinese nuclear forces vaguely referred to “new air- and ground-launched cruise missiles that could perform nuclear missions” and therefore “improve the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China’s nuclear forces.”
Whether that means China is deploying nuclear cruise missiles remains to be seen.
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
The paper describes that China over the past decades has built a weaponry and equipment system with both nuclear and conventional missiles, both solid-fueled and liquid-fueled missiles, with different ranges and “different types of warheads.”
The safety and surety features of those warheads and the personnel that handle them have been changed, the white paper states. For example, safety measures have been established to “avoid unauthorized and accidental launches,” measures that are needed for enhancing security but probably also for enhancing command and control of the weapons in the increasingly flexible scenarios the paper describes.
Nuclear Weapons Policy
The white paper states that new military strategic guidelines have been issued that are aimed at “winning local wars in conditions of informationization.” The new guidelines stress “deterring crises and wars,” and “effectively control war situations,” and calls for “the building of a lean and effective deterrent force and the flexible use of different means of deterrence.”
Hovering above that evolution is a long-held policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and a pledge never to enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
The good news about the no-first-use policy is that it is explicitly nuclear focused, and that China does not yet appear to have made it conditional on specific situations such as conventional attacks against China’s nuclear forces. This is important because some Chinese officials privately insist that a conventional attack against China’s nuclear forces would be considered a nuclear attack and the no-first-use policy therefore not a limiting factor in China’s response.
The not so good news is that the no-first-use policy in certain situations doesn’t seem credible. The pledge to “not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances” means that if an adversary invaded China and threatened the survival of the state, China’s nuclear forces would not be used as long as the invader did not use nuclear weapons. Hardly a credible policy.
Likewise, the pledge to “unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones,” means that if the United States staged strikes against China from Japan or South Korea, Chinese nuclear weapons would not be used against U.S. bases in those countries. In that credible?
Despite these “credibility issues” in Chinese nuclear policy, the white paper is noteworthy because it indicates that China – unlike the other nuclear weapon states – has not yet fallen for the temptation to broaden its nuclear policy to deter all forms of weapons of mass destruction. The policy seems entirely focused on deterring and responding to nuclear attacks.
The white paper also states that China would like the nuclear weapon states to stop research into and development of new types of nuclear weapons, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policy, and reduce their nuclear arsenals. Those are good policy goals but they ring hollow given that China is busy deploying new nuclear weapons with new nuclear warheads and is the only of the five original nuclear weapon states that is thought to be increasing its nuclear arsenal.
As China increases its capabilities and pursues a more flexible deterrent posture, there is a risk that its policies will be modified too. With increased flexibility in capability tends to come increased flexibility in mission.
Oh, and in case you wondered: while the U.S. military plans against “red forces,” the Chinese plan against “blue forces.” Some things never change.
The paper describes a growing portfolio of deterrence and counterattack capabilities with an ambitious agenda to control war situations with a more flexible deterrent and strategy.
Despite shortcomings, the paper provides a new level of Chinese transparency about its forces and planning.
Nuclear Escalation Phases
The white paper describes how the Second Artillery Corps (or Force, the term used by the paper) would change the operational status of the nuclear forces at different levels of crisis and conflict. Three levels of escalation are described:
Peacetime: Under normal circumstances – “in peacetime” – China’s nuclear missiles are “not aimed at any country.” The term “not aimed at any country” seems borrowed from U.S. terminology where it refers to the absence of targeting data in a missile’s guidance system rather than the alert level of the weapon. It has been assumed for many years that Chinese warheads were not mated with liquid-fuel missiles under normal circumstances (The situation with solid-fuel missiles has been less clear but might be similar).
Nuclear crisis: If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Corps “will go into a state of alert, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China.” In this phase, depending on the situation, mobile missiles would probably be dispersed to their deployments areas and presumably be aimed at the particular threat. If nuclear warheads were not already mated, they would be so too.
Nuclear attack: If China is attacked with nuclear weapons, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Corps “will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services.” The “nuclear forces of other services” probably refers to the navy’s SSBNs and the Air Force’s bombers (see below).
Nuclear Missile Submarines
The submarine force is said to be equipped with “nuclear-powered strategic missile submarines,” a vague reference to the small fleet of perhaps 3-4 Jin-class SSBNs under construction.
The first was spotted at Xiaopingdao Submarine Base in 2007 and Hainan Island in 2008, the old Xia ended a multi-year overhaul at Jianggezhuang Submarine Base in 2008, although its operational condition is unknown.
The mission of the SSBNs is said to be “strategic deterrence and strategic counterattack,” which probably means non-alert operations in peacetime, increased readiness in a crisis, and the ability to counterattack in wartime. The paper states that the ability to counterattack is being improved, probably a reference to the new JL-2 SLBM on the Jin-class.
The mission description is vague and inconsistent. Whereas the section describing the navy’s development history uses the term “strategic deterrence and strategic counterattack,” the general force building section states that, “the submarine force possesses underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities.”
Why the authors have used “strategic deterrence” in one part but only “nuclear counterattack capabilities” in the second part is unclear. Whether it is a vague reference to a nuclear cruise missile capability being added to some attack submarines is unknown, but absent any additional information might just be a matter of language.
A New Air Force Capability?
The Air Force section is interesting because it describes a “transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations.” While much of this has to do with the introduction of new and more capable fighter and bomber aircraft and new concepts of operations, the white paper also describes “certain capabilities to execute long-range precision strikes and strategic projection operations.”
The force building section adds that in addition to traditional air force missions such as strikes and air defense, the transition involves increasing the capabilities for “strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force.”
A small portion of China’s H-6 bombers have for decades been thought to have a secondary nuclear mission with gravity bombs, but the language in the white paper appears to go beyond that and might refer to some of the H-6 bombers being upgraded to carry a new long-range cruise missile intended for land-attack missions.
Most new cruise missiles will carry conventional explosives, but at least one – possibly the DH-10 – might also have a nuclear capability. The operational status of a nuclear cruise missile is highly uncertain and may initially be ground-launched, yet the U.S. Defense Department’s 2008 projection for Chinese nuclear forces vaguely referred to “new air- and ground-launched cruise missiles that could perform nuclear missions” and therefore “improve the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of China’s nuclear forces.”
Whether that means China is deploying nuclear cruise missiles remains to be seen.
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
The paper describes that China over the past decades has built a weaponry and equipment system with both nuclear and conventional missiles, both solid-fueled and liquid-fueled missiles, with different ranges and “different types of warheads.”
The safety and surety features of those warheads and the personnel that handle them have been changed, the white paper states. For example, safety measures have been established to “avoid unauthorized and accidental launches,” measures that are needed for enhancing security but probably also for enhancing command and control of the weapons in the increasingly flexible scenarios the paper describes.
Nuclear Weapons Policy
The white paper states that new military strategic guidelines have been issued that are aimed at “winning local wars in conditions of informationization.” The new guidelines stress “deterring crises and wars,” and “effectively control war situations,” and calls for “the building of a lean and effective deterrent force and the flexible use of different means of deterrence.”
Hovering above that evolution is a long-held policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and a pledge never to enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.
The good news about the no-first-use policy is that it is explicitly nuclear focused, and that China does not yet appear to have made it conditional on specific situations such as conventional attacks against China’s nuclear forces. This is important because some Chinese officials privately insist that a conventional attack against China’s nuclear forces would be considered a nuclear attack and the no-first-use policy therefore not a limiting factor in China’s response.
The not so good news is that the no-first-use policy in certain situations doesn’t seem credible. The pledge to “not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances” means that if an adversary invaded China and threatened the survival of the state, China’s nuclear forces would not be used as long as the invader did not use nuclear weapons. Hardly a credible policy.
Likewise, the pledge to “unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones,” means that if the United States staged strikes against China from Japan or South Korea, Chinese nuclear weapons would not be used against U.S. bases in those countries. In that credible?
Despite these “credibility issues” in Chinese nuclear policy, the white paper is noteworthy because it indicates that China – unlike the other nuclear weapon states – has not yet fallen for the temptation to broaden its nuclear policy to deter all forms of weapons of mass destruction. The policy seems entirely focused on deterring and responding to nuclear attacks.
The white paper also states that China would like the nuclear weapon states to stop research into and development of new types of nuclear weapons, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policy, and reduce their nuclear arsenals. Those are good policy goals but they ring hollow given that China is busy deploying new nuclear weapons with new nuclear warheads and is the only of the five original nuclear weapon states that is thought to be increasing its nuclear arsenal.
As China increases its capabilities and pursues a more flexible deterrent posture, there is a risk that its policies will be modified too. With increased flexibility in capability tends to come increased flexibility in mission.
Oh, and in case you wondered: while the U.S. military plans against “red forces,” the Chinese plan against “blue forces.” Some things never change.
Wednesday, 11 February 2009
Report: China to build 2 carriers by 2015????
China plans to begin building two aircraft carriers next year, a Japanese newspaper reported Wednesday, in what would be its first attempt at fixed-wing naval aviation and a potentially major new variable in the strategic calculus of the Pacific.
The two flattops each would be between 50,000 and 60,000 tons, be conventionally powered and patrol the South China Sea, according to the report in Japans Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which cited Chinese shipbuilding sources. The carriers could be in the fleet by 2015, the story said.
China is one of the worlds largest builders of commercial ships, although its biggest indigenous warship so far has been no more than about 17,000 tons. The Asahi Shimbun reported that the carriers would be built at a new shipyard outside Shanghai and include components already on order from Russia.
A Chinese naval officer told the newspaper that one of the carriers primary missions would be to guard the sea lanes that connect energy-ravenous China with oil and mineral resources in the Middle East and Africa.
The story is the latest in a series of reports from around the world about Chinese ambitions to field an aircraft carrier. The official Peoples Liberation Army Daily newspaper reported in September that 50 pilots from the Dalian Naval Academy were training for ship borne aircraft flight. Official Russian press agencies reported in October that China had purchased as many as 50 Su-33 Flanker-D fighter jets, an updated version of the Su-27K carried aboard Russias sole aircraft carrier. Since then, British and American news agencies have quoted top Chinese officials as expressing great interest in seaborne airpower.
The Chinese government would seriously consider relevant issues with factors in every aspects on building its first ever aircraft carrier, said navy spokesman Huang Xueping, according to a Dec. 23 report by the official Xinhua news agency. China has a long coastline and the sacred duty of Chinas armed forces is to safeguard the countrys marine safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas, he said.
Chinas carriers if the Japanese report is accurate would likely be comparable to the Royal Navys Queen Elizabeth-class ships, now just beginning construction. Slightly larger, at 65,000 tons, the Queen Elizabeth is designed for a complement of around 1,400 sailors, including its ships company and air wing, and designed to carry about 40 strike aircraft, plus additional helicopters, according to Combat Fleets of the World.
Because the Chinese carriers are smaller and shorter-ranged than their American counterparts, the U.S. shouldnt view them as a threat, the Chinese naval official told the Asahi Shimbun.
China Seriously Considering Carriers
The most controversial naval issue of the post-Cold War era has been whether or not China is planning to procure aircraft carriers. In late December the senior national defense spokesman, Huang Xueping, declared that China is "seriously" considering adding an aircraft carrier to its navy.
While this may be the most definitive statement to date by a Chinese official, more significant was the Chinese Navy's decision this past fall when 50 naval officers began a pilot training program at the Dalian Naval Academy to provide a cadre of carrier-based aviators.
Thus, speculation about a future Chinese carrier force continues albeit still without any public indications of whether such ships would be constructed in China or possibly purchased from a foreign source, in particular Ukraine, which contains the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev. That yard produced all Soviet-era aircraft carriers. Also, no definitive time table has been put forward by any Chinese officials.
And, much more significant from a viewpoint of the future of China's Navy, on 26 December a three-ship task force departed Sanya in Hainan Province for operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to help deter pirate attacks on international merchant shipping. Although Chinese warships have carried out long-range visits to other countries, those could not be considered operational missions.
(The last time that China sent a naval expedition to East Africa was during the Ming Dynasty when the emperor's envoy Zheng He led a large armada in the early 15th Century to the region for goodwill port calls.)
The modern Chinese task force consists of two missile destroyers and a replenishment oiler. The destroyers are the Haikou and Wuhan. These are two of China's newest warships. The Haikou, completed in 2005, is an advanced air-defense ship, the Chinese equivalent of a Western Aegis-type warship. With a full load displacement of about 6,500 tons, the Haikouhas a heavy anti-air and anti-ship missile armament as well as anti-submarine weapons. Two helicopters are embarked.
The Wuhan, completed in 2004, is the same size, also with a multi-mission capability, although without the advanced 30N6E multi-function radar (Western code name Tombstone). One helicopter is carried.
The replenishment oiler Weishanhu, a 22,000-ton ship, completes the anti-pirate force.
About 800 officers and sailors man the three ships, commanded by Rear Admiral Du Jingchen. Upon sailing, Admiral Du stated that, "China definitely has neither the intention of threatening interests of any sovereign parties nor the interest in breaking up power equilibrium in the region."
A Defense Ministry spokesman said in an earlier statement that Chinese naval forces would observe United Nations Security Council resolutions and relative international laws in fulfilling its obligations. Almost 1,300 Chinese merchant ships have passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2008, with seven being attacked. One fishing ship and her 18 crew members are still being held by pirates. Negotiations for their rescue are underway.
China's increasing world-wide political and economic interests have rarely been supported by military forces. Thus, the anti-pirate operation will provide excellent training for Chinese naval forces in such operations while at the same time giving their officers experience in tactical operations with other navies. And, for Western navies operating in the area, it will provide an excellent opportunity for intelligence collection against modern Chinese warships their procedures.
"The main draw back of China in this issue is" an amrican officer concluded the issue "China either have the main catapult technolgy or the aircrafts.so the question does not raise when will they finish the project".
The two flattops each would be between 50,000 and 60,000 tons, be conventionally powered and patrol the South China Sea, according to the report in Japans Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which cited Chinese shipbuilding sources. The carriers could be in the fleet by 2015, the story said.
China is one of the worlds largest builders of commercial ships, although its biggest indigenous warship so far has been no more than about 17,000 tons. The Asahi Shimbun reported that the carriers would be built at a new shipyard outside Shanghai and include components already on order from Russia.
A Chinese naval officer told the newspaper that one of the carriers primary missions would be to guard the sea lanes that connect energy-ravenous China with oil and mineral resources in the Middle East and Africa.
The story is the latest in a series of reports from around the world about Chinese ambitions to field an aircraft carrier. The official Peoples Liberation Army Daily newspaper reported in September that 50 pilots from the Dalian Naval Academy were training for ship borne aircraft flight. Official Russian press agencies reported in October that China had purchased as many as 50 Su-33 Flanker-D fighter jets, an updated version of the Su-27K carried aboard Russias sole aircraft carrier. Since then, British and American news agencies have quoted top Chinese officials as expressing great interest in seaborne airpower.
The Chinese government would seriously consider relevant issues with factors in every aspects on building its first ever aircraft carrier, said navy spokesman Huang Xueping, according to a Dec. 23 report by the official Xinhua news agency. China has a long coastline and the sacred duty of Chinas armed forces is to safeguard the countrys marine safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas, he said.
Chinas carriers if the Japanese report is accurate would likely be comparable to the Royal Navys Queen Elizabeth-class ships, now just beginning construction. Slightly larger, at 65,000 tons, the Queen Elizabeth is designed for a complement of around 1,400 sailors, including its ships company and air wing, and designed to carry about 40 strike aircraft, plus additional helicopters, according to Combat Fleets of the World.
Because the Chinese carriers are smaller and shorter-ranged than their American counterparts, the U.S. shouldnt view them as a threat, the Chinese naval official told the Asahi Shimbun.
China Seriously Considering Carriers
The most controversial naval issue of the post-Cold War era has been whether or not China is planning to procure aircraft carriers. In late December the senior national defense spokesman, Huang Xueping, declared that China is "seriously" considering adding an aircraft carrier to its navy.
While this may be the most definitive statement to date by a Chinese official, more significant was the Chinese Navy's decision this past fall when 50 naval officers began a pilot training program at the Dalian Naval Academy to provide a cadre of carrier-based aviators.
Thus, speculation about a future Chinese carrier force continues albeit still without any public indications of whether such ships would be constructed in China or possibly purchased from a foreign source, in particular Ukraine, which contains the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolayev. That yard produced all Soviet-era aircraft carriers. Also, no definitive time table has been put forward by any Chinese officials.
And, much more significant from a viewpoint of the future of China's Navy, on 26 December a three-ship task force departed Sanya in Hainan Province for operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to help deter pirate attacks on international merchant shipping. Although Chinese warships have carried out long-range visits to other countries, those could not be considered operational missions.
(The last time that China sent a naval expedition to East Africa was during the Ming Dynasty when the emperor's envoy Zheng He led a large armada in the early 15th Century to the region for goodwill port calls.)
The modern Chinese task force consists of two missile destroyers and a replenishment oiler. The destroyers are the Haikou and Wuhan. These are two of China's newest warships. The Haikou, completed in 2005, is an advanced air-defense ship, the Chinese equivalent of a Western Aegis-type warship. With a full load displacement of about 6,500 tons, the Haikouhas a heavy anti-air and anti-ship missile armament as well as anti-submarine weapons. Two helicopters are embarked.
The Wuhan, completed in 2004, is the same size, also with a multi-mission capability, although without the advanced 30N6E multi-function radar (Western code name Tombstone). One helicopter is carried.
The replenishment oiler Weishanhu, a 22,000-ton ship, completes the anti-pirate force.
About 800 officers and sailors man the three ships, commanded by Rear Admiral Du Jingchen. Upon sailing, Admiral Du stated that, "China definitely has neither the intention of threatening interests of any sovereign parties nor the interest in breaking up power equilibrium in the region."
A Defense Ministry spokesman said in an earlier statement that Chinese naval forces would observe United Nations Security Council resolutions and relative international laws in fulfilling its obligations. Almost 1,300 Chinese merchant ships have passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2008, with seven being attacked. One fishing ship and her 18 crew members are still being held by pirates. Negotiations for their rescue are underway.
China's increasing world-wide political and economic interests have rarely been supported by military forces. Thus, the anti-pirate operation will provide excellent training for Chinese naval forces in such operations while at the same time giving their officers experience in tactical operations with other navies. And, for Western navies operating in the area, it will provide an excellent opportunity for intelligence collection against modern Chinese warships their procedures.
"The main draw back of China in this issue is" an amrican officer concluded the issue "China either have the main catapult technolgy or the aircrafts.so the question does not raise when will they finish the project".
Hypothetical attack on U.S. outlined by China
In a hypothetical future scenario, the U.S. and China are poised to clash likely over Taiwan.
The democratic Republic of China, commonly called Taiwan which America backs and the communist Peoples Republic of China considers part of its territory frequently irritates Chinese leaders with calls for greater independence from the mainland. But while the American military mulls its options, Chinese missiles hit runways, fuel lines, barracks and supply depots at U.S. Air Force bases in Japan and South Korea. Long-range warheads destroy American satellites, crippling Air Force surveillance and communication networks. A nuclear fireball erupts high above the Pacific Ocean, ionizing the atmosphere and scrambling radars and radio feeds.
This is Chinas anti-U.S. sucker punch strategy.
Its designed to strike Americas military suddenly, stunning and stalling the Air Force more than any other service. In a script written by Chinese military officers and defense analysts, a bruised U.S. military, beholden to a sheepish American public, puts up a small fight before slinking off to avoid full-on war.
This strategic outlook isnt hidden in secret Chinese documents. Its printed in Chinas military journals and textbooks. And for much of last year, Mandarin literates and defense experts working for the Santa Monica, Calif.-based Rand Corp. on an Air Force contract combed through a range of Chinese military sources.
They emerged with Entering the Dragons Lair, a lengthy report on how the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army would likely confront the U.S. military and how the Air Force in particular can brace itself. In many cases, the theoretical enemy nation Chinas officers discuss in these scenarios isnt explicitly named but is unmistakably the U.S.
These arent war plans, said report co-author Roger Cliff, a former Defense Department strategist and China military specialist who spoke to Air Force Times from Taiwan. This is the military talking to itself. Its not designed for foreigners or even Chinas general public to read.
Element of surprise
When it comes to conflict with the U.S., Chinese military analysts favor age-old schoolyard wisdom: Throw the first punch and hit hard.
Future conflicts are likely to be short, intense affairs that might consist of a single campaign, Cliff said. Theyre thinking about ways to get the drop on us. Most of our force is not forward-deployed.
Chinas experts concede its army would lose a head-on fight, with one senior colonel comparing such a scenario to throwing an egg against a rock. Instead, the Chinese would attempt what Rand calls an anti-access strategy: slowing the deployment of U.S. forces to the Pacific theater, damaging operations within the region and forcing the U.S. to fight from a distance.
Taking the enemy by surprise, one Chinese military expert wrote, would catch it unprepared and cause confusion within and huge psychological pressure on the enemy and help [China] win relatively large victories at relatively small costs. Another military volume suggests feigning a large-scale military training exercise to conceal the attacks buildup.
The Dragons Lair
Striking U.S. air bases specifically command-and-control facilities, aircraft hangars and surface-to-air missile launchers would be Chinas first priority if a conflict arose, according to Rands report.
U.S. facilities in South Korea and Japan, even far-south Okinawa, sit within what Rand calls the Dragons Lair: a swath of land and sea along Chinas coast. This is an area reachable by cruise missiles, jet-borne precision bombs and local covert operatives. Air Force bases within this area include Osan and Kunsan in South Korea, as well as Misawa, Yokota and Kadena in Japan. And in a conflict over Taiwan, any nation allowing an intervening superpower such as the U.S. to operate inside its territory can expect a Chinese attack, according to Chinas defense experts.
China is designing ground-launched cruise missiles capable of nailing targets more than 900 miles away well within striking range of South Korea and much of Japan, according to the report. Cruise missiles able to reach Okinawa home to Kadena Air Base are in development.
The Chinese would first launch concentrated and unexpected attacks on tarmacs using runway-penetrating missiles and, soon after, would target U.S. aircraft. Saboteurs would play a role in reconnaissance, harassing operations and even assassinating key personnel, according to another military expert.
Chinese fighter jets would scramble to intercept aerial refueling tankers and cargo planes sent to shuttle in fuel, munitions, supplies or troops. High-explosive cluster bombs would target pilot quarters and other personnel buildings.
Because the American public is abnormally sensitive about military casualties, according to an article in Chinas Liberation Army Daily, killing U.S. airmen or other personnel would spark a domestic anti-war cry on the home front and possibly force early withdrawal of U.S. forces. (The U.S. experience in Somalia is usually cited in support of this assertion, according to the Rand report.) Once this hard-and-fast assault on U.S. bases commenced, the Chinese army would swiftly divert its forces and guard vigilantly against enemy retaliation, according to a Chinese expert.
Dumb and blind The PLA also would likely use less conventional attacks on the American militarys vital communications network. The goal, as one Chinese expert put it: leaving U.S. combat capabilities blind, deaf and paralyzed.
Losing early-warning systems designed to detect incoming missiles would be, for the Air Force, the most devastating setback one that could force the service to exit the region altogether, according to Rand.
China could also launch a nuclear e-bomb, or electromagnetic explosive, that would fry U.S. communication equipment while ionizing the atmosphere for minutes to hours, according to the report. This would likely jam radio signals in a 900-mile diameter beneath the nuclear fireball.
The PLA could also employ long-range anti-satellite missiles similar to one successfully tested last January to destroy one or more American satellites. However, the PLA has a host of less dramatic options: short-range jammers hidden in suitcases or bombs and virus attacks on Air Force computer networks.
U.S. Air Force options
Shielding against a swift Chinese onslaught is, according to Rand, as simple as reinforcing a runway or as complex as cloaking the orbit of military satellites.
In the short term, U.S. air bases inside the Dragons Lair should add an extra layer of concrete to their runways and bury fuel tanks underground. All aircraft, the report said, should be parked in hardened shelters, especially fighter jets.
Parking larger aircraft bombers, tankers and E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Systems jets in hard-shell hangars would be expensive and difficult but likely worth the cost, according to the report.
U.S. fighter jets remain the best defense against incoming Chinese missile attacks. But, given Chinas taste for sudden attacks, surface-launched missile defense systems must be installed long before a conflict roils. Because the PLA is expected to strike quickly, the report said, waiting for the first tremors of conflict is not an option.
The Air Force also should fortify itself against Chinese hackers by using software encryption, isolating critical computer systems and preparing contingency plans to communicate without a high-bandwidth network. Though China maintains a no first use nuclear bomb policy, the U.S., according to Rand, should warn China that nuclear electromagnetic pulse attacks will be considered acts of nuclear aggression and could prompt nuclear retaliation.
Rand insists the Air Force must defend satellites which support communication, reconnaissance, bomb guidance and more against Chinas proven satellite-killing missiles. This could be accomplished in the Cold War tradition of mutually assured destruction by threatening to retaliate in kind if the PLA blasts U.S. satellites.
That might be the one restraining factor, Cliff said. They might not want to start that space war.
Or, Rand suggests, the U.S. could invest heavily in satellite protection or evasion techniques, including stealth, blending in with other satellite constellations or perhaps developing and deploying microsatellites capable of swarming to defend larger satellites, which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working toward.
Could this really happen? The Chinese first-strike strategy is more than hypothetical, according to the report. But in the near term, at least, its considered unlikely.
If the most contentious issue is Taiwan, Cliff said, then the likely trigger would be Taiwanese elections, where assertions of complete independence from the mainland can infuriate Chinese leaders. Chinas current president, Hu Jintao, has built up Chinas military but also its ties with America. In 2012, however, when Taiwan holds an election and mainland Chinas leadership is expected to turn over, perhaps for the worse, the risk of conflict could increase.
It really depends on the circumstances, Cliff said. Would Taiwan be the provocateur? If so, it might be hard for the American public to support intervention.
However, if China moves to capture control of the island, Cliff said he believes the U.S. would face a rocky dilemma.
Are we really going to let a small, democratic country get snuffed out by a huge authoritarian country especially when you think about how our own country came into existence? Cliff said.
As China pours more resources into its evolving and expanding military, it buys the power to more strongly assert itself against America. In November, China denied U.S. Navy minesweepers shelter from a storm and, in another incident that month, turned down an Air Force C-17 flight shuttling supplies to the American consulate in Hong Kong. Experts speculate this was a rebuff to American arms sales to Taiwan, as well as President Bushs autumn meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of another state China claims, Tibet.
If this conflict happened today, its certain wed prevail. But as time goes on, thats not a given.
The democratic Republic of China, commonly called Taiwan which America backs and the communist Peoples Republic of China considers part of its territory frequently irritates Chinese leaders with calls for greater independence from the mainland. But while the American military mulls its options, Chinese missiles hit runways, fuel lines, barracks and supply depots at U.S. Air Force bases in Japan and South Korea. Long-range warheads destroy American satellites, crippling Air Force surveillance and communication networks. A nuclear fireball erupts high above the Pacific Ocean, ionizing the atmosphere and scrambling radars and radio feeds.
This is Chinas anti-U.S. sucker punch strategy.
Its designed to strike Americas military suddenly, stunning and stalling the Air Force more than any other service. In a script written by Chinese military officers and defense analysts, a bruised U.S. military, beholden to a sheepish American public, puts up a small fight before slinking off to avoid full-on war.
This strategic outlook isnt hidden in secret Chinese documents. Its printed in Chinas military journals and textbooks. And for much of last year, Mandarin literates and defense experts working for the Santa Monica, Calif.-based Rand Corp. on an Air Force contract combed through a range of Chinese military sources.
They emerged with Entering the Dragons Lair, a lengthy report on how the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army would likely confront the U.S. military and how the Air Force in particular can brace itself. In many cases, the theoretical enemy nation Chinas officers discuss in these scenarios isnt explicitly named but is unmistakably the U.S.
These arent war plans, said report co-author Roger Cliff, a former Defense Department strategist and China military specialist who spoke to Air Force Times from Taiwan. This is the military talking to itself. Its not designed for foreigners or even Chinas general public to read.
Element of surprise
When it comes to conflict with the U.S., Chinese military analysts favor age-old schoolyard wisdom: Throw the first punch and hit hard.
Future conflicts are likely to be short, intense affairs that might consist of a single campaign, Cliff said. Theyre thinking about ways to get the drop on us. Most of our force is not forward-deployed.
Chinas experts concede its army would lose a head-on fight, with one senior colonel comparing such a scenario to throwing an egg against a rock. Instead, the Chinese would attempt what Rand calls an anti-access strategy: slowing the deployment of U.S. forces to the Pacific theater, damaging operations within the region and forcing the U.S. to fight from a distance.
Taking the enemy by surprise, one Chinese military expert wrote, would catch it unprepared and cause confusion within and huge psychological pressure on the enemy and help [China] win relatively large victories at relatively small costs. Another military volume suggests feigning a large-scale military training exercise to conceal the attacks buildup.
The Dragons Lair
Striking U.S. air bases specifically command-and-control facilities, aircraft hangars and surface-to-air missile launchers would be Chinas first priority if a conflict arose, according to Rands report.
U.S. facilities in South Korea and Japan, even far-south Okinawa, sit within what Rand calls the Dragons Lair: a swath of land and sea along Chinas coast. This is an area reachable by cruise missiles, jet-borne precision bombs and local covert operatives. Air Force bases within this area include Osan and Kunsan in South Korea, as well as Misawa, Yokota and Kadena in Japan. And in a conflict over Taiwan, any nation allowing an intervening superpower such as the U.S. to operate inside its territory can expect a Chinese attack, according to Chinas defense experts.
China is designing ground-launched cruise missiles capable of nailing targets more than 900 miles away well within striking range of South Korea and much of Japan, according to the report. Cruise missiles able to reach Okinawa home to Kadena Air Base are in development.
The Chinese would first launch concentrated and unexpected attacks on tarmacs using runway-penetrating missiles and, soon after, would target U.S. aircraft. Saboteurs would play a role in reconnaissance, harassing operations and even assassinating key personnel, according to another military expert.
Chinese fighter jets would scramble to intercept aerial refueling tankers and cargo planes sent to shuttle in fuel, munitions, supplies or troops. High-explosive cluster bombs would target pilot quarters and other personnel buildings.
Because the American public is abnormally sensitive about military casualties, according to an article in Chinas Liberation Army Daily, killing U.S. airmen or other personnel would spark a domestic anti-war cry on the home front and possibly force early withdrawal of U.S. forces. (The U.S. experience in Somalia is usually cited in support of this assertion, according to the Rand report.) Once this hard-and-fast assault on U.S. bases commenced, the Chinese army would swiftly divert its forces and guard vigilantly against enemy retaliation, according to a Chinese expert.
Dumb and blind The PLA also would likely use less conventional attacks on the American militarys vital communications network. The goal, as one Chinese expert put it: leaving U.S. combat capabilities blind, deaf and paralyzed.
Losing early-warning systems designed to detect incoming missiles would be, for the Air Force, the most devastating setback one that could force the service to exit the region altogether, according to Rand.
China could also launch a nuclear e-bomb, or electromagnetic explosive, that would fry U.S. communication equipment while ionizing the atmosphere for minutes to hours, according to the report. This would likely jam radio signals in a 900-mile diameter beneath the nuclear fireball.
The PLA could also employ long-range anti-satellite missiles similar to one successfully tested last January to destroy one or more American satellites. However, the PLA has a host of less dramatic options: short-range jammers hidden in suitcases or bombs and virus attacks on Air Force computer networks.
U.S. Air Force options
Shielding against a swift Chinese onslaught is, according to Rand, as simple as reinforcing a runway or as complex as cloaking the orbit of military satellites.
In the short term, U.S. air bases inside the Dragons Lair should add an extra layer of concrete to their runways and bury fuel tanks underground. All aircraft, the report said, should be parked in hardened shelters, especially fighter jets.
Parking larger aircraft bombers, tankers and E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Systems jets in hard-shell hangars would be expensive and difficult but likely worth the cost, according to the report.
U.S. fighter jets remain the best defense against incoming Chinese missile attacks. But, given Chinas taste for sudden attacks, surface-launched missile defense systems must be installed long before a conflict roils. Because the PLA is expected to strike quickly, the report said, waiting for the first tremors of conflict is not an option.
The Air Force also should fortify itself against Chinese hackers by using software encryption, isolating critical computer systems and preparing contingency plans to communicate without a high-bandwidth network. Though China maintains a no first use nuclear bomb policy, the U.S., according to Rand, should warn China that nuclear electromagnetic pulse attacks will be considered acts of nuclear aggression and could prompt nuclear retaliation.
Rand insists the Air Force must defend satellites which support communication, reconnaissance, bomb guidance and more against Chinas proven satellite-killing missiles. This could be accomplished in the Cold War tradition of mutually assured destruction by threatening to retaliate in kind if the PLA blasts U.S. satellites.
That might be the one restraining factor, Cliff said. They might not want to start that space war.
Or, Rand suggests, the U.S. could invest heavily in satellite protection or evasion techniques, including stealth, blending in with other satellite constellations or perhaps developing and deploying microsatellites capable of swarming to defend larger satellites, which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working toward.
Could this really happen? The Chinese first-strike strategy is more than hypothetical, according to the report. But in the near term, at least, its considered unlikely.
If the most contentious issue is Taiwan, Cliff said, then the likely trigger would be Taiwanese elections, where assertions of complete independence from the mainland can infuriate Chinese leaders. Chinas current president, Hu Jintao, has built up Chinas military but also its ties with America. In 2012, however, when Taiwan holds an election and mainland Chinas leadership is expected to turn over, perhaps for the worse, the risk of conflict could increase.
It really depends on the circumstances, Cliff said. Would Taiwan be the provocateur? If so, it might be hard for the American public to support intervention.
However, if China moves to capture control of the island, Cliff said he believes the U.S. would face a rocky dilemma.
Are we really going to let a small, democratic country get snuffed out by a huge authoritarian country especially when you think about how our own country came into existence? Cliff said.
As China pours more resources into its evolving and expanding military, it buys the power to more strongly assert itself against America. In November, China denied U.S. Navy minesweepers shelter from a storm and, in another incident that month, turned down an Air Force C-17 flight shuttling supplies to the American consulate in Hong Kong. Experts speculate this was a rebuff to American arms sales to Taiwan, as well as President Bushs autumn meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of another state China claims, Tibet.
If this conflict happened today, its certain wed prevail. But as time goes on, thats not a given.
Sunday, 8 February 2009
North Sea Fleet Naval Bases of China
- Base Type Latitude Longitude
Qingdao Fleet HQ 3604'N 12019'E
Qingdao Major Base 3604'N 12019'E
Lushun
Port Arthur Major Base 3848'N 12115'E
Xiaopingdao Major Base ____'N ____'E
Changshanqundao Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Dahushan Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Dalian major shipyard 3855'N 12138'E
Dayuanjiadun Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Huludao Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Jianggezhuang Sub Base ____'N ____'E
Lianyungang Minor Base 3445'N 11927'E
Lingshanwei Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Liushuang Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Qingshan Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Ta Kushan Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Weihai Minor Base ____'N ____'E
Anyang Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Changzhi Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Dalian Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Jiaozhou Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Jiaoxian Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Jinxi Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Jiyuan Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Laishan Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Laiyang Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Liangxiang Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Qingdao Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Shanhaiguan Naval Air Station ____'N ____'E
Xingtai Naval Air Station
China's hollow military
How good is China's military, and how much should the United States care? There are ample grounds
for addressing these questions. In 1995, and then again in 1996, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) splashed missiles off the Taiwanese coast. It also reinforced military facilities on the
Spratly Islands, which China claims although they are hundreds of miles from its shores. More
recently, the PRC has undertaken a steady build-up of short-range missiles opposite Taiwan -
hardly, it seems, a benign development, particularly when considered alongside President Jiang
Zemin's presumed goal of reuniting Taiwan with the Chinese mainland during his tenure in office.
And now these questions have been given a new urgency by the espionage allegations contained in
the Cox report.
The PRC, then, has demonstrated a number of intentions and aims that warrant close American
attention. The ongoing dispute over Taiwan, for example, is ripe for troublesome misperception.
Chinese ambitions toward the Spratly Islands do not converge with U.S. interests or, for that
matter, with those of nearby countries. The PRC continues to criticize harshly America's global
alliance system and its assertive foreign policy. More generally, Beijing appears poised to
translate its growing economic power into greater military strength and geopolitical weight, as
indeed a Chinese defense white paper acknowledged last year.
Despite all of the above, we believe that the recent clamor over China's strategic ambitions is
greatly overblown. Most of the Chinese aims that run counter to U.S. interests are in fact not
global or ideological but territorial in nature, and confined primarily to the islands and
waterways to China's south and southeast. In addition, Beijing has recently taken a number of
steps to cooperate with the United States on security matters: signing the Chemical Weapons
Convention and nuclear test ban treaty, terminating its assistance to nuclear facilities in
Pakistan, pledging to cut off ballistic missile transfers to Pakistan as well as nuclear and
anti-ship cruise missile trade with Iran, and quietly restraining the North Koreans. Moreover,
China is plagued by enormous socioeconomic problems, whose solution requires maintaining good
relations with the world's major economic powers - and with the United States in particular.
That said, our main focus in this article is less on the PRC'S intentions, always subject to
change in any event, than on its military capabilities. An enormous gap separates China's
military capabilities from its aspirations. The PRC's armed forces are not very good, and not
getting better very fast. Whatever China's concerns and intentions, its capacity to act upon them
in ways inimical to U.S. interests is severely limited, and will remain so for many years.
To begin with, consider some basic facts: China remains a developing country, with per capita
income levels - even after twenty years' growth of historic proportions - only about one-tenth
those of the West. China's living standards trail even those of American adversaries such as
Iran, Yugoslavia and pre-Desert Storm Iraq. It faces enormous challenges in its agricultural,
environmental and banking sectors, which its arteriosclerotic central government is ill-equipped
to address.
Looking at these facts, the new commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific forces, Admiral Dennis Blair,
has declared that China will not represent a serious strategic threat to the United States for at
least twenty years.(1) In almost every respect, China's armed forces lag behind the U.S. military
by at least a couple of decades; in many areas they even compare poorly with the "hollow force"
that the United States fielded in the immediate wake of the war in Vietnam.(2) And on matters
ranging from the professionalism of its officer corps and troop morale to training and logistics,
China's military is in even worse shape than that.
An Empty Threat
China wields by far the world's largest military, with 2.8 million soldiers, sailors and airmen -
twice the American number. (The United States is number two; the only other countries with more
than a million active duty troops are China's neighbors - Russia, India and North Korea.) Yet
China's military was a full million people stronger in the 1980s - before PRC leaders recognized
that its size actually worked against their aim of developing a modern force. Raw size is
deceptive. Two million of China's soldiers serve in the ground forces, where their primary
responsibilities are to ensure domestic order and protect borders - not to project power. Then,
too, the Pentagon estimates that only about 20 percent of those ground forces are even equipped
to move about within China. A still smaller number possess the trucks, repair facilities,
construction and engineering units, and other mobile assets needed to project power abroad.(3)
In China's ever expanding defense budget, which has grown by more than 50 percent in real terms
over the course of the 1990s and is to increase 15 percent this year, there is also less than
meets the eye. Much of this year's increase represents compensation to the Chinese armed forces
for divesting themselves of their many business operations, which sapped China's military
readiness. Even with these increases, China's announced defense budget will still only total
about $12 billion, less than 5 percent of the U.S. figure.
Of course, that $12 billion figure does not capture all Chinese military spending. It does not
include spending on foreign arms purchases, nuclear weapons development, most of China's military
research and local militias. Nor does it account for subsidies to China's ailing defense
industries, or administrative costs such as demobilization and pensions. Taking these additions
into account, and adjusting for purchasing-power parity effects - admittedly a difficult and
imprecise business - China's actual defense expenditures are generally estimated at somewhere
between $35 billion and $65 billion a year.(4) But these are still modest numbers - especially
for such a huge military. Even at the higher estimates, China spends less than 25 percent of what
the United States spends on defense, while supporting a force twice as large.
This basic disparity will not change anytime soon. First, as noted, China faces enormous
economic challenges that limit its ability to fund a military expansion. Second, even if China
begins to close the gap with the United States, it starts from a position of marked inferiority.
The United States owns a "capital stock" of modern military equipment valued at close to $1
trillion; China's corresponding figure is well under $100 billion. As such, one can see why a
recent study concluded that the Chinese military would have to increase spending on hardware by
$22-39 billion annually for ten years to wield a force capable of significant power
projection.(5) Further, this estimate does not take into account the additional investments that
would be required to man, train, deploy and sustain such a modern force. China is in no position
even to attempt this scale of effort.
Weapons and Training
As congressman Barney Frank has sardonically observed, China did recently acquire its first
aircraft carrier. But it then immediately anchored it in Macao and transformed it into a
recreation center. So much for the next great hegemon's efforts to launch a blue-water fleet by
the turn of the century.
More detailed assessments of Chinese military capability and readiness tell a similar story.
Consider China's combat air force. Though roughly equaling the aggregate air power numbers of the
United States, China's air forces include only a few dozen so-called "fourth generation" combat
aircraft and only a couple hundred "third generation" aircraft. The rest rely on 1960s or even
older technology. By contrast, all of the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines' 3,000-plus fighters
are fourth generation models. China's projected fourth generation arsenal in the year 2005 is
expected to include perhaps 150 fighters - by which point the United States will have purchased
300 "fifth generation" aircraft.(6)
Two additional factors render an even bleaker assessment: supporting equipment and overall
military readiness. First, as a recent Pentagon report observed, the PRC's air forces possess
minimal aerial refueling capabilities, poor surveillance aircraft and a behind-schedule program
to acquire airborne warning and control planes.(7) Second, and as another Pentagon report
describes, the electronic warfare capabilities of the PRC air force are "extremely limited by
western standards."(8) Programs are underway in China to improve certain specialized
capabilities, such as the use of space, long-range precision strike, and other "strategic
dimensions of warfare."(9) But the PRC continues to have trouble modernizing its forces. What
passes in the literature as "capabilities" are often better understood as long-term aspirations.
As for the caliber of China's military manpower, it is hard to be more damning than the
Pentagon's most recent report on PRC military capabilities. It acknowledges that Chinese troops
are generally patriotic, fit and good at basic infantry fighting skills, but then goes on to say:
Ground force leadership, training in combined operations, and morale are poor. The PLA is still a
party army with nepotism and political/family connections continuing to predominate in officer
appointment and advancement. The soldiers, for the most part, are semi-literate rural peasants;
there is no professional NCO [non-commissioned officer] corps, per se. Military service, with its
low remuneration and family disruption, is increasingly seen as a poor alternative to work in the
private sector.(10)
China's military training is elsewhere assessed as getting better, though still weak,
particularly as concerns joint service operations.
With respect to the hardware on which those troops rely, the Defense Intelligence Agency expects
that, by 2010 or so, perhaps 10 percent of China's overall military will have acquired "late Cold
War equivalent" heavy equipment and become reasonably proficient in employing it. Even that will
leave them twenty years behind the American curve - and the remaining 90 percent of the force
more obsolescent yet.
Projecting Power
So much for an assessment of China's overall military readiness. Some would argue that this type
of analysis misses the point in any case. Many American analysts contend that while the United
States should not fret too much about China's traditional military power, it should recognize
that Beijing, having watched the Gulf War on CNN, might utilize "asymmetric warfare" to threaten
American interests in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. By employing advanced cruise
missiles, sea mines, sub-marines, imaging satellites, anti-satellite weapons, computer viruses
and other specialized weaponry, China would wage "local war under high-tech conditions" in a
manner that exploits American vulnerabilities.
There is a kernel of truth in this concern - militaries, after all, routinely seek to exploit the
weaknesses of their adversaries. But it is only a kernel. To defeat Taiwan, for instance, China
would need to land enough troops on the island to overcome Taiwan's quarter million-strong ground
forces (plus some fraction of its 1.5 million man reserve force). But currently China cannot even
move a quarter million soldiers overland into Mongolia or Vietnam. What is more, this type of
power projection is precisely the type of operation that future military technology may render
even more difficult.
The sum total of China's amphibious transport capacity (about 70 ships) can move 10,000 to 15,000
troops. Its airborne transport may carry 6000 more.(11) True, China could utilize fishing vessels
and cargo ships, and tap its civilian air fleet, for an operation against Taiwan. But all of
these vessels, military and civilian, would be fiercely attacked before they reached the island.
Making matters worse for China is the fact that there are only a few suitable beachheads on
Taiwan where PRC forces could land.
Even if only half of Taiwan's fleet of nearly 500 combat aircraft survived an initial Chinese
assault with missiles and fighters, the remaining aircraft could wreak enormous damage on an
amphibious armada. The surviving planes would carry enough weapons that in theory they could sink
almost the entire amphibious armada in a single sortie. Although Taiwan's air force may not yet
have large numbers of anti-ship missiles like the U.S. Harpoon in its arsenal, it could inflict a
fair amount of damage with its own Hsiung Feng 2 anti-ship weapons(12) - and would probably be
provided with weapons like the Harpoon fairly quickly. Taiwan also possesses highly effective
air-to-air missiles, which would pose a serious threat to Chinese troop transport aircraft.
Things get even worse from the Chinese standpoint. To quote the Pentagon again, "China's C4I
[command, control, communications, computers and intelligence] infrastructure cannot support
large scale, joint force projection operations at any significant distance from the country's
borders." Granted, Taiwan is only about one hundred kilometers from the mainland (though many PRC
aircraft would have to operate from several hundred kilometers' distance, given constraints on
the capacity of individual airfields). But even if the distances involved are not great, the
operation would be enormously complex, as China would need to destroy Taiwan's air force, sink
its fleet, deceive its ground forces about the armada's primary objective - and do all of these
things after Taiwan was fully aware that hostilities were imminent, since a major and largely
visible build-up of Chinese forces would already have taken place. Nor could China rule out the
participation of American forces. Even if the United States did not put its combat assets in
harm's way, it could provide Taiwan all-weather day-night reconnaissance and targeting data from
spy satellites and aircraft.
Bizarrely, after making many of these arguments in its own report, and further concluding that
Beijing is making few efforts to improve its lift capacity, the Pentagon's 1999 report on the
PRC-Taiwan military balance concludes that, absent third-party intervention, China could probably
carry out a successful amphibious assault by 2005. The basis for reaching this conclusion,
however, is either unstated or unpersuasive.
China could plausibly blockade Taiwan - at least well enough to cut commerce severely and extract
a steep economic price from Taipei. Here, the same technical realities and trends working against
a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan might actually work in the PRC's favor. Surface vessels
in confined waters are already quite vulnerable. If anything, they are becoming more so - and
China has in recent years vastly improved the quality of its anti-ship cruise missiles.(13)
China has a large navy, too, one that boasts some 60 submarines, 50 large surface combatants and
hundreds of smaller ships. Of the submarines, three are high-quality Kilo-class vessels purchased
from Russia; another five are indigenously produced Han nuclear-powered attack submarines. They
do not carry anti-ship missiles at present, but may soon. China's stock of torpedoes and mines,
too, is well suited for blockade-style operations. But recall, this is a navy for which a
three-ship crossing of the Pacific for its first ever visit to a mainland U.S. port - San Diego
in March 1997 - proved a huge undertaking. Even so, as Taiwan's navy has only 4 submarines, 36
major surface combatants and about 100 smaller surface combat ships, it might well find itself
outmatched by the PRC navy. Or at least that is the conclusion of the Pentagon.
In any cross-strait blockade or naval conflict, Taiwan's main advantage would be air cover,
especially if it reacted to a PRC blockade by shutting down its ports that face China and routing
ships to its less vulnerable eastern harbors. China, however, could pursue Taiwanese-flagged
vessels beyond the range of Taiwan's aircover. Even if the PRC navy suffered huge losses, it
could effectively discourage merchant shipping and shut down much of Taiwan's export economy.
These options would not be available to China if the United States intervened. Deploying two
carriers several hundred miles east of Taiwan, the United States could, with the assistance of
the Taiwanese air force, clear the seas of Chinese warships. U.S. airpower, to use a well-coined
phrase, can "do" open water much better than it can ferret Serbian tanks and troops out of
Kosovo's woods. American anti-submarine warfare capabilities would be challenged only against
China's best submarines, of which the PRC only has a handful. At most a few merchant or naval
vessels would be lost on the U.S./Taiwan side before the Chinese threat was eliminated.(14)
On the matter of asymmetric Chinese approaches to defeating the U.S. military during a conflict
over Taiwan, it is especially important to distinguish China's aspirations from its capabilities.
It is true that Chinese writers intend to utilize information warfare and other concepts derived
from what American analysts often term the revolution in military affairs (RMA). This approach to
countering America's edge in traditional military capabilities undoubtedly has particular allure
in a nation that gave the world Sun Tzu. But the fact that Chinese military writers can blend
ancient maxims with concepts borrowed from the U.S. RMA debate does not mean they will be able to
exploit its principles and technology during a conflict in the Straits. And even if China
succeeds in developing one type of asymmetric weapon (e.g., a laser anti-satellite weapon), we
will retain other systems that will not be threatened (e.g., radar satellites and surveillance
aircraft).
What, finally, are we to make of China's recent missile build-up along the Taiwan Straits?
Reportedly, the PRC had deployed 30 to 50 short-range missiles on the Straits by 1996, has about
200 deployed there today, and may triple this package within five years. From their current
positions, the M-9 and M-11 missiles, both of which are nuclear-capable, can reach Taiwan.(15)
But neither possesses sufficient accuracy to strike ports, airfields or ships to great effect.
Indeed, they would generally miss their targets by several football fields and almost always by
the length of at least a single field.(16) Granted, if Beijing unleashed a salvo of hundreds of
missiles, it might register a few hits. But with the development of more effective passive
defenses in Taiwan, most airfields and ports could absorb a few explosions and either continue
functioning or be quickly repaired. Commercial sea traffic might disappear for a while, to be
sure - but if China exhausted the bulk of its missile inventory to sink a grand total of two or
three cargo vessels, would that really be such an intimidating use of force? It would say more
about Chinese weakness than anything else.
Today, both China and Taiwan are modernizing their forces. But Taiwan will surely do so much
faster, especially given its high-tech economy, its willingness to purchase weapons abroad, and a
modernization agenda that emphasizes capabilities such as precision strike, maritime
reconnaissance and integrated air defense. China's armed forces talk a good high-tech game, but
possess few of the requisite assets and are redressing their weaknesses at a very slow pace
As for the Spratly Islands, where China has been constructing facilities of late, Beijing seems
mostly interested in the economic potential of the surrounding waters and seabeds. Fortunately
for it, the countries nearest to the Spratlys - the Philippines and Vietnam - possess little
military wherewithal to challenge its claim to the islands. Hence, China's decision to claim
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, while hardly justifiable in law, is not entirely
surprising.
Still, given China's inability to project substantial power very far beyond its borders, the PRC
will be able to assert and maintain control over the Spratlys now and in the foreseeable future
only if the United States allows it to do so. Washington may in fact decide on such a course,
even if diplomatic skirmishes over the islands continue to pit China against formal U.S. allies
like the Philippines - provided, that is, that China does not attempt to control the adjacent sea
lanes. But the Spratlys could prove a costly prize for Beijing. The modest economic benefits
accruing would probably be more than balanced by strong political resentment from neighboring
states. In that event, the United States might be granted land bases in countries like the
Philippines, from which it could patrol and expand its own influence in the region.
The Scandals
For all of the fear and suspicion aroused by illicit transfers of U.S. military technology, they
have not fundamentally shifted the strategic balance between China, Taiwan and the United States.
While their impact will not be trivial, neither will it be catastrophic.
Consider first the question of nuclear espionage. A native Taiwanese scientist, Wen Ho Lee,
allegedly provided China with information on the Trident II missile warhead, known as the W-88;
he may have also leaked computer codes mimicking the behavior of that and other warheads. The
United States developed this warhead in the 1980s at Los Alamos, where Lee worked until he was
fired earlier this year. The warhead has a yield of roughly 350 kilotons, or about 20 times that
of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs - not unusually large for U.S. thermonuclear warheads, but
still one of the country's most efficient nuclear devices. Warheads of that power formerly
weighed well over 1,000 pounds; the W-88 warhead reportedly weighs hundreds.(17) With this
powerful lightweight warhead, China could place several warheads on missiles that currently carry
only one.
That would not change China's ability to threaten the continental United States, which it has
been able to do for almost two decades. Beijing at present has about 20 ICBMs that can reach the
U.S. mainland. In addition, it has a nuclear-armed submarine, though the vessel is barely
seaworthy and would need to approach within about 1,000 miles of the U.S. coast to launch its
weapons successfully. China also possesses some 300 nuclear warheads it could use against U.S. or
allied forces in Asia.While the W-88 transfer will not alter the basic facts of the U.S.-China
nuclear balance, it would aid any Chinese effort to counter an American ballistic missile defense
system, and could provide the PRC with greater targeting options in the event of a nuclear war.
That fact might in turn make Beijing believe it had greater leverage in a major crisis with the
United States (though if China really thought in these terms, it probably would have already
expanded its ICBM force). Moreover, China, which joined the global test ban in 1996, might never
have been able to develop its own lightweight warhead without the W-88 technology.
Still, we cannot be sure of the impact. China appears to have tested a warhead similar to the
W-88 design only once.(18) The United States typically required at least six to ten tests to
obtain confidence in a nuclear warhead.(19) True, if China obtained an already proven design it
might require less. But nuclear warheads are highly complex devices. For example, the manner in
which a warhead ages can affect its performance. Also, warheads that have been chilled or heated
or violently jolted during trajectory may not detonate.(20) All the weapons blueprints and
computer codes in the world cannot substitute for a properly tested and robustly built warhead.
China might not wish to devote large amounts of resources to the construction of a warhead that
it may not fully understand.
The Hughes/Loral scandal may be the most significant of the recent cases. As part of their work
in launching satellites on Chinese carrier vehicles, these companies may have helped China
correct a problem in its guidance systems for their strategic rockets. Any technology transfer
that increases the accuracy and reliability of China's rockets and missiles will surely aid its
ICBM force and its efforts to place military satellites in space. Here too, though, we must be
cautious in our conclusions. After all, we still do not know exactly what information was
transferred; the former U.S. commander of Pacific forces, Admiral Joseph Prueher, for one,
appears not to believe the data was of great import. Even if China's launch capabilities do
improve slightly as a result of the transfer, its fledgling satellite program is rudimentary and
will likely remain so for years to come.
The Cox Committee has raised serious concerns about improvements in Chinese military capability.
Still, enormous uncertainties persist, for acquisitions do not translate automatically into new
capabilities. That at least was the conclusion of the CIA's damage assessment, which determined
that "the aggressive Chinese collection effort" has not yet resulted in the modernization of its
deployed strategic forces. The reality of America's enormous strategic nuclear advantage - U.S,
nuclear warheads outnumber China's by a ratio of about 15 to 1 - will remain a powerful deterrent
in the face of any foreseeable Chinese strategic rocket modernization.
China's military is simply not very good. The majority of its members serve in the ground forces,
but so lack in transport and mobile logistics assets that they are more aptly described as
internal security personnel. Their training ranges from spotty to poor. Moreover, the armed
forces remain plagued by poor pay, nepotism and party favoritism, and attract few of China's
brightest citizens.
The PRC's power projection capabilities, too, are constrained by huge weaknesses - especially in
areas such as aerial refueling, electronic warfare, command and control, and amphibious and air
assault assets. China owns considerably less top-level military equipment than medium military
powers like Japan and Britain; it owns even less than smaller powers such as Italy, South Korea
or the Netherlands. Nor has it embarked on a concerted effort to purchase sophisticated new
weapons. Though some analysts estimate China's military budget to be as high as $65 billion a
year in purchasing power terms, the resources it devotes to acquiring modern weaponry are akin to
those of countries spending $10-20 billion a year on defense.
The numerous defects of its military establishment notwithstanding, China is a rising power that
could one day significantly challenge the United States and its allies in East Asia. But that day
will not come anytime soon; it will be at least twenty years before China can pose such a threat.
Why it would wish to do so, even with a strong military, remains an open question.
for addressing these questions. In 1995, and then again in 1996, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) splashed missiles off the Taiwanese coast. It also reinforced military facilities on the
Spratly Islands, which China claims although they are hundreds of miles from its shores. More
recently, the PRC has undertaken a steady build-up of short-range missiles opposite Taiwan -
hardly, it seems, a benign development, particularly when considered alongside President Jiang
Zemin's presumed goal of reuniting Taiwan with the Chinese mainland during his tenure in office.
And now these questions have been given a new urgency by the espionage allegations contained in
the Cox report.
The PRC, then, has demonstrated a number of intentions and aims that warrant close American
attention. The ongoing dispute over Taiwan, for example, is ripe for troublesome misperception.
Chinese ambitions toward the Spratly Islands do not converge with U.S. interests or, for that
matter, with those of nearby countries. The PRC continues to criticize harshly America's global
alliance system and its assertive foreign policy. More generally, Beijing appears poised to
translate its growing economic power into greater military strength and geopolitical weight, as
indeed a Chinese defense white paper acknowledged last year.
Despite all of the above, we believe that the recent clamor over China's strategic ambitions is
greatly overblown. Most of the Chinese aims that run counter to U.S. interests are in fact not
global or ideological but territorial in nature, and confined primarily to the islands and
waterways to China's south and southeast. In addition, Beijing has recently taken a number of
steps to cooperate with the United States on security matters: signing the Chemical Weapons
Convention and nuclear test ban treaty, terminating its assistance to nuclear facilities in
Pakistan, pledging to cut off ballistic missile transfers to Pakistan as well as nuclear and
anti-ship cruise missile trade with Iran, and quietly restraining the North Koreans. Moreover,
China is plagued by enormous socioeconomic problems, whose solution requires maintaining good
relations with the world's major economic powers - and with the United States in particular.
That said, our main focus in this article is less on the PRC'S intentions, always subject to
change in any event, than on its military capabilities. An enormous gap separates China's
military capabilities from its aspirations. The PRC's armed forces are not very good, and not
getting better very fast. Whatever China's concerns and intentions, its capacity to act upon them
in ways inimical to U.S. interests is severely limited, and will remain so for many years.
To begin with, consider some basic facts: China remains a developing country, with per capita
income levels - even after twenty years' growth of historic proportions - only about one-tenth
those of the West. China's living standards trail even those of American adversaries such as
Iran, Yugoslavia and pre-Desert Storm Iraq. It faces enormous challenges in its agricultural,
environmental and banking sectors, which its arteriosclerotic central government is ill-equipped
to address.
Looking at these facts, the new commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific forces, Admiral Dennis Blair,
has declared that China will not represent a serious strategic threat to the United States for at
least twenty years.(1) In almost every respect, China's armed forces lag behind the U.S. military
by at least a couple of decades; in many areas they even compare poorly with the "hollow force"
that the United States fielded in the immediate wake of the war in Vietnam.(2) And on matters
ranging from the professionalism of its officer corps and troop morale to training and logistics,
China's military is in even worse shape than that.
An Empty Threat
China wields by far the world's largest military, with 2.8 million soldiers, sailors and airmen -
twice the American number. (The United States is number two; the only other countries with more
than a million active duty troops are China's neighbors - Russia, India and North Korea.) Yet
China's military was a full million people stronger in the 1980s - before PRC leaders recognized
that its size actually worked against their aim of developing a modern force. Raw size is
deceptive. Two million of China's soldiers serve in the ground forces, where their primary
responsibilities are to ensure domestic order and protect borders - not to project power. Then,
too, the Pentagon estimates that only about 20 percent of those ground forces are even equipped
to move about within China. A still smaller number possess the trucks, repair facilities,
construction and engineering units, and other mobile assets needed to project power abroad.(3)
In China's ever expanding defense budget, which has grown by more than 50 percent in real terms
over the course of the 1990s and is to increase 15 percent this year, there is also less than
meets the eye. Much of this year's increase represents compensation to the Chinese armed forces
for divesting themselves of their many business operations, which sapped China's military
readiness. Even with these increases, China's announced defense budget will still only total
about $12 billion, less than 5 percent of the U.S. figure.
Of course, that $12 billion figure does not capture all Chinese military spending. It does not
include spending on foreign arms purchases, nuclear weapons development, most of China's military
research and local militias. Nor does it account for subsidies to China's ailing defense
industries, or administrative costs such as demobilization and pensions. Taking these additions
into account, and adjusting for purchasing-power parity effects - admittedly a difficult and
imprecise business - China's actual defense expenditures are generally estimated at somewhere
between $35 billion and $65 billion a year.(4) But these are still modest numbers - especially
for such a huge military. Even at the higher estimates, China spends less than 25 percent of what
the United States spends on defense, while supporting a force twice as large.
This basic disparity will not change anytime soon. First, as noted, China faces enormous
economic challenges that limit its ability to fund a military expansion. Second, even if China
begins to close the gap with the United States, it starts from a position of marked inferiority.
The United States owns a "capital stock" of modern military equipment valued at close to $1
trillion; China's corresponding figure is well under $100 billion. As such, one can see why a
recent study concluded that the Chinese military would have to increase spending on hardware by
$22-39 billion annually for ten years to wield a force capable of significant power
projection.(5) Further, this estimate does not take into account the additional investments that
would be required to man, train, deploy and sustain such a modern force. China is in no position
even to attempt this scale of effort.
Weapons and Training
As congressman Barney Frank has sardonically observed, China did recently acquire its first
aircraft carrier. But it then immediately anchored it in Macao and transformed it into a
recreation center. So much for the next great hegemon's efforts to launch a blue-water fleet by
the turn of the century.
More detailed assessments of Chinese military capability and readiness tell a similar story.
Consider China's combat air force. Though roughly equaling the aggregate air power numbers of the
United States, China's air forces include only a few dozen so-called "fourth generation" combat
aircraft and only a couple hundred "third generation" aircraft. The rest rely on 1960s or even
older technology. By contrast, all of the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines' 3,000-plus fighters
are fourth generation models. China's projected fourth generation arsenal in the year 2005 is
expected to include perhaps 150 fighters - by which point the United States will have purchased
300 "fifth generation" aircraft.(6)
Two additional factors render an even bleaker assessment: supporting equipment and overall
military readiness. First, as a recent Pentagon report observed, the PRC's air forces possess
minimal aerial refueling capabilities, poor surveillance aircraft and a behind-schedule program
to acquire airborne warning and control planes.(7) Second, and as another Pentagon report
describes, the electronic warfare capabilities of the PRC air force are "extremely limited by
western standards."(8) Programs are underway in China to improve certain specialized
capabilities, such as the use of space, long-range precision strike, and other "strategic
dimensions of warfare."(9) But the PRC continues to have trouble modernizing its forces. What
passes in the literature as "capabilities" are often better understood as long-term aspirations.
As for the caliber of China's military manpower, it is hard to be more damning than the
Pentagon's most recent report on PRC military capabilities. It acknowledges that Chinese troops
are generally patriotic, fit and good at basic infantry fighting skills, but then goes on to say:
Ground force leadership, training in combined operations, and morale are poor. The PLA is still a
party army with nepotism and political/family connections continuing to predominate in officer
appointment and advancement. The soldiers, for the most part, are semi-literate rural peasants;
there is no professional NCO [non-commissioned officer] corps, per se. Military service, with its
low remuneration and family disruption, is increasingly seen as a poor alternative to work in the
private sector.(10)
China's military training is elsewhere assessed as getting better, though still weak,
particularly as concerns joint service operations.
With respect to the hardware on which those troops rely, the Defense Intelligence Agency expects
that, by 2010 or so, perhaps 10 percent of China's overall military will have acquired "late Cold
War equivalent" heavy equipment and become reasonably proficient in employing it. Even that will
leave them twenty years behind the American curve - and the remaining 90 percent of the force
more obsolescent yet.
Projecting Power
So much for an assessment of China's overall military readiness. Some would argue that this type
of analysis misses the point in any case. Many American analysts contend that while the United
States should not fret too much about China's traditional military power, it should recognize
that Beijing, having watched the Gulf War on CNN, might utilize "asymmetric warfare" to threaten
American interests in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. By employing advanced cruise
missiles, sea mines, sub-marines, imaging satellites, anti-satellite weapons, computer viruses
and other specialized weaponry, China would wage "local war under high-tech conditions" in a
manner that exploits American vulnerabilities.
There is a kernel of truth in this concern - militaries, after all, routinely seek to exploit the
weaknesses of their adversaries. But it is only a kernel. To defeat Taiwan, for instance, China
would need to land enough troops on the island to overcome Taiwan's quarter million-strong ground
forces (plus some fraction of its 1.5 million man reserve force). But currently China cannot even
move a quarter million soldiers overland into Mongolia or Vietnam. What is more, this type of
power projection is precisely the type of operation that future military technology may render
even more difficult.
The sum total of China's amphibious transport capacity (about 70 ships) can move 10,000 to 15,000
troops. Its airborne transport may carry 6000 more.(11) True, China could utilize fishing vessels
and cargo ships, and tap its civilian air fleet, for an operation against Taiwan. But all of
these vessels, military and civilian, would be fiercely attacked before they reached the island.
Making matters worse for China is the fact that there are only a few suitable beachheads on
Taiwan where PRC forces could land.
Even if only half of Taiwan's fleet of nearly 500 combat aircraft survived an initial Chinese
assault with missiles and fighters, the remaining aircraft could wreak enormous damage on an
amphibious armada. The surviving planes would carry enough weapons that in theory they could sink
almost the entire amphibious armada in a single sortie. Although Taiwan's air force may not yet
have large numbers of anti-ship missiles like the U.S. Harpoon in its arsenal, it could inflict a
fair amount of damage with its own Hsiung Feng 2 anti-ship weapons(12) - and would probably be
provided with weapons like the Harpoon fairly quickly. Taiwan also possesses highly effective
air-to-air missiles, which would pose a serious threat to Chinese troop transport aircraft.
Things get even worse from the Chinese standpoint. To quote the Pentagon again, "China's C4I
[command, control, communications, computers and intelligence] infrastructure cannot support
large scale, joint force projection operations at any significant distance from the country's
borders." Granted, Taiwan is only about one hundred kilometers from the mainland (though many PRC
aircraft would have to operate from several hundred kilometers' distance, given constraints on
the capacity of individual airfields). But even if the distances involved are not great, the
operation would be enormously complex, as China would need to destroy Taiwan's air force, sink
its fleet, deceive its ground forces about the armada's primary objective - and do all of these
things after Taiwan was fully aware that hostilities were imminent, since a major and largely
visible build-up of Chinese forces would already have taken place. Nor could China rule out the
participation of American forces. Even if the United States did not put its combat assets in
harm's way, it could provide Taiwan all-weather day-night reconnaissance and targeting data from
spy satellites and aircraft.
Bizarrely, after making many of these arguments in its own report, and further concluding that
Beijing is making few efforts to improve its lift capacity, the Pentagon's 1999 report on the
PRC-Taiwan military balance concludes that, absent third-party intervention, China could probably
carry out a successful amphibious assault by 2005. The basis for reaching this conclusion,
however, is either unstated or unpersuasive.
China could plausibly blockade Taiwan - at least well enough to cut commerce severely and extract
a steep economic price from Taipei. Here, the same technical realities and trends working against
a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan might actually work in the PRC's favor. Surface vessels
in confined waters are already quite vulnerable. If anything, they are becoming more so - and
China has in recent years vastly improved the quality of its anti-ship cruise missiles.(13)
China has a large navy, too, one that boasts some 60 submarines, 50 large surface combatants and
hundreds of smaller ships. Of the submarines, three are high-quality Kilo-class vessels purchased
from Russia; another five are indigenously produced Han nuclear-powered attack submarines. They
do not carry anti-ship missiles at present, but may soon. China's stock of torpedoes and mines,
too, is well suited for blockade-style operations. But recall, this is a navy for which a
three-ship crossing of the Pacific for its first ever visit to a mainland U.S. port - San Diego
in March 1997 - proved a huge undertaking. Even so, as Taiwan's navy has only 4 submarines, 36
major surface combatants and about 100 smaller surface combat ships, it might well find itself
outmatched by the PRC navy. Or at least that is the conclusion of the Pentagon.
In any cross-strait blockade or naval conflict, Taiwan's main advantage would be air cover,
especially if it reacted to a PRC blockade by shutting down its ports that face China and routing
ships to its less vulnerable eastern harbors. China, however, could pursue Taiwanese-flagged
vessels beyond the range of Taiwan's aircover. Even if the PRC navy suffered huge losses, it
could effectively discourage merchant shipping and shut down much of Taiwan's export economy.
These options would not be available to China if the United States intervened. Deploying two
carriers several hundred miles east of Taiwan, the United States could, with the assistance of
the Taiwanese air force, clear the seas of Chinese warships. U.S. airpower, to use a well-coined
phrase, can "do" open water much better than it can ferret Serbian tanks and troops out of
Kosovo's woods. American anti-submarine warfare capabilities would be challenged only against
China's best submarines, of which the PRC only has a handful. At most a few merchant or naval
vessels would be lost on the U.S./Taiwan side before the Chinese threat was eliminated.(14)
On the matter of asymmetric Chinese approaches to defeating the U.S. military during a conflict
over Taiwan, it is especially important to distinguish China's aspirations from its capabilities.
It is true that Chinese writers intend to utilize information warfare and other concepts derived
from what American analysts often term the revolution in military affairs (RMA). This approach to
countering America's edge in traditional military capabilities undoubtedly has particular allure
in a nation that gave the world Sun Tzu. But the fact that Chinese military writers can blend
ancient maxims with concepts borrowed from the U.S. RMA debate does not mean they will be able to
exploit its principles and technology during a conflict in the Straits. And even if China
succeeds in developing one type of asymmetric weapon (e.g., a laser anti-satellite weapon), we
will retain other systems that will not be threatened (e.g., radar satellites and surveillance
aircraft).
What, finally, are we to make of China's recent missile build-up along the Taiwan Straits?
Reportedly, the PRC had deployed 30 to 50 short-range missiles on the Straits by 1996, has about
200 deployed there today, and may triple this package within five years. From their current
positions, the M-9 and M-11 missiles, both of which are nuclear-capable, can reach Taiwan.(15)
But neither possesses sufficient accuracy to strike ports, airfields or ships to great effect.
Indeed, they would generally miss their targets by several football fields and almost always by
the length of at least a single field.(16) Granted, if Beijing unleashed a salvo of hundreds of
missiles, it might register a few hits. But with the development of more effective passive
defenses in Taiwan, most airfields and ports could absorb a few explosions and either continue
functioning or be quickly repaired. Commercial sea traffic might disappear for a while, to be
sure - but if China exhausted the bulk of its missile inventory to sink a grand total of two or
three cargo vessels, would that really be such an intimidating use of force? It would say more
about Chinese weakness than anything else.
Today, both China and Taiwan are modernizing their forces. But Taiwan will surely do so much
faster, especially given its high-tech economy, its willingness to purchase weapons abroad, and a
modernization agenda that emphasizes capabilities such as precision strike, maritime
reconnaissance and integrated air defense. China's armed forces talk a good high-tech game, but
possess few of the requisite assets and are redressing their weaknesses at a very slow pace
As for the Spratly Islands, where China has been constructing facilities of late, Beijing seems
mostly interested in the economic potential of the surrounding waters and seabeds. Fortunately
for it, the countries nearest to the Spratlys - the Philippines and Vietnam - possess little
military wherewithal to challenge its claim to the islands. Hence, China's decision to claim
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, while hardly justifiable in law, is not entirely
surprising.
Still, given China's inability to project substantial power very far beyond its borders, the PRC
will be able to assert and maintain control over the Spratlys now and in the foreseeable future
only if the United States allows it to do so. Washington may in fact decide on such a course,
even if diplomatic skirmishes over the islands continue to pit China against formal U.S. allies
like the Philippines - provided, that is, that China does not attempt to control the adjacent sea
lanes. But the Spratlys could prove a costly prize for Beijing. The modest economic benefits
accruing would probably be more than balanced by strong political resentment from neighboring
states. In that event, the United States might be granted land bases in countries like the
Philippines, from which it could patrol and expand its own influence in the region.
The Scandals
For all of the fear and suspicion aroused by illicit transfers of U.S. military technology, they
have not fundamentally shifted the strategic balance between China, Taiwan and the United States.
While their impact will not be trivial, neither will it be catastrophic.
Consider first the question of nuclear espionage. A native Taiwanese scientist, Wen Ho Lee,
allegedly provided China with information on the Trident II missile warhead, known as the W-88;
he may have also leaked computer codes mimicking the behavior of that and other warheads. The
United States developed this warhead in the 1980s at Los Alamos, where Lee worked until he was
fired earlier this year. The warhead has a yield of roughly 350 kilotons, or about 20 times that
of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs - not unusually large for U.S. thermonuclear warheads, but
still one of the country's most efficient nuclear devices. Warheads of that power formerly
weighed well over 1,000 pounds; the W-88 warhead reportedly weighs hundreds.(17) With this
powerful lightweight warhead, China could place several warheads on missiles that currently carry
only one.
That would not change China's ability to threaten the continental United States, which it has
been able to do for almost two decades. Beijing at present has about 20 ICBMs that can reach the
U.S. mainland. In addition, it has a nuclear-armed submarine, though the vessel is barely
seaworthy and would need to approach within about 1,000 miles of the U.S. coast to launch its
weapons successfully. China also possesses some 300 nuclear warheads it could use against U.S. or
allied forces in Asia.While the W-88 transfer will not alter the basic facts of the U.S.-China
nuclear balance, it would aid any Chinese effort to counter an American ballistic missile defense
system, and could provide the PRC with greater targeting options in the event of a nuclear war.
That fact might in turn make Beijing believe it had greater leverage in a major crisis with the
United States (though if China really thought in these terms, it probably would have already
expanded its ICBM force). Moreover, China, which joined the global test ban in 1996, might never
have been able to develop its own lightweight warhead without the W-88 technology.
Still, we cannot be sure of the impact. China appears to have tested a warhead similar to the
W-88 design only once.(18) The United States typically required at least six to ten tests to
obtain confidence in a nuclear warhead.(19) True, if China obtained an already proven design it
might require less. But nuclear warheads are highly complex devices. For example, the manner in
which a warhead ages can affect its performance. Also, warheads that have been chilled or heated
or violently jolted during trajectory may not detonate.(20) All the weapons blueprints and
computer codes in the world cannot substitute for a properly tested and robustly built warhead.
China might not wish to devote large amounts of resources to the construction of a warhead that
it may not fully understand.
The Hughes/Loral scandal may be the most significant of the recent cases. As part of their work
in launching satellites on Chinese carrier vehicles, these companies may have helped China
correct a problem in its guidance systems for their strategic rockets. Any technology transfer
that increases the accuracy and reliability of China's rockets and missiles will surely aid its
ICBM force and its efforts to place military satellites in space. Here too, though, we must be
cautious in our conclusions. After all, we still do not know exactly what information was
transferred; the former U.S. commander of Pacific forces, Admiral Joseph Prueher, for one,
appears not to believe the data was of great import. Even if China's launch capabilities do
improve slightly as a result of the transfer, its fledgling satellite program is rudimentary and
will likely remain so for years to come.
The Cox Committee has raised serious concerns about improvements in Chinese military capability.
Still, enormous uncertainties persist, for acquisitions do not translate automatically into new
capabilities. That at least was the conclusion of the CIA's damage assessment, which determined
that "the aggressive Chinese collection effort" has not yet resulted in the modernization of its
deployed strategic forces. The reality of America's enormous strategic nuclear advantage - U.S,
nuclear warheads outnumber China's by a ratio of about 15 to 1 - will remain a powerful deterrent
in the face of any foreseeable Chinese strategic rocket modernization.
China's military is simply not very good. The majority of its members serve in the ground forces,
but so lack in transport and mobile logistics assets that they are more aptly described as
internal security personnel. Their training ranges from spotty to poor. Moreover, the armed
forces remain plagued by poor pay, nepotism and party favoritism, and attract few of China's
brightest citizens.
The PRC's power projection capabilities, too, are constrained by huge weaknesses - especially in
areas such as aerial refueling, electronic warfare, command and control, and amphibious and air
assault assets. China owns considerably less top-level military equipment than medium military
powers like Japan and Britain; it owns even less than smaller powers such as Italy, South Korea
or the Netherlands. Nor has it embarked on a concerted effort to purchase sophisticated new
weapons. Though some analysts estimate China's military budget to be as high as $65 billion a
year in purchasing power terms, the resources it devotes to acquiring modern weaponry are akin to
those of countries spending $10-20 billion a year on defense.
The numerous defects of its military establishment notwithstanding, China is a rising power that
could one day significantly challenge the United States and its allies in East Asia. But that day
will not come anytime soon; it will be at least twenty years before China can pose such a threat.
Why it would wish to do so, even with a strong military, remains an open question.
White paper: China endeavors to build strong navy
China takes informationization as the "strategic priority" of its Navy's modernization drive, and endeavors to build a strong navy, says a white paper on China's National Defense in 2008 issued here Tuesday.
The white paper, issued by the Information Office of the State Council, says the Chinese Navy has innovated training programs and methods, highlighting training in maritime integrated joint operations. The integrated combat capability in conducting offshore campaigns and the capability of nuclear counterattacks has been strengthened.
There are three fleets under the Navy, namely, the Beihai Fleet, Donghai Fleet and Nanhai Fleet, which are headquartered respectively in Qingdao of Shandong Province, Ningbo of Zhejiang Province, and Zhanjiang of Guangdong Province.
Each fleet has under its command fleet aviation, support bases, flotillas, maritime garrison commands, aviation divisions and marine brigades. So far the Navy has eight educational institutions, according to the white paper.
Through nearly six decades of development, the Navy has become a modern force consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations.
The Navy focuses on the integrated training of joint operations elements in conditions of informationization and explores methods of training in complex electromagnetic environments, says the white paper.
It organizes in a scientific way operational training, tactical training, specialized skill training and common subject training, and actively participates in bilateral and multilateral joint training exercises, it says.
Upgrading weaponry and equipment, the Navy endeavors to build new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone.
The submarine force possesses underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities, says the white paper.
The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and possesses maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying and other operational capabilities, it says.
The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine and air-defense operational capabilities.
The Marine Corps has developed an amphibious operational force represented by amphibious armored vehicles, and possesses amphibious operational capabilities, according to the white paper.
The white paper, issued by the Information Office of the State Council, says the Chinese Navy has innovated training programs and methods, highlighting training in maritime integrated joint operations. The integrated combat capability in conducting offshore campaigns and the capability of nuclear counterattacks has been strengthened.
There are three fleets under the Navy, namely, the Beihai Fleet, Donghai Fleet and Nanhai Fleet, which are headquartered respectively in Qingdao of Shandong Province, Ningbo of Zhejiang Province, and Zhanjiang of Guangdong Province.
Each fleet has under its command fleet aviation, support bases, flotillas, maritime garrison commands, aviation divisions and marine brigades. So far the Navy has eight educational institutions, according to the white paper.
Through nearly six decades of development, the Navy has become a modern force consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations.
The Navy focuses on the integrated training of joint operations elements in conditions of informationization and explores methods of training in complex electromagnetic environments, says the white paper.
It organizes in a scientific way operational training, tactical training, specialized skill training and common subject training, and actively participates in bilateral and multilateral joint training exercises, it says.
Upgrading weaponry and equipment, the Navy endeavors to build new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone.
The submarine force possesses underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities, says the white paper.
The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and possesses maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying and other operational capabilities, it says.
The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine and air-defense operational capabilities.
The Marine Corps has developed an amphibious operational force represented by amphibious armored vehicles, and possesses amphibious operational capabilities, according to the white paper.
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