After many years of lukewarm relations, Russia and China are finally strengthening their economic ties, especially in the energy sphere. About two weeks ago it was announced that Russia would double its electric power deliveries to China. On Monday, China's Premier Wen Jiabao said that Russia will considerably boost oil exports by rail to its neighbor
In 2005, Russia will deliver 500 million kWt/hrs of electric energy to China, the deputy chairman of Russia's power grid monopoly Unified Energy System, Leonid Drachevsky, said. A relevant cooperation agreement was signed in Beijing by the head of the Federal Grid Company Andrei Rappoport and head of the State Grid Corporation of China. In 2004, Russia delivered to China 300 million kWt/hrs, while in 2006 this figure is set to grow to 800 million kWt/hrs. The UES official also said that the Russian power monopoly may attract Chinese investments into the development and renovation of the country's power assets. "I see no reason why Chinese capital cannot take part in the Russian energy system," Drachevsky said.
Speaking to reporters on Monday, the Chinese Prime Minister said that oil exports by rail from Russia, the world's second largest oil exporter to China, the world's second largest oil consumer, would rise to 10 million tons in 2005 and 15 million tons in 2006. Over the last year, China's total crude imports from Russia soared by 105% to 10.77 million tons. The oil export drive to China will be led by the state-owned Rosneft Oil Company which will supply 4 million tons this year and 8.9 million tons annually for the next five years. Another 4 million tons will come from oil major Lukoil.
"We have reached important consensus on energy cooperation," Wen Jiabao said. "Energy cooperation between China and Russia is of equal and mutual benefit". The two countries also would strengthen cooperation in oil and natural gas exploration and development, he said. Wen said he would further discuss energy cooperation with his Russian counterpart in the second half of this year. "This is the best period in the history of Russian-Chinese relations," the Chinese Premier stressed.
Russia and China have a lot to offer each other as long as both sides have a clear understanding of what one wants from the other. China has strategic needs in the sphere of energy consumption while Russia has the means to satisfy China's demand for oil and electricity. China also needs markets for the goods that it's rapidly growing economy produces. It wasn't for anything that Wen Jiabao said that by 2010 the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia should reach $60-80 billion, up from the current $20 billion. And what is it that China has that may be interesting and useful to Russia? China can offer Russia a strategic political partnership - the idea of which scares the U.S. and European politicians. But political partnership is something that one has to be very careful about. China is a very pragmatic partner ready to change its position at any moment as the situation demands. Therefore, while a "Russia-China" political block would be a powerful new player on the international scene, Russia and its authorities should concentrate for now on the economic relations. What China has is the spare funds to invest in the Russian economy and the willingness to do this. What the Russian authorities need to do is to work out the conditions for investment that would satisfy both sides. China needs to feel that it's investing money wisely and will be able to reap the fruits of its investment. Russia needs to feel that it's not selling control over any of its precious natural resources to some "foreigners". The experience of other countries with a wealth of natural resources shows that such an investment scheme which satisfies both sides is possible. Now it is up to the Russian authorities to do this quickly enough before China changes its mind and finds other places for investment.
Monday, 28 January 2008
Trio:Anti American
In the past few years, the Trio met to the sounds of bombing in Iraq as a united group that condemned the war and worried over America's disdain for international law. In this sense, the addition of Spain looks logical. The coming to power of a new Social-Democratic government radically changed Madrid's attitude to the Iraq war, promoted the pullout of Spanish troops, and paved Mr. Zapatero's way to the European Trio.
Some people think the informal club is anti-American, but they would be better advised to note the three leaders' desire to reconstruct the global balance that has been disrupted by the egoistic broad use of military might by the United States. Old Europe is alarmed by George Bush's messianic doctrine and would like to join forces with Russia to search for a political counterbalance to the U.S. global ambitions.
The background for the four-party summit in Paris will differ from the situation in which previous three-party meetings were held. The four leaders' criticism of the Iraq war (and U.S. conduct in the world at large) has been confirmed by the events of the past months. Despite the publicized success of the Iraqi election, the U.S. is bogged down there and the withdrawal of its 150,000 troops has been put off for an indefinite time. None of the four European leaders, including Vladimir Putin, can imagine Bush spending his second term on one more military adventure. It is one thing to threaten Syria and Iran, but a completely different to send troops there.
The declining status of a "hyperpower," as French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine once described America, seems to be changing the partnership of Europe and the U.S., turning it from Atlantic (read: universal) into selective, where the interests of the sides clash increasingly often. Disregarding Washington's protests, the EU plans to lift the arms embargo imposed on China after Tienanmen Square. The U.S. is also outraged by European plans to create a system of European security outside NATO, the ratification by many European countries (including Russia) of the Kyoto protocol, and the resistance of many European capitals to Washington's attempt to undermine the authority of the International Criminal Court.
As a result, the idea of Paris, Berlin and Moscow to create a constructive counterbalance to the largely arrogant foreign policy of the U.S. that rests on military might, an idea which Madrid seems to have accepted, is gradually becoming reality.
However, counterbalance does not mean anti-Americanism. Just as democracy works better when there is a healthy opposition, so the U.S. may find positive elements for harmonizing its foreign policy in the alternative centers of world power - if the latter take a clearer form.
The agenda of the four-party working meeting in Paris is broad and will largely depend on improvisation. The possible issues include the role of the UN in the modern world, Iraq and the Middle East, and the nuclear problems of Iran and North Korea.
Putin plans to raise the issue of developing Russia's relations with the EU and to hold bilateral talks with Chirac after the summit.
Moreover, the Italian premier will inevitably influence the four leaders' discussion of Iraq. Silvio Berlusconi's announcement that the 3,000-strong Italian group would start to withdraw from Iraq in September confirms the thoughts of a growing number of Anglo-American coalition members: The domestic price of loyalty to the U.S. in Iraq is becoming intolerably high. Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine and several other countries have refused to pay any more. They have announced they will pull their troops out or have already started the withdrawal process.
Berlusconi's decision, made with due regard for the 2006 parliamentary election, will be a serious blow to Bush's attempt to divide responsibility for the Iraqi campaign. It also confirms the growing feeling of independence, if not opposition to Washington, in Greater Europe.
America knows what this can lead to. And the four leaders in Paris will most probably note with satisfaction Washington's recent U-turn on Iran's nuclear program. For months Moscow, Paris and Berlin have sought to secure a diplomatic solution to the problem, whereas the U.S. continued to threaten Iran with a repetition of Iraq. Washington changed tactics right after Bush's recent European tour. Displaying unexpected generosity, it has offered Iran economic benefits in return for abandoning its alleged nuclear weapons program. One of the benefits is a real gift - it is a pledge not to protest against Iran's accession to the WTO, which the U.S. has been preventing for a decade.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says Washington wants to support the Europeans and not to benefit the Iranians. In reality, it was the common stand of the Europeans, including Russia, that forced Washington to drop the stick and take up the carrot in relations with Iran. One would like to view this as a good sign. Bush's foreign policy team, led by his new secretary of state, is becoming aware of the need to act jointly with Greater Europe (including Russia) in critical situations. These rules of conduct suit the new world that has developed after the Iraq war, which was not very successful for America.
Putin is also in Paris to discuss Russia's relations with the EU, which are mostly impressive. The parties say they are to develop the so-called four common spaces in the economy, domestic and external security, science and culture. But the events in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova spotlighted the European trend of supporting political forces in the former Soviet republics depending on the distance they put between themselves and Russia. In reality, the bureaucrats in Brussels are facing Tbilisi, Kiev and Chisinau with a false choice between the West (meaning the EU and NATO) and Russia.
Vladimir Putin cannot accept this attitude, and it seems that this does not suit France, Germany and other Old European countries either. They reject Russophobic sentiments brought to the enlarged EU by such new members as Poland and the Baltic countries. The summit in Paris will show if Old Europe is ready to stop this unproductive anti-Russian trend. In this year of the 60th anniversary of victory over Nazism, the attempts by Brussels bureaucrats and radical newcomers to the EU to create new division lines in Europe look like an archaism and sacrilege.
Some people think the informal club is anti-American, but they would be better advised to note the three leaders' desire to reconstruct the global balance that has been disrupted by the egoistic broad use of military might by the United States. Old Europe is alarmed by George Bush's messianic doctrine and would like to join forces with Russia to search for a political counterbalance to the U.S. global ambitions.
The background for the four-party summit in Paris will differ from the situation in which previous three-party meetings were held. The four leaders' criticism of the Iraq war (and U.S. conduct in the world at large) has been confirmed by the events of the past months. Despite the publicized success of the Iraqi election, the U.S. is bogged down there and the withdrawal of its 150,000 troops has been put off for an indefinite time. None of the four European leaders, including Vladimir Putin, can imagine Bush spending his second term on one more military adventure. It is one thing to threaten Syria and Iran, but a completely different to send troops there.
The declining status of a "hyperpower," as French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine once described America, seems to be changing the partnership of Europe and the U.S., turning it from Atlantic (read: universal) into selective, where the interests of the sides clash increasingly often. Disregarding Washington's protests, the EU plans to lift the arms embargo imposed on China after Tienanmen Square. The U.S. is also outraged by European plans to create a system of European security outside NATO, the ratification by many European countries (including Russia) of the Kyoto protocol, and the resistance of many European capitals to Washington's attempt to undermine the authority of the International Criminal Court.
As a result, the idea of Paris, Berlin and Moscow to create a constructive counterbalance to the largely arrogant foreign policy of the U.S. that rests on military might, an idea which Madrid seems to have accepted, is gradually becoming reality.
However, counterbalance does not mean anti-Americanism. Just as democracy works better when there is a healthy opposition, so the U.S. may find positive elements for harmonizing its foreign policy in the alternative centers of world power - if the latter take a clearer form.
The agenda of the four-party working meeting in Paris is broad and will largely depend on improvisation. The possible issues include the role of the UN in the modern world, Iraq and the Middle East, and the nuclear problems of Iran and North Korea.
Putin plans to raise the issue of developing Russia's relations with the EU and to hold bilateral talks with Chirac after the summit.
Moreover, the Italian premier will inevitably influence the four leaders' discussion of Iraq. Silvio Berlusconi's announcement that the 3,000-strong Italian group would start to withdraw from Iraq in September confirms the thoughts of a growing number of Anglo-American coalition members: The domestic price of loyalty to the U.S. in Iraq is becoming intolerably high. Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Ukraine and several other countries have refused to pay any more. They have announced they will pull their troops out or have already started the withdrawal process.
Berlusconi's decision, made with due regard for the 2006 parliamentary election, will be a serious blow to Bush's attempt to divide responsibility for the Iraqi campaign. It also confirms the growing feeling of independence, if not opposition to Washington, in Greater Europe.
America knows what this can lead to. And the four leaders in Paris will most probably note with satisfaction Washington's recent U-turn on Iran's nuclear program. For months Moscow, Paris and Berlin have sought to secure a diplomatic solution to the problem, whereas the U.S. continued to threaten Iran with a repetition of Iraq. Washington changed tactics right after Bush's recent European tour. Displaying unexpected generosity, it has offered Iran economic benefits in return for abandoning its alleged nuclear weapons program. One of the benefits is a real gift - it is a pledge not to protest against Iran's accession to the WTO, which the U.S. has been preventing for a decade.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says Washington wants to support the Europeans and not to benefit the Iranians. In reality, it was the common stand of the Europeans, including Russia, that forced Washington to drop the stick and take up the carrot in relations with Iran. One would like to view this as a good sign. Bush's foreign policy team, led by his new secretary of state, is becoming aware of the need to act jointly with Greater Europe (including Russia) in critical situations. These rules of conduct suit the new world that has developed after the Iraq war, which was not very successful for America.
Putin is also in Paris to discuss Russia's relations with the EU, which are mostly impressive. The parties say they are to develop the so-called four common spaces in the economy, domestic and external security, science and culture. But the events in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova spotlighted the European trend of supporting political forces in the former Soviet republics depending on the distance they put between themselves and Russia. In reality, the bureaucrats in Brussels are facing Tbilisi, Kiev and Chisinau with a false choice between the West (meaning the EU and NATO) and Russia.
Vladimir Putin cannot accept this attitude, and it seems that this does not suit France, Germany and other Old European countries either. They reject Russophobic sentiments brought to the enlarged EU by such new members as Poland and the Baltic countries. The summit in Paris will show if Old Europe is ready to stop this unproductive anti-Russian trend. In this year of the 60th anniversary of victory over Nazism, the attempts by Brussels bureaucrats and radical newcomers to the EU to create new division lines in Europe look like an archaism and sacrilege.
Saturday, 26 January 2008
INDIA BECOMING TRIAD
urya 1 and 2 : India's ICBM's
The Surya-1 is an intercontinental-range, surface-based, solid and liquid propellant ballistic missile under development. It is based upon a space launch vehicle . This project would result in India’s first intercontinental-range ballistic missile. The Surya-1 and -2 will be classified as a strategic weapon. It will likely be used to extend the Indian nuclear deterrent force to targets deeper within China. India can only hit a limited number of targets within China, even upon the completion of the Agni-3 missile. The development of a true ICBM would make almost any strategic target within China vulnerable and decrease India’s relative weakness. This would develop a credible deterrent for India against any Chinese aggression. The Surya-1 will have an expected range of some 8,000 km (4971 miles). It reportedly has a length of 40 m and a launch weight of 80,000 kg. As the missile has yet to be developed, the payload and warhead are as yet unknown. It is believed to be a three-stage design, with the first two stages using solid propellant and the third-stage using liquid. The Surya-2 is a longer-ranged variant of the Surya-1. It has a reported range of 12,000 km (7456 miles). This is likely accomplished by decreasing the payload.
The Surya-1 is an intercontinental-range, surface-based, solid and liquid propellant ballistic missile under development. It is based upon a space launch vehicle . This project would result in India’s first intercontinental-range ballistic missile. The Surya-1 and -2 will be classified as a strategic weapon. It will likely be used to extend the Indian nuclear deterrent force to targets deeper within China. India can only hit a limited number of targets within China, even upon the completion of the Agni-3 missile. The development of a true ICBM would make almost any strategic target within China vulnerable and decrease India’s relative weakness. This would develop a credible deterrent for India against any Chinese aggression. The Surya-1 will have an expected range of some 8,000 km (4971 miles). It reportedly has a length of 40 m and a launch weight of 80,000 kg. As the missile has yet to be developed, the payload and warhead are as yet unknown. It is believed to be a three-stage design, with the first two stages using solid propellant and the third-stage using liquid. The Surya-2 is a longer-ranged variant of the Surya-1. It has a reported range of 12,000 km (7456 miles). This is likely accomplished by decreasing the payload.
china&usa
eries of questions on this nightmare scenario: 1. Can the U.S. invade China in the first place? 2. Are America's technological and firepower advantages helpful in the long run against 1 billion people? 3. How effective would U.S. airpower be? 4. Is it safe to say every Chinese citizen would fight? 5. Can the U.S. hold up against a modern military supported by guerrilla warfare? 6. Any other thoughts? I think China is one enemy the U.S. will need a miracle to defeat. I see it sort of as a whole bunch of people lining up against the Chinese coast to prevent an amphbious assault. An airborne assault is pretty dumb as well. The only advantage America will have is our airpower and sea-launched missiles, but that won't last forever. In the end, I think it's a lose-lose situation for the U.S. Also, does anyone know of any tactics or warplans the U.S. has in store regarding China?
Wednesday, 16 January 2008
PLAAF's Doctrine and Strategy
The PLAAF's evolution of operational capabilities is tied to the evolution of the PLA.Âs overall doctrine and strategy. ChinaÆ’Âs communist leaders have long seen themselves as encircled by real or potentially hostile forces threatening the regime's security. They have also long sought to define a doctrine and strategy to deal with this situation. The PLA's doctrine has evolved from Mao Zedong's basic doctrine of people's war, which still retains a measure of influence in Chinese thinking, at least in broad conceptual terms. In 1985, the CMC radically revised China's doctrine and strategic defense policy by directing the armed forces to change from preparation for an "early, major, and nuclear war" to preparing for "local limited wars around China's borders, including its maritime territories and claims." Following the Gulf War, this doctrine was amended to "fight local wars under modern, high-technology conditions." Thus, people's war has evolved as a blend of defense and offense, and has been modified to incorporate various strategies, including active defense and the rapid-reaction strategy.
In its essence, the people's war doctrine reflects a strategy of weakness. Since the PLA was founded in 1927, it has had to develop strategies for defeating adversaries which had superior weapons and equipment. That this dilemma should continue into the 21st century is no doubt frustrating to members of the current military hierarchy.
While people's war places special emphasis on defensive strategy and on the factor of manpower over weapons, the PLA has never ignored the need for an offensive strategy. The PLA's involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars, plus its attacks against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 - which were followed by quick, unilateral withdrawals - were all described as defensive operations. At the same time, Mao long recognized the value of utilizing superior force to overwhelm China's adversaries. Within the people's war doctrine, the basic military strategy Mao formulated, known as active defense, was one of a protracted, defensive war.
In a recent paper, Dr. Paul Godwin states that "the PLA has been shifting over the past twenty years from continental defense in depth to peripheral defense and maritime force projection, and from a ground-force dominated approach to war, to a multi-service joint operations doctrine. In conceptualizing the battlefield, the PLA has shifted from a two dimensional concept, where the ground war was the central focus, to a multidimensional battlespace, where space and cyberspace play roles as important as the traditional air-land-sea dimensions. The PLA has faced the major difficulty of the absence of any period of stability in which it could complete the organizational, training, and logistics changes required to implement a revised strategy and operational doctrine."
Although PLAAF writings mention the broader PLA doctrine and strategic concepts of people's war, people's war under modern conditions, and people's war under modern, high-tech conditions, they tend to focus more on campaign strategy, campaign tactics, and tactical training.
As an arm of the PLA, the PLAAF has traditionally conducted its combat operations as a series of subordinate campaigns within the PLA's overall campaign. The PLAAF describes a campaign as "using from one to many aviation, air defense, or airborne units to carry out a series of combined battles according to a general battle plan to achieve a specified strategic or campaign objective in a specified time." During March 1997, Commander Liu stated the PLAAF must improve its capabilities in actual combat by highlighting campaign and tactical training. He emphasized that campaign training involves air deterrence, air interdiction, air strikes, and participation in joint exercises.
Although the PLA has always had an active defense strategy, one of the PLAAF's most significant developments in the past couple of years has been the public emphasis by Chinese leaders, including CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin, on the PLAAF's capability to fight offensive battles. What this means is that the PLAAF is beginning to acquire the types of weapon systems, such as the Su-27 and Il-76, that will allow the PLAAF to change its doctrine appropriately and move away from its purely defensive missions.PLAAF Rapid-Reaction Force
The PLAAF's Airborne Troops
One of the PLAAF's most important changes in campaign strategy took place in 1992, when the Air Force's 15th Airborne Army began changing into a rapid-reaction force (RRF). Although PLAAF airpower discussions in the late 1980s included ideas about fist units, these discussions centered on the airborne forces and not the aviation units. While the airborne forces were clearly included in plans for the RRF, it appears that the airborne forces did not actually form any operational RRFs until around 1992.
images from PLA Daily
According to an October 1993 Jane's Defence Weekly report, China was in the process of changing the 15th Airborne Army's three brigades into divisions, in order to boost their rapid-response power. The 43rd Brigade, based in Kaifeng, was the first brigade to undergo expansion to a division. The other two brigades, the 44th at Yingshan and 45th at Huangpi, followed suit shortly thereafter. Military planners had apparently decided that brigade-size forces were too small for their assigned combat missions. Chinese brigades normally have about 3,000 to 4,000 troops, and ground force divisions have about 15,000 troops. The airborne units are composed of eight types of troops: scouts, infantry, artillerymen, signalmen, engineers, antichemical warfare corps, and automobile corps.
The 1999 Department of Defense's (DoD) assessment of the PLA describes the 15th Airborne Army as consisting of three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troops. The 15th Airborne Army is China's primary quick reaction force and has been designated as a strategic rapid reaction unit, but the airborne units remain handicapped by insufficient airlift. Acquisition of additional aircraft and modern equipment, together with the increased emphasis on utilizing airborne forces during training exercises, would marginally improve the airborne army's combat capabilities.
According to Commander Liu, however, since the PLAAF began receiving several Russian Il-76 transports in 1992, the airborne troops now have all-terrain, all-weather, omni-directional combat capabilities. (21) In order to adapt to various adverse operational conditions, the airborne units have conducted exercises in the snowfields of the Greater Khingan (Da Xingan) Mountains, the hot jungles on the Shiwan Mountains in Guangxi, and the Kunlun Plateau, located 4,600 meters above sea level where the air is thin.
Airborne troop training over the past few years appears to have focused primarily in and around Tibet. At the same time, however, some airborne training has also concentrated on a Taiwan scenario. By reporting this type of activity, the government is apparently trying to send a signal to inhabitants of Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang that the airborne forces are preparing for internal contingencies, should the need arise. Reporting of these types of exercises also points out some of the airborne forces' limitations. For example, during the 1996 military exercise opposite Taiwan, the PLAAF inserted a small contingent of airborne troops onto Haitan island, but this portion of the exercise was scaled down due to inclement weather, again calling the reliability of Liu's statement into question.
Aviation Rapid Reaction Force Units
Serious discussions about establishing aviation RRF units did not occur until around the early 1990s, which coincided with China's purchase of the first Russian Su-27s and Il-76s. According to interviews with foreign air force officers in Asia, the PLAAF's rapid-reaction aviation units are currently composed of J-7, J-8, and Su-27 fighters and Il-76 transports. Although the bulk of the PLAAF consists of J-6 fighters, the RRF does not include any of these aircraft.
The PLA's rapid-reaction strategy is based on the premise that China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future, and that the PLA must strike quickly to end the war and meet Beijing's political objectives. Furthermore, cost is a big factor, since equipment is becoming more expensive and the cost of maintaining older weapon systems is rising.
PLAAF Missions and Organizational Structure (1/2)
Over the past fifty years, the PLAAF has endeavored to undertake an exceptionally broad range of operational missions. The first mission the CMC assigned to the PLAAF in 1949 was the air defense of Beijing and Shanghai against Nationalist air raids. This mission expanded to include northeast China during the Korean War and to the southeast provinces during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. Although Western writings normally refer to air defense as including aircraft, AAA, and SAMs, the PLAAF makes a clear distinction between its aviation troops (aircraft) and air defense (AAA/SAM) troops.
Today, the PLAAF still describes its primary mission as defending China's territorial airspace. However, this mission can best be described as defending China's major cities and industrial areas, which can clearly be seen by looking at the location of the PLAAF's airfields, combat aircraft, SAMs, and AAA. As the PLAAF acquires aircraft and SAMs with longer ranges, these envelopes will gradually expand. Although the PLAAF states that its secondary mission is supporting ground and naval forces, it has never successfully carried out direct support to the ground troops and officially states that it can only support them indirectly. The PLAAF still describes a joint exercise as having aircraft airborne at the same time that its own SAM and AAA units or that some ground force units are active in a different area. It is also questionable just how much the PLAAF can actually support the ground and naval forces in the future. The PLAAF lacks the proper aircraft and joint experience to accomplish close air support or interdiction and has only recently made nascent inroads into the over water training necessary for naval air support. Support for the naval forces is left up primarily to the Naval air force.
The PLAAF also supports other maritime activities. For example, according to a May 1998 Xinhua report from Guangzhou, the PLAAF was to conduct inspection flights in the coastal waters off Guangdong Province, as well as the Zhujiang River delta area, in order to enforce the May to September fishing ban. Guangdong Province and the South China Sea Branch of the National Bureau of Oceanography had requested the inspections in order to counter serious problems in excessive, unpaid, and disorderly utilization of maritime resources.
In the absence of broader PLAAF mission statements, one must look at the PLAAF's organizational structure, operational branch functions, force locations, weapon systems, and planned weapons acquisitions, in order to analyze the PLAAF's full range of missions.
Administratively, the PLAAF's chain-of-command is organized into four levels: headquarters air force; seven military region air force (MRAF) headquarters; air corps and command posts; and operational units. Headquarters Air Force is equivalent to the US Air Force's Air Staff and is organized administratively into four first level or major departments - headquarters, political, logistics, and equipment - and their subordinate elements (second level departments, bureaus, divisions, offices, and sections). The PLA's military region (MR) headquarters is responsible for combined operations, and the MRAF commander, who is also an MR deputy commander, is responsible for flight operations within the MR. The seven military regions are Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Jinan, and Chengdu. Each echelon below Headquarters Air Force from the MRAF headquarters to the lowest level in the chain-of-command basically mirrors this administrative structure.
In order to perform its operational missions, the PLAAF is organized into branches - aviation, AAA, SAM, radar, and communications. The PLA's airborne troops belong to the Air Force, and sometimes, but not always, are noted as the PLAAF's sixth branch. The PLAAF also has schools, logistics units, repair facilities, research institutes, hospitals, and sanitoriums as part of its organizational structure. The Air Force's Logistics Department has its own water transport craft and boat troops to ship fuel to PLAAF units along the Yangzi River and coast. The PLAAF's political structure ensures Party control at all levels. By looking at modernization of the PLAAF's six branches, it is possible to understand more fully the scope of the Air Force's operations and capabilities.
The PLAAF's Aviation Branch
The PLAAF was formed around its aviation troops (hangkongbing), which remain the Air Force's main arm. The aviation troops are organized into fighters, ground attack aircraft, bombers, transports, and reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft are organized into air divisions, regiments, groups, squadrons, and associated maintenance, logistics, and support units. The support units are organized into regiments, battalions, and companies. There are also independent air regiments and groups, which conduct specialized missions, such as operational test and evaluation of equipment, reconnaissance and surveying, troop transport, and reforestation. For the most part, these special mission aircraft include reconnaissance fighters and Il-14 and Yun-5 transports. Air divisions can be directly subordinate to Headquarters Air Force, an MRAF headquarters, an air corps, or a command post.
A typical air division headquarters consists of the command staff and administrative organization. These organizations are responsible for combat, training, political training, supply, and maintenance support for the division. Each division and regiment has a Party committee and a standing committee, of which the political commissar serves as the secretary for both committees. The division's Party committee consists of the standing committee, which includes the division's command staff, plus the commanders and political commissars of each subordinate regiment.
Because the PLAAF has historically been synonymous with the aviation troops, the Headquarters Department's second level Operations Department has basically functioned as the Aviation Troop Department. The Operations Department also is responsible for the airborne troops. This is in contrast to the separate second level departments that have been established for the radar, communications, and AAA/SAM branches. This separation of aviation and air defense permeates the entire chain-of-command, keeping administrative firewalls between the aviators and the rest of the PLAAF. PLAAF Missions and Organizational Structure (2/2)
Origins of the Aviation Branch
When the PLAAF was established, its aviation troops were organized into several brigades with three to four regiments each. For example, the 4th Combined Brigade was established at Nanjing in June 1950 and became the PLAAF's first aviation troop unit. It consisted of 10th and 11th Pursuit Regiments, the 12th Bomber Regiment, and the 13th Attack Regiment. By the end of 1950, these brigades reduced the number of regiments to two, dropped the type of unit (Pursuit/Attack/ Bomber) from the name, and became air divisions.
Since 1951, the number for regiments per division has fluctuated between two and three, depending upon the number of aircraft available and the changing missions. Some flying academies have up to four regiments. By the end of May 1951, the PLAAF had seventeen air divisions, each with two regiments, including twelve pursuit divisions, two attack divisions, two bomber divisions, and one transport division. This expanded rapidly, so that by March 1953, a total of twenty-eight air divisions and fifty-six air regiments were formed. At the same time, each division began changing from two regiments back to three. By early 1954, the PLAAF had twenty-eight air divisions and seventy air regiments, with 3,000 aircraft.
From 1960-1965, more air divisions were created to guard the coast. From 1966-1976, aviation troop units were expanded to cover the rest of China. Although the PLAAF had fifty air divisions by the mid-1980s, the number was reduced to around forty-five by 1990 as older aircraft were gradually taken out of the inventory.
According to the 1999 DoD report, the PLAAF currently numbers over 400,000 personnel with approximately 4,500 combat aircraft organized in some thirty air divisions. The PLAAF also maintains about 150 transport aircraft in two air divisions. A PLAAF air division can have one or more air regiments per airfield, with each airfield assigned a field station for logistics support. Although a division can have more than one type of aircraft (i.e., J-7s and J-8s), each regiment typically has the same type of aircraft. The table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for a typical air regiment consists of from 25-32 aircraft, but may actually have more or less assigned. The regiment is the basic organization for training and operations. Each regiment has three flying groups and one aircraft maintenance group. Each flying group is further divided into three squadrons.
The division has about one and one-half to two pilots per aircraft. Although the pilots are assigned to squadrons, each with three to five pilots, the aircraft are assigned to the regiment as a whole, not just to the squadrons. Each pilot, however, normally only flies one to three airframes, so they become familiar with each aircraft's handling capabilities. The average pilot remains in the Air Force until he or she retires. The PLAAF established age limits for its pilots in the 1980s: fighter and ground-attack pilots, 43-45 years; bomber pilots, 48-50 years; transport pilots, 55 years; helicopter pilots, 47-50 years; and female pilots, 48 years. The average fighter and ground-attack pilot is 28 years old.
Flight Training (1/3)
To help build esprit de corps, the PLAAF began awarding four pilot ratings in 1986 - special, first, second, and third grade - which are awarded after the pilots complete their initial and upgrade training at an operational unit. The criteria includes time-on-station, flying hours, "flying in weather," and special missions. In addition, the PLAAF awards aircrew ratings to navigators, communications and gunnery personnel, and instructor pilots. According to a 1989 PLAAF report, of the 10,000 pilots in the entire PLAAF at that time, seven percent of the total and fifteen to twenty percent of the fighter pilots were special grade. There are differing reports about the educational background of today's PLAAF pilots. In April 1999, Commander Liu stated that all air division and regiment leaders are special-grade or first grade pilots, and one-half of the pilots in the flight units are college-educated. This is in contrast to an interview in 1989 with then-PLAAF Political Commissar Zhu Guang, who stated that all the pilots had a college education or above, and to a 1999 article by John Lewis and Xue Litai that states,
In 1997, the PLAAF finished drafting its training programs for high-tech wars, but in carrying them out, it has encountered a fundamental problem because only 20.7 percent of the air officers are college graduates. Quick fixes or short-term training classes cannot solve the lack of qualified technical personnel to operate high-tech air weapons in an environment that attracts the best to civilian occupations.
There are no ready explanations for this apparent drop in college educated officers, especially since all PLAAF officers must attend a PLAAF four-year academy, many of which now offer post graduate degrees as well.
Based upon an analysis of Chinese literature and interviews in China, it is evident that PLAAF pilots do not fly as many hours as their Western counterparts. According to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air force officials, the PLAAF's flying hours have not changed appreciably over the past fifteen years, but they have changed their training techniques. Since the end of the 1970s, bomber pilots have consistently flown an average of 80 hours per year; fighter pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots up to 150 hours. This compares to about 215 hours per year for US Air Force bomber, fighter, and attack crews. USAF pilots also conduct numerous hours training on advanced simulators.
Based on interviews in Asia, it appears that PLAAF pilots are flying the Su-27s between 60-100 hours per year, and supplementing this with flight time in J-7s. These interviews also indicate that every country considers the PLAAF's Su-27s as their primary concern, regardless of how many hours the pilots train. The acquisition of these aircraft has definitely had a significant psychological impact on China's neighbors.
Since 1996, PLAAF pilots have been noted flying in more sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat with newly-formed aggressor units, employing jamming, flying over the Taiwan Strait, conducting live missile firings over the East China Sea, and dropping parachute-retarded bombs at a bomb range. There are also Chinese writings that the PLAAF conducts post mission analysis of aerial combat using information from flight data recorders which contain information from the air data computer and possibly some fire control data. The Chinese are also seeking Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) pods similar to those used by Western forces. These pods send information to ground personnel so they can evaluate aerial engagements on a real-time basis.
Although the PLAAF may not fly as many hours as the USAF, the PLAAF believes that its training is improving and is adequate to conduct its missions. Some Air Force leaders firmly believe that their intelligence, mobility, and attack capabilities will be sufficient to allow them to react appropriately to any situation, including gaining air superiority, supporting the ground forces, and conducting counterattacks against targets inside the enemy's borders. Furthermore, interviews with foreign air force officials indicate that they believe Western reporting does not take into account how the PLAAF matches up against China's neighbors. For example, Commander Liu noted that aviation units during 1996 exceeded their annual training plan requirements by 1.8 percent. Highlights during that time included night flying, live bombing and missile firing, training over the ocean, low-altitude flights, and emergency mobility deployments to other airfields. This type of training accounted for forty-five percent of the planned annual training time. What the article failed to state was that most of this training took place in a single exercise opposite Taiwan, and that several portions of the exercise were curtailed due to inclement weather.
To round out the PLAAF's tactical training and help make up for the limited number of flying hours per year, the PLAAF has increased its use of flight simulators. The PLAAF now reportedly conducts more than ninety percent of its tactical and technological training on simulators. The PLAAF has developed a full-spectrum spherical screen simulator, three-dimensional flight simulator, and in-flight refueling plane simulator for pilots to train and develop special flight and air strike skills under simulated combat conditions. Simulation capabilities have evolved from electromechanical simulation to laser, electronic, and computer simulation; from technical simulation to tactical and campaign simulation; and from the simulation of a single armament or aircraft type to integrated simulation of the main battle arms combined with multiple aircraft types and various forms of weaponry. If these types of simulators have, in fact, become operational at all aviation units, then they will definitely help supplement pilot training, which is minimal at best. During the 1980s, the Air Force only had a few, non-standard simulators. Most of the pilots trained on an instrument board - a mock cockpit with a wooden panel containing all of the cockpit's instrument dials on it.
In January 1999, PLAAF Deputy Commander Wu Guangyu emphasized the PLAAF's increased readiness by stating,
China's Air Force has significantly improved its combat readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per capita flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summer flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots paid particular attention to improving basic flying techniques. The fact that sixty-six percent of air units conducted highly successful long?distance mobile maneuvers under harsh weather conditions indicated that China's Air Force has greatly enhanced its combat readiness.
Commander Liu also discussed training reforms by stating that several units have been selected to carry out a series of reforms on tactics. Those units have tried, demonstrated, and refined a series of advanced combat theories and propositions in live-fire training exercises. They have scored excellent initial results in mobile operations, air strike, air superiority, air control, night attacks, and defensive operations
In its essence, the people's war doctrine reflects a strategy of weakness. Since the PLA was founded in 1927, it has had to develop strategies for defeating adversaries which had superior weapons and equipment. That this dilemma should continue into the 21st century is no doubt frustrating to members of the current military hierarchy.
While people's war places special emphasis on defensive strategy and on the factor of manpower over weapons, the PLA has never ignored the need for an offensive strategy. The PLA's involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars, plus its attacks against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 - which were followed by quick, unilateral withdrawals - were all described as defensive operations. At the same time, Mao long recognized the value of utilizing superior force to overwhelm China's adversaries. Within the people's war doctrine, the basic military strategy Mao formulated, known as active defense, was one of a protracted, defensive war.
In a recent paper, Dr. Paul Godwin states that "the PLA has been shifting over the past twenty years from continental defense in depth to peripheral defense and maritime force projection, and from a ground-force dominated approach to war, to a multi-service joint operations doctrine. In conceptualizing the battlefield, the PLA has shifted from a two dimensional concept, where the ground war was the central focus, to a multidimensional battlespace, where space and cyberspace play roles as important as the traditional air-land-sea dimensions. The PLA has faced the major difficulty of the absence of any period of stability in which it could complete the organizational, training, and logistics changes required to implement a revised strategy and operational doctrine."
Although PLAAF writings mention the broader PLA doctrine and strategic concepts of people's war, people's war under modern conditions, and people's war under modern, high-tech conditions, they tend to focus more on campaign strategy, campaign tactics, and tactical training.
As an arm of the PLA, the PLAAF has traditionally conducted its combat operations as a series of subordinate campaigns within the PLA's overall campaign. The PLAAF describes a campaign as "using from one to many aviation, air defense, or airborne units to carry out a series of combined battles according to a general battle plan to achieve a specified strategic or campaign objective in a specified time." During March 1997, Commander Liu stated the PLAAF must improve its capabilities in actual combat by highlighting campaign and tactical training. He emphasized that campaign training involves air deterrence, air interdiction, air strikes, and participation in joint exercises.
Although the PLA has always had an active defense strategy, one of the PLAAF's most significant developments in the past couple of years has been the public emphasis by Chinese leaders, including CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin, on the PLAAF's capability to fight offensive battles. What this means is that the PLAAF is beginning to acquire the types of weapon systems, such as the Su-27 and Il-76, that will allow the PLAAF to change its doctrine appropriately and move away from its purely defensive missions.PLAAF Rapid-Reaction Force
The PLAAF's Airborne Troops
One of the PLAAF's most important changes in campaign strategy took place in 1992, when the Air Force's 15th Airborne Army began changing into a rapid-reaction force (RRF). Although PLAAF airpower discussions in the late 1980s included ideas about fist units, these discussions centered on the airborne forces and not the aviation units. While the airborne forces were clearly included in plans for the RRF, it appears that the airborne forces did not actually form any operational RRFs until around 1992.
images from PLA Daily
According to an October 1993 Jane's Defence Weekly report, China was in the process of changing the 15th Airborne Army's three brigades into divisions, in order to boost their rapid-response power. The 43rd Brigade, based in Kaifeng, was the first brigade to undergo expansion to a division. The other two brigades, the 44th at Yingshan and 45th at Huangpi, followed suit shortly thereafter. Military planners had apparently decided that brigade-size forces were too small for their assigned combat missions. Chinese brigades normally have about 3,000 to 4,000 troops, and ground force divisions have about 15,000 troops. The airborne units are composed of eight types of troops: scouts, infantry, artillerymen, signalmen, engineers, antichemical warfare corps, and automobile corps.
The 1999 Department of Defense's (DoD) assessment of the PLA describes the 15th Airborne Army as consisting of three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troops. The 15th Airborne Army is China's primary quick reaction force and has been designated as a strategic rapid reaction unit, but the airborne units remain handicapped by insufficient airlift. Acquisition of additional aircraft and modern equipment, together with the increased emphasis on utilizing airborne forces during training exercises, would marginally improve the airborne army's combat capabilities.
According to Commander Liu, however, since the PLAAF began receiving several Russian Il-76 transports in 1992, the airborne troops now have all-terrain, all-weather, omni-directional combat capabilities. (21) In order to adapt to various adverse operational conditions, the airborne units have conducted exercises in the snowfields of the Greater Khingan (Da Xingan) Mountains, the hot jungles on the Shiwan Mountains in Guangxi, and the Kunlun Plateau, located 4,600 meters above sea level where the air is thin.
Airborne troop training over the past few years appears to have focused primarily in and around Tibet. At the same time, however, some airborne training has also concentrated on a Taiwan scenario. By reporting this type of activity, the government is apparently trying to send a signal to inhabitants of Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang that the airborne forces are preparing for internal contingencies, should the need arise. Reporting of these types of exercises also points out some of the airborne forces' limitations. For example, during the 1996 military exercise opposite Taiwan, the PLAAF inserted a small contingent of airborne troops onto Haitan island, but this portion of the exercise was scaled down due to inclement weather, again calling the reliability of Liu's statement into question.
Aviation Rapid Reaction Force Units
Serious discussions about establishing aviation RRF units did not occur until around the early 1990s, which coincided with China's purchase of the first Russian Su-27s and Il-76s. According to interviews with foreign air force officers in Asia, the PLAAF's rapid-reaction aviation units are currently composed of J-7, J-8, and Su-27 fighters and Il-76 transports. Although the bulk of the PLAAF consists of J-6 fighters, the RRF does not include any of these aircraft.
The PLA's rapid-reaction strategy is based on the premise that China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future, and that the PLA must strike quickly to end the war and meet Beijing's political objectives. Furthermore, cost is a big factor, since equipment is becoming more expensive and the cost of maintaining older weapon systems is rising.
PLAAF Missions and Organizational Structure (1/2)
Over the past fifty years, the PLAAF has endeavored to undertake an exceptionally broad range of operational missions. The first mission the CMC assigned to the PLAAF in 1949 was the air defense of Beijing and Shanghai against Nationalist air raids. This mission expanded to include northeast China during the Korean War and to the southeast provinces during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. Although Western writings normally refer to air defense as including aircraft, AAA, and SAMs, the PLAAF makes a clear distinction between its aviation troops (aircraft) and air defense (AAA/SAM) troops.
Today, the PLAAF still describes its primary mission as defending China's territorial airspace. However, this mission can best be described as defending China's major cities and industrial areas, which can clearly be seen by looking at the location of the PLAAF's airfields, combat aircraft, SAMs, and AAA. As the PLAAF acquires aircraft and SAMs with longer ranges, these envelopes will gradually expand. Although the PLAAF states that its secondary mission is supporting ground and naval forces, it has never successfully carried out direct support to the ground troops and officially states that it can only support them indirectly. The PLAAF still describes a joint exercise as having aircraft airborne at the same time that its own SAM and AAA units or that some ground force units are active in a different area. It is also questionable just how much the PLAAF can actually support the ground and naval forces in the future. The PLAAF lacks the proper aircraft and joint experience to accomplish close air support or interdiction and has only recently made nascent inroads into the over water training necessary for naval air support. Support for the naval forces is left up primarily to the Naval air force.
The PLAAF also supports other maritime activities. For example, according to a May 1998 Xinhua report from Guangzhou, the PLAAF was to conduct inspection flights in the coastal waters off Guangdong Province, as well as the Zhujiang River delta area, in order to enforce the May to September fishing ban. Guangdong Province and the South China Sea Branch of the National Bureau of Oceanography had requested the inspections in order to counter serious problems in excessive, unpaid, and disorderly utilization of maritime resources.
In the absence of broader PLAAF mission statements, one must look at the PLAAF's organizational structure, operational branch functions, force locations, weapon systems, and planned weapons acquisitions, in order to analyze the PLAAF's full range of missions.
Administratively, the PLAAF's chain-of-command is organized into four levels: headquarters air force; seven military region air force (MRAF) headquarters; air corps and command posts; and operational units. Headquarters Air Force is equivalent to the US Air Force's Air Staff and is organized administratively into four first level or major departments - headquarters, political, logistics, and equipment - and their subordinate elements (second level departments, bureaus, divisions, offices, and sections). The PLA's military region (MR) headquarters is responsible for combined operations, and the MRAF commander, who is also an MR deputy commander, is responsible for flight operations within the MR. The seven military regions are Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Jinan, and Chengdu. Each echelon below Headquarters Air Force from the MRAF headquarters to the lowest level in the chain-of-command basically mirrors this administrative structure.
In order to perform its operational missions, the PLAAF is organized into branches - aviation, AAA, SAM, radar, and communications. The PLA's airborne troops belong to the Air Force, and sometimes, but not always, are noted as the PLAAF's sixth branch. The PLAAF also has schools, logistics units, repair facilities, research institutes, hospitals, and sanitoriums as part of its organizational structure. The Air Force's Logistics Department has its own water transport craft and boat troops to ship fuel to PLAAF units along the Yangzi River and coast. The PLAAF's political structure ensures Party control at all levels. By looking at modernization of the PLAAF's six branches, it is possible to understand more fully the scope of the Air Force's operations and capabilities.
The PLAAF's Aviation Branch
The PLAAF was formed around its aviation troops (hangkongbing), which remain the Air Force's main arm. The aviation troops are organized into fighters, ground attack aircraft, bombers, transports, and reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft are organized into air divisions, regiments, groups, squadrons, and associated maintenance, logistics, and support units. The support units are organized into regiments, battalions, and companies. There are also independent air regiments and groups, which conduct specialized missions, such as operational test and evaluation of equipment, reconnaissance and surveying, troop transport, and reforestation. For the most part, these special mission aircraft include reconnaissance fighters and Il-14 and Yun-5 transports. Air divisions can be directly subordinate to Headquarters Air Force, an MRAF headquarters, an air corps, or a command post.
A typical air division headquarters consists of the command staff and administrative organization. These organizations are responsible for combat, training, political training, supply, and maintenance support for the division. Each division and regiment has a Party committee and a standing committee, of which the political commissar serves as the secretary for both committees. The division's Party committee consists of the standing committee, which includes the division's command staff, plus the commanders and political commissars of each subordinate regiment.
Because the PLAAF has historically been synonymous with the aviation troops, the Headquarters Department's second level Operations Department has basically functioned as the Aviation Troop Department. The Operations Department also is responsible for the airborne troops. This is in contrast to the separate second level departments that have been established for the radar, communications, and AAA/SAM branches. This separation of aviation and air defense permeates the entire chain-of-command, keeping administrative firewalls between the aviators and the rest of the PLAAF. PLAAF Missions and Organizational Structure (2/2)
Origins of the Aviation Branch
When the PLAAF was established, its aviation troops were organized into several brigades with three to four regiments each. For example, the 4th Combined Brigade was established at Nanjing in June 1950 and became the PLAAF's first aviation troop unit. It consisted of 10th and 11th Pursuit Regiments, the 12th Bomber Regiment, and the 13th Attack Regiment. By the end of 1950, these brigades reduced the number of regiments to two, dropped the type of unit (Pursuit/Attack/ Bomber) from the name, and became air divisions.
Since 1951, the number for regiments per division has fluctuated between two and three, depending upon the number of aircraft available and the changing missions. Some flying academies have up to four regiments. By the end of May 1951, the PLAAF had seventeen air divisions, each with two regiments, including twelve pursuit divisions, two attack divisions, two bomber divisions, and one transport division. This expanded rapidly, so that by March 1953, a total of twenty-eight air divisions and fifty-six air regiments were formed. At the same time, each division began changing from two regiments back to three. By early 1954, the PLAAF had twenty-eight air divisions and seventy air regiments, with 3,000 aircraft.
From 1960-1965, more air divisions were created to guard the coast. From 1966-1976, aviation troop units were expanded to cover the rest of China. Although the PLAAF had fifty air divisions by the mid-1980s, the number was reduced to around forty-five by 1990 as older aircraft were gradually taken out of the inventory.
According to the 1999 DoD report, the PLAAF currently numbers over 400,000 personnel with approximately 4,500 combat aircraft organized in some thirty air divisions. The PLAAF also maintains about 150 transport aircraft in two air divisions. A PLAAF air division can have one or more air regiments per airfield, with each airfield assigned a field station for logistics support. Although a division can have more than one type of aircraft (i.e., J-7s and J-8s), each regiment typically has the same type of aircraft. The table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for a typical air regiment consists of from 25-32 aircraft, but may actually have more or less assigned. The regiment is the basic organization for training and operations. Each regiment has three flying groups and one aircraft maintenance group. Each flying group is further divided into three squadrons.
The division has about one and one-half to two pilots per aircraft. Although the pilots are assigned to squadrons, each with three to five pilots, the aircraft are assigned to the regiment as a whole, not just to the squadrons. Each pilot, however, normally only flies one to three airframes, so they become familiar with each aircraft's handling capabilities. The average pilot remains in the Air Force until he or she retires. The PLAAF established age limits for its pilots in the 1980s: fighter and ground-attack pilots, 43-45 years; bomber pilots, 48-50 years; transport pilots, 55 years; helicopter pilots, 47-50 years; and female pilots, 48 years. The average fighter and ground-attack pilot is 28 years old.
Flight Training (1/3)
To help build esprit de corps, the PLAAF began awarding four pilot ratings in 1986 - special, first, second, and third grade - which are awarded after the pilots complete their initial and upgrade training at an operational unit. The criteria includes time-on-station, flying hours, "flying in weather," and special missions. In addition, the PLAAF awards aircrew ratings to navigators, communications and gunnery personnel, and instructor pilots. According to a 1989 PLAAF report, of the 10,000 pilots in the entire PLAAF at that time, seven percent of the total and fifteen to twenty percent of the fighter pilots were special grade. There are differing reports about the educational background of today's PLAAF pilots. In April 1999, Commander Liu stated that all air division and regiment leaders are special-grade or first grade pilots, and one-half of the pilots in the flight units are college-educated. This is in contrast to an interview in 1989 with then-PLAAF Political Commissar Zhu Guang, who stated that all the pilots had a college education or above, and to a 1999 article by John Lewis and Xue Litai that states,
In 1997, the PLAAF finished drafting its training programs for high-tech wars, but in carrying them out, it has encountered a fundamental problem because only 20.7 percent of the air officers are college graduates. Quick fixes or short-term training classes cannot solve the lack of qualified technical personnel to operate high-tech air weapons in an environment that attracts the best to civilian occupations.
There are no ready explanations for this apparent drop in college educated officers, especially since all PLAAF officers must attend a PLAAF four-year academy, many of which now offer post graduate degrees as well.
Based upon an analysis of Chinese literature and interviews in China, it is evident that PLAAF pilots do not fly as many hours as their Western counterparts. According to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air force officials, the PLAAF's flying hours have not changed appreciably over the past fifteen years, but they have changed their training techniques. Since the end of the 1970s, bomber pilots have consistently flown an average of 80 hours per year; fighter pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots up to 150 hours. This compares to about 215 hours per year for US Air Force bomber, fighter, and attack crews. USAF pilots also conduct numerous hours training on advanced simulators.
Based on interviews in Asia, it appears that PLAAF pilots are flying the Su-27s between 60-100 hours per year, and supplementing this with flight time in J-7s. These interviews also indicate that every country considers the PLAAF's Su-27s as their primary concern, regardless of how many hours the pilots train. The acquisition of these aircraft has definitely had a significant psychological impact on China's neighbors.
Since 1996, PLAAF pilots have been noted flying in more sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat with newly-formed aggressor units, employing jamming, flying over the Taiwan Strait, conducting live missile firings over the East China Sea, and dropping parachute-retarded bombs at a bomb range. There are also Chinese writings that the PLAAF conducts post mission analysis of aerial combat using information from flight data recorders which contain information from the air data computer and possibly some fire control data. The Chinese are also seeking Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) pods similar to those used by Western forces. These pods send information to ground personnel so they can evaluate aerial engagements on a real-time basis.
Although the PLAAF may not fly as many hours as the USAF, the PLAAF believes that its training is improving and is adequate to conduct its missions. Some Air Force leaders firmly believe that their intelligence, mobility, and attack capabilities will be sufficient to allow them to react appropriately to any situation, including gaining air superiority, supporting the ground forces, and conducting counterattacks against targets inside the enemy's borders. Furthermore, interviews with foreign air force officials indicate that they believe Western reporting does not take into account how the PLAAF matches up against China's neighbors. For example, Commander Liu noted that aviation units during 1996 exceeded their annual training plan requirements by 1.8 percent. Highlights during that time included night flying, live bombing and missile firing, training over the ocean, low-altitude flights, and emergency mobility deployments to other airfields. This type of training accounted for forty-five percent of the planned annual training time. What the article failed to state was that most of this training took place in a single exercise opposite Taiwan, and that several portions of the exercise were curtailed due to inclement weather.
To round out the PLAAF's tactical training and help make up for the limited number of flying hours per year, the PLAAF has increased its use of flight simulators. The PLAAF now reportedly conducts more than ninety percent of its tactical and technological training on simulators. The PLAAF has developed a full-spectrum spherical screen simulator, three-dimensional flight simulator, and in-flight refueling plane simulator for pilots to train and develop special flight and air strike skills under simulated combat conditions. Simulation capabilities have evolved from electromechanical simulation to laser, electronic, and computer simulation; from technical simulation to tactical and campaign simulation; and from the simulation of a single armament or aircraft type to integrated simulation of the main battle arms combined with multiple aircraft types and various forms of weaponry. If these types of simulators have, in fact, become operational at all aviation units, then they will definitely help supplement pilot training, which is minimal at best. During the 1980s, the Air Force only had a few, non-standard simulators. Most of the pilots trained on an instrument board - a mock cockpit with a wooden panel containing all of the cockpit's instrument dials on it.
In January 1999, PLAAF Deputy Commander Wu Guangyu emphasized the PLAAF's increased readiness by stating,
China's Air Force has significantly improved its combat readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per capita flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summer flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots paid particular attention to improving basic flying techniques. The fact that sixty-six percent of air units conducted highly successful long?distance mobile maneuvers under harsh weather conditions indicated that China's Air Force has greatly enhanced its combat readiness.
Commander Liu also discussed training reforms by stating that several units have been selected to carry out a series of reforms on tactics. Those units have tried, demonstrated, and refined a series of advanced combat theories and propositions in live-fire training exercises. They have scored excellent initial results in mobile operations, air strike, air superiority, air control, night attacks, and defensive operations
PLA Air Force Operation and Modernization
The Central Military Commission has called for the urgent upgrading of the country's Air Force to neutralize growing threats from regional neighbors and other countries....Our country now faces a serious challenge....China needs to develop airborne early warning systems and foster research in the development of high-tech electronic combat systems....If threatened from the air, China must have the ability to carry its defense strike capability to targets outside its own airspace.
- Jiefangjun Bao, 7 April 1996 (1)
The Chinese Air Force plans to acquire state-of-the-art weapons systems by early next century, including early warning planes, electronic warfare warplanes, and surface-to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions.
- Liu Shunyao, PLA Air Force Commander, April 1997 (2)
ChinaÆ’Âs Air Force has significantly improved its combat readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per capita flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summer flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots paid particular attention to improving basic flying techniques. The fact that sixty-six percent of air units conducted highly successful long?distance mobile maneuvers under harsh weather conditions indicated that China's Air Force has greatly enhanced its combat readiness.
- Wu Guangyu, PLA Air Force Deputy Commander, January 1998 (3)
We should build an Air Force capable of both offensive and defensive operations with Chinese characteristics.
- Jiang Zemin, March 1999 (4)
Introduction
China's Air Force, known as the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), is in a crucial transition period, as it changes from an obsolescent giant to a modern force prepared to fight local, limited warsunder high-tech conditions. The PLAAF is slowly moving from a defensive force dominated by 1950s vintage combat aircraft with short legs and limited all-weather intercept capabilities to an offensive-oriented force with extended range and greater lethality. While new aircraft like the J-10, J-11 (Su-27), and Su-30 are gradually introduced into the force, older aircraft like the J-7 and J-8 are being modified with better avionics and air-to-air missiles to bridge the gap. The new combat aircraft force of the 21st century will be controlled by airborne early warning aircraft, refueled by tankers, and supported by electronic countermeasure and intelligence collection aircraft. The PLAAF is forging ahead with advanced tactics and logistics techniques for its newer aircraft, while sustaining the operational capabilities of its older inventory. In addition to its combat aircraft, the PLAAF is improving its surface-to-air missile force and mobility for its elite airborne corps. In ten years, the PLAAF will be a much smaller force, but will have greater range and lethality than the PLAAF of the 1990s. (5)
PLAAF writings indicate that it has an impressive history defending China. The PLAAF established its credibility during the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the Vietnam War, but it has not conducted any large-scale air battles since then. The official PLAAF history states that it has shot down 1,474 and damaged 2,344 aircraft of all types. Analysis of these figures shows that PLAAF aircraft have shot down or damaged only about 200 aircraft during air-to-air combat, most of which occurred during the Korean War. The PLAAF's antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) shot down or damaged the remaining 3,600 aircraft. The PLAAF's SAM forces are particularly proud of shooting down five Nationalist Air Force U-2 reconnaissance planes between 1963 and 1967. (6) The last PLAAF combat took place in October 1987, when a SAM shot down a Vietnamese MiG-21 that had crossed the border.
The PLAAF readily admits that its equipment is backwards, but modernization is taking place across the board, including equipment, tactics, training, logistics, and maintenance. Unlike the 1980s, there are very few PLAAF leaders left who fought in the Korean War. Today's Air Force leaders have put forth an optimistic vision of the future. Unfortunately, the PLAAF does not provide many solid clues as to how it plans to reach that vision. One of the biggest problems foreigners have looking at the PLAAF is the lack of open source information. Even when information is available, it focuses on the vision, not on the process. Most Western writings on the PLAAF tend to focus on the acquisition of hardware, such as the Russian Su-27s, Su-30s, Il-76s, and S-300s. (7) These articles pay little attention to the "software" issues, including leadership, missions and organization, strategy and doctrine, personnel, support equipment, operations, training, logistics, maintenance, and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence). (8)
This paper will address the PLAAF's operational capabilities and modernization. The first part will provide statements by the PLAAF's commander, Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao, describing the PLAAF's past, present, and future. The next part will look at the PLAAF's missions and organizational structure, including the aviation, air defense, and airborne forces. The third part will assess the air activity that has occurred over the Taiwan Strait in reaction to President Lee Teng-hui's 9 July 1999 statements about "state-to-state" relations between Taiwan and the mainland. The paper will also address China's neighbors' perceptions of the PLAAF. The final part will provide conclusions.
PLAAF Commander's Assessment (1/2)
Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao has had several interviews with Chinese reporters since he became PLAAF commander in December 1996. (9) The first of these interviews coincided with Taiwan's receipt of the first group of 150 F-16 fighters from the United States and 60 Mirage 2000-5s from France. The interviews also came after the PLAAF had already received several Russian Su-27 fighters, Il-76 transports, and S-300 SAMs. The PLAAF had also deployed its first indigenous B-6 airborne refueling aircraft for its J-8II fighters, and had ordered the first Il-76 airborne early warning platform from Russia and Israel.
During the interviews, Commander Liu stressed that the aviation troops formed the Air Force's backbone. The PLAAF culture has always focused on the role of aircraft as the core of the force, even though the air defense (SAM and AAA) forces have shot down more aircraft. He also emphasized that the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Army, which has also become more integrated into the PLA's joint operations, has established 'fist' units that are now more mobile and have longer range as a result of acquiring several Russian Il-76 transports. (10)
While discussing the PLAAF's current capabilities, Commander Liu has focused on the ability to fight defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The shift from strictly defensive to offensive capabilities derived from the PLAAF's post-Gulf War realization that precision guided missiles (PGMs) and long-range cruise missiles had changed the rules of warfare. This realization was one of the driving forces for the PLAAF to acquire modern weapon systems from Russia. As a result of modernizing its weapon systems, the Air Force has been able to changes its tactics, extend its combat range, and practice providing support for ground and naval operations.
Liu and other PLAAF officials continue to emphasize that three-quarters of its pilots are now able to fly in all-weather conditions, the percentage of category "A" combat regiments, an indicator of the Air Force's combat effectiveness, has reached 95.5 percent, and that the Air Force has a sixteen year flight safety record. (11) As for flying in all-weather conditions, there is some question as to exactly what types of flying the pilots conduct under visual flight regulations (VFR) and night flying conditions. Are these types of flights flown only on cloudless, moonlit nights, or during cloudy, pitch black conditions over long distances while engaged in air intercept training? Since the Chinese media rarely reports aircraft accidents, there is no way to verify the accuracy of the flight safety record, but this claim, also, is questionable. For example, there are credible reports that Cao Shuangming, the PLAAF commander from 1992-1994, was relieved of duty partly due to a series of aircraft accidents that took place under his command. Furthermore, since the PLAAF rarely trains using rapid aircraft turn around sorties and most engines can only be used from 100 to 300 hours before they are overhauled, the maintenance record would probably be reduced considerably during periods of sustained use, such as during a conflict.
Given the PLAAF's current limitations, Commander Liu and other Air Force leaders have expressed an optimistic vision of the future. As the Air Force upgrades the capabilities of its current inventory with foreign technology, begins producing the J-10 and J-11 (Su-27) aircraft, and acquires new fighters (Su-30) and airborne early warning aircraft and SAMs, the PLAAF will be able to extend its range, increase its firepower, and change its tactics through the use of improved electronic warfare, night training, and joint campaign training. The PLAAF will also focus its efforts on research and development, while importing some high-tech weapons.
PLAAF Commander's Assessment (2/2)
The debate in China about importing weapon systems versus domestically producing them continues. For example, a July 1999 report in Science and Technology Daily, complained that China's achievements in many areas over the past twenty years have attracted world attention, but the aviation industry has increasingly lagged behind. The aviation industry continues to have a sprawling organization with weak facilities and low standards, and the gap between it and the aviation industries of the developed western countries is widening. The article lamented that this is cause for anxiety, because without a strong defense there can be no genuine overall strength. (12)
There is also a debate among foreign analysts about how much China's aviation industry has been able to learn from foreign aircraft manufacturers and transfer the knowledge to producing combat aircraft. Foreign aircraft manufacturers have routinely complained for almost two decades that they have spent time and money training Chinese technicians to work on a specific commercial aircraft project, only to have those technicians disappear to some unknown project and be replaced by a new batch of trainees.
While some observers see China's aviation industry as large and stagnant, other observers cite some centers of excellence. Facilities such as the Chengdu Aircraft Company, Xian Aircraft Company, and Shenyang Aircraft Company have made significant progress through joint ventures with Western companies and assistance from Russia and Israel. For example, Boeing 737 tail sections are produced in China with no U.S. backup. These ventures have provided access to Western manufacturing processes and provided valuable technical and managerial training. While these are derived from commercial aircraft manufacturing, the processes are generally the same for a mostly metal fighter aircraft like the J-10 and the Su-27. Only time will tell how these aircraft production programs will turn out. Because of the size of China's air forces, however, any modernization plan will require Chinese production to be economically feasible.
As the PLAAF upgrades its weapons systems, it must also modernize its organizational structure, tactics, training, and support capabilities. One problem associated with analyzing the PLAAF is determining which changes are being tested and which changes are being implemented. PLA journals often discuss research or changes that have taken place at the unit level. Some analysts, however, assume that these changes have been, or will be, implemented throughout the force. This is not necessarily the case. The PLAAF, like the PLA as a whole, has a complex method of introducing new ideas, weapon systems, and tactics into the force. The General Equipment Department has attempted to streamline this process, but only time will tell whether or not it is successful.
After identifying a problem, the PLAAF systematically seeks a solution. First, the appropriate research institute and/or the PLAAF Command College studies the problem from a theoretical perspective and makes recommendations. (13) Next, PLAAF Headquarters approves the recommendations. After this, the theories are tested at the unit level. Occasionally, separate units test different alternatives simultaneously. Based upon evaluations, competing theories may be accepted, modified, or rejected. After the competing theories are tested and accepted at the unit level, they are tested at the next level, and so forth up the organizational structure. At some point, the PLAAF selects one of the theories and begins implementing it force-wide, starting again at the unit level.
This is a time consuming process and involves a tremendous amount of coordination. The problem becomes even more complex if the theory being tested involves more than one PLAAF branch or PLA service. Whereas a change in flying tactics involves only the PLAAF's aviation branch, changes in the logistics system to support joint service operations involves the entire PLA. For example, the 1995 and 1996 exercises opposite Taiwan were intended as a show of force, but they also provided the PLA with the opportunity to test joint training that had been evolving since the end of the Gulf War.
- Jiefangjun Bao, 7 April 1996 (1)
The Chinese Air Force plans to acquire state-of-the-art weapons systems by early next century, including early warning planes, electronic warfare warplanes, and surface-to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions.
- Liu Shunyao, PLA Air Force Commander, April 1997 (2)
ChinaÆ’Âs Air Force has significantly improved its combat readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per capita flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summer flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots paid particular attention to improving basic flying techniques. The fact that sixty-six percent of air units conducted highly successful long?distance mobile maneuvers under harsh weather conditions indicated that China's Air Force has greatly enhanced its combat readiness.
- Wu Guangyu, PLA Air Force Deputy Commander, January 1998 (3)
We should build an Air Force capable of both offensive and defensive operations with Chinese characteristics.
- Jiang Zemin, March 1999 (4)
Introduction
China's Air Force, known as the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), is in a crucial transition period, as it changes from an obsolescent giant to a modern force prepared to fight local, limited warsunder high-tech conditions. The PLAAF is slowly moving from a defensive force dominated by 1950s vintage combat aircraft with short legs and limited all-weather intercept capabilities to an offensive-oriented force with extended range and greater lethality. While new aircraft like the J-10, J-11 (Su-27), and Su-30 are gradually introduced into the force, older aircraft like the J-7 and J-8 are being modified with better avionics and air-to-air missiles to bridge the gap. The new combat aircraft force of the 21st century will be controlled by airborne early warning aircraft, refueled by tankers, and supported by electronic countermeasure and intelligence collection aircraft. The PLAAF is forging ahead with advanced tactics and logistics techniques for its newer aircraft, while sustaining the operational capabilities of its older inventory. In addition to its combat aircraft, the PLAAF is improving its surface-to-air missile force and mobility for its elite airborne corps. In ten years, the PLAAF will be a much smaller force, but will have greater range and lethality than the PLAAF of the 1990s. (5)
PLAAF writings indicate that it has an impressive history defending China. The PLAAF established its credibility during the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the Vietnam War, but it has not conducted any large-scale air battles since then. The official PLAAF history states that it has shot down 1,474 and damaged 2,344 aircraft of all types. Analysis of these figures shows that PLAAF aircraft have shot down or damaged only about 200 aircraft during air-to-air combat, most of which occurred during the Korean War. The PLAAF's antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) shot down or damaged the remaining 3,600 aircraft. The PLAAF's SAM forces are particularly proud of shooting down five Nationalist Air Force U-2 reconnaissance planes between 1963 and 1967. (6) The last PLAAF combat took place in October 1987, when a SAM shot down a Vietnamese MiG-21 that had crossed the border.
The PLAAF readily admits that its equipment is backwards, but modernization is taking place across the board, including equipment, tactics, training, logistics, and maintenance. Unlike the 1980s, there are very few PLAAF leaders left who fought in the Korean War. Today's Air Force leaders have put forth an optimistic vision of the future. Unfortunately, the PLAAF does not provide many solid clues as to how it plans to reach that vision. One of the biggest problems foreigners have looking at the PLAAF is the lack of open source information. Even when information is available, it focuses on the vision, not on the process. Most Western writings on the PLAAF tend to focus on the acquisition of hardware, such as the Russian Su-27s, Su-30s, Il-76s, and S-300s. (7) These articles pay little attention to the "software" issues, including leadership, missions and organization, strategy and doctrine, personnel, support equipment, operations, training, logistics, maintenance, and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence). (8)
This paper will address the PLAAF's operational capabilities and modernization. The first part will provide statements by the PLAAF's commander, Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao, describing the PLAAF's past, present, and future. The next part will look at the PLAAF's missions and organizational structure, including the aviation, air defense, and airborne forces. The third part will assess the air activity that has occurred over the Taiwan Strait in reaction to President Lee Teng-hui's 9 July 1999 statements about "state-to-state" relations between Taiwan and the mainland. The paper will also address China's neighbors' perceptions of the PLAAF. The final part will provide conclusions.
PLAAF Commander's Assessment (1/2)
Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao has had several interviews with Chinese reporters since he became PLAAF commander in December 1996. (9) The first of these interviews coincided with Taiwan's receipt of the first group of 150 F-16 fighters from the United States and 60 Mirage 2000-5s from France. The interviews also came after the PLAAF had already received several Russian Su-27 fighters, Il-76 transports, and S-300 SAMs. The PLAAF had also deployed its first indigenous B-6 airborne refueling aircraft for its J-8II fighters, and had ordered the first Il-76 airborne early warning platform from Russia and Israel.
During the interviews, Commander Liu stressed that the aviation troops formed the Air Force's backbone. The PLAAF culture has always focused on the role of aircraft as the core of the force, even though the air defense (SAM and AAA) forces have shot down more aircraft. He also emphasized that the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Army, which has also become more integrated into the PLA's joint operations, has established 'fist' units that are now more mobile and have longer range as a result of acquiring several Russian Il-76 transports. (10)
While discussing the PLAAF's current capabilities, Commander Liu has focused on the ability to fight defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The shift from strictly defensive to offensive capabilities derived from the PLAAF's post-Gulf War realization that precision guided missiles (PGMs) and long-range cruise missiles had changed the rules of warfare. This realization was one of the driving forces for the PLAAF to acquire modern weapon systems from Russia. As a result of modernizing its weapon systems, the Air Force has been able to changes its tactics, extend its combat range, and practice providing support for ground and naval operations.
Liu and other PLAAF officials continue to emphasize that three-quarters of its pilots are now able to fly in all-weather conditions, the percentage of category "A" combat regiments, an indicator of the Air Force's combat effectiveness, has reached 95.5 percent, and that the Air Force has a sixteen year flight safety record. (11) As for flying in all-weather conditions, there is some question as to exactly what types of flying the pilots conduct under visual flight regulations (VFR) and night flying conditions. Are these types of flights flown only on cloudless, moonlit nights, or during cloudy, pitch black conditions over long distances while engaged in air intercept training? Since the Chinese media rarely reports aircraft accidents, there is no way to verify the accuracy of the flight safety record, but this claim, also, is questionable. For example, there are credible reports that Cao Shuangming, the PLAAF commander from 1992-1994, was relieved of duty partly due to a series of aircraft accidents that took place under his command. Furthermore, since the PLAAF rarely trains using rapid aircraft turn around sorties and most engines can only be used from 100 to 300 hours before they are overhauled, the maintenance record would probably be reduced considerably during periods of sustained use, such as during a conflict.
Given the PLAAF's current limitations, Commander Liu and other Air Force leaders have expressed an optimistic vision of the future. As the Air Force upgrades the capabilities of its current inventory with foreign technology, begins producing the J-10 and J-11 (Su-27) aircraft, and acquires new fighters (Su-30) and airborne early warning aircraft and SAMs, the PLAAF will be able to extend its range, increase its firepower, and change its tactics through the use of improved electronic warfare, night training, and joint campaign training. The PLAAF will also focus its efforts on research and development, while importing some high-tech weapons.
PLAAF Commander's Assessment (2/2)
The debate in China about importing weapon systems versus domestically producing them continues. For example, a July 1999 report in Science and Technology Daily, complained that China's achievements in many areas over the past twenty years have attracted world attention, but the aviation industry has increasingly lagged behind. The aviation industry continues to have a sprawling organization with weak facilities and low standards, and the gap between it and the aviation industries of the developed western countries is widening. The article lamented that this is cause for anxiety, because without a strong defense there can be no genuine overall strength. (12)
There is also a debate among foreign analysts about how much China's aviation industry has been able to learn from foreign aircraft manufacturers and transfer the knowledge to producing combat aircraft. Foreign aircraft manufacturers have routinely complained for almost two decades that they have spent time and money training Chinese technicians to work on a specific commercial aircraft project, only to have those technicians disappear to some unknown project and be replaced by a new batch of trainees.
While some observers see China's aviation industry as large and stagnant, other observers cite some centers of excellence. Facilities such as the Chengdu Aircraft Company, Xian Aircraft Company, and Shenyang Aircraft Company have made significant progress through joint ventures with Western companies and assistance from Russia and Israel. For example, Boeing 737 tail sections are produced in China with no U.S. backup. These ventures have provided access to Western manufacturing processes and provided valuable technical and managerial training. While these are derived from commercial aircraft manufacturing, the processes are generally the same for a mostly metal fighter aircraft like the J-10 and the Su-27. Only time will tell how these aircraft production programs will turn out. Because of the size of China's air forces, however, any modernization plan will require Chinese production to be economically feasible.
As the PLAAF upgrades its weapons systems, it must also modernize its organizational structure, tactics, training, and support capabilities. One problem associated with analyzing the PLAAF is determining which changes are being tested and which changes are being implemented. PLA journals often discuss research or changes that have taken place at the unit level. Some analysts, however, assume that these changes have been, or will be, implemented throughout the force. This is not necessarily the case. The PLAAF, like the PLA as a whole, has a complex method of introducing new ideas, weapon systems, and tactics into the force. The General Equipment Department has attempted to streamline this process, but only time will tell whether or not it is successful.
After identifying a problem, the PLAAF systematically seeks a solution. First, the appropriate research institute and/or the PLAAF Command College studies the problem from a theoretical perspective and makes recommendations. (13) Next, PLAAF Headquarters approves the recommendations. After this, the theories are tested at the unit level. Occasionally, separate units test different alternatives simultaneously. Based upon evaluations, competing theories may be accepted, modified, or rejected. After the competing theories are tested and accepted at the unit level, they are tested at the next level, and so forth up the organizational structure. At some point, the PLAAF selects one of the theories and begins implementing it force-wide, starting again at the unit level.
This is a time consuming process and involves a tremendous amount of coordination. The problem becomes even more complex if the theory being tested involves more than one PLAAF branch or PLA service. Whereas a change in flying tactics involves only the PLAAF's aviation branch, changes in the logistics system to support joint service operations involves the entire PLA. For example, the 1995 and 1996 exercises opposite Taiwan were intended as a show of force, but they also provided the PLA with the opportunity to test joint training that had been evolving since the end of the Gulf War.
China Improves its Air Force
For the last decade PLAAF doctrine has been shifting from a stress on defensive operations to a new emphasis on "active defense." This term includes a range of operations that can be considered "offensive." Chinese scholar of the PLA You Ji has further listed a range of new tactical operations that stress rapid mobilization, and pre-emptive attacks, and independent operations that all fall under a doctrine of "active defense." The current doctrinal challenge for the PLAAF is to devise tactics and operations that conform to a more recent PLA stress on joint-service operations. All of this points toward the development of a modern vision for the employment of air forces.
TRAINING
In the past PLAAF training was criticized for its lack of realism, an unwillingness to put aircraft at risk, and its stress on following ground control orders. While open source information is limited, it appears that with more advanced aircraft like the Su-27, the PLAAF is exercising harder and is trying to simulate more realistic combat scenarios. There also appears to be a greater emphasis on obtaining modern simulators, which are critical for training multirole fighter operations. The PLA may also be developing it own Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation system, which allows aerial operations to be recorded and analyzed on computer monitors.
MULTIROLE FIGHTERS
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the new stress on "active defense" is the PLAAF's current expansion of its attack-capable multirole fighters. It now appears that most new PLAAF fighters will be multirole aircraft. According to recent reports, the total number of modern multirole fighters could reach between 300 and 400 aircraft by 2005. If realized, this would constitute a rapid transformation of PLAAF capabilities.
The most potent multirole fighter now entering PLAAF service is the Su-30MKK, a twin-seat dedicated attack variant of the Su-27. Recent Russian reports suggest that the PLAAF could acquire 100 of these fighters, perhaps by 2005. Comparable to the U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle, the Su-30MKK is the first PLAAF strike fighter capable of all-weather attack missions with modern precision-guided missiles. It is also a very effective air superiority fighter. With aerial refueling its combat radius can exceed 2,500 miles, which allows strikes against Okinawa, Guam and most of the South China Sea.
Recent reports suggest that China may build up to 500 of its long-awaited Chengdu J-10 fighter. After a twenty-year development period, this F-16 size fighter will soon enter production. Having benefited from Israeli design advice and Russian components, the J-10 will likely also be a potent multirole fighter capable of aerial combat and ground-attack missions with precision-guided weapons.
The PLAAF's urgency in acquiring multirole fighters is demonstrated by its continued acquisition of seemingly obsolete fighters like the Shenyang J-8II and the Xian JH-7. The J-8II is a very old design, yet the PLAAF could build or modify up to 100 with new Russian multimode radar that make this fighter attack capable. The JH-7 is an indigenous Chinese attack fighter that is far less capable than the Su-30MKK, yet China is also persisting with this program by acquiring more British Rolls Royce engines to make more fighters. Though obsolete airframes, the PLAAF understands that with advanced radar and attack munitions, these aircraft can make a valuable contribution to a campaign for Taiwan.
MODERN MUNITIONS
It is also apparent that the PLAAF is following foreign trends and investing more in "smart" long-range munitions that allow the aircraft to avoid enemy air defenses. In the last year the PLAAF has unveiled a new supersonic ramjet-powered attack missile and a new land-attack variant of an older antiship missile. Both were featured on models of the JH-7 attack fighter. The PLAAF is also buying new Russian attack missiles like the Kh-31P anti-radar missile and the Kh-59 television-guided attack missile. At the recent August 2001 Moscow Airshow a new 285km range antiship variant of the Kh-59 was revealed, with strong indications that the PLAAF is its primary customer.
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
Dedicated radar, tanker and intelligence aircraft are essential for modern air combat, and the PLAAF is investing in all three. Its first capable airborne warning and control system (AWACS), the Russian A-50E, may be delivered in 2002. These will be able to direct both offensive and defensive operations over the Taiwan Strait. The PLAAF is converting old H-6 (Tu-16) bombers to aerial tankers and is reported to have purchased more capable Russian Ilyushin Il-78M aerial tankers. The PLAAF is also acquiring a small number of dedicated electronic reconnaissance aircraft and may be developing new drone aircraft for photo reconnaissance.
AIRBORNE FORCES
Recent reports from Taiwan suggest that the 15th Airborne Army may be substantially expanded to a force that exceeds 50,000 men. This plus recent reports that the PLAAF will acquire thirty to forty more large Il-76 transport aircraft, and many other reports of the development of new light armor vehicles, point the potential for a more capable PLA Airborne force in the future. The danger is that such a force could prove instrumental in either scaring Taiwan into submission, or, if used correctly, could deliver the final blow needed to force Taiwan's surrender. However, the airborne forces are not at this stage just yet.
AIR DEFENSES
Often overlooked, the PLAAF is also investing heavily in new radar and anti-aircraft weapons. The PLA understands that to support modern offensive operations, bases and critical logistic nodes require far greater protection. The PLA's radar and electronic warfare capabilities are already quite respectable. The last decade has seen the PLA buy new Russian anti-aircraft missiles and possibly seek Russian help in developing new families of Chinese anti-aircraft missiles. The PLA has also place a high priority on defending against U.S. cruise missiles and precision-guided weapons. PLA systems like the "Bodyguard" combine laser dazzlers plus smoke and chaff to confuse U.S. laser-guided bombs. The PLA is also investing in a number of radar technologies to defeat the U.S. advantage in stealth aircraft.
TRAINING
In the past PLAAF training was criticized for its lack of realism, an unwillingness to put aircraft at risk, and its stress on following ground control orders. While open source information is limited, it appears that with more advanced aircraft like the Su-27, the PLAAF is exercising harder and is trying to simulate more realistic combat scenarios. There also appears to be a greater emphasis on obtaining modern simulators, which are critical for training multirole fighter operations. The PLA may also be developing it own Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation system, which allows aerial operations to be recorded and analyzed on computer monitors.
MULTIROLE FIGHTERS
Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the new stress on "active defense" is the PLAAF's current expansion of its attack-capable multirole fighters. It now appears that most new PLAAF fighters will be multirole aircraft. According to recent reports, the total number of modern multirole fighters could reach between 300 and 400 aircraft by 2005. If realized, this would constitute a rapid transformation of PLAAF capabilities.
The most potent multirole fighter now entering PLAAF service is the Su-30MKK, a twin-seat dedicated attack variant of the Su-27. Recent Russian reports suggest that the PLAAF could acquire 100 of these fighters, perhaps by 2005. Comparable to the U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle, the Su-30MKK is the first PLAAF strike fighter capable of all-weather attack missions with modern precision-guided missiles. It is also a very effective air superiority fighter. With aerial refueling its combat radius can exceed 2,500 miles, which allows strikes against Okinawa, Guam and most of the South China Sea.
Recent reports suggest that China may build up to 500 of its long-awaited Chengdu J-10 fighter. After a twenty-year development period, this F-16 size fighter will soon enter production. Having benefited from Israeli design advice and Russian components, the J-10 will likely also be a potent multirole fighter capable of aerial combat and ground-attack missions with precision-guided weapons.
The PLAAF's urgency in acquiring multirole fighters is demonstrated by its continued acquisition of seemingly obsolete fighters like the Shenyang J-8II and the Xian JH-7. The J-8II is a very old design, yet the PLAAF could build or modify up to 100 with new Russian multimode radar that make this fighter attack capable. The JH-7 is an indigenous Chinese attack fighter that is far less capable than the Su-30MKK, yet China is also persisting with this program by acquiring more British Rolls Royce engines to make more fighters. Though obsolete airframes, the PLAAF understands that with advanced radar and attack munitions, these aircraft can make a valuable contribution to a campaign for Taiwan.
MODERN MUNITIONS
It is also apparent that the PLAAF is following foreign trends and investing more in "smart" long-range munitions that allow the aircraft to avoid enemy air defenses. In the last year the PLAAF has unveiled a new supersonic ramjet-powered attack missile and a new land-attack variant of an older antiship missile. Both were featured on models of the JH-7 attack fighter. The PLAAF is also buying new Russian attack missiles like the Kh-31P anti-radar missile and the Kh-59 television-guided attack missile. At the recent August 2001 Moscow Airshow a new 285km range antiship variant of the Kh-59 was revealed, with strong indications that the PLAAF is its primary customer.
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
Dedicated radar, tanker and intelligence aircraft are essential for modern air combat, and the PLAAF is investing in all three. Its first capable airborne warning and control system (AWACS), the Russian A-50E, may be delivered in 2002. These will be able to direct both offensive and defensive operations over the Taiwan Strait. The PLAAF is converting old H-6 (Tu-16) bombers to aerial tankers and is reported to have purchased more capable Russian Ilyushin Il-78M aerial tankers. The PLAAF is also acquiring a small number of dedicated electronic reconnaissance aircraft and may be developing new drone aircraft for photo reconnaissance.
AIRBORNE FORCES
Recent reports from Taiwan suggest that the 15th Airborne Army may be substantially expanded to a force that exceeds 50,000 men. This plus recent reports that the PLAAF will acquire thirty to forty more large Il-76 transport aircraft, and many other reports of the development of new light armor vehicles, point the potential for a more capable PLA Airborne force in the future. The danger is that such a force could prove instrumental in either scaring Taiwan into submission, or, if used correctly, could deliver the final blow needed to force Taiwan's surrender. However, the airborne forces are not at this stage just yet.
AIR DEFENSES
Often overlooked, the PLAAF is also investing heavily in new radar and anti-aircraft weapons. The PLA understands that to support modern offensive operations, bases and critical logistic nodes require far greater protection. The PLA's radar and electronic warfare capabilities are already quite respectable. The last decade has seen the PLA buy new Russian anti-aircraft missiles and possibly seek Russian help in developing new families of Chinese anti-aircraft missiles. The PLA has also place a high priority on defending against U.S. cruise missiles and precision-guided weapons. PLA systems like the "Bodyguard" combine laser dazzlers plus smoke and chaff to confuse U.S. laser-guided bombs. The PLA is also investing in a number of radar technologies to defeat the U.S. advantage in stealth aircraft.
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