China's new super missile targets U.S. carriers in deep ocean

China is developing a new, nasty surprise for the U.S Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups -- a super-long-range anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of 1,200 miles.

The U.S. Naval Institute reported on its Web site Tuesday that the new weapon has already been under secret development for years. It is a modified version of the Dong Feng 21 missile that, in addition to its range, can carry a warhead capable of doing serious, and possibly lethal, damage to an 80,000-ton nuclear-powered U.S. supercarrier.

The Naval Institute report said details of the new anti-ship ballistic missile were first revealed on a Chinese blog that U.S. military analysts regard as a credible source for information about the People's Liberation Army and Navy. The report was translated into English and can be viewed at the naval affairs blog Information Dissemination: informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2009/03/plan-asbm-development.html.

"The range of the modified Dong Feng 21 missile is significant in that it covers the areas that are likely hot zones for future confrontations between U.S. and Chinese surface forces," the Naval Institute noted.

The report also describes the new missile as being difficult to locate and track on radar because of its combination of "a complex guidance system, low radar signature and a maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable."

The report said the new missile can fly at speeds of up to Mach 10 -- 10 times the speed of sound. That is about 7,500 miles per hour at sea level. It can fly more than 1,200 miles in less than 12 minutes.

The weapon was not developed in isolation. The Naval Institute report said it can be guided on to its giant aircraft carrier targets by a combination of low-Earth-orbit satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles.

U.S. naval analysts believe that the Chinese allowed details of the new ASBM to be published unofficially because the weapon is already operational, the report said. "The Chinese rarely mention weapons projects unless they are well beyond the test stages," it said.

The new Chinese weapon, if it is operational or likely to be so soon, marks a huge advance in naval warfare and heralds a shift in the balance of power at sea that could prove strategic in its scale. It would be, as the Naval Institute report pointed out, "the first time a ballistic missile has been successfully developed to attack vessels at sea. Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack."

China has slowly but relentlessly and steadily built up already an overwhelming concentration of short-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles to dominate the Taiwan Strait. Already, they have made the strait a death trap for U.S. carrier battle groups in any time of war. However, the U.S. carrier force has retained its great capability to project power hundreds of miles against land-based targets while remaining out of range of land-based and light warship-based ASBMs.

The new anti-ship Chinese ballistic missile, however, if it proves successful and reliable, could have the capability to threaten U.S. warships operating more than a thousand miles away from Chinese land bases, effectively driving U.S. naval power in the event of any conflict with China back into the Central Pacific. It will also spur urgent U.S. efforts to adapt and advance existing ballistic missile defense technology to provide defenses against the new threat.

Along with the Chinese naval buildup, U.S. Navy officials appear to view the development of the anti-ship ballistic missile as a tangible threat.

Respected analyst Raymond Pritchett writes on the U.S. Naval Institute blog at blog.usni.org/?p=1964 that senior U.S. Navy officers appear to be taking the new threat very seriously indeed.

"The Navy's reaction is telling because it essentially equals a radical change in direction based on information that has created a panic inside the bubble," he wrote. "For a major military service to panic due to a new weapon system, clearly a mission kill weapon system, either suggests the threat is legitimate or the leadership of the Navy is legitimately unqualified. There really aren't many gray spaces in evaluating the reaction by the Navy ... the data tends to support the legitimacy of the threat."

China's naval commanders are certainly riding high and feeling confident these days. On March 8 they harassed a U.S. survey ship, the USNS Impeccable, which appears to have been on an intelligence-gathering voyage in international waters near the major Chinese strategic submarine and bomber bases on the island of Hainan.

The new weapon also confirms reports from United Press International's Andrei Chang that the Chinese navy is no longer satisfied with simply being able to prevent the U.S. Navy and its carrier battle groups from operating in China's home waters. Beijing appears determined to create the weapons systems that will allow it to assert command of the seas at least 1,000 miles out into the ocean beyond its shores.

Facilities in the South China Sea reflect technologies otherwise hidden.

As with other maritime forces, China has been seeking to network disparate assets, and to meet that requirement, it has been establishing signal stations on islands and atolls throughout the South China Sea. These facilities, which range from communications relays to radar units, both demonstrate Chinas expanding regional reach and provide a rare glimpse of the countrys military electronics technologies.

China has been actively expanding south from Hainan Island since 1974 when it seized the Paracel Islands from the Vietnamese, and its activities continued in the 1990s with construction on several Spratley Islands reefs. Locations of Chinese military electronics on the mainland are largely hidden, and any photographs are classified. But, facilities on the South China Sea islands and reefs place this technology out in the open.

Based on electronics and facilities observed, Woody Island in the Paracels and Fiery Cross Island in the Spratleys seem to be the main control links to Chinas South Fleet Guangzhou headquarters. Other armed Chinese islands or reefs are linked via satellite communications and radio to the local and fleet commanders. The electronics and combat systems of the Chinese aircraft, warships and paramilitary ships greatly augment the island-based electronics.

The only electronic systems directly off the south China coast are ones that involve offshore naval operations. A large over-the-horizon (OTH) backscatter (OTH-B) radar faces south near the southern coast of China. In the 1970s, the experimental OTH radar had a 2,300-meter antenna and could pick up surface ships at 250 kilometers. A series of technical papers describing a skyway OTH radar in the early 1990s leads to the conclusion that operational deployment would have been in that period.

The fact that Guangzhou is the headquarters of the South China Fleet indicates a major complex of tactical and strategic space and land-based communication and long-range radars in that area. They would be focused south into the South China Sea.

Radio beacon navigation–differential global positioning system (GPS), or RBN-DGPS, are located at the southern ports of Zhanjiang, Fangcheng and Luyu. DGPS manufactured by Communication Systems International can be accurate to within 5 to 10 meters with a 300-kilometer range. The vessel traffic service (VTS) is located at Zhanjiang. Western imported technology is an integral part of these electronic systems because the DGPS is Australian and VTS is from Lockheed Martin in Syracuse, New York.

Although appearing to be a tourist island of native tribes and small villages, Hainan Island features an embedded, but nearly invisible, strong military electronic infrastructure. The emergency landing of a U.S. Navy EP-3C at Lingshui airfield in 2001 was a peek into this. Mainland Chinese governments prior to World War II minimally touched Hainan, although there was a naval station at "Hoihow" (now Haikou) in the early 1900s. During the seven-year Japanese occupation in World War II, the island had an extensive military and industrial buildup. This included large coal and ore mines as well as the first railroads connecting to a new major Japanese submarine base at Yulin. Although today the locations of Hainan long-range air search sites are classified, Japan had sites at Yulin, Basuo and Haikou in 1944.

Work started in the late 1970s on three high-power radio navigation aids in south China, but they were not online until 1983. Modern RBN-DGPS navigation aids are located at Sanya, Haikou and Haifou. The VTS with radar and a computer tracking/control station are located on the west coast at Dong Fang (formerly Basuo) and in Haikou. The Haikou facility has one local and three remote dual X-band radars, a local and remote very high frequency (VHF) communication system and a remote VHF direction finder. This vessel traffic management system controls traffic in the Qiongzhou Channel between Hainan and the mainland. A digital GPS beacon station of 295 kilohertz was activated in 1999 at Sanya, and two more followed at Yangpu and Baohujiao.

Hainan certainly has one or more major electronics intelligence (ELINT) stations, but references are usually vague or disagree in details. Because of the continuing threat of conflict with Vietnam, a major ELINT site probably was built on mountaintops on southwest Hainan. The most detailed description available discusses a large facility at Lingshui air base on the southeast coast. This complex reportedly was established in 1968 and greatly expanded in 1995, with about 1,000 signal analysts located there. A large satellite downlink facility with an associated computer complex and links to Beijing is at Changcheng. It is allegedly a State Oceanographic Agency site for weather data connected to a Chinese weather outpost in Antarctica.

The first high-power low frequency (LF) station was built on Hainan in 1965. The large submarine base at Yulin, which is not on most maps anymore, has extensive communication links for the 3rd Submarine Flotilla headquarters. These include very low frequency (VLF) communications to submarines and surface ships in the South China Sea area. This may have been one of the first Chinese VLF stations, since construction activities had been reported from 1969 until 1982. Even navigation charts showing Yulin stated it was “closed to foreign commercial vessels” due to World War II mines in the approach.

The Paracel Islands were occupied by Vietnam until China seized them in occupation assaults supported by naval warships in 1974. A 1980s photograph of a naval base in the Paracels shows a huge multiantenna array of 16 yagi antennas aimed skyward. Each antenna consisted of 8 yagi cross arms. This probable VHF monstrous array is not described or named in open literature references. One publication with this illustration described it as a satellite communication antenna, while another stated it was a Moon early warning radar. The antenna appears similar to a smaller truck-mounted 400-megahertz wind-tracking yagi radar designated Type 701 by China. This may be a meteorological weather antenna that is located on Woody Island.

Woody Island is a classic example of how a crude outpost can grow over time into a significant threat equivalent to an unsinkable aircraft carrier. A helicopter landing pad was built within one year, and this would have required ground-to-air links—probably the Ote Alenia imported radios used throughout China. In 1990, China constructed a 1,200-foot runway on Woody Island that was suitable for jet fighter aircraft. In 1998, the runway was extended to 7,300 feet and finally to 8,100 feet in 1990 for heavier aircraft such as H-6 bombers or large transports for resupply. This requires the Chinese Type 791 X-band precision approach radar (PAR), which is based on the old Soviet Two Spot RSP-7. It has a 20-degree-azimuth and six-degree-elevation antenna beam pattern and a cone-shape antenna for VHF and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) air communications. A larger pier and airplane hangers augmented the islands single jetty, and fuel storage has been added.
In June 2001, HY-2 antiship cruise missiles appeared. They would require a long-range surface-search radar to detect surface ship targets. In mid-1995, a new signals intelligence (SIGINT) station entered service on Rocky Island, which is near Woody Island. This station could support air or surface warning for air missions or ship targeting, especially because Rocky Island has the highest peak in the Paracel Islands.

The largest island in the Paracels is Pattle Island, which had a weather station when Vietnam lost it in 1974. The port facilities on Duncan Island, the second largest island, are being enlarged, which would indicate increased military construction and electronic equipment. Drummond Island, the site of a naval battle in 1974, is not known to have any buildings or electronic equipment.

The only radio beacon south of Hainan is at Robert Island, which is only 500 meters long. There are no modern DGPS navigation beacons in the Paracels, so this must be an older type installed in the late 1970s.

Another disputed island group claimed by China is the Spratley Islands. Popular opinion tends to state that the Spratley Islands largely were uninhabited until the recent construction. In fact, during World War II, Japan built bases on Danger Reef, Tizard Bank and Namyit Island, which are occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines today.

In the 1980s, cruises in the Spratleys by nonmilitary fishermen and later ocean research ships soon were followed by Chinese warship visits. In 1988-1989, several dozen Chinese warships conducted large naval exercises coinciding with occupation of reefs in the Spratleys. In November 1990, China completed a lengthy hydrological survey with search ships in the Spratleys. In the 1990s, construction began on crude huts and octagonal wooden structures on wooden pilings. These were called “typhoon shelters for fishermen” by the Beijing government.

In 1995, China built its first structures on one point of the circular Mischief Reef. In October 1998, these were expanded with three additional clusters of more octagonal wooden structures. Each cluster of structures has a 2.5-meter satellite communication dish aimed skyward. The northern and southern clusters had two-story cement buildings constructed, which resembled forts with the usual satellite communication and high frequency (HF) whip antennas. The southern building was about 36 meters long, and the northern building was 122 meters long. Two years later, major electronic and weapon emplacements were added to the smaller northern building. Additional piers, a helicopter pad and several anti-aircraft guns were added along with an unidentified missile weapon system. The new weapon system could be HY-2 or newer C-801 anti-surface-ship cruise missiles. A white rectangular antenna was placed on top of the building control tower. It resembles a navy navigation radar, which would have a range of about 25 miles around the semi-submerged island. It could be an imported Racal Decca 1290 Arpa radar or a Chinese Model 756 navigation radar with a dual X-band and S-band antenna.

After civilian and scientific vessels reconnoitered the area in October 1987, China seized Fiery Cross Island in March 1988. It sits in the eastern Spratleys deep in Philippine waters. A photo of a 200-foot-long cement building on Fiery Cross Island shows a standard naval HF yagi radar antenna based on the Soviet Knife Rest. The Chinese copy, designated Bean Sticks, operates in the 70- to 73-megahertz frequencies with a range of about 180 kilometers.

Two other small electronic countermeasures (ECM) radomes on the building appear similar to the RWS-1 mounted on navy destroyers. Land-based ECM domes such as these are not identified in references. Several whip communication antennas and taller mast antennas also are on the roof.

Chinese radios may be connected to different antennas for different needs. For example, R-series HF radios use a 4-meter whip for up to 25-kilometer communications, and they use an 11-meter mast for ranges out to 40 kilometers. A long wire runs from a mast on one end of the building to the ground, which would be an HF long-line radio antenna. A probable radio would be the large 73-kilogram SR 109 synthesized receiver with a band from 10 kilohertz to 30 megahertz. It is suitable for radio signal surveillance and long-range distance communications. In addition to two roof-mounted 2.5-meter satellite communications dishes, there is a large 4-meter dish mounted on a large pedestal. This probably is a meteorological weather antenna.

On Johnson South Reef, four octagonal huts initially were built on wooden pilings. By 1989 there were two round cement towers on the ends of a two-story white rectangular building on a cement base. At one end is a 2.5-meter satellite communications antenna adjacent to an 8-foot mast antenna, with two more tall mast antennas on the roof. Chigua Island has an identical building structure with a wooden barracks adding greatly increased manning space. Subi Reef in 1997 had the typical wooden barracks structure and a two-story building with one satellite communications antenna. Two unusual features are a huge round helicopter landing pad and a sturdy cement bridge with cement arches connecting it to the headquarters building. These are both unique to Subi Reef.

Most of the Chinese outposts have a small tower on top of the two-story cement buildings that are the electronics centers for communications, ELINT and radars. This would be where the duty officer would stand watches. Many of these complexes retain small wooden huts on the end of jetties, which would be a good location for noisy power generators and hazardous toxic materials like fuel barrels for the power sources. Most outposts have helicopter landing pads and small- to medium-size piers to receive personnel or logistic supplies via ships.

On the far western edge of the South China Sea is a Chinese electronic activity aimed at India. In 1992, construction began on a SIGINT station on Coco Island near the Indian navys large base on Andaman Island.

China has been engaged in a sustained drive

Over the past decade, China has been engaged in a sustained drive
to create a modern and professional military. How much military power does
China ultimately desire? Although the answer is unclear, the ambiguity that
surrounds Chinas motivations for the modernization of the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) generates concern and even anxiety about the future of
peace and stability in East Asia. A recent Pentagon report notes, for example,
that much uncertainty surrounds Chinas future course, in particular in the
area of its expanding military power and how that power might be used&.
Chinas leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the
PLAs modernizing military capabilities.
Looking toward the future, several approaches might be used to determine
how much military power China seeks to acquire. One option is simply to focus
on the worst case and assume that all states, including China, want to develop
as much military power as domestic resources and external constraints
permit. The study of threat perceptions offers another approach, tracking
changes in Chinas security environment to identify core drivers of military
modernization and possible force structures.
This article explores a third method, one grounded in Chinese texts on
military doctrine. Analysts have always faced limitations on access to data
with which to study Chinas armed forces. Over the past decade, however, the
availability of sources on Chinas military doctrine, including textbooks on
strategy and operations used to train PLA officers, has grown.
The Washington 126 Quarterly Summer 2008
Assessment of Chinas national strategic goals as well as the capabilities
and force structure required to achieve them.
Such an approach naturally risks taking Chinas declaratory objectives at
face value. Nevertheless, it offers several advantages for assessing the implications
of Chinas ongoing military modernization effort. This approach allows
analysts to assess the congruence of strategic goals reflected in PLA writings
and the military means necessary for achieving them. In this way, progress
toward modernization can be tracked and charted. It also provides a baseline
with which to identify potential changes in the trajectory of China s military
reforms, either through a shift in goals or a change in the capabilities and
forces being developed and deployed.
Examination of these writings suggests that Chinas objectives for the use
of military power are more certain than many policy analysts maintain. These
sources indicate that Chinas strategic goals are keyed to the defense of a
continental power with growing maritime interests as well as to Taiwans unification
and are largely conservative, not expansionist. China is developing
internal control, peripheral denial, and limited force-projection capabilities
consistent with these objectives. Yet, as China shifts its force structure, especially
its navy, to acquire these capabilities, it may nevertheless spark a new
security dilemma in East Asia, increasing regional instability and undermining
Chinas current diplomacy of reassurance.
Chinas Strategic Goals
Why is China modernizing its military capabilities? China adopted its current
military strategy in 1993. Following the normalization of relations with the
Soviet Union and then the demonstration of precision-strike munitions in
the Persian Gulf War, China s leaders instructed the PLA to prepare to fight
local wars under modern high technology conditions. The adoption of this
military strategy stemmed from paramount leader Deng Xiaopings judgment
that small- and medium-sized local conflicts, not general or total wars, were
the most likely threats that China would encounter in a world no longer characterized
by intense competition between two superpowers. Chinese military
writings portray these local conflicts as sudden, intense, and destructive, thus
requiring China to develop new operational capabilities stressing joint operations,
rapid response, and offensive strikes to deter such local wars from arising
or to win them if they do erupt.
Military analyst David Finkelstein has eloquently argued that China lacks
a public document similar to the U.S. National Military Strategy that outlines
its national military strategy.6 Nevertheless, Chinese leaders speeches, official
documents, and PLA texts on military doctrine identify five strategic goals for
The Washington Quarterly Summer 2008
China s Search for Military Power which China seeks to develop military power as a tool of statecraft: regime security, territorial integrity, national unification, maritime security, and regional stability.Chinas multiple goals for the use of military power reflect the diversity of China security challenges. Perhaps too crudely, China seeks to ensure the
defense of a continental state, governed by an authoritarian political system,
with growing maritime interests and several unresolved territorial disputes, especially
over Taiwan. Yet, these goals defy simple categorization as status quo or revisionist, defensive or offensive. Chinas desire to secure its homeland territory from attack is a defensive goal pursued by all states, while its desire to alter the status quo across the strait through unification is clearly revisionist from the regions perspective,
but not from Chinas.
Regime Security
Chinas first goal, maintaining the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) monopoly
on political power, distinguishes its armed forces from most other modern
militaries in the world. Since becoming general secretary, Hu Jintao has
stressed that the military falls under the absolute leadership of the party. 8
This phrase highlights that internal security and defense of the CCP remains
a top priority, as political unrest poses a stark challenge to the continued economic
growth that underpins the partys legitimacy. Political Commissar of the
Nanjing Army Command College Tian Bingren echoes Hus view in a recent
article, noting that the armed forces should provide important and powerful
guarantees for the consolidation of the partys ruling position. Key sources
of instability include ethnic violence, unemployment, income inequality, and
cross-border criminal activity. The March 2008 demonstrations and riots in
Tibetan areas only reinforce the view of one military scholar that threats to
regime security such as ethnic unrest are a strategic issue that influences
national unification, social stability & [and] economic development.Terr itorial Integrity
The second goal is securing Chinas territory from external threats, a basic mission
for any country s armed forces. A study on army building from the PLAs
National Defense University (NDU) states that the safeguarding of a nation s
territorial integrity must have a large and powerful armed force. Defending
the homelands territory, territorial waters and airspace & is our army s duty-
Chinese military writings identify five strategic goals for its military power.
The end of the Cold War bolstered Chinas external security, as the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the largest land-based threat to China since 1949. In the 1990s, China further strengthened its border security through demilitarization and boundary agreements with its neighbors that reduced troop levels and resolved outstanding territorial disputes. Although Chinas territory is more secure than at any time since 1949, PLA sources still stress the importance of preparing for potential
conflict along Chinas continental periphery that might threaten the countrys territorial integrity.These concerns stem from the operational challenges of defending one of the longest land borders in the world, a task that is complicated by harsh environmental conditions and potential ethnic unrest in frontier areas. China also remains involved in one major territorial dispute on its land border with India. Although efforts to settle the dispute have progressed in recent years, resulting in a 2005 agreement on guiding principles, concerns remain that conflict could still erupt in the future, especially as a
chain reaction of conflict along Chinas borders during a crisis in the Taiwan
Strait. Accordingly, the PLAs training guidelines for 2008 stress tasks
consistent with maintaining territorial integrity, especially air defense, border
defense, and border control.
National Unification
The goal pursued by China that attracts the most concern is the potential use of
force over Taiwan, which Chinese writings identify as a goal distinct from maintaining
territorial integrity. Today, Chinas leaders emphasize preventing the islands
de jure, or formal, independence and, through economic interdependence,
creating conditions for peaceful unification. According to a recent study on
military strategy by NDU scholars, China must contain Taiwan separatist
activities and safeguard national unity. Indeed, the Taiwan issue is the most
real and prominent threat to our territorial sovereignty. Although it may just
make a virtue out of necessity, the 2005 National Anti-Secession Law reflects an
emphasis on deterring independence over compelling unification.
Maritime Security
A fourth goal that also attracts increasing attention is Chinas emphasis on
defending its maritime rights and interests (haiyang quanyi). Today, China
Chinese military growth, especiallyits navy, may sparka new regional
security dilemma.It involved in maritime sovereignty disputes with many of its neighbors.Although it controls the Paracel islands claimed by Vietnam, it occupies only
a minority of the features in the Spratlys in the South China Sea and none
of the Senkakus disputed with Japan. With one exception, China has yet to
reach maritime delimitation agreements with its neighbors and thus agree on
the control of undersea resources, especially petroleum.
Chinese sources also reflect an increased sensitivity to military threats from
the sea to Chinas wealthy coastal provinces, the need to exploit maritime
resources for economic development, and, as a trading nation, the economys
dependence on sea lines of communication that could be disrupted in a conflict,
especially one near Chinas coast. The NDUs study of military strategy,
for example, notes the growing importance of the rights and interests of
our continental shelf and maritime exclusive economic zones, especially the
threats facing strategic resource development and strategic passageways.
Regional Stability
A fifth goal is the need to maintain a stable external environment within
which to continue economic development. One NDU study describes this
goal as providing the necessary peaceful environment for national development.
According to a book from the PLA s Academy of Military Science,
because Chinas economy relies heavily on trade, regional stability carries important
significance for our economic development as well as resisting Americas
posture against us. In practice, this goal is linked with avoiding or
deterring armed conflicts on China s periphery, lest they disrupt or potentially
derail Chinas economic reforms. Another NDU study noted that if turmoil
or local war occurs in hot spots on Chinas periphery, the flames of war will
bring disaster to China, compelling China to be drawn into a local war or be
pounded by waves of refugees.
Chinas Military Capabilities and Emerging Force Structure
China prepares to achieve its strategic goals by strengthening or developing
three general military capabilities: internal control, area denial around its
periphery, and limited regional force projection. Reflecting the complexity of
China s security challenges and the varied goals that it pursues, these capabilities
also defy simple categorization. They support offensive and defensive
campaigns, low-intensity and high-intensity operations, and the employment
of force across the spectrum of the contemporary battle space on land, in the
air, and at sea. To simplify the analysis, the discussion below examines only
China s conventional military capabilities.
The evolution in the force structure of China s armed forces is roughly
consistent with the capabilities required to achieve its strategic goals. As the
PLA remains dominated by its ground forces, China already possesses strong
internal control and denial capabilities on the Asian continent. By contrast,
China has only begun to acquire forces for maritime denial and regional forceprojection
capabilities. Nevertheless, progress in these latter areas is likely
to intensify the security dilemma in the region because they enable China to
project power at greater distances than ever before since 1949.
Internal Control
Internal control is the first capability required for China to achieve its strategic
goals. It is key to ensuring regime security and contributes to maintaining
territorial integrity by limiting domestic vulnerability to external pressure. Internal
control enables the CCP to prevent the emergence of any political force
that might challenge its rule and to limit any social unrest that might result
in regime instability or even collapse by derailing the economic growth key to
the CCP s continued legitimacy to govern China. Moreover, as highlighted by
the demonstrations and riots in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas in March 2008,
the potential for political unrest is likely to persist if not increase as China s
authoritarian party-state seeks to cope with the social and institutional challenges
of rapid growth in a multiethnic society.
With the largest army in the world, China has already achieved an internal
control capability. Nevertheless, as a form of policing and, at times, lowintensity
conflict, maintenance of this capability involves a significant number
of personnel with the related financial, organizational, and logistical burdens
of manpower-intensive military operations. Within China s armed forces, the
People s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary organization, carries primary responsibility
for internal control.
Within the PAP, internal security units, composed mostly of demobilized
PLA infantry divisions, are trained to contain events that might upset political
stability, including antigovernment demonstrations, riots, and potential rebellions.
The PAP s internal security force consists of 660,000 troops deployed
throughout the country and comes under the joint control of the State Council
and the Central Military Commission. Other PAP units are assigned to
secure border areas and checkpoints as well as critical infrastructure such as
mines, dams, and forests. The leading role of PAP units in suppressing Tibetan
unrest in March 2008 reflects the continued importance for the government
of maintaining a robust internal control capability.
Although the PAP s establishment in 1982 reflected an effort to separate
internal and external security missions for China s armed forces, internal seThe
Washington Quarterly Summer 2008
China s Search for Military Power l
131
curity remains an important although secondary task for the PLA. In the early
1990s, for example, the original impetus for creating rapid-reaction units of
high-quality troops came from a desire to suppress unrest quickly anywhere in
the country.20 As depicted in figure 1, many of the PLA s main force combat
units, including mobile infantry and armored forces, are deployed in or near
China s major cities, both to defend key population
centers in case of an invasion, however
unlikely at the moment, and to serve as a reserve
force in case of sustained or severe social
unrest that threatens regime security, as the
events in Tiananmen Square demonstrated in
1989. Today, for example, the PLA bases four
independent divisions in Xinjiang, not coincidentally
located in areas, such as Tacheng,
that experienced violent ethnic unrest in the
1990s. Similarly, the 27th, 38th, and 65th Group Armies, each with several
maneuver divisions and brigades, are sited in and around Beijing to defend the
capital from attack and to maintain domestic political stability.21
Area Denial around the Periphery
The second capability that China seeks to help achieve its military goals is
area denial around its periphery. According to the U.S. Department of Defense,
area denial is the ability to hinder an adversary s use of space or facilities.
22 It is distinguished from area control or the domination of a defined
area by one military. Through the development of an area denial capability,
China hopes to create a buffer around its continental and maritime periphery
that will increase the cost for other states to conduct military operations
against targets on the mainland.
Area denial supports the achievement of several strategic goals. On land,
efforts to secure territorial integrity from attack are best achieved when a
potential adversary must think twice about conducting military operations
near China s borders under any set of circumstances. At sea, China s military
preparations for potential conflict over Taiwan have focused on delaying or
slowing the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and potentially frustrating
U.S. military operations around the island if a conflict erupts. Maritime
denial also enhances the security of China s wealthiest provinces and cities
such as Guangdong and Shanghai, which could become military targets in a
conflict over Taiwan. Finally, it strengthens China s ability to counter efforts
to blockade its ports or adjacent sea lanes that link China with its trading
partners.
The goal that attracts
the most concern is
the potential use of
force over Taiwan.
l M. Taylor Fravel
The Washington 132 Quarterly Summer 2008
China has achieved considerable progress in creating an area denial capability
on the Asian continent around its land borders. China arguably first
demonstrated such a capability in the mid-1960s, when concerns about potential
Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War limited U.S. ground operations
to areas below the 17th parallel. A key factor in China s continental denial
capability is the strategic depth that large but sparsely populated frontiers
within China create. This geography allows China to secure its population and
economic centers from land-based threats by leveraging defense-in-depth
against any attack, depth that raises significantly the costs for any potential
adversary to coerce China through attacks on its homeland territory. The
PLA s large ground force of more than 1.6 million troops complements this
favorable geography, especially as it continues to modernize its weaponry and
increase its mobility within the country. Taken together, the cost for any regional
power to attack China on land would be high even if it were able to
breach the border.
The number of troops within China s armed forces devoted to this mission
reflects the continued importance of continental denial for China s military
planners. Approximately 224,500 PLA and PAP troops are tasked with guard-
Figure 1. PLA Ground Forces Order of Battle (2005)
The Washington Quarterly Summer 2008
China s Search for Military Power l
133
ing China s land borders and maintaining internal security around ports of
entry and adjacent areas. In wartime, these units also form the first line of
defense in any attack against China s borders. In addition, almost one-half of
the PLA s main force infantry and armored units are based in provinces with
an international boundary and are responsible in part for repelling any assault
against Chinese territory or deterring an adversary from deploying large forces
near its borders. This force structure, composed of light infantry units on the
border and maneuver units in the interior, sustains a strong area-denial capability
on its continental periphery.23
The strength of China s continental denial capability weakens, however, as
the distance from its borders grows. At the same time, Chinese territory has
become increasingly vulnerable to long-range precision strikes. As a result,
China strives to extend the range of its continental denial capability beyond
its borders. Two key platforms are advanced tactical multirole fighters, such
as the Russian Su-27 or China s J-10 that entered into serial production in
2006, as well as short-range ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles,
all of which can be used to destroy targets beyond China s borders. Similarly,
to defend against long-range strikes, China has been enhancing its air defense
network through the acquisition of advanced surface-to-air missile systems
such as the Russian S-300PMU.24
By contrast, China began to pursue a maritime denial capability in the
mid-1980s and has only recently acquired limited forces consistent with this
capability. At sea, China lacks the strategic depth that it enjoys on the Asian
continent, increasing the vulnerability of its wealthy coastal provinces to attack
from the sea. As the 2006 white paper on national defense notes, China
seeks to gradually extend the strategic depth for coastal defense [jinhai
fangyu]. 25 In the short to medium term, this effort will continue to focus on
area denial in the waters around Taiwan for a blockade or attacks in any coercive
campaign against the island in addition to coastal defense.26
China s evolving force structure for maritime denial builds on several components.
The first is the steady modernization of the PLA Navy s submarine
force, perhaps the classic maritime denial platform. Since 1995, China has
commissioned 28 new submarines, including 12 advanced Kilo-class Russian
vessels as well as several classes of domestically developed diesel and nuclearpowered
attack boats.27 The second component is advanced surface combatants,
especially domestically produced air-defense guided missile destroyers,
including the Luyang-II and Luzhou-class vessels. These ships carry limited area-
wide air-defense systems that can provide protection for a small task force
or flotilla. The third component is a variety of anti-ship missiles, which can be
launched from submarines, surface ships, and airplanes, such as the Sunburn
and Sizzler systems recently purchased from Russia.28 China has also embarked
l M. Taylor Fravel
The Washington 134 Quarterly Summer 2008
on a program to use medium-range ballistic missiles to target surface ships at
standoff distances, especially aircraft carriers.29 A final component is antisatellite
systems such as the SC-19 missile that was successfully tested in January
2007 that could be employed to deny the United States unfettered use of its
space-based assets during conflict.
Limited Regional Force Projection
Limited regional force projection is the third capability that China pursues.
Force projection is the ability to deploy and sustain military forces beyond a
country s borders, especially to conduct offensive operations. The capability
that China pursues, however, is limited in the sense of projecting force in a
well-defined area for a specific duration of time as opposed to all along China s
coast and over all disputed areas.30
Regional force projection facilitates China s
achievement of several of its strategic goals. It is
required to achieve national unification, as any
coercive campaign against Taiwan to deter or
prevent its formal independence would almost
certainly require offensive operations against the
island. It also plays a key role in maintaining regional
stability, enabling China to deploy troops
abroad to deter the spread of armed conflict or
prevent a conflict from arising. Force projection
also allows China to maintain regional stability by playing a greater role in humanitarian
relief, peacekeeping, and stability operations in East Asia.
China has achieved even less progress toward acquiring capabilities to deploy
and sustain forces far from its borders. Indeed, China s small role in regional
disaster relief in the past several years demonstrates the limits of its
ability to project military power. Following the December 2004 tsunami in
Southeast Asia, for example, China lacked the ability to deliver aid rapidly to
the region, a task completed by the aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike
groups deployed to Indonesia by the U.S. Navy.
China has acquired some platforms consistent with a limited force projection
capability. Although the PLA possesses several expeditionary units,
including a few airborne and amphibious assault divisions as well as marine
brigades, it lacks the means to deploy these troops rapidly or at great distances.
China ordered 34 heavy-duty Il-76 transport aircraft from Russia in 2005,
but production of the line has yet to begin, and the contract may be cancelled.
Even if these aircraft are eventually delivered, bringing China s total number
of heavy transports to almost 50, China will still have just a small fraction
China has only
begun to acquire
forces for maritime
denial and regional
force projection.
The Washington Quarterly Summer 2008
China s Search for Military Power l
135
of the strategic airlift capacity of other major militaries and be able to airlift
quickly only one fully equipped light mechanized infantry brigade. China will
possess only 14 percent and 6 percent of the heavy strategic airlift capacity
that Russia and the United States possess, respectively.31
Similarly, although China possesses more than 12 large landing ships that
would be used in an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait, its strategic
sealift capability beyond the Taiwan Strait is likewise limited. China
recently commissioned two landing platform dock (LPD) ships, each capable
of transporting one battalion of marines and their vehicles. Although several
more LPDs may be built in the coming years, the total number of troops and
equipment that China would be able to transport for force projection remains
constrained.
China s force structure for long-distance air and naval operations is also
consistent with a limited regional force projection capability. The modernization
of China s air force over the past decade has focused on short-range fighters,
not long-range bombers. Although China has developed aerial refueling
technology for some of its domestically produced fighters, it has yet to invest
in a large tanker fleet that would allow the PLA Air Force to conduct longdistance
strikes or sustained combat patrols beyond China s borders. China s
most advanced multirole fighter, the Russian Su-30MMK, has an aerial refueling
capability, but it cannot mate with the tankers that China has converted
from its old H-6 bombers. Even if China ever takes delivery of four IL-78/MIDAS
tankers ordered from Russia, they would be able to support at most only
a squadron of Su-30s in combat operations. Likewise, China possesses only a
modest ability to replenish ships required for long-distance patrols. Although
China has several oilers to refuel ships, it has recently commissioned two
large, multiproduct replenishment ships that carry fuel, water, ammunition,
and other supplies. Without overseas naval bases, however, the number of
long-range naval patrols will be constrained by the number of large replenishment
ships that China commissions in the future.
A New Security Dilemma?
When viewed through the lens of the security dilemma, China s military modernization
in pursuit of conservative and nonexpansionist goals may nevertheless
increase instability in East Asia. According to this theory, the dilemma
exists because one state s efforts to increase its own security usually decrease
the security of other states.32 Given the uncertainty created by anarchy in the
international system, even if one state enhances its military power for what
it sees as defensive reasons, other states are likely to see the same actions as
offensive and threatening, resulting in security competition characterized by
l M. Taylor Fravel
The Washington 136 Quarterly Summer 2008
mistrust, suspicion, and spirals of tension. Such spirals are especially likely
when a state increases its defense spending significantly and acquires force
projection capabilities, two features of China s current military modernization
effort.33
Signs of mistrust and suspicion consistent with the presence of a security
dilemma are not difficult to find within the U.S. and Chinese militaries. The
2006 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, concluded that China s
growing military capabilities, the size of the East Asian theater, and China s
continental depth (normally viewed as a defensive advantage) place a premium
on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied
areas on offensive capabilities to offset China s modernization. More recently,
during a March 2008 press conference, one Pentagon official concisely
reflected the logic of the security dilemma: [W]e don t have that kind of strategic
understanding of these Chinese intentions, and that leads to uncertainty,
that leads to a readiness to hedge against the possibility that China s development
will go in ways that the Chinese right now say it won t. 34
By contrast, China sees its own military posture as defensive and nonthreatening.
According to a key book on strategy from the PLA s Academy of Military
Science, the nature of our military strategy is defensive. 35 At the same
time, many military scholars are suspicious of U.S. intentions toward China.
One Chinese source, for example, notes that the United States resolutely
believes that China may become its global strategic opponent around 2015. 36
Similarly, reflecting these suspicions, Chinese texts on military operations
stress ways of defeating stronger opponents, highlighting concerns about dominant
U.S. military power.37
Security dilemma dynamics could become most acute in maritime East
Asia, where China s naval modernization enables it to project power at the
greatest distance from its coastline since 1949. It also gives China the ability
to project power into waters in which other navies already operate. For the
United States, China s evolving maritime denial capability could be seen as
challenging its command of the seas. Although China has only conducted a
few submarine patrols in recent years, mostly in its coastal waters, the number
increased to seven in 2007.38 Chinese submarines have also become more visible,
transiting unannounced through Japanese territorial waters in November
2004 and surfacing unexpectedly near a U.S. aircraft carrier in October 2006.39
When combined with the deployment of advanced anti-ship missiles, the trajectory
of China s naval modernization might create incentives for the United
States to deploy more forces in the region, thus fueling a potential spiral.
China s naval modernization is also likely to appear threatening to other
states in the region, especially those involved in disputes with China over
maritime sovereignty. As China continues to commission advanced surface
The Washington Quarterly Summer 2008
China s Search for Military Power l
137
combatants and submarines, the frequency of naval patrols will increase in
coastal areas, as well as in the South China Sea, the same waters in which
the sovereignty of islands and maritime rights are contested. Even if China
does not vigorously press its claims through diplomatic channels, an increased
military presence will almost surely be viewed as assertive and provocative.
As a result, Japan may invest more heavily in its own naval capabilities and
increase its own presence in disputed waters, whereas other states may seek
improved security ties with the United States,
again further feeding the potential for increased
security competition in the region.
Should these security dilemma dynamics intensify,
they could have profound consequences
for regional stability. After the end of the Cold
War, the U.S. forward military presence enhanced
stability by dampening the potential for
spirals of hostility between states in the region,
especially China and Japan. In the future, however,
U.S. efforts to maintain its naval power could paradoxically undermine
stability if it increases security competition with China. Moreover, it will be
more difficult for the United States to act as an outside arbiter in other regional
conflicts involving China. Increased security competition could also
subvert China s grand strategy of reassurance. Many states in the region may
come to see China s continued double-digit growth in defense spending and
deployment of power projection platforms as increasingly at odds with the
stated Chinese objective of peaceful development, raising, not reducing,
suspicions about China s long-term intentions.
Such spirals of tension, however, are far from inevitable. Although China s
absolute levels of defense spending have increased over the past decade, several
points bear noting. First, China s defense spending as a proportion of overall
government spending has remained relatively constant at roughly 8 percent
over the past 15 years.40 China is not favoring defense spending over other
government priorities such as education and welfare. Second, China faces real
limits on what it can spend for maritime denial and regional force projection
capabilities that would most likely intensify the security dilemma. Even when
using the highest estimate from the Pentagon, China s total defense spending
in 2007 ($139 billion) was slightly less than just the budget for the U.S.
Navy ($147 billion).41 Third, the U.S. presence in maritime East Asia remains
strong. The United States now bases 29 nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) around the Pacific, just more than one-half of all SSNs in the fleet and
six times more than those in the PLA Navy.42 As a reflection of U.S. strength,
the USS Kitty Hawk carrier strike group transited through the Taiwan Strait in
China sees its own
military posture as
defensive and
nonthreatening.
l M. Taylor Fravel
The Washington 138 Quarterly Summer 2008
November 2007 after a dispute with China arose over a cancelled port call in
Hong Kong.43
To mitigate the potential for severe spirals, both sides can take concrete
action. China should continue its efforts to increase its military transparency,
especially in the areas of defense spending and military doctrine, which
started with the publication of white papers on national defense in 1998. In
the past, China was reluctant to increase transparency lest it reveal any weaknesses
to the outside. Today, however, with growing concerns about its military
modernization, a lack of further transparency
will only confirm worst-case assumptions
about China s ambitions. Importantly, China
recognizes the salutary effects of such efforts.
Senior Colonel Chen Zhou noted in a recent
interview that more openness leads to greater
trust. 44 The United States and China should
continue efforts to deepen military-to-military
ties, especially exchanges among senior officers,
including not just the chiefs of staff but
all relevant commanders in the Pacific theater. The Pentagon might follow the
Departments of State and the Treasury to establish a formal senior dialogue
for the military aspect of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Increased joint exercises
in areas where interests overlap would be another way to reduce mistrust,
perhaps following the model of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum in which
member countries, including China and the United States, have engaged in
substantial joint operations.45
The Future of Stability in East Asia
The strategic goals guiding China s military modernization are more certain
than they might appear. Overall, the changes in China s force structure over
the past decade are consistent with capabilities required for regime security,
territorial integrity, national unification, maritime security, and regional stability.
China is not pursuing broadly expansionist goals, nor is it investing heavily
in forces that are inconsistent with its strategic goals.
Over time, of course, China s goals could change in ways that require new
capabilities other than those outlined in this article. One possibility is that Chinese
leaders could stress the need to protect China s economic interests not just
in the region but around the world. Whether China will seek to move toward
long-range force projection remains unknown. Nevertheless, changes in force
structure and a substantial increase in the share of government spending on
defense would provide a range of useful indicators to chart this type of shift. Po-
A lack of further
transparency will only
confirm worst-case
assumptions.
The Washington Quarterly Summer 2008
China s Search for Military Power l
139
tential indicators of such a shift include a significant expansion in the numbers
of China s attack submarines for sustained patrols in distant waters; an increase
in the number of large, multiproduct replenishment ships to support long-range
patrols; the development of a robust, space-based ocean surveillance system;
investments in large fleets of tanker and transport aircraft; and the development
of a new type of bomber to replace China s aging H-6 fleet. The acquisition of
multiple aircraft carriers would be another indicator of a move toward longrange
force projection, but building just one such ship is likely to be pursued for
the status that it conveys rather than the capability it generates.
Whether China can or even wants to pursue a long-range force projection
capability remains an open question. For now, China s strategic goals,
military capabilities, and force structure are relatively conservative. Yet, given
concerns about its military ambitions and the nature of the security dilemma,
China s search for military power could nevertheless create increased tension
and instability without efforts to increase transparency, build trust, and reduce
misunderstanding.

China Unveils Ambitious Space Plans at National Space Symposium

China Unveils Ambitious Space Plans at National Space Symposium
China is celebrating its 50th anniversary of space progress this year, but also laying out a sweeping plan for lofting Earth orbiting satellites for a multitude of duties, expanding its human spaceflight abilities, and carrying out a multi-step program of lunar exploration.
Luo Ge, Vice Administrator, China National Space Administration, spoke here today at the 22nd National Space Symposium (NSS).
"Generally speaking, in the coming five to eight years we will be launching about 100 satellites," Luo told a standing room only audience here. Space technology is making its contribution to the economic and social development in China, he said.
Luo outlined an expansive roster of satellite projects, building upon 5 different operational systems already in service: telecommunications, meteorological, Earth remote sensing, as well as recoverable satellites and technology demonstration spacecraft.
Over the years, Luo explained, China has developed a series of 12 launch vehicles to satisfy different demands. Access to space is a priority, he said, with work now underway on a new generation booster-- a non-toxic, non-pollution and highly reliable launch vehicle, he said, able to toss 25 metric tons into low Earth orbit and 15 metric tons into geostationary orbit.
"We have achieved all technical breakthroughs ... by the year 2011 we'll be launching the first launch vehicle," Luo said.
Historic breakthrough
In the human spaceflight arena, China has also made stunning achievements, Luo explained. In 1999-2002, four unpiloted spaceships were launched by China, followed in October 2003 by its first piloted mission, Shenzhou 5. "That was a historic breakthrough for China," he added.
"We have become the third country capable of developing a spaceship by itself and launching our own astronauts into orbit and safely recover them," Luo said. In October 2005 a two-person spacecraft rocketed into Earth orbit, achieving the first "attended space lab tests," he said.
Luo said that, based on success in the manned mission area, they intend to establish an orbiting space lab by 2015. Leading up to this effort, he added, space walking skills by Chinese astronauts are to be honed, as will be the ability of space docking.
In the area of human spaceflight, Luo noted several times that China is open to the possibility for international cooperation.
Lunar robotic plans
China has drafted a multi-step program for lunar exploration.
Next year, the country's first lunar orbiter/fly mission is to fly, Luo said. By 2012, China space planners will be landing a rover on the Moon surface. In 2017, that country's lunar exploration plans call for robotic lunar sample return missions.
"We call these three stages the first step of our lunar exploration," Luo explained. "The first step will be done purely robotically ... with unmanned missions."
And in the future, Luo stated, "China will also consider the possibility of manned mission to the Moon."
But by far the most extensive element of China's space plans is within the arena of Earth orbiting satellites - from oceanographic, navigation, and telecommunications satellite systems to constellations of Earth observing and disaster mitigation spacecraft - Luo outlined an impressive cadre of upcoming missions. Furthermore, in-space testing of high-tech components is also slated.
China's focus, Luo emphasized, is on conversion of space technology to a variety of applications to further the social and economic development of the nation. Commercialization of space products is also a priority.
In terms of partnerships, China is working with the European Space Agency, Brazil, Russia, as well as a number of Asian-Pacific countries, Luo said. While moving forward on their national efforts, China is also counting on extensive international cooperation, he said.
Eye-opener
China's ambitious space program was clearly an eye-opener at the NSS gathering.
"Man oh man ... they're not kidding around," said one NSS attendee after hearing Luo's review of China's past and future space intentions
"I don't regard it as a threat...I regard it as a challenge," said former Congressman and National Space Symposium leader, Robert Walker, in an earlier interview with SPACE.com. "I think the Chinese have a very ambitious space program ... that they are doing for reasons of national prestige."

China's Military Space Power Growing

China's Military Space Power Growing
China's escalating expertise in space is also enhancing its competence as a global military force. Along with lofting future radar, ocean surveillance, and high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellites, China's rise as a space power also includes pursuit of an offensive anti-satellite system.

Those observations are included in a new report-Military Power of the People's Republic of China: A Report to Congress-issued by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The annual Pentagon report issued late last month addresses the current and future military strategy of the People's Republic of China. It takes a look at the current and probable future course of military-technological development on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the tenets and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.

Regional power projection

Underscored in this year's report as a high priority in China's military modernization efforts is development of advanced space-based C4ISR and targeting capability. C4ISR in military jargon is short for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

Furthermore, China's access to space will continue to improve as it develops newer boosters to replace the aging Long March system, the report stresses. "Acquiring more sophisticated space systems will allow China to expand the reach of its anti-access forces and could serve as a key enabler for regional power projection."


In the area of satellite reconnaissance, the report notes that China participated in the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program with the CBERS-1 and CBERS-2 remote sensing satellites.

These space assets can take 66-foot (20-meter) resolution images in swaths exceeding 62 miles (100 kilometers), and transmit those digital images to earth stations. "The program will continue with follow-on satellites CBERS-2B, CBERS-3 and CBERS-4, which reportedly increase camera resolution substantially," the report explains.

Military applications

The Pentagon assessment spotlights China's interest in acquiring a disaster/environmental monitoring satellite constellation called Huanjing.

A first phase of the Huanjing program calls for three satellites, two of which are equipped for visible, infrared, and multi-spectral imaging. A third spacecraft will possess a synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Phase two of the Huanjing initiative allows for eight satellites: four imaging and four SAR in orbit simultaneously.

"In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field radar, ocean surveillance, and high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellites. China will eventually deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications," the report states.

In the interim, the Department of Defense (DoD) report adds, China will likely supplement existing coverage with commercial systems, utilizing the French SPOT, the U.S. Landsat, Canada's Radarsat, as well as the American commercial Ikonos satellite, as well as Russian satellite imagery.

Navigation and timing

The Pentagon report also focuses on China's navigation and timing space attributes, noting that the country orbited three BeiDou satellites to provide navigation coverage with an accuracy of 20 meters over China and surrounding areas.

"BeiDou is an active positioning system that requires transmissions between satellite and the user, slowing the time it takes a user to receive a corrected position. The BeiDou system is best suited for use by troops, ships and vehicles that move slowly. The active part of BeiDou also enables leadership to send and receive secure orders," the report explains.

In this space application area, the report continues, China also uses the U.S. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system and Russia's GLONASS navigation satellites, and has invested in the European Union's Galileo navigation system program.

In the human spaceflight arena, the Pentagon report explains that China launched its second manned space mission on October 12, 2005, nearly two years after its first piloted Earth orbiting mission. The two-person crew returned safely on October 17, 2005.

"This was the first occasion during which Chinese astronauts performed experiments in space. Press reports indicate China will perform its first space walk in 2007, and rendezvous and docking in 2009-2012. China's goal is to have a manned space station by 2020," the report observes.

The success of China's human spaceflight program to date "required a substantial amount of systems integration and planning, and serves as an indicator of China's rapid and relatively smooth rise as an emerging space power," the report concludes.

In the marketplace

The newly issued report highlights the fact that not only is China expanding indigenous capabilities, it is also marketing its technological space knowledge-satellite building, manufacturing, and launch services-to the international market.

As example, the report describes two international contracts between China and other nations-one with Nigeria and one with Venezuela-for the design and manufacture of communication satellites based on their Dongfanghong-4 (DFH-4) spacecraft.

"China may be developing a system of data relay satellites to support global coverage, and has reportedly acquired mobile data reception equipment that could support more rapid data transmission to deployed military forces and units," the report states.


Additionally, China is studying and seeking foreign assistance for developing small satellites, lofting a number of them since 2000 for oceanographic, imagery, and environmental monitoring purposes.

China is also developing microsatellites-weighing less than 100 kilograms-for remote sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar satellites," the DoD assessment notes. "These developments could allow for a more rapid reconstitution or expansion of their satellite force given any disruption in coverage."

Anti-satellite weaponry

The Pentagon report warns that Beijing "continues to pursue an offensive anti-satellite system," saying that China can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon.

"However, there are many risks associated with this method, and potentially adverse consequences from the use of nuclear weapons," the report adds. "Evidence exists that China is improving its situational awareness in space, which will give it the ability to track and identify most satellites. Such capability will allow for the deconfliction of Chinese satellites, and would also be required for offensive actions. At least one of the satellite attack systems appears to be a ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites."

China is also working on several types of "new concept" weapon systems, the report says, including a radio frequency (RF) weapon, citing Chinese writings that suggest it could be used against satellites in orbit.

Useless compendium

A critic of the U.S. Secretary of Defense-issued report is space policy and arms control analyst, Jeffrey Lewis. He thinks poorly of the assessment and judges it far from a work of scholarship.

Lewis is Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

"This report, as in previous years, suffers from the usual defects associated with a report drafted by committee and rushed into print with poor or compromise editing," Lewis told SPACE.com.

He added that the report's space section is little more than a laundry list of Chinese space activities.

"A member of Congress or defense analyst looking to argue that China is developing anti-satellite weapons might find such a list useful," Lewis said. "But an analyst attempting to make a serious, evidence-based assessment should regard the report as a useless compendium of previously established facts lacking the necessary qualifications about what the intelligence community does not know."

For example, Lewis said that the Pentagon view of China's laser weaponry proficiency falls short. Previous reports, he added, described limits to what the intelligence community knew about Chinese laser research, noting that "whether this claim extends to actual facilities" or "whether Beijing has tested such a capability is unclear."

Lewis said that the U.S. Congress ought to create a requirement that the Director of National Intelligence-not the Secretary of Defense-report on Chinese military power.

China wages maritime "lawfare"

China wages maritime "lawfare"
China’s bold and dangerous maneuvers against the USNS Impeccable, a U.S. Navy military survey vessel that was operating about 120 km from the island of Hainan in the East China Sea, is the latest salvo in China's ongoing campaign to upset traditional notions of freedom of navigation in order to deny access to its coastal waters, or littorals, by foreign warships and aircraft. The event marks the first test of the Obama administration regarding China’s efforts to reshape the international law of the sea.

Following the Cold War, the littorals have emerged as the primary maritime battleground for peace and stability. International law, as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, recognizes that all states enjoy the right to conduct military activities throughout the near shore environment -- generally beyond the 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea and extending out to 200 nm (one nm = 1.85 km). This coastal zone is the primary operating area for “Seabasing,” amphibious, expeditionary, and littoral operations, and generally encompasses the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal state, a special resource zone created by the Law of the Sea. Although coastal states have exclusive rights to exploit natural resources in the zone, they cannot claim a security interest in the area, agreed Shen Dingli, director of the Center of American Studies at Shanghai’s Fudan University. Regardless, China wants to exert control that extends beyond its economic interests, creating the potential for conflict with the U.S. Navy. Dingli stated, “China considers that international law only allows innocent passage for military vessels [in the EEZ], not activities that could be considered to have a military purpose.”

Chinese sailors getting drenched by fire hoses while harassing a U.S. Navy ship might make a great headline,, but the real fight is going on much more quietly on land. China has recently begun to engage in a resourceful legal warfare, or “lawfare” strategy to deny access to its coastal seas to warships and aircraft of the United States, Japan, and other countries in the region. This strategy, which was set forth in a recent Chinese defense white paper, proposed the“gradual extension of strategic depth for offshore defensive operations,” and for “enhancing [Chinese] capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.”

A 2007 Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military power explains that Chinese strategists have taken an increasing interest in international law as an instrument to deter adversaries prior to combat. Through an orchestrated program of scholarly articles and symposia, China is working to shape international opinion in favor of a distorted interpretation of the Law of the Sea by shifting scholarly views and national perspectives away from long-accepted norms of freedom of navigation and toward interpretations of increased coastal state sovereign authority. By doing so, China is misreading the law of the sea.

The United States should ensure navigational freedom and littoral access as a cornerstone of world maritime security. The U.S. Navy has spent hundreds of millions on building a new generation of high-tech Littoral Combat Ships and implementing “Seabasing” amphibious warfare tactics to effectively operate in the coastal zone—capability that is undermined by restrictive interpretations of the law. But all this planning will be for naught if China continues to advance on the battlefield of international law. The United States would be on a far stronger footing at diplomatic summits and military-to-military meetings if it joined the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. To ensure the right of U.S. vessels to enjoy unhindered global mobility, the United States should continue resisting excessive coastal state maritime claims through diplomacy and operational challenges.

China tells Japan it wants aircraft carrier

China will not remain the world's only major nation without an aircraft carrier indefinitely, state press Monday cited the nation's defence minister as telling his Japanese counterpart.

Liang Guanglie made the remarks to visiting Japanese Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada on Friday, the Oriental Morning Post said, in discussions that took place after a recent spike in tension in the South China Sea.

"Among the big nations only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," the paper quoted Liang as saying, citing Japanese official sources.

"China's navy is currently rather weak, we need to develop an aircraft carrier."

Liang's comment is the highest-level recent confirmation that China aims to acquire an aircraft carrier, a sophisticated piece of military hardware that can be used to project power far beyond a nation's shores.

It comes after several similar calls in recent months by senior members of the People's Liberation Army.

"Building aircraft carriers is a symbol of an important nation. It is very necessary," the China Daily quoted Admiral Hu Yanlin as saying earlier this month.

"China has the capability to build aircraft carriers and should do so."

In December, defence ministry spokesman Huang Xueping told reporters that China would "seriously" consider getting an aircraft carrier.

Defence Minister Liang was speaking after Chinese vessels confronted and nearly collided with a US naval surveillance ship in what Washington says are international waters off south China earlier this month.

The confrontation was described by US intelligence director Dennis Blair as the most serious military incident involving the two powers since a US spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in April 2001.

China said the US naval ship Impeccable was carrying out illegal activities in its exclusive economic zone.

Beijing has also reacted angrily to a Philippine law passed earlier this month that laid claim to parts of the Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea which are claimed by China and other nations in the region.

China called the law "illegal and invalid," and dispatched a civilian patrol boat to the region.