A major review of US military strategy Friday singled out China as the country with the greatest potential to challenge the United States militarily.The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) rated Russia as a "country in transition" that is unlikely to pose a military threat on the scale of the Soviet Union, and said India is emerging as "a great power and a key strategic partner."
The review, which is conducted every four years, said a key goal for the US military in the coming years will be to "shape the choices of countries at a strategic crossroads."The QDR report noted China's steady but secretive military buildup since 1996.
"Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that over time offset traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies," the report said.The pace and scope of China's military buildup already puts regional military balances at risk, it said.It listed an array of high end military capabilities that China is investing in.
They include electronic and cyberwarfare, counter-space operations, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced integrated air defense systems, next generation torpedoes, advanced submarines, land and sea-base strategic nuclear missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
"These capabilities, the vast distances of the Asian theater, China's continental depth, and the challenge of en route and in-theater US basing place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied area," the report said.
It said US policy aims at encouraging China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization, rather than military threat or intimidation.But, it said, "The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization.""The United States encourages China to take actions to make its intentions clear and clarify its military plans."
Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, said the United States wanted to be a partner in China's peaceful rise, but have the means to dissuade it from taking an adversarial path."We think China should have a military capability sufficient to meet its genuine security needs," he told reporters. He indicated those should be regional in scope.
The report also flags US worries about Russia, citing the erosion of democracy there and restrictions on non-governmental organizations and press freedoms."Internationally, the United States welcomes Russia as a constructive partner but views with increasing concern its sales of disruptive weapons technologies abroad and actions that compromise the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of other states," it said.In the case of India, the report foresaw "continued and increased strategic cooperation."
Sunday, 24 February 2008
China 'Likely' Saw U.S. Secrets
Shuddering and out of control, the Navy spy plane plunged toward the Earth. Inside, 24 stunned Americans worked feverishly - first to save themselves, then, when survival looked within reach, to prevent national security secrets from falling into Chinese hands.They tossed classified materials out a hatch, smashed equipment with an ax and prepared to ditch their crippled aircraft.
The crew of the EP-3 electronic surveillance plane survived, but, unfortunately, so did some of its secrets.A newly released Navy investigation report on the April 1, 2001, incident concludes that some of those classified materials likely were found by Chinese officials who took control of the plane when it landed on China's Hainan Island.
The crew was detained on the island for 11 days and China refused Bush administration requests to fly the damaged plane home; it was cut up and flown back to U.S. territory in pieces.
A partially censored copy of the report was provided to reporters Thursday after it was released to Jane's Defense Weekly in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Deleted were specifics about the classified materials aboard the spy plane and procedures for handling the materials.
Investigators found no fault with the crew's performance, although they recommended that aircrews of such planes be required to practice emergency destruction drills as part of regular training.The report made no assessment of the damage caused by the likely compromise of national secrets, which likely included information about U.S. electronic surveillance targets or techniques.
The EP-3 was flying southeast of Hainan Island, five hours into a routine mission over the South China Sea, when two Chinese F-8 fighter jets approached it. One of the fighters eventually struck the Navy plane in its No. 1 propeller, ripping the fighter in half and throwing the EP-3 out of control.The U.S. plane fell into an uncontrolled dive from about 22,000 feet, descending at a rate of 4,000 feet per minute. The Chinese pilot was killed.
"The destruction of classified material was accomplished while the aircrew was probably still in shock from the aircraft collision and the subsequent rapid descent of the aircraft and with very little time prior to landing," the report said.
After reviewing the investigators' findings, Adm. William Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations, in March 2003 recommended no disciplinary action against the crew, saying they "performed well under dire circumstances." A copy of Fallon's letter was released with the investigative report.The EP-3 crew belonged to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One, based at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash. The report said they were fully qualified and ready for the mission. The EP-3 is designed to conduct reconnaissance and collect electronic signals intelligence.
Materials classified as confidential, secret and top secret were, as a matter of normal practice, carried aboard the plane in papers, magnetic tapes, computer disks and computer hard drives, the report said.After the Chinese fighter struck the Navy plane, causing the U.S. plane to shake violently and snap-roll to the left at about a 140-degree angle of bank, the aircraft commander, Lt. Shane Osborn, gave the order for the crew to prepare to bail out.Out of control, the plane fell to about 15,000 feet when it began to level off but continued to vibrate violently.
At 10,000 feet, the crew regained partial control of the plane. Procedures do not require that destruction of classified material begin in that situation. After the No. 1 engine was shut down and the plane became more controllable, the crew was redirected to "prepare to ditch," meaning they would stay with the plane as it went down.Although not required at that point, the crew began to destroy classified material, the report said. Some was jettisoned out a hatch, and equipment was smashed with an ax and other hard objects such as metal containers. Upon landing at a military air base on Hainan Island some remaining classified papers were shredded.
The Chinese military ordered the Americans off the plane and took control of it. The investigation report said the crew had hidden some classified materials on the plane and hand-shredded some papers."Therefore, compromise of undestroyed classified material is highly probable," it concluded.
The crew of the EP-3 electronic surveillance plane survived, but, unfortunately, so did some of its secrets.A newly released Navy investigation report on the April 1, 2001, incident concludes that some of those classified materials likely were found by Chinese officials who took control of the plane when it landed on China's Hainan Island.
The crew was detained on the island for 11 days and China refused Bush administration requests to fly the damaged plane home; it was cut up and flown back to U.S. territory in pieces.
A partially censored copy of the report was provided to reporters Thursday after it was released to Jane's Defense Weekly in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Deleted were specifics about the classified materials aboard the spy plane and procedures for handling the materials.
Investigators found no fault with the crew's performance, although they recommended that aircrews of such planes be required to practice emergency destruction drills as part of regular training.The report made no assessment of the damage caused by the likely compromise of national secrets, which likely included information about U.S. electronic surveillance targets or techniques.
The EP-3 was flying southeast of Hainan Island, five hours into a routine mission over the South China Sea, when two Chinese F-8 fighter jets approached it. One of the fighters eventually struck the Navy plane in its No. 1 propeller, ripping the fighter in half and throwing the EP-3 out of control.The U.S. plane fell into an uncontrolled dive from about 22,000 feet, descending at a rate of 4,000 feet per minute. The Chinese pilot was killed.
"The destruction of classified material was accomplished while the aircrew was probably still in shock from the aircraft collision and the subsequent rapid descent of the aircraft and with very little time prior to landing," the report said.
After reviewing the investigators' findings, Adm. William Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations, in March 2003 recommended no disciplinary action against the crew, saying they "performed well under dire circumstances." A copy of Fallon's letter was released with the investigative report.The EP-3 crew belonged to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One, based at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash. The report said they were fully qualified and ready for the mission. The EP-3 is designed to conduct reconnaissance and collect electronic signals intelligence.
Materials classified as confidential, secret and top secret were, as a matter of normal practice, carried aboard the plane in papers, magnetic tapes, computer disks and computer hard drives, the report said.After the Chinese fighter struck the Navy plane, causing the U.S. plane to shake violently and snap-roll to the left at about a 140-degree angle of bank, the aircraft commander, Lt. Shane Osborn, gave the order for the crew to prepare to bail out.Out of control, the plane fell to about 15,000 feet when it began to level off but continued to vibrate violently.
At 10,000 feet, the crew regained partial control of the plane. Procedures do not require that destruction of classified material begin in that situation. After the No. 1 engine was shut down and the plane became more controllable, the crew was redirected to "prepare to ditch," meaning they would stay with the plane as it went down.Although not required at that point, the crew began to destroy classified material, the report said. Some was jettisoned out a hatch, and equipment was smashed with an ax and other hard objects such as metal containers. Upon landing at a military air base on Hainan Island some remaining classified papers were shredded.
The Chinese military ordered the Americans off the plane and took control of it. The investigation report said the crew had hidden some classified materials on the plane and hand-shredded some papers."Therefore, compromise of undestroyed classified material is highly probable," it concluded.
China's Secret Nuclear Carrier (Udpated Again)

The South Korean newspaper Hankyoreh is reporting that it's obtained information on a top-secret dossier that claims China plans to build a nuclear-powered carrier by 2020. Those claims, if true, would certainly have big implications for China's military power -- extending the reach of China's navy out to Guam as the article notes:
A source close to Chinese military affairs said on March 27 that China has been promoting the construction of a 93,000-ton atomic-powered carrier under a plan titled the "085 Project." The nation also has a plan to build a 48,000-ton non-nuclear-powered carrier under the so-called "089 Project," added the source. China had so far been known to be pushing ahead with construction of a non-nuclear-powered carrier, but not an atomic-powered one.
Once the proposed Chinese carriers are deployed, the radius of the Chinese Navy¡¯s range is expected to reach Guam, where a U.S. base is located. Thus, military experts are worried about China¡¯s moves prompting an arms race in Northeast Asia.
The dossier said the construction of the nuclear-powered carrier will be completed in 2020. China State Shipbuiling Corp¡¯s Jiangnan shipyard located on Changxing Island near Shanghai, will be responsible for its design and construction. The size is similar to former Soviet¡¯s unfinished atomic-powered carrier Ulyanovsk, the dossier states. China reportedly secretly purchased the design of Ulyanovsk from Russia. When the nuclear-powered carrier is finished, China will own an aircraft carrier which is on par with the U.S.¡¯s newest of such vessels, the 97,000-ton atomic-powered USS Ronald Reagan, which recently docked at Busan Port to participate in a joint exercise between the South Korean and U.S. militaries.
UPDATE #1: Michael Goldfarb at the Weekly Standard says the carrier report, if true, may be nothin' more than a big bullseye, but it demonstrates China's commitment to being a world power.
I'd still contend that, as Brookes put it, Chinese carriers would be "nuthin’ but big, fat gray targets," but that doesn't change the fact that an aircraft carrier would boost Beijing's ability to project "soft power." And deploying a Nimitz-sized nuclear carrier would, like the ASAT test, show that China is to be considered a military superpower.
UPDATE #2: Dave, a self-declared DANGER ROOM fan (which we always appreciate) tells me that the Korean newspaper's big scoop has actually been around for some time (okay, but in Chinese). He also notes the newspaper has confused the "085" with the "089" (the latter being the nuclear-powered carrier).
Monday, 18 February 2008
Chinese Special Operations Forces: "Lessons Learned" and Potential Missions.
Over the past 10-15 years, China has placed increasing emphasis on the development and improvement of its special operations forces . According to the 2000 U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military power, particularly since the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, the PLA has devoted considerable resources to the development of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Moreover, the PLA identified the further development of these elite units as “an integral element of ground force modernization. In keeping with this assessment, the PLA in the 1990s created a number of new SOF units, with capabilities similar to U.S. Army Ranger units, as a complement to its existing long-range reconnaissance forces . This emphasis on enhancing SOF capabilities was sparked at least in part by Chinese analysis of the role of special operations in conflicts such as the Falkland Islands War and the Gulf War. According to PLA strategists, one of the key lessons of these conflicts was that special warfare has become an indispensable and important combat operation in modern campaigns.
The level of priority accorded to improving SOF capabilities seems to have grown even further over the past few years, as reflected by a passage in Chinas 2006 National Defense White Paper, which identifies improving special operations capabilities as one of the Armys major military modernization priorities. The white paper states, the Army aims at moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, and improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults and special operations.†This increasingly strong interest in special operations capabilities almost certainly derives from Chinese analysis of the role of special operations units in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It appears that Chinese analysts have devoted a considerable amount of attention to observing and analyzing the performance of U.S. and coalition special operations forces in both of these conflicts. Indeed, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and Central Military Commission (CMC) reportedly established special research taskforces to analyze the role of special operations in Operation Enduring Freedom .
Chinese analysts argue that the role of SOF in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and other recent conflicts underscores their increasing importance in fighting local wars under informatized conditions. For example, one recent Chinese article concludes that special operations forces have emerged from the shadows and moved to the center of the stage as a result of their central role in recent conflicts. According to the author of this analysis, SOF achieved "striking results in battle" in Afghanistan and the status of special operations forces increased even further following their widespread employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), during which they conducted a variety of missions, including special reconnaissance, targeting for air strikes, direct action in the enemy's rear area, disruption of enemy logistics and search and rescue, as well as playing a key role in the decapitation strategy and participating directly in major combat operations . According to the author of this article, the influence of special operations is no longer relegated to the tactical and operational levels. On the contrary, the author asserts, SOF units are capable of directly achieving strategic aims. Consequently, the author concludes, SOF units have become an important force in high-tech local wars; they are indispensable to commanders because of their flexibility and utility, not only in low-intensity conflicts, but also in mid-to-high intensity warfare. Accordingly, the modernization of SOF units should receive a very high priority and the development of elite units should focus on informatized construction and realistic training.
This analysis is consistent with the findings of a number of recent articles in PLA Daily and other Chinese newspapers, which have highlighted the role of U.S. and coalition SOF in the war on terror, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of these articles reflect a favorable view of the potential contributions of SOF, but some also address the challenges of conducting special operations. For example, a January 2007 article on U.S. air strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia stated that opportunities to target the leaders of terrorist groups have been limited by the difficulties of acquiring actionable intelligence on the whereabouts of these elusive high-value targets.
Chinese Views on the Characteristics of Special Operations Forces
Chinese assessments of the role of foreign special operations forces in recent conflicts are an important influence on the development of the PLAs own SOF capabilities. Although much of the available Chinese writing on special operations focuses on assessing foreign experiences, some publications offer insights into how the PLA plans to apply these lessons learned to its own operations. At a general level, PLA writings on special operations define SOF units as elite combat units capable of conducting operations that may achieve strategic results despite their small numbers. For example, according to a 2002 China Militia article, the principle characteristic of small, elite special forces units, which are "very well equipped" (zhuangbei jingliang) and "highly trained" (xunlian yousu), is that they are "of unimposing stature but very strong and capable" (duanxiao jinghan) .
Some Chinese military publications go into greater detail, analyzing the characteristics of SOF and describing the potential roles of PLA special operations units in future warfare. Most notable in this regard is The Science of Campaigns, which defines campaign special warfare (zhanyi tezhong zhan) as a series of combat operations conducted by specially trained and equipped elite forces employing special tactics . Among the strengths of SOF units, according to this volume, are their survivability, self-reliance and flexibility (linghuoxing). SOF groups range in size from just a handful to a few dozen and serve multi-functional objectives. They usually operate in the enemys campaign deep areas, where they carry out operations that are integral to the success of a campaign. They are capable of conducting a variety of missions, and rapidly changing elements of their missions when necessary to achieve their general objectives. Chinese writers emphasize that the success of special warfare operations depends upon the elements of surprise and covertness. It is most difficult for an enemy to defend against special operations attacks when they are sudden and covert. This means that to complete their missions successfully, SOF teams must launch surprise attacks, striking at unexpected times and locations with unexpected combat methods and means. Given these characteristics, special warfare is timed mainly to take advantage of the darkness of night, bad weather, and the enemys negligence.
Based on this analysis of the characteristics and capabilities of SOF, PLA writers discuss a number of potential missions. According to The Science of Campaigns, for example, SOF can be employed to achieve a variety of general operational and strategic objectives, including attacking critical targets and infrastructure, paralyzing the enemys combat system, reducing the enemys combat capabilities, interfering with the enemys combat operations and creating favorable conditions for the main force. More specifically, SOF missions may include:
conducting strategic reconnaissance and collecting intelligence; capturing or assassinating key enemy personnel; engaging in harassment actions; participating in psychological operations; taking part in information and electronic warfare campaigns and launching direct attacks on targets such as airbases, ports, bridges, command and control facilities, radar sites, critical weapons systems, transportation and communications hubs and other rear area logistics facilities, bases and depots. If required, SOF can also provide direct support to main forces by concentrating a certain number of special forces to seize key targets and key points in an enemys deep area in order to directly help the offensive of the main force. In addition, other sources indicate that SOF units may participate in a variety of potential domestic missions, such as counter-terrorism operations, hostage rescue and perhaps even responding to unexpected incidents such as riots and outbreaks of social unrest.
Implications for a China-Taiwan Conflict
Although PLA writers generally refrain from discussing potential SOF missions in Taiwan scenarios, the more general analysis they provide sheds some light on how China would likely employ its special operations capabilities in a cross-Strait conflict. Indeed, these writings suggest that Chinese SOF would likely conduct a broad range of direct action, strategic reconnaissance and other special missions in the event of a conflict with Taiwan. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses that specific missions assigned to PLA SOF units in Taiwan contingency operations would likely include conducting reconnaissance and surveillance; locating or destroying C4I assets, transport nodes, and logistics depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports; and destroying air defense facilities.
In a Taiwan conflict, PLA special operations units would probably play a particularly important role in strategic reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) missions by supplementing Chinas growing space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. For example, SOF units could provide targeting data for precision strikes against critical military targets such as Taiwans major airbases or other government and military facilities. They could also assess the effectiveness of attacks on such targets. Moreover, Chinese media reports indicate that SOF units would conduct strategic reconnaissance missions perhaps as far away as several hundred or thousand kilometers,†which suggests that PLA SOF might also attempt to conduct such missions against U.S. military bases in the region. Potential direct action missions would include attacks on Taiwans airbases, command and control facilities, ISR assets, and key logistics and transportation targets such as major highways and bridges. PLA SOF could also support the efforts of main forces by seizing control of ports or airfields to facilitate their arrival on the island.
Whether independently conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct action missions or supporting main forces, PLA SOF would almost certainly play an important role in almost any type of military operation against Taiwan, ranging from a limited, coercive use of force to a full-scale amphibious invasion. In particular, special operations might be an especially critical factor in a decapitation strategy scenario, in which the PLA would attempt to overthrow Taiwans democratically elected government by capturing or killing senior civilian officials and paralyze the military by degrading the ability of commanders to communicate with forces in the field . As part of a decapitation strike, analysts in Taiwan have speculated that the PLA would launch missile strikes or carry out special operations attacks against the Presidential Palace in Taipei and other important national-level command and control facilities to eliminate pro-independence leaders and paralyze the armed forces . In such a scenario, SOF units would probably infiltrate Taiwan long before the initiation of hostilities and then undertake missions, such as seizing key leadership facilities, attacking key communications nodes and supporting psychological and information operations. Although this would seem like a very high-risk strategy for the PLA, and one with a significant probability of failure, the threat of a potential decapitation strike cannot be ruled out entirely. Indeed, Taiwan has used scenarios involving PLA decapitation strikes in some of its recent military exercises .
Conclusion
Chinese analysts have carefully studied the role of foreign SOF in military operations from the Falkland Islands War to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Based on Chinas analysis of U.S., British, and other foreign special operations in recent years, Chinese strategists envision SOF playing a variety of roles conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct action missions, participating in psychological and information operations and possibly supporting main forcesin future military conflicts. Although often implied rather than stated explicitly in Chinese writings, this almost certainly includes Taiwan contingencies. There are many uncertainties regarding actual Chinese special operations capabilities, but even if PLA SOF units are not on par with the worlds leading special operations units, they could nevertheless pose a serious threat to Taiwanand perhaps to U.S. forces as wellin a variety of conflict scenarios, ranging from a coercive campaign intended to achieve limited political objectives to a full-scale invasion attempt. Preparing to counter the Chinese SOF threat thus represents a growing challenge for planners and policymakers in Taiwan and the United States.
The level of priority accorded to improving SOF capabilities seems to have grown even further over the past few years, as reflected by a passage in Chinas 2006 National Defense White Paper, which identifies improving special operations capabilities as one of the Armys major military modernization priorities. The white paper states, the Army aims at moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, and improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults and special operations.†This increasingly strong interest in special operations capabilities almost certainly derives from Chinese analysis of the role of special operations units in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It appears that Chinese analysts have devoted a considerable amount of attention to observing and analyzing the performance of U.S. and coalition special operations forces in both of these conflicts. Indeed, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and Central Military Commission (CMC) reportedly established special research taskforces to analyze the role of special operations in Operation Enduring Freedom .
Chinese analysts argue that the role of SOF in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and other recent conflicts underscores their increasing importance in fighting local wars under informatized conditions. For example, one recent Chinese article concludes that special operations forces have emerged from the shadows and moved to the center of the stage as a result of their central role in recent conflicts. According to the author of this analysis, SOF achieved "striking results in battle" in Afghanistan and the status of special operations forces increased even further following their widespread employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), during which they conducted a variety of missions, including special reconnaissance, targeting for air strikes, direct action in the enemy's rear area, disruption of enemy logistics and search and rescue, as well as playing a key role in the decapitation strategy and participating directly in major combat operations . According to the author of this article, the influence of special operations is no longer relegated to the tactical and operational levels. On the contrary, the author asserts, SOF units are capable of directly achieving strategic aims. Consequently, the author concludes, SOF units have become an important force in high-tech local wars; they are indispensable to commanders because of their flexibility and utility, not only in low-intensity conflicts, but also in mid-to-high intensity warfare. Accordingly, the modernization of SOF units should receive a very high priority and the development of elite units should focus on informatized construction and realistic training.
This analysis is consistent with the findings of a number of recent articles in PLA Daily and other Chinese newspapers, which have highlighted the role of U.S. and coalition SOF in the war on terror, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of these articles reflect a favorable view of the potential contributions of SOF, but some also address the challenges of conducting special operations. For example, a January 2007 article on U.S. air strikes against al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia stated that opportunities to target the leaders of terrorist groups have been limited by the difficulties of acquiring actionable intelligence on the whereabouts of these elusive high-value targets.
Chinese Views on the Characteristics of Special Operations Forces
Chinese assessments of the role of foreign special operations forces in recent conflicts are an important influence on the development of the PLAs own SOF capabilities. Although much of the available Chinese writing on special operations focuses on assessing foreign experiences, some publications offer insights into how the PLA plans to apply these lessons learned to its own operations. At a general level, PLA writings on special operations define SOF units as elite combat units capable of conducting operations that may achieve strategic results despite their small numbers. For example, according to a 2002 China Militia article, the principle characteristic of small, elite special forces units, which are "very well equipped" (zhuangbei jingliang) and "highly trained" (xunlian yousu), is that they are "of unimposing stature but very strong and capable" (duanxiao jinghan) .
Some Chinese military publications go into greater detail, analyzing the characteristics of SOF and describing the potential roles of PLA special operations units in future warfare. Most notable in this regard is The Science of Campaigns, which defines campaign special warfare (zhanyi tezhong zhan) as a series of combat operations conducted by specially trained and equipped elite forces employing special tactics . Among the strengths of SOF units, according to this volume, are their survivability, self-reliance and flexibility (linghuoxing). SOF groups range in size from just a handful to a few dozen and serve multi-functional objectives. They usually operate in the enemys campaign deep areas, where they carry out operations that are integral to the success of a campaign. They are capable of conducting a variety of missions, and rapidly changing elements of their missions when necessary to achieve their general objectives. Chinese writers emphasize that the success of special warfare operations depends upon the elements of surprise and covertness. It is most difficult for an enemy to defend against special operations attacks when they are sudden and covert. This means that to complete their missions successfully, SOF teams must launch surprise attacks, striking at unexpected times and locations with unexpected combat methods and means. Given these characteristics, special warfare is timed mainly to take advantage of the darkness of night, bad weather, and the enemys negligence.
Based on this analysis of the characteristics and capabilities of SOF, PLA writers discuss a number of potential missions. According to The Science of Campaigns, for example, SOF can be employed to achieve a variety of general operational and strategic objectives, including attacking critical targets and infrastructure, paralyzing the enemys combat system, reducing the enemys combat capabilities, interfering with the enemys combat operations and creating favorable conditions for the main force. More specifically, SOF missions may include:
conducting strategic reconnaissance and collecting intelligence; capturing or assassinating key enemy personnel; engaging in harassment actions; participating in psychological operations; taking part in information and electronic warfare campaigns and launching direct attacks on targets such as airbases, ports, bridges, command and control facilities, radar sites, critical weapons systems, transportation and communications hubs and other rear area logistics facilities, bases and depots. If required, SOF can also provide direct support to main forces by concentrating a certain number of special forces to seize key targets and key points in an enemys deep area in order to directly help the offensive of the main force. In addition, other sources indicate that SOF units may participate in a variety of potential domestic missions, such as counter-terrorism operations, hostage rescue and perhaps even responding to unexpected incidents such as riots and outbreaks of social unrest.
Implications for a China-Taiwan Conflict
Although PLA writers generally refrain from discussing potential SOF missions in Taiwan scenarios, the more general analysis they provide sheds some light on how China would likely employ its special operations capabilities in a cross-Strait conflict. Indeed, these writings suggest that Chinese SOF would likely conduct a broad range of direct action, strategic reconnaissance and other special missions in the event of a conflict with Taiwan. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses that specific missions assigned to PLA SOF units in Taiwan contingency operations would likely include conducting reconnaissance and surveillance; locating or destroying C4I assets, transport nodes, and logistics depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports; and destroying air defense facilities.
In a Taiwan conflict, PLA special operations units would probably play a particularly important role in strategic reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) missions by supplementing Chinas growing space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. For example, SOF units could provide targeting data for precision strikes against critical military targets such as Taiwans major airbases or other government and military facilities. They could also assess the effectiveness of attacks on such targets. Moreover, Chinese media reports indicate that SOF units would conduct strategic reconnaissance missions perhaps as far away as several hundred or thousand kilometers,†which suggests that PLA SOF might also attempt to conduct such missions against U.S. military bases in the region. Potential direct action missions would include attacks on Taiwans airbases, command and control facilities, ISR assets, and key logistics and transportation targets such as major highways and bridges. PLA SOF could also support the efforts of main forces by seizing control of ports or airfields to facilitate their arrival on the island.
Whether independently conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct action missions or supporting main forces, PLA SOF would almost certainly play an important role in almost any type of military operation against Taiwan, ranging from a limited, coercive use of force to a full-scale amphibious invasion. In particular, special operations might be an especially critical factor in a decapitation strategy scenario, in which the PLA would attempt to overthrow Taiwans democratically elected government by capturing or killing senior civilian officials and paralyze the military by degrading the ability of commanders to communicate with forces in the field . As part of a decapitation strike, analysts in Taiwan have speculated that the PLA would launch missile strikes or carry out special operations attacks against the Presidential Palace in Taipei and other important national-level command and control facilities to eliminate pro-independence leaders and paralyze the armed forces . In such a scenario, SOF units would probably infiltrate Taiwan long before the initiation of hostilities and then undertake missions, such as seizing key leadership facilities, attacking key communications nodes and supporting psychological and information operations. Although this would seem like a very high-risk strategy for the PLA, and one with a significant probability of failure, the threat of a potential decapitation strike cannot be ruled out entirely. Indeed, Taiwan has used scenarios involving PLA decapitation strikes in some of its recent military exercises .
Conclusion
Chinese analysts have carefully studied the role of foreign SOF in military operations from the Falkland Islands War to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Based on Chinas analysis of U.S., British, and other foreign special operations in recent years, Chinese strategists envision SOF playing a variety of roles conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct action missions, participating in psychological and information operations and possibly supporting main forcesin future military conflicts. Although often implied rather than stated explicitly in Chinese writings, this almost certainly includes Taiwan contingencies. There are many uncertainties regarding actual Chinese special operations capabilities, but even if PLA SOF units are not on par with the worlds leading special operations units, they could nevertheless pose a serious threat to Taiwanand perhaps to U.S. forces as wellin a variety of conflict scenarios, ranging from a coercive campaign intended to achieve limited political objectives to a full-scale invasion attempt. Preparing to counter the Chinese SOF threat thus represents a growing challenge for planners and policymakers in Taiwan and the United States.
China's Emerging Strategic Partnerships in Africa
Chinese President Hu Jintao wrapped up his eight-country, twelve-day African tour this month in the midst of controversy regarding Chinas role in the continent. Government officials from the countries that received Chinas leader expressed gratitude for their guests generous offers of aid, cancellations of debt and promises of trade and investment. Critics, however, charge that Chinas actions in Africa are no less than neocolonialism, as it seizes a new sphere of influence, grabs oil and other resources, props up repressive regimes and leaves individual African countries on the losing end. Beijing has refuted such characterizations by identifying itself with the developing world, stressing the reciprocal nature of its interactions with Africa and promising a new paradigm of China-Africa partnership based on the traditional friendship.
Beijings Unprecedented Focus on Africa
The international attention on Chinas relations with Africa is in part a result of the Chinese leaderships decision to make the resource-rich continent one of its foreign policy priorities in recent years. Hus latest trip to Africa is his second within a span of one year, the third as Chinas President and the fifth since he became a member of the Politburo in the early 1990s. In the summer of 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao toured seven African countries. Since 2004, six senior Chinese leaders from the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party have visited Africa, covering most of the countries on the continent . The Chinese foreign ministers decision to select an African country as his first foreign trip of each year since 1991 indicates the extensive focus that Chinese leaders have placed upon Africa and, in doing so, reveals the importance that Beijing has attached to that part of the world.
The watershed event in Sino-African relations was the elaborate Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing last November. As a part of the 2006 Chinas Year of Africas and in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Chinas diplomatic relationship with Africa, 48 out of the 53 African countries sent their leaders to Beijing for a gathering that no other country in the world has yet been able to assemble. Beijings streets and subways were filled with celebratory signs; President Hu, standing at the Great Hall of the People, received all 48 African leaders, most of them presidents or prime ministers and over the course of the following days, promised a long list of future initiatives of cooperation bundled with generous financial incentives:
- A new type of China-Africa strategic partnership, characterized by “political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges, was announced as an overall framework in bilateral relations.
- Additional high-level bilateral visits in order to maintain the positive momentum of Sino-African relations were proposed. The foreign ministers of China and the African countries will hold political consultations in New York on the sideline of the UN General Assembly to exchange views on major issues of common interest.
- China and Africa will work to more than double the current trade volumes by 2010, reaching $100 billion in bilateral trade.
- China will encourage investment in Africa by setting up a China-Africa development fund amounting to $5 billion and establishing special economic zones in Africa.
- Beijing will provide African countries with $3 billion in preferential loans in the next three years, while also canceling $1 billion of debt from African countries.
- Trade deals signed between Chinese and African corporations during the summit totaled $1.9 billion.
- In addition to providing a $37.5 million grant for anti-malarial drugs in the next three years, Beijing will assist African countries in building 30 hospitals and 30 demonstration centers for the prevention and treatment of malaria
- China will build 100 rural schools in Africa over the next three years and double the number of current scholarships given to African students to study in China from 2,000 to 4,000 by 2009 .
The Three Notables: Sudan, Zambia and South Africa
President Hus much publicized African trip is clearly a strategic step and a committed follow-up to the FOCAC summit. To carry out Beijings promise of enhanced cooperation, Hu delivered offers and initiatives at every stop of his eight-country tour. Three particular countries on Hus itinerary, however, generated more headlines than the others: Sudan, Zambia and South Africa. Each country represents a specific challenge that Beijing faces in its African diplomacy.
Of the three countries, China has the most significant energy interests in Sudan, and its oil companies have been operating in the country since the departure of the Western oil majors in the mid-1990s. The state-owned China National Petroleum Cooperation has the largest overseas production in Sudan, and other Chinese firms have also invested heavily in refineries, pipelines and other infrastructure projects. Bilateral trade reached $2.9 billion in the first eleven months of 2006. China is Sudans largest trading partner, while Sudan is Chinas third-largest trading partner in Africa . In recent years, Beijing has been facing increased international criticism for its unwillingness to use its significant economic leverage to persuade the Sudanese government to cease its sponsorship of atrocities in the Darfur region. In what seemed to be a response to the criticism and possibly a departure from Chinas traditional policy of non-interference in other countries domestic affairs, Hu presented a four-point proposal on seeking a resolution on Darfur during his meeting with Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir. The most important point was Hus support of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur . While it is too early to conclude from such a mild case of interference that there are any major changes in Chinas foreign policy tenets, Hus Sudan encounter certainly reflects Beijings desire to stabilize Sudan and to be perceived as a responsible power by the international community.
In Zambia, the rapid influx of Chinese businessmen and investment in the countries rich copper and other commodity sectors has resulted in accusations that many of the Chinese owners have exploited the local workers. Not long ago, the opposition leader in Zambias election ran on an anti-China platform, and though he lost the election, accusations of low wages and other mistreatment in Chinese-owned mines linger. Hus stop in Zambia was marked by efforts from both sides to defuse criticisms, with Beijing offering Zambia $800 million in special loans and canceling $350 million in debts that Zambia owed to China. The two governments also announced the establishment of a special economiczone. While Hu emphatically rejected the view that China is simply replacing the old colonial powers, interested in extracting Africas resources for its own economic benefits, Chinas own record of labor protection during the past three decades is a troubling one; extraordinary efforts will be required if fair labor laws are to be strictly enforced abroad.
Chinas presence in South Africa is likewise being questioned, though the debate has been centered upon the extent to which bilateral economic ties between the two countries are competitive or complementary. South Africa is Chinas largest trading partner on the continent, with bilateral trade totaling $6.3 billion in 2005, up 42.4 percent year-on-year . As the most advanced economy in Africa, South Africa's domestic economy has received serious challenges from the arrival of Chinese products. There are significant concerns that Chinese imports are resulting in the loss of manufacturing jobs in South Africa. Facing concerns that South Africa may end up in a neocolonial relationship, exporting resources to China and receiving more expensive valued-added manufacturing goods in return familiar pattern that characterizes Africas past colonial trade relations with Europe Hu pledged to address the issue of trade imbalances between China and Africa, which are heavily in Chinas favor.
Africa a Zero-Sum Game?
Regarding the prospects of further China-Africa cooperation, the issues raised during Hus latest trip to Africa will almost certainly resurface again. Zhongnanhais economic interests in the continent as well as its global aspirations guarantee that China will not be disengaging from Africa in the near future. In fact, Chinas policymakers and academics will pay even closer attention to these contentious problems, and Beijing is likely to continue to adjust its policies toward Africa in order to both advance its relations with the continent and to fend off international criticism.
Such resolve may only be reinforced, rather than weakened, by the recent decision of the U.S. military to create an Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The fact that the announcement coincided with President Hus tour of Africa may lead China to believe that the United States intends to compete with it for both geopolitical influence and resources on the continent. Yet, such a move is likely to reinforce Beijings awareness of the current limitations of its global reach, and could strengthen the voices inside Chinas military and policymaking circles that call for the development of even greater power projection capabilities.
The irony is that both China and the United States have similar interests in gaining access to Africas vast energy and raw material resources, and both require a stable environment on the continent in order for them to achieve their objectives. The two major powers could also work together to tackle many of the development problems facing African countries. It is therefore in Beijings interests to forge a truly win-win situation in its relations with Africa, while exploring a cooperative framework with the United States and the EU countries to ensure that the major powers do not engage in hostile policies that harm both the African people as well as their own interests.
Beijings Unprecedented Focus on Africa
The international attention on Chinas relations with Africa is in part a result of the Chinese leaderships decision to make the resource-rich continent one of its foreign policy priorities in recent years. Hus latest trip to Africa is his second within a span of one year, the third as Chinas President and the fifth since he became a member of the Politburo in the early 1990s. In the summer of 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao toured seven African countries. Since 2004, six senior Chinese leaders from the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party have visited Africa, covering most of the countries on the continent . The Chinese foreign ministers decision to select an African country as his first foreign trip of each year since 1991 indicates the extensive focus that Chinese leaders have placed upon Africa and, in doing so, reveals the importance that Beijing has attached to that part of the world.
The watershed event in Sino-African relations was the elaborate Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing last November. As a part of the 2006 Chinas Year of Africas and in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Chinas diplomatic relationship with Africa, 48 out of the 53 African countries sent their leaders to Beijing for a gathering that no other country in the world has yet been able to assemble. Beijings streets and subways were filled with celebratory signs; President Hu, standing at the Great Hall of the People, received all 48 African leaders, most of them presidents or prime ministers and over the course of the following days, promised a long list of future initiatives of cooperation bundled with generous financial incentives:
- A new type of China-Africa strategic partnership, characterized by “political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges, was announced as an overall framework in bilateral relations.
- Additional high-level bilateral visits in order to maintain the positive momentum of Sino-African relations were proposed. The foreign ministers of China and the African countries will hold political consultations in New York on the sideline of the UN General Assembly to exchange views on major issues of common interest.
- China and Africa will work to more than double the current trade volumes by 2010, reaching $100 billion in bilateral trade.
- China will encourage investment in Africa by setting up a China-Africa development fund amounting to $5 billion and establishing special economic zones in Africa.
- Beijing will provide African countries with $3 billion in preferential loans in the next three years, while also canceling $1 billion of debt from African countries.
- Trade deals signed between Chinese and African corporations during the summit totaled $1.9 billion.
- In addition to providing a $37.5 million grant for anti-malarial drugs in the next three years, Beijing will assist African countries in building 30 hospitals and 30 demonstration centers for the prevention and treatment of malaria
- China will build 100 rural schools in Africa over the next three years and double the number of current scholarships given to African students to study in China from 2,000 to 4,000 by 2009 .
The Three Notables: Sudan, Zambia and South Africa
President Hus much publicized African trip is clearly a strategic step and a committed follow-up to the FOCAC summit. To carry out Beijings promise of enhanced cooperation, Hu delivered offers and initiatives at every stop of his eight-country tour. Three particular countries on Hus itinerary, however, generated more headlines than the others: Sudan, Zambia and South Africa. Each country represents a specific challenge that Beijing faces in its African diplomacy.
Of the three countries, China has the most significant energy interests in Sudan, and its oil companies have been operating in the country since the departure of the Western oil majors in the mid-1990s. The state-owned China National Petroleum Cooperation has the largest overseas production in Sudan, and other Chinese firms have also invested heavily in refineries, pipelines and other infrastructure projects. Bilateral trade reached $2.9 billion in the first eleven months of 2006. China is Sudans largest trading partner, while Sudan is Chinas third-largest trading partner in Africa . In recent years, Beijing has been facing increased international criticism for its unwillingness to use its significant economic leverage to persuade the Sudanese government to cease its sponsorship of atrocities in the Darfur region. In what seemed to be a response to the criticism and possibly a departure from Chinas traditional policy of non-interference in other countries domestic affairs, Hu presented a four-point proposal on seeking a resolution on Darfur during his meeting with Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir. The most important point was Hus support of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur . While it is too early to conclude from such a mild case of interference that there are any major changes in Chinas foreign policy tenets, Hus Sudan encounter certainly reflects Beijings desire to stabilize Sudan and to be perceived as a responsible power by the international community.
In Zambia, the rapid influx of Chinese businessmen and investment in the countries rich copper and other commodity sectors has resulted in accusations that many of the Chinese owners have exploited the local workers. Not long ago, the opposition leader in Zambias election ran on an anti-China platform, and though he lost the election, accusations of low wages and other mistreatment in Chinese-owned mines linger. Hus stop in Zambia was marked by efforts from both sides to defuse criticisms, with Beijing offering Zambia $800 million in special loans and canceling $350 million in debts that Zambia owed to China. The two governments also announced the establishment of a special economiczone. While Hu emphatically rejected the view that China is simply replacing the old colonial powers, interested in extracting Africas resources for its own economic benefits, Chinas own record of labor protection during the past three decades is a troubling one; extraordinary efforts will be required if fair labor laws are to be strictly enforced abroad.
Chinas presence in South Africa is likewise being questioned, though the debate has been centered upon the extent to which bilateral economic ties between the two countries are competitive or complementary. South Africa is Chinas largest trading partner on the continent, with bilateral trade totaling $6.3 billion in 2005, up 42.4 percent year-on-year . As the most advanced economy in Africa, South Africa's domestic economy has received serious challenges from the arrival of Chinese products. There are significant concerns that Chinese imports are resulting in the loss of manufacturing jobs in South Africa. Facing concerns that South Africa may end up in a neocolonial relationship, exporting resources to China and receiving more expensive valued-added manufacturing goods in return familiar pattern that characterizes Africas past colonial trade relations with Europe Hu pledged to address the issue of trade imbalances between China and Africa, which are heavily in Chinas favor.
Africa a Zero-Sum Game?
Regarding the prospects of further China-Africa cooperation, the issues raised during Hus latest trip to Africa will almost certainly resurface again. Zhongnanhais economic interests in the continent as well as its global aspirations guarantee that China will not be disengaging from Africa in the near future. In fact, Chinas policymakers and academics will pay even closer attention to these contentious problems, and Beijing is likely to continue to adjust its policies toward Africa in order to both advance its relations with the continent and to fend off international criticism.
Such resolve may only be reinforced, rather than weakened, by the recent decision of the U.S. military to create an Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The fact that the announcement coincided with President Hus tour of Africa may lead China to believe that the United States intends to compete with it for both geopolitical influence and resources on the continent. Yet, such a move is likely to reinforce Beijings awareness of the current limitations of its global reach, and could strengthen the voices inside Chinas military and policymaking circles that call for the development of even greater power projection capabilities.
The irony is that both China and the United States have similar interests in gaining access to Africas vast energy and raw material resources, and both require a stable environment on the continent in order for them to achieve their objectives. The two major powers could also work together to tackle many of the development problems facing African countries. It is therefore in Beijings interests to forge a truly win-win situation in its relations with Africa, while exploring a cooperative framework with the United States and the EU countries to ensure that the major powers do not engage in hostile policies that harm both the African people as well as their own interests.
Wednesday, 13 February 2008
Chinese Submarine Patrols Rebound in 2007,but Remain Limited.

China’s entire fleet of approximately 55 general-purpose submarines conducted a total of six patrols during 2007, slightly better than the two patrols conducted in 2006 and zero in 2005.
The 2007 performance matches China’s all-time high of six patrols conducted in 2000, the only two years since 1981 that Chinese submarines conducted more than five patrols in a single year.
The new information, obtained by Federation of American Scientists from the U.S. Navy under the Freedom of Information Act, also shows that none of China’s ballistic missile submarines have ever conducted a deterrent patrol.
In Perspective
Just what constitutes a Chinese “patrol” is secret, according to the U.S. Navy, but it probably refers to an extended voyage away from the homeport area (see here for further definitions). The seven Chinese patrols conducted in 2007 is but a fraction of the number of patrols conducted by the U.S. submarine force, which musters well over 100 patrols per year. But a comparison of U.S. and Chinese submarine patrol levels is not possible because the two navies have very different missions. China has no overseas military commitments and uses its submarine fleet almost exclusively as a coastal defense force, whereas the U.S. submarine force is constantly engaged in forward operations alone or with allies.
The Chinese patrol rate compares better with that of the Russian Navy, which has largely ceased forward submarine operations compared with those of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Russian general purpose submarines conducted seven patrols in 2007.
In historic perspective, the six Chinese submarine patrols conducted in 2007 continues a trend that China in this decade has sent slightly more submarines on patrol than during the 1990s. Whereas Chinese submarines in the 1990s conducted an average of 1.2 patrols each year, the average has been 3.4 patrols since 2000.
About Those Boomers
Twenty-five years after it launched its first ballistic missiles submarine, Xia (Type 092), China has yet to conduct its first deterrent patrol. The new information confirms that neither the Xia, nor the two new Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines - the first of which was launched in 2004 - have ever conducted a deterrent patrol.
The single-warhead Julang-1 sea-launched ballistic missile developed for the Xia has been test launched twice, but is not thought to be fully operational and has been referred to by the U.S. intelligence community for years as the CSS-NX-3 (X for experimental). Each Jin-class submarine has 12 launch tubes for the new Julang-2 sea-launched ballistic missile, which the U.S. intelligence community estimates will carry a single warhead.
The future mission of the missile submarines appears to be regional because the range of the missiles and operational constraints facing the submarines limit the targets that can be held at risk. The range of the Julang-2 is estimated by the US intelligence community at more than 8,000 km (4,970+ miles), which brings Hawaii and Alaska (but not the continental United States) within reach from Chinese territorial waters. Assuming they made it out of port past lurking U.S. attack submarines, the Chinese missile submarines would have to sail through the narrow straight between South Korea and Japan into the Sea of Japan for its Julang-2 missiles to be able to strike the Seattle area.
The Bo Hai Bay has been suggested as a possible deployment area for China’s missile submarines because it would offer more protection against hostile attack submarines. From the shallow bay, the Julang-2 missiles could be used to target Guam and Alaska, India, Russia, and - at the limit of its range - Hawaii.
There are also rumors - one apparently even with a photo - that China may plan to homeport some of its ballistic missile submarines at the new submarine base under construction at Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The infrastructure includes what appears to be a waterway entrance to an underground facility similar to the underground facility at Jianggezhuang submarine base near Qingdao where the Xia is based. Hainan Island has access to deeper waters than Jianggezhuang, but is also less protected. From Hainan Island the Julang-2 would be within range of Guam, India and most of Russia, but not Hawaii.
The U.S. Navy has assessed that China might build as many as five Jin-class submarines “in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence,” but is yet unclear whether China plans to develop a near-continuous sea-based deterrent or just a surge capability for deployment in a crisis. If all current ballistic missile boats became fully operational, China could deploy a maximum of 36 warheads at sea, although at least one of the boats would probably be in overhaul at any given time. Whatever the future mission, absent any deterrent patrols so far, the Chinese military will first have to learn how to operate the missile submarines in a way that would matter.
Implications
Despite the rebound in general purpose submarine patrols, dramatic reports from recent years about Chinese submarines operating inside Japanese territorial waters or surfacing close to U.S. aircraft carriers have been largely absent in 2007. The meaning of the patrol rebound is yet unclear. After all, it follows a complete absence of submarine patrols in 2005, the fourth year since 1981 that China’s submarine fleet did not conduct any patrols despite introduction of several new classes of more advanced submarines for greater reach. That modernization has (not yet) manifested itself in the form of a clear increase in submarine patrols.
The patrol number does not say anything about what the submarines did during the six patrols. They might have been basic attempts to sail far from shore to test navigational equipment or communication with the homebase, or they might have included more advanced tactical operations. They might have been conducted by six different submarines, or only a couple.
Yet for the Chinese submarine force overall, six patrols do not provide very much operational experience for more than 50 submarines and their crews. If China did plan a more extended reach for its submarine force, one might expect the patrol rate to continue to increase in the next couple of years. Only the future will tell. But the operational experience from the 55 patrols conducted by the entire submarine force between 1981 and the end of 2007 suggests that China’s submarine force - at least for now - remains a coastal defense force.
Pakistan Navy orders two MESMA AIP systems
Pakistan Navy has recently ordered two systems of anaerobic propulsion MESMA, conceived and carried out by DCN Propulsion, close to Nantes.
This Air Independent System (AIP) will equip the first two submarines diesels with the type Agosta-90B, delivered in 1999 by DCN Cherbourg and 2003 by the arsenal of Karashi.
Built like the second submarine in technology transfer, Hamza, launched this summer in Pakistan, was equipped right from the start with the MESMA. For DCN, the tests at sea of the building, envisaged in the next months, will be crucial, these tests being the first in natural size for the French AIP. If this countryside is conclusive, DCN can hope to take ascending some on its German competitor TKMS and its system containing fuel cells.
The AIP system is very quiet and produces no exhaust heat making the submarine very diffcult to detect compare to the traditional propulsion system submarines, the AIP system will give the submarine a considerably increased autonomy in diving, spending 4 days with nearly three weeks. Making turn a generator which supplies a steam turbine, the system functions according to the same principle as the nuclear propulsion, the hot source being replaced by ethanol. Direct consequence, the ship does not have any more needs to supply its engines in air via the snorkel.
In the future, the fuel of the MESMA will be rather diesel, which will make it possible for the submarines to embark one type of fuel.
The first two Pakistani submarines, Khalid and Saad, will receive a new section of 9 meters containing the AIP, during a major maintenance action. Their length will be carried, as for first Agosta, from 67 to 76 meters and displacement in diving of 1760 to 1980 tons.
"The people involved in the project consider the AIP integration fairly challenging initially when assembly facilities were being set up so it was skipped for the first two submarines. Khalid and Saad both will be equipped with AIP system during their normal overhaul. The AIP was always on the roadmap for all three Agosta 90Bs in the PN service."
In addition to this program, DCN always hopes to sell Pakistan submarines of the type Marlin, or Scorpène. On this contract, the French are in the competition with TKMS.
This Air Independent System (AIP) will equip the first two submarines diesels with the type Agosta-90B, delivered in 1999 by DCN Cherbourg and 2003 by the arsenal of Karashi.
Built like the second submarine in technology transfer, Hamza, launched this summer in Pakistan, was equipped right from the start with the MESMA. For DCN, the tests at sea of the building, envisaged in the next months, will be crucial, these tests being the first in natural size for the French AIP. If this countryside is conclusive, DCN can hope to take ascending some on its German competitor TKMS and its system containing fuel cells.
The AIP system is very quiet and produces no exhaust heat making the submarine very diffcult to detect compare to the traditional propulsion system submarines, the AIP system will give the submarine a considerably increased autonomy in diving, spending 4 days with nearly three weeks. Making turn a generator which supplies a steam turbine, the system functions according to the same principle as the nuclear propulsion, the hot source being replaced by ethanol. Direct consequence, the ship does not have any more needs to supply its engines in air via the snorkel.
In the future, the fuel of the MESMA will be rather diesel, which will make it possible for the submarines to embark one type of fuel.
The first two Pakistani submarines, Khalid and Saad, will receive a new section of 9 meters containing the AIP, during a major maintenance action. Their length will be carried, as for first Agosta, from 67 to 76 meters and displacement in diving of 1760 to 1980 tons.
"The people involved in the project consider the AIP integration fairly challenging initially when assembly facilities were being set up so it was skipped for the first two submarines. Khalid and Saad both will be equipped with AIP system during their normal overhaul. The AIP was always on the roadmap for all three Agosta 90Bs in the PN service."
In addition to this program, DCN always hopes to sell Pakistan submarines of the type Marlin, or Scorpène. On this contract, the French are in the competition with TKMS.
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