China's New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities

China's New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities Toshi Yoshihara

and James R. Holmes 1 The past few years have witnessed a lively debate among Western

strategic thinkers over China’s emerging force of fleet ballistic-missile submarines and

what it portends for Beijing’s overall strategy of nuclear deterrence. One influential

school of thought prophesies a relatively static model for Chinese nuclear development,

assuming that the rudimentary land-based missile force that served Beijing’s needs in the

past will continue to do so. Others dispute such benign prognoses, pointing to the

introduction of next-generation, land-based mobile ballistic missiles, the rapid buildup of

China’s navy in general, and improvements to the navy’s submarine and ballistic-missile

forces in particular. If so, the coming years will see China put to sea a force more

symmetrical with the U.S. Navy, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Moreover, it

will abandon its traditional stance of “minimum deterrence,” assuming a nuclear posture

better described as “limited deterrence.” We take issue with both of these projections

of Chinese nuclear strategy, doctrine, and undersea capabilities. We assess China’s

undersea deterrent purely at the strategic level, leaving aside other important questions

such as how Beijing might use fleet submarines to support coercion against Taiwan or in

other contingencies. Our chief finding: that a larger, more advanced, more capable flotilla

of fleet ballistic-missile submarines (FBM, or SSBN) does not necessary signal a break with

China’s tradition of minimalist nuclear strategy. Indeed, a modest undersea deterrent

would reinforce minimum deterrence as Beijing conceives of it. 2 We first examine historical

precedents for Chinese ballistic-missile submarine development, revealing some parameters

for China’s likely future in this domain, then attempt to project the likely size and

deployment patterns for Chinese SSBNs. With apologies to Yogi Berra, it’s tough to make

predictions, especially about the future. This is nonetheless an exercise worth undertaking

as the United States and other powers with a stake in Asian politico-military affairs shape

their own strategies and forces. Historical Models for China’s Undersea Deterrent Five

countries have deployed undersea nuclear deterrent forces: the United States, the Soviet

Union and its successor, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China itself. Though it may seem

counterintuitive, the China of past decades is the least relevant of these historical

models. For one thing, Mao Zedong scoffed at nuclear weapons, describing them as a “paper

tiger,” and was famously indifferent to the seas beyond China’s coastal waters. For

another, the purges Yoshihara/Holmes - 1accompanying China’s Great Leap Forward and

Cultural Revolution devastated the nation’s scientific and engineering sectors, depriving

the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN) of the expertise it needed for

submarine development and construction. Accordingly, Chinese shipbuilders and weapons

scientists never managed to construct the reliable fleet ballistic-missile submarine the

nation needs to furnish an invulnerable second-strike capability. 3 For the sake of

parsimony, then, we will set aside the China of the Mao era. By examining the remaining four

historical models, we can glimpse possible futures for China’s sea-based deterrent. 4 The

United States and the Soviet Union are obvious choices, given Beijing’s much-discussed

rise to world power status and the prospect that it will follow the path taken by the

superpowers. At the risk of ruffling feathers, we will consider the French and British cases

together. Similar incentives and disincentives—notably misgivings about the reliability of

the U.S. nuclear guarantee during the Cold War—induced Paris and London to develop modest

nuclear arsenals of their own and to deploy ballistic missiles in nuclear-powered

submarines. Some China-watchers, moreover, predict that Beijing will settle for regional

power status in Asia, akin to the status the United Kingdom and France have enjoyed in

Europe and its environs since the 1950s. This commends the independent NATO-European

deterrents to our attention. United States. In the early Cold War, successive U.S.

administrations concluded that the United States depended on a large nuclear force

structure. The rationale for a large arsenal underwent several phases. At first, in the

1950s, this was largely a matter of exploiting the U.S. lead in nuclear weapons. The

Eisenhower administration saw nuclear forces as a way to offset enormous Soviet advantages

in geography and manpower, especially in the crucial NATO-European theater. President Dwight

D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, briefly flirted with a

doctrine of “massive retaliation” to respond to all communist efforts at expansion,

however minor. 5 By the Kennedy years, massive retaliation had lost credibility—the notion

of using nuclear weapons against, say, an insurgency in the Third World was

unpersuasive—and Washington was scrambling to plug the “missile gap” that seemed to

have opened with the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957. In the 1960s and 1970s,

strategists developed and refined a doctrine of “mutual assured destruction,” or MAD. No

sane leader on either side would risk nuclear war, maintained proponents of MAD, knowing

that this would bring on an automatic, devastating second strike. 6 And so the Western

debate over nuclear strategy went. According to the scholar Lawrence Freedman, though,

“the weapons never left center stage.” Dominant perceptions held that a large arsenal

was essential to counter an adversary that commanded overwhelming conventional supremacy and

a potent nuclear stockpile of its own. Neither the vagaries of academic debate nor

intermittent efforts at arms control and disarmament overcame that fundamental conviction. 7

Hence the powerful U.S. submarine force, the core of the U.S. second-strike capability. By

the late Cold War, eighteen Ohio-class SSBNs armed with Trident II C-4 or D-5 SLBMs

constituted the U.S. undersea deterrent. 8 American submariners are famously closemouthed

about SSBN Yoshihara/Holmes - 2deployment practices, as befits their mission of keeping the

nation’s second-strike capability invulnerable. Telegraphing the locations of U.S.

submarines’ patrol grounds or their habits while on their 77-day patrols might render the

submarine force vulnerable to an adversary’s antisubmarine-warfare efforts. Successive

U.S. administrations have developed elaborate command-and-control procedures to guard

against an unauthorized release of nuclear weapons. For instance, even a thirty-minute loss

of communications with an SSBN on patrol warrants intensive efforts to restore connectivity

between U.S. Strategic Command, the parent command for all U.S. strategic forces, and these

crucial assets. 9 Political and military leaders are clearly mindful of the repercussions

that would follow a mistaken release of SLBMs from U.S. strategic submarines. 10 Yet they

also seem comfortable allowing individual skippers to roam their patrol grounds without

tight political supervision, and without the luxury of having attack submarines or

land-based platforms nearby to defend them from enemy action. The U.S. approach to sea-based

nuclear deterrence, then, seems offensive in nature, confident in U.S. submarines’

capacity for concealment, and unfettered by geographically based conceptions that safe

havens are necessary to protect American SSBNs. If Chinese leaders follow the U.S. template,

and once the supporting technologies mature, the coming years may see PLA Navy SSBNs range

throughout the Pacific Ocean basin. Soviet Union/Russia. Like the United States, the Soviet

Union seemed convinced that it needed to hold a maximum number of its adversary’s

assets—cities or, technology permitting, military forces—at risk in order to ensure

deterrence. Accordingly, the Soviet Navy put to sea a sizable fleet of nuclear-powered

submarines armed with the latest nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Technology—especially

range limitations on the early generations of Soviet missiles—imposed constraints on

Soviet SSBNs’ deployment patterns, compelling Soviet commanders to send these boats into

Atlantic waters, where they could threaten American cities. Indeed, U.S. naval planners

worried that the presence of Soviet SSBNs in the Atlantic Ocean, a body of water

crisscrossed by vital sea lanes connecting North America with NATO-Europe, would conflate

the SLOC defense and antisubmarine-warfare missions—severely complicating the wartime

tasks assigned the U.S. and allied navies. 11 Soviet naval strategists seem to have come to

the same realization, while advances in technology allowed the Soviet preference for a

defensive stance at sea to reassert itself. By the 1970s, a growing body of evidence

suggested that the increasingly capable Soviet Navy was reverting to defensive deployment

patterns. Soviet weapons engineers had improved the ranges of the navy’s

submarine-launched ballistic missiles while adding capabilities such as multiple,

independently targeted warheads. 12 Rather than venturing into the Atlantic, Soviet SSBNs

were patrolling Arctic waters, where they could still range U.S. targets while enjoying the

advantages that came with proximity to Soviet naval bases. This insight drove the thinking

behind the U.S. Maritime Strategy of the Reagan years, which envisioned U.S. Navy task

forces’ seizing the initiative in wartime, steaming northward into the Norwegian Sea to

threaten Soviet strategic forces in their Yoshihara/Holmes - 3icy northern “bastions.”

Should Beijing follow Moscow’s naval strategy of the 1970s and 1980s, PLAN SSBNs would

shelter within such geographic redoubts as the Bohai Sea or, perhaps, the waters within the

“first island chain” that parallels the Chinese coastline. 13 Britain/France. It is

worth saying a few words about the British and French approaches to undersea deterrence, if

only because they could offer a third model for a China content with regional influence and

a second-strike capacity far more modest than those of the United States or the Soviet

Union/Russia. London and Paris developed independent submarine deterrents out of concerns

that the U.S. nuclear umbrella would prove flimsy in wartime. That is, Washington might

prove unwilling to expose the American homeland to a nuclear counterattack for the sake of

NATO-European allies. Preserving the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the

USSR—and thereby supplementing the U.S. security guarantee—helped them hedge against

possible American waffling. Keeping sea-based nuclear forces modest in size was imperative

in light of the meager budgets available to these middle-rank economic powers and the

competing demands for preparedness in continental Europe. Asymmetrical undersea forces

appeared sufficient to British and French officials, not only in strategic but in budgetary

terms. The United Kingdom and France, then, made do with SSBN forces dwarfed by those of the

superpowers. It is worth noting that, numbers aside, SSBN deployments patterns seemingly

resembled those of the U.S. Navy. The entire French SSBN force was based at the Atlantic

port of Brest, while for obvious reasons submarines based in the British Isles patrolled the

Atlantic and the North Sea. Neither of these governments adopted a strategy requiring its

FBM submarines to stay within confined geographic regions or within range of land-based

military forces for support. Should China adopt this approach, it will continue its

tradition of maintaining a small nuclear arsenal but permit its submarine commanders to

patrol widely in the Pacific, the South China Sea, or the Indian Ocean, subject only to

staying within firing range of the targets they are assigned to threaten. Targets for

Chinese SSBNs would include U.S. bases in the Pacific, as well as less obvious sites in

India and the Russian Far East. 14 Judging from these historical cases, several indices are

worth taking into account when appraising China’s emerging submarine deterrent: • Nature

of the Regime. Regimes exhibit certain distinct strategic and operational preferences. Like

their authoritarian counterparts, Western liberal governments with nuclear capacity

institute elaborate precautions and stringent command-and-control arrangements to prevent

unauthorized releases of nuclear weapons. They nonetheless evince a fair degree of comfort

with SSBN skippers’ operating far from their shores, in an offensive manner and beyond

land-based support. Deployment patterns reflected this, with U.S., British, and French SSBNs

enjoying considerable latitude to cruise independently within range of Soviet targets. By

comparison, authoritarian regimes—particularly those driven by ideologies such as

communism, which place great weight on loyalty to the regime and go to elaborate lengths to

enforce it—are ill-disposed to permit Yoshihara/Holmes - 4 naval officers this degree of

control over strategic assets. As became apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet leaders

preferred to keep FBM submarines closer to home, under their watchful gaze. Whether Chinese

leaders will incline to one of these approaches or fashion one of their own remains to be

seen. • Strategic Culture. During the 1970s, Western strategic thinkers waged a lively

debate over whether there was a peculiarly Soviet way of thinking about and executing

nuclear strategy. They formerly assumed not. But accumulating evidence indicated that,

contrary to the logic of mutual assured destruction, Moscow was pursuing the capacity to

fight and prevail in a nuclear conflict. Long-held assumptions among scholars and

practitioners of nuclear strategy held that the same logic of nuclear deterrence would

govern decision-making in all countries. If such assumptions were false, however, U.S. and

Western nuclear strategy and force structures designed for mutual assured destruction might

have been dangerously misguided. Spurred by the debate over Soviet nuclear strategy,

strategic thinkers began taking into account the effects of national traditions, history,

and culture on the making of policy and strategy. 15 This recognition did not come easy. The

Soviet approach—holding SSBNs back and deploying general-purpose naval and land forces to

defend them—defied offensively minded Western sensibilities. At one briefing in 1981,

reports John Hattendorf, Adm. Thomas Hayward, the chief of naval operations, “found the

concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that he expressed disbelief that the

Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such a manner.” 16 But they did. If the

Soviet Union and other powers displayed distinctive styles in submarine warfare, the

People’s Republic of China probably will as well. • Threat Perceptions. How Beijing

views the threat from prospective adversaries will shape its SSBN doctrine. Generally

speaking, the historical models surveyed here involved putting to sea submarine forces able

to counter a single threat. For the most part, the Soviet Union and United States sought to

deter each other, keeping their opponent from gaining a nuclear advantage that would allow

it to wage war without fear of a disastrous counterstrike. Britain and France tried to deter

the Soviets and guard against U.S. abandonment by deploying sufficient nuclear forces. China

clearly faces a more complex geometry, since it must worry about not only about, say, a U.S.

effort to knock out the Chinese ICBM force in a Taiwan contingency, but also about India, a

new nuclear neighbor with which China shares a long border and a history of at-times violent

competition. China and Russia also have a tumultuous past. Despite their cooperation of

recent years, Russian sites will almost certainly find themselves on the target list for

Chinese submarines. How these competing considerations will affect the size and operations

of the PLAN SSBN force remains to be seen. Yoshihara/Holmes - 5 Technology Dependence. As

seen from this survey of Cold War precedents, technology at times imposed certain

constraints on SSBN deployment patterns that were at odds with political and culturally

derived strategic and operational preferences. The Soviet Navy seemed to prefer a defensive

stance leveraging geographic and land-based defenses, but early on, Soviet SSBNs were forced

to venture into the Atlantic to meet their objectives. Western submarines, similarly, were

compelled to patrol in range of their targets, limiting their liberty of action. Once

technological constraints eased, however, normal strategic and operational preferences

grounded in political and strategic culture reasserted themselves. Soviet boats were limited

to geographically defined bastions, while U.S., British, and French boats carried on

open-ocean patrols. China will undoubtedly confront similar technical challenges as it

attempts to construct and use its first effective SSBN flotilla. Once it meets these

challenges, it too may pursue SSBN operations in keeping with Chinese strategic traditions

and preferences. China’s Nuclear Posture To test the applicability of the undersea

deterrent models postulated above to China, it is necessary to assess the evolution of

broader Chinese nuclear doctrine and force posture. Over the past four decades, China has

carved out a rather unique niche among the five declared nuclear weapon states. Since China

demonstrated its ability to fire ballistic missiles at intercontinental ranges in 1980, its

nuclear posture has remained surprisingly modest and remarkably resistant to change. China

maintains what many Western analysts consider a doctrine of minimum deterrence, which calls

for: 1) a strictly defensive posture, 2) a small arsenal, 3) a pledge not to be the first to

use nuclear weapons, and 4) a commitment not to attack or threaten non-nuclear states.

Official Chinese documents have repeatedly reaffirmed these minimalist principles. 17 In the

most detailed articulation of Chinese nuclear policy to date, China’s authoritative and

most recent Defense White Paper forcefully states: China remains firmly committed to the

policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It

unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against

non-nuclear-weapon states….China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense

and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective

nuclear force….It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons

and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. 18 Wang Zhongchun, a professor at

China’s National Defense University and a senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army

(PLA), asserts succinctly, “China’s nuclear strategy is mainly defensive, directional,

passive and limited.” 19 Such nuclear minimalism has exerted significant influence on

China’s nuclear posture, suppressing the size and readiness of the force structure.

According to a RAND study: Yoshihara/Holmes - 6One of the most intriguing aspects of

China’s nuclear weapons program has been its quantitatively and qualitatively limited

nature over time. These limitations are characterized in practice by a relatively small

number of warheads, technically and numerically limited delivery vehicles, an overwhelming

reliance on land-based systems, persistent concerns over the arsenal’s survivability,

reliability and penetrability, and a limited program of research, development and testing.

20 Another, more recent analysis concurs: China’s small but effective nuclear

counterattacking force—comprising around eighty operationally deployed nuclear warheads

that are stored separately from their land-based ballistic missiles and intended for

retaliatory mission—is significantly smaller, less diverse, and less ready to conduct

actual operations than any of the arsenals maintained by the other four nuclear powers

recognized under the NPT. 21 While there is an ongoing debate in China and in the West on

the merits of rejecting minimum deterrence, authorities in Beijing appear unswervingly

committed to existing policy. As nonproliferation expert Jing-Dong Yuan notes, “China will

continue to view nuclear weapons as largely political and psychological instruments in the

contest of will, not usable weapons. Beijing will remain satisfied with the small size of

its nuclear force as long as a comfortable margin of survivability of its nuclear arsenal

can be assured.” 22 Rather than speculate on a nuclear posture not yet in existence, then,

one reasonable baseline for analysis is to assume that China will hew closely to its

minimalist posture well into the next decade. 23 Such a benchmark would at least provide

policymakers and analysts with some basis to measure the degree of change should China

decide at some future point to depart from minimum deterrence. It is important to note,

however, that minimalism does not equate to immutability. Qualitative and quantitative

changes are clearly underway in China’s nuclear posture as Beijing seeks to shape and

respond to the dynamic security environment. It is within this context of apparent restraint

that the new generation of undersea deterrent force has entered into China’s strategic

calculus. Successive Defense White Papers, for example, stress the need to improve nuclear

deterrence at sea. The 2004 issue observes that, “Preparation for maritime battlefield

[has] intensified…and the capability of nuclear counter-attacks [has been] enhanced.” 24

Similarly, the 2006 version envisions the PLA Navy “enhancing its capabilities in

integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks.” 25 Beijing is clearly eyeing a

larger role for its undersea deterrent. Sufficiency Goes to Sea Defense planners in Beijing

face several basic but crucial questions regarding the future of undersea deterrence. What

types of force structures would Beijing consider viable? What factors might tend to favor a

greater reliance on the nascent ballistic-missile submarine fleet? In short,

Yoshihara/Holmes - 7how much is enough? Sizing the fleet is both an analytical exercise and

an art, not least because of the political ramifications of deploying the most destructive

single platform known to mankind. A large SSBN fleet will not only impose a substantial

financial burden but could very well trigger competitive responses from potential

adversaries. Thus, China faces a delicate balancing act that seeks to meet strategic

requirements without unduly alarming other great powers. An important intervening variable

is Beijing’s calculus concerning the proper force mix and tradeoffs between its

land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the DF-31s, and the

sea-based component. Each leg of the dyad presents distinct advantages and disadvantages

that will surely influence the PRC’s cost-benefit analysis. In terms of survivability,

both land- and sea-based options enhance China’s ability to escape a disarming first

strike. The mobility of the DF-31s will allow the PLA to exploit China’s geographic depth,

while the next-generation Type 094 SSBN currently under development will impose additional

targeting, tracking, and other intelligence challenges on any adversary. 26 Ideally, an

interactively survivable nuclear dyad would greatly increase the versatility of China’s

nuclear forces. In other words, if the DF-31s suffered unacceptable losses in a first

strike, the Type 094s would still guarantee a retaliatory option. Modest quantitative

increases in both the land- and sea-based arsenals, then, would go a long way to enhance the

survivability of China’s nuclear forces. 27 Some factors unique to an undersea strategic

force magnify the relative importance of SSBNs vis-� -vis their land-based counterparts. A

ballistic-missile submarine distinguishes itself even from a road- or rail-mobile ICBM by

its stealth and unlimited mobility and endurance, which generate virtually infinite

possibilities in terms of launch locations. 28 As a Chinese study on nuclear submarines

written by a senior nuclear engineer declares, “the ballistic missile submarine is thus

far the most ideal ‘nuclear weapons armory.’” 29 The author identifies three key

factors that make the SSBN the ultimate weapon: 1) survivability (as high as ninety

percent); 2) offensive power; and 3) destructive power. The survivability of SSBNs promises

to reduce the temptation for Beijing to adopt a destabilizing land-based posture that

undermines crisis stability and escalation control, including increased dispersion and

decentralized command and control. Jing-Dong Yuan concludes that a “sea-based deterrent

would be less vulnerable to preemption and could reinforce China’s no-first-use policy,

reducing the risk of a sudden escalation to the nuclear level.” 30 However, the

persuasiveness of abstract strategic and operational benefits of an undersea strategic force

likely will not convince the Chinese leadership to lean decisively in favor of SSBNs over

ICBMs. Foremost in the thinking of any political leadership is command and control of its

nuclear arsenal. It is unclear whether Beijing would be willing to delegate operational

control of a nuclear-armed submarine to a tactical commander. 31 Practical considerations

such as technical feasibility and steep financial costs, moreover, could impose burdens that

the PRC may be unwilling to carry. The enormous technological, scientific, and

Yoshihara/Holmes - 8engineering challenges of building a SSBN are already well documented.

32 The very troubled history of the first-generation Xia-class SSBN is a testament to the

tremendous hurdles that the Chinese had to overcome to master a craft involving

extraordinarily high barriers to entry. In terms of costs, the pricetags of modern U.S.

SSBNs provide a rough sense of the financial liabilities that Beijing confronts. The average

per-unit cost of an Ohio-class SSBN, measured over ten years from 1981 to 1991, was an

estimated $1.2 billion in 1994 dollar terms. 33 Relying on similar estimates of U.S.

expenditures on SSBNs and SSNs, Chinese observers have also commented on the prohibitive

costs of nuclear-powered submarines. 34 Land basing, then, still appears to have significant

financial advantages. In theory, a relatively modest number of survivable ICBMs and SSBNs

should reduce the probability that “bean counting” would prompt a competitive response

from the United States. In other words, Beijing will likely favor a force configuration that

demonstrates restraint in order to maintain a stable deterrent relationship with Washington.

However, accurately determining a quantitative ceiling of ICBMs and sea-based ballistic

missiles that would buttress deterrence while precluding a countervailing U.S. response is a

delicate affair. For example, Zhang Baohui observes that if China possessed four Type 094s

carrying sixteen JL-2 ballistic missiles armed with three warheads each, then Beijing’s

undersea deterrent would boast 192 warheads. 35 If China deployed six SSBNs with six

multiple warheads atop each JL-2, the number of warheads would jump to 572. These figures

exclude the ongoing introduction of DF-31s and DF-31As that could also be armed with

multiple warheads. Such a dramatic increase would likely raise concerns in Washington, even

assuming the United States continues to enjoy commanding quantitative and qualitative

advantages over China’s nuclear arsenal. 36 While a classic arms race resembling the Cold

War would not ensue as a result of such a shift in the nuclear balance, it is unlikely that

U.S. defense planners would respond passively to this hypothetical orders-of-magnitude

increase in the Chinese nuclear inventory. 37 At present, the forecast number of Chinese

SSBNs remains a subject of contention. The U.S. intelligence community and the Pentagon

believe that both the JL-2 ballistic missiles and the strategic nuclear submarine will not

enter service until the end of the decade. 38 According to the director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, “the 8,000+ kilometer range JL-2…likely

will be ready for deployment later this decade.” 39 The Pentagon’s most recent

assessment of Chinese military power speculates that the JL-2 will achieve initial

operational capability in the 2007-2010 timeframe. 40 The U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval

Intelligence believes that the Type 094 may enter service as early as 2008 and that “a

fleet of probably five TYPE 094 SSBNs will be built in order to provide more redundancy and

capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence.” 41 The open-source literature

provides even more disparate estimates concerning the number of SSBNs that the Chinese plan

to, or will be able to, build. Conservative assessments of China’s strategic forces tend

to agree with the U.S. intelligence community. The Council on Foreign Yoshihara/Holmes - 9

Relations, for example, believes that the first ballistic-missile submarine will not be in

service before 2010. 42 Jane’s Strategic Weapons speculates that China will ultimately

build four to six Type 094 submarines. 43 The latest Jane’s Fighting Ships places the

expected number of commissioned hulls at four by 2014. 44 The Congressional Research

Service, which regularly tracks U.S. analyses of China’s navy, places the number of Type

094s at four to five. 45 Other studies have drawn a more alarming picture. One study

projects five to six vessels before the end of this decade. 46 Two analysts from the U.S.

Naval War College cite sources predicting the availability of two to three strategic

submarines by 2010 47 and place the final number of SSBNs at twelve. 48 The degree of

uncertainty over the operational status of the Type 094 was on full public display in Taiwan

as politicians openly disputed the veracity of the National Security Bureau’s intelligence

report, which claimed that the Type 094 had completed sea trials and would be in service in

the near future. 49 Simply put, the future size of the fleet is still anybody’s guess.

Some parameters and assumptions embedded in the historical models set forth previously

provide useful guidance for estimating the likely size of China’s future SSBN fleet.

First, an underlying principle of minimum deterrence is that as long as the number of

surviving retaliatory weapons after a disarming first strike is not zero, then the posture

is credible. As in the British and French models, the threshold for sufficiency would be

quite low for China. In theory, even if all of China’s land-based deterrent were destroyed

in a first strike, only one SSBN armed with multiple re-entry warheads would need to survive

a “bolt from the blue” to conduct a retaliatory strike. Second, the only power with the

capacity to inflict a disarming preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear forces on land and at

sea simultaneously for the foreseeable future will be the United States. This reduces if not

eliminates China’s requirement to conduct deterrent patrols against lesser nuclear powers

such as India and perhaps even Russia. In other words, the SSBN would only have to cope with

one threat vector across the Pacific. Third, this study assumes that the United States’

ability to degrade the survivability of an SSBN will not improve radically over the coming

decade—say, by making the oceans transparent to U.S. sensors and ASW weaponry. Since the

end of the Cold War, furthermore, America’s nuclear attack-submarine fleet and ASW

aviation squadrons—the most potent counters to an undersea threat—have atrophied in

numbers, at rates that many believe will take decades to reverse. Nor is U.S.

ballistic-missile defense in its current state any match against submerged launched

missiles. A counter-SLBM capability might be decades away from deployment. Under such

circumstances, even if all of China’s land-based deterrent was destroyed in a first

strike, only one SSBN armed with multiple re-entry warheads would need to survive a “bolt

from the blue” to conduct a highly destructive retaliatory strike. Fourth, Beijing’s

high degree of comfort with the ambiguity surrounding the survivability of its nuclear

forces, a longstanding hallmark of Chinese nuclear strategy, would further reduce the need

for absolute numerical guarantees. Yoshihara/Holmes - 10 These factors suggest that the

lower-range estimates from the analysts discussed above would likely suffice for China. The

rule of thumb—familiar to U.S. naval planners—is that three aircraft-carrier

expeditionary groups are needed to keep one fully operational at sea at any given time. Of

the remaining two groups, one will be in an extended maintenance period, probably in a

shipyard, while the other will be undergoing training and workups for deployment (and its

availability will thus be reduced). Assuming China adopts similar operating procedures, a

minimum deterrent posture would not demand too much in terms of quantity. Assuming fifty

percent of the at-sea SSBNs fell prey to enemy ASW—a generous estimate in view of SSBNs

capacity for concealment and quiet operations—only two Chinese SSBNs would need to be at

sea at any given time to ensure that one survived a first strike. Based on the rotating

deployment cycle described above, then, China would need six SSBNs to fulfill the basic

demands of minimum deterrence. Depending on the eventual technical quality, reliability, and

characteristics of the Type 094, furthermore, Beijing may not even need six boats. If the

PLA Navy adopted an arrangement similar to the U.S. Navy’s Blue and Gold crew system,

which alternates crews after each deterrent patrol with a short maintenance period in

between, it might even make do with a two-for-one ratio of boats in port to at sea. Four

fleet boats would serve China’s needs under these circumstances. Potential Deployment

Patterns Beyond force sizing, China would also need to consider a range of possible

deployment patterns. Recently, speculation concerning the logic of a “bastion strategy”

for China has emerged among U.S. analysts. 50 The Chinese themselves seem intrigued by the

Soviet Union’s experience in this regard. 51 China could seek to replicate the Soviet

model by turning the geographical features of the Asian coastline to its advantage. 52

Beijing could, for instance, concentrate its SSBNs within the protective confines of the

Bohai and Yellow seas. 53 Nuclear attack submarines, shore-based fighter aircraft, and

surface combatants could be poised as “palace guards” to quickly respond against hostile

forces seeking to hold China’s SSBNs at risk. The bastion approach would offer sanctuaries

within which high-value SSBNs could operate. In theory, sea- and shore-based assets would be

able to identify and hold at bay hostile forces operating near or in the Bohai or Yellow

Seas. The shallowness and complex acoustic environment of littoral waters, moreover, would

pose serious challenges to high-speed American hunter-killer submarines designed for open-

ocean operations during the Cold War. However attractive it seems, a bastion strategy would

entail certain risks. Keeping the undersea deterrent in the Bohai area would: 1) constrain

patrol patterns, thereby increasing the likelihood that the submarines would be detected by

enemy forces; 2) forego much of the inherent stealth and mobility of an SSBN; and 3) keep

certain targets out of reach due to the longer distances that the missiles would have to

traverse. 54 To overcome such obstacles, China would have to build large, capable naval

forces to protect the SSBNs lurking within the bastion and to enable the boats to stage a

breakout should hostile forces seek to bottle then up and hunt them down in Yoshihara/Holmes

- 11confined waters. The main risk of such an all-consuming strategy of deterrence is that

excessive investment in protecting SSBN forces would detract from broader maritime

priorities such as Taiwan-related contingencies, sea-lane defense, and secure access to

overseas energy supplies. 55 As an alternative to the bastion strategy, the strategic

submarines could operate more freely along China’s long coastline under the protective

cover of naval and land-based aviation forces on the mainland. Recent studies have

postulated that China has already embarked on an ambitious plan to create “contested

zones” along its maritime periphery. 56 Premised on the concept of sea denial, Beijing

would be able to exercise local superiority roughly within the first island chain stretching

from the Japanese archipelago to the northern Philippines. Under this scenario, China might

be confident enough to permit SSBN patrols along the Asian mainland, particularly in the

Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China seas and the Taiwan Strait. Given that China

confronts several deterrent relationships in Asia, including India, one analysis argues that

the presence of SSBNs in the South China Sea would help shore up deterrence on the southern

flank. 57 This sort of “expanded bastion” strategy would clearly open up new options for

the PLA, albeit at greater risk. Most ambitiously, China could deploy its submarines out to

the Pacific in forays reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet undersea competition during the Cold

War. One analyst speculates that China might base its SSBNs in the South China Sea, enabling

them to slip into deeper Pacific waters undetected. 58 Forward deployment would place a much

larger number of U.S. targets within the range of the JL-2 missiles. Assuming China manages

to develop very capable and quiet submarines, Chinese patrols in the Pacific would pose the

greatest challenges to U.S. defenders seeking to detect and track lurking SSBNs. Forward

patrols would also force the United States to devote more of its attack boats to shadow

Chinese submarines in open waters, thereby diverting American SSNs that might otherwise be

available for a Taiwan contingency or some other flare-up. The PLA Navy would incur

strategic and operation risks by permitting such free-ranging deployments. From a political

standpoint, active patrols within the first island chain or in the Pacific could prove

highly provocative to the United States and would almost certainly stimulate a competitive

response. U.S. naval planners would likely see China’s entry into Asian waters as a

dramatic change in the threat environment—especially given the lack of Russian deterrent

patrols in the Pacific since the end of the Cold War. Given that the Xia-class SSBN “has

never conducted a deterrent patrol,” 59 even a modestly forward-leaning deployment pattern

could signal a sea change in Chinese nuclear strategy that might significantly heighten

American threat perceptions. From an operational standpoint, submarine patrols along the

mainland littoral or in the Pacific would expose PLA Navy boats to U.S. and allied ASW

measures. 60 Throughout the Cold War, the United States developed extensive and highly

effective undersea detection networks—most Yoshihara/Holmes - 12notably the Sound

Surveillance System, or SOSUS—to track the location of Soviet submarines. In the Pacific

theater, U.S. submarines aided by SOSUS monitored every movement of Soviet SSBNs in waters

off the Kamchatka Peninsula. In the 1980s, American and Japanese naval forces raised ASW to

an art form, cooperating closely to bottle up Soviet forces operating in the Seas of Okhostk

and Japan. These “legacy” systems and well-developed tactics would lend themselves

readily to ASW against Chinese SSBNs. The ability of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

(JMSDF) to track a Chinese Han-class submarine that had breached Japanese territorial waters

reaffirmed the JMSDF’s high level of ASW readiness. Commenting on the Han incident, a

former JMSDF chief of staff boasted that Chinese submarines would be unable to slip into the

deep waters of the Pacific through the Ryukyu island chain, to the north or south of Taiwan,

or through the Bashi (Luzon) Strait without being detected by U.S. and Japanese ASW forces.

61 Given such potent risks, China will probably avoid coastal and blue-water patrols,

especially during the initial stages of deployment when training, tactical skills, and

doctrine are still immature. 62 Additionally, Beijing simply might not have enough SSBNs to

contemplate riskier, more forward-leaning options. As noted above, China may be content with

two boats conducting deterrent patrols at any given time. If so, then secondary

considerations such as patrols in the South China Sea aimed at India, could be viewed as a

diversion from the primary mission of deterring the United States. Unless the range of the

JL-2 is sufficient to reach the continental United States from any location within the first

island chain, which seems unlikely, operating farther from American shores may be deemed

counterproductive. These factors suggest that submarine deployment patterns will be rather

constrained. Beijing will likely favor protection over effectiveness during the early phases

of SSBN deployment and will thus rely on some type of bastion strategy. Over time, if the

vessels are operationally capable of extended patrols far beyond the Chinese coastline, then

China might be willing to relax its protectiveness and permit more forward patrols. It is

important to note that the deployment options—the bastion strategy, coastal patrols, and

open-ocean patrols—are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that the Chinese may keep

open variations of the three choices and alternate between them as security conditions

change. Beijing may be content to rely on the bastion strategy during peacetime, when no

immediate threat is evident. In times of crisis or conflict, China may permit more active

coastal patrols or slip its SSBNs into open waters to signal resolve or to counter potential

nuclear coercion by an adversary. In sum, even a small undersea deterrent would give Beijing

multiple options across a spectrum of contingency scenarios. Potential Stimuli for a Larger

Undersea Deterrent While a restrained Chinese nuclear posture is a more likely outcome at

present, it is nevertheless worth exploring how China’s willingness to retain its

minimalist posture could come under Yoshihara/Holmes - 13significant pressure in the future.

There has been considerable speculation in the U.S. policy community about the prospects of

a shift in China’s deterrent posture from minimum to limited deterrence for at least a

decade. 63 Western analysts have long predicted that China will make the transition to a

more flexible capacity to engage in a broader range of nuclear “warfighting” missions,

requiring substantial increases in the numbers and types of nuclear weaponry. So, too,

Chinese analysts and policymakers have exhibited greater willingness to reconsider and

question the basic merits of minimum deterrence. Although official policy remains firmly

rooted in the status quo, three key factors could challenge the logic of minimalism. First,

China’s ongoing refusal to acknowledge the utility of an adversary’s nuclear

first-strike option, which is central to the concept of minimum deterrence, depends in part

on whether the United States wants to submit to the logic of assured (but minimal)

retaliation vis-� -vis China. There is evidence that some U.S. strategists have dismissed

such a mutual vulnerability, asserting that the United States should direct its

ballistic-missile defenses specifically to negate China’s deterrent. 64 Reflecting such an

attitude, one advocate of missile defense argues that should Beijing continue to exhibit

hostile intent toward Washington, particularly with regard to Taiwan, then the United States

“may simply have no choice” but build defenses against China. 65 If Washington overtly

seeks to deny China a retaliatory option, then Beijing will almost certainly respond with a

larger and faster buildup, including a buildup of its undersea strategic forces. Second,

China’s more leisurely approach to bolstering its nuclear posture could come under strain

with the emergence of strategic technical advances or surprises. For instance, more capable

missile-defense systems deployed by the United States in the coming decades could shake

Beijing’s confidence in its retaliatory options. It is conceivable (although highly

improbable in the near term) that the advent of space-based lasers and other advanced

capabilities could radically reshape China’s outlook. 66 The track record of the

missile-defense program to date suggests that such radical breakthroughs are highly unlikely

over the next decade. But, should such technological leaps occur, then SSBNs might emerge as

a strategic trump card. 67 Third, the reconnaissance/precision-strike complex that the

United States boasts could alter China’s exclusively retaliatory posture. In July 2005,

Major Geneal Zhu Chenghu caused a sensation when he declared to the foreign press that “If

the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition onto the target zone on

China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.” He argued that

if China faced the prospect of defeat in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, then Beijing

would have no choice but to conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against American cities.

Similarly, in a candid assessment of how Chinese calculations might change, Shen Dingli

argues that precision conventional strikes against China’s nuclear forces during a Taiwan

contingency could force Beijing to abandon its no-first-use pledge. He asserts that, “If

China’s conventional forces are devastated, and if Taiwan takes the opportunity to declare

de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China would allow its nuclear weapons to be

destroyed by a precision attack with conventional munitions, rather Yoshihara/Holmes -

14than use them as true means of deterrence.” 68 In other words, if the effects of

America’s conventional attacks are indistinguishable from a disarming nuclear strike, then

China’s no-first-use policy would quite sensibly become untenable. 69 Shen’s conclusion

seems consistent with China’s longstanding aversion to nuclear blackmail. In this context,

a much larger SSBN fleet might be perceived as the only viable insurance policy against a

conventional and/or a nuclear disarming first strike. Clearly, China’s next generation

undersea deterrent would give Beijing the strategic option to hedge against sudden shifts in

the international security environment. However, it is important to acknowledge that SSBNs

are not China’s only answer to the strategic dilemmas noted above. Beijing is actively

developing a range of alternative countermeasures to shore up the credibility its deterrent

forces. For instance, the PRC boasts a rather comprehensive set of programs designed to

defeat U.S. ballistic-missile defenses. 70 The recent anti-satellite test by the Chinese is

perhaps the most vivid demonstration of its determination to possess multiple options,

ensuring that missile defenses will not have a debilitating impact on Beijing’s deterrent

posture. Conclusions This study demonstrates how China can make significant qualitative and

quantitative leaps in its nuclear posture without fundamentally overturning the type of

minimalism (at least at the strategic level) that has characterized its nuclear strategy. It

appears that China has redefined the parameters of minimalism in tune with the fluid

security environment. China will have a more effective and credible nuclear deterrent with

the deployment of the Type 094s, even as technical and doctrinal advances by the U.S.

military have introduced elements of nuclear instability. Such a balancing trend should not

be surprising for a rising power like China and augurs well for a more stable nuclear

relationship with the United States. Mutual ambivalence continues to characterize bilateral

ties. As long as Washington and Beijing refuse to embark on a Cold War-style rivalry,

radical shifts in China’s nuclear posture are nonetheless improbable. Yoshihara/Holmes -

15

V-75 SA-2 GUIDELINE

HQ-1 / HQ-2 (Chinese versions)
Tayir as Sabah (Egyptian versions)
The V-75 (SA-2) surface-to-air missile system was designed for the defense of both fixed targets and field forces. The V-75 was designed to cope with the threat posed by small groups of aircraft rather than massed raids. Flexibility and mobility are its chief advantages over the SA-1. In contrast to the massive SA-1 sites, each of which is capable of defending only a limited sector around the target area, each SA-2 site is capable of 360� coverage. This flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling capacity and rate of fire relative to the SA-1.

Although there are a variety of arrangement patterns, all sites consist of six launching positions -- usually revetted - deployed around a guidance radar and linked by service roads to facilitate loading. While the sites were permanent installations, all operating components of the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and are capable of movement by road or raiL

The V-75 was the basic missile defense system for critical urban-industrial areas in the USSR, other than Moscow. The V-75 deployment began on a wide scale since early 1958, with sites located throughout the western part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Deployment patterns and levels of concentration varied according to the geography, size, and shape of the target area, and the Soviet estimate of the worth of individual targets. Between mid-1958 and 1964 more than 600 SA-2 sites were identified by US intelligence in the USSR, mostly in defense of population centers, industrial complexes, and government control centers.

Most SA-2 sites defended major centers of population and industry. SA-2 defenses were also deployed for the special protection of nuclear materials production and storage facilities. In addition, some key Soviet field forces and long range bomber bases were included in the SA-2 deployment pattern. The construction of sites and the training and activation of firing units was seasonal, with activity at a minimum during the winter months.

The sites in the Moscow area, located within the inner ring of SA-1 sites, were intended to supplement the existing defenses. Deployment of SA-2 installations around Moscow included seven sites as of 1964 as part of a program to supplement the SA-1 system.

Missile defenses were provided for most of the Soviet cities with populations greater than 200,000. SA-2 sites were emplaced at some smaller urban areas which contained government control centers or other installations of critical importance. They were also deployed for defense of naval and port facilities, nuclear production and weapon storage Installations, missile test ranges, and Industrial facilities. Other major military installations, such as long-range missile sites and alrfields of the long-range air force, are also defended by SA-2. A number of sites in border areas, which were unrelated to specific targets, were part of the deployment of peripheral defenses which eventually extended from the Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of the USSR into central Asia. Deployment in the Baltic coastal area was particularly dense. In mid-1962 about 750 sites were operational in defense of more than 200 target areas in the USSR. The Soviets eventually deployed roughly a thousand SA-2 sites in the USSR, with the major portion of the deployment completed by the mid-1960s.

Some SA-2 units were deployed in support of Soviet field forces in East Germany and in the USSR. Although SA-2 units assigned to Soviet field forces were normally emplaced at fixed installations, the system is transportable by road and SA-2 units were observed in field exercises. However, SA-2 units have a limited ability to follow a fast moving front because of the requirement for good roads and the time required to displace to new positions. SA-2 missile defenses for field forces were primarily assigned to such targets as major headquarters, logistic centers, and airfields.

Deployment of SA-2 sites for defense of Warsaw Pact targets began in 1960. The heaviest deployment has occurred in East Germany. About half of the sites were manned by East German troops, and the remainder by units of the Soviet field forces. The East German sites were located in the vicinity of Berlin and in the northern portion of East Germany. The Soviet sites were deployed to defend important Soviet military installations such as major headquarters and airfields.

China

Suspension of Soviet assistance limited the extent of SA-2 deployment in China. Only about a half dozen sites were initially deployed in China, three of them at Beijing. These sites contained Soviet manufactured equipment. The Chinese license-built version of the V-75 was designated the HQ-1. The People's Republic of China developed its own modified version of the V-750 under the designation HQ-2 (Hong Qian = Red Leader), with the Western designation CSA-1.

According to a China sales brochure, the FT-2000A SAM will use a highly-modified HQ-2/ CSA-1 missile that has been equipped with a passive radio frequency homing seeker operating in the 2- to 6-GHz band. The FT-2000A also will contain a new millimeter-wave band fuze, a new guidance-and-control section, and a new 60 kg fragmentation warhead. The missile has a cutoff valve for thrust adjustment while in flight, probably to extend its range. The missile seeker is loaded with the target aircraft�s radio frequency (RF) signature before launch and relies on this information for tracking and intercept. The missile has an estimated maximum range of 60 km, with a maximum altitude of 18,000 meters.

A stand-alone FT-2000A battery consists of a central control station and twelve launchers, each holding one missile. The central control station has one master passive sensor and three auxiliary passive sensors. The auxiliary passive sensors coordinate with the master passive sensor through triangulation to determine angle and range of targets emitting in the 2- to 6-GHz band. This configuration is totally passive, relying on the RF emissions of the target.

A composite fire unit consists of FT-2000A launchers and missiles, integrated with standard SAM components like those of the HQ-2, SA-2, or SA-3. Although a special fire control unit and launcher are required, this configuration allows anti-jamming missiles to replace several of the command guided missiles normally associated with these SAMs.

Egypt

Egyptian technicians have reverse engineered and modified two Soviet SAMs -- the Ayn as Saqr (a version of the SA-7) and the Tayir as Sabah (a version of the SA-2).
V-75 Missile System

The V-75 SA-2 GUIDELINE is a medium to high altitude surface-to-air missile system. This two-stage missile has a large solid propellant booster stage fitted with four very large delta fins. The core stage consists of a storable liquid propellant sustainer rocket motor using inhibited red fuming nitric acid oxidizer and kerosene fuel. A set of four cropped delta-shaped wings are located near the mid-section, with a second in-line set of smaller fixed fins at the nose, and a third in-line set of slightly larger powered control fins at the tail.

The guidance system at an SA-2 site can handle only one target at a time, but can direct three missiles against a target simultaneously. Additional missiles could be fired against the same target after one or more missiles of the first salvo had completed their run. The Soviets apparently believed they must program three or four missiles against each target in order to achieve acceptable kill probabilities.

The 295 kg nuclear warhead used only on the SA-2E variant is believed to have a yield of 15 kT. The other V-75 variants have an internally grooved fragmentation warhead weighs 195 kg (130 kg of which is high explosive) with proximity, contact and command fusing available. This conventional warhead is fitted forward of the main fins and behind the nose-mounted guidance assembly. At medium and low altitudes the kill radius is about 65 meters and the blast radius for severe damage is 100-120 meters. The maximum blast radius against a high altitude target is approximately 250 meters, due to the rarefied atmosphere. The weapon has a accuracy of 75 meters with the large blast radius compensating for system inaccuracies.

The V-75 system is designed to be simple and easy to operate with the minimum of specialized training. The standard deployment pattern of a battalion site consists of six semi-fixed trainable single rail launchers are deployed in the familiar hexagon arrangement about 60-100 meters apart. The launchers may be dug into pits, left at ground level or hardened in concrete revetments. The battery command post fire control team and its computer, the Fan Song missile control radar, the P-12 Spoon Rest early warning radar, and typically six reload rounds on their articulated trailers are all located in the center of the launchers array.

The Spoon Rest A-band warning and target acquisition radar has a range of 275 km using a large Yagi antenna array.

SPOON REST


Function:


Target acquisition, early warning

Range


275 km

Frequency
A versions: A band (VHF)
B versions: VHF below A band

Comments
Power 314kw, BW 6x22.5
PRF 310-400pps
PW 4-6us
Max Alt 32km
Scan 2-6rpm

Associated weapon system


SA-2 GUIDELINE
FAN SONG fire control radar

Recognition

# Six yagi array with bisecting crossbar
# Mast mounted on 6x6 truck
# In transit, two truck carry array and generator






V-75
SA-2 GUIDELINE
HQ-1 / HQ-2 (Chinese versions)
Tayir as Sabah (Egyptian versions)
The V-75 (SA-2) surface-to-air missile system was designed for the defense of both fixed targets and field forces. The V-75 was designed to cope with the threat posed by small groups of aircraft rather than massed raids. Flexibility and mobility are its chief advantages over the SA-1. In contrast to the massive SA-1 sites, each of which is capable of defending only a limited sector around the target area, each SA-2 site is capable of 360� coverage. This flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling capacity and rate of fire relative to the SA-1.

Although there are a variety of arrangement patterns, all sites consist of six launching positions -- usually revetted - deployed around a guidance radar and linked by service roads to facilitate loading. While the sites were permanent installations, all operating components of the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and are capable of movement by road or raiL

The V-75 was the basic missile defense system for critical urban-industrial areas in the USSR, other than Moscow. The V-75 deployment began on a wide scale since early 1958, with sites located throughout the western part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Deployment patterns and levels of concentration varied according to the geography, size, and shape of the target area, and the Soviet estimate of the worth of individual targets. Between mid-1958 and 1964 more than 600 SA-2 sites were identified by US intelligence in the USSR, mostly in defense of population centers, industrial complexes, and government control centers.

Most SA-2 sites defended major centers of population and industry. SA-2 defenses were also deployed for the special protection of nuclear materials production and storage facilities. In addition, some key Soviet field forces and long range bomber bases were included in the SA-2 deployment pattern. The construction of sites and the training and activation of firing units was seasonal, with activity at a minimum during the winter months.

The sites in the Moscow area, located within the inner ring of SA-1 sites, were intended to supplement the existing defenses. Deployment of SA-2 installations around Moscow included seven sites as of 1964 as part of a program to supplement the SA-1 system.

Missile defenses were provided for most of the Soviet cities with populations greater than 200,000. SA-2 sites were emplaced at some smaller urban areas which contained government control centers or other installations of critical importance. They were also deployed for defense of naval and port facilities, nuclear production and weapon storage Installations, missile test ranges, and Industrial facilities. Other major military installations, such as long-range missile sites and alrfields of the long-range air force, are also defended by SA-2. A number of sites in border areas, which were unrelated to specific targets, were part of the deployment of peripheral defenses which eventually extended from the Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of the USSR into central Asia. Deployment in the Baltic coastal area was particularly dense. In mid-1962 about 750 sites were operational in defense of more than 200 target areas in the USSR. The Soviets eventually deployed roughly a thousand SA-2 sites in the USSR, with the major portion of the deployment completed by the mid-1960s.

Some SA-2 units were deployed in support of Soviet field forces in East Germany and in the USSR. Although SA-2 units assigned to Soviet field forces were normally emplaced at fixed installations, the system is transportable by road and SA-2 units were observed in field exercises. However, SA-2 units have a limited ability to follow a fast moving front because of the requirement for good roads and the time required to displace to new positions. SA-2 missile defenses for field forces were primarily assigned to such targets as major headquarters, logistic centers, and airfields.

Deployment of SA-2 sites for defense of Warsaw Pact targets began in 1960. The heaviest deployment has occurred in East Germany. About half of the sites were manned by East German troops, and the remainder by units of the Soviet field forces. The East German sites were located in the vicinity of Berlin and in the northern portion of East Germany. The Soviet sites were deployed to defend important Soviet military installations such as major headquarters and airfields.

China

Suspension of Soviet assistance limited the extent of SA-2 deployment in China. Only about a half dozen sites were initially deployed in China, three of them at Beijing. These sites contained Soviet manufactured equipment. The Chinese license-built version of the V-75 was designated the HQ-1. The People's Republic of China developed its own modified version of the V-750 under the designation HQ-2 (Hong Qian = Red Leader), with the Western designation CSA-1.

According to a China sales brochure, the FT-2000A SAM will use a highly-modified HQ-2/ CSA-1 missile that has been equipped with a passive radio frequency homing seeker operating in the 2- to 6-GHz band. The FT-2000A also will contain a new millimeter-wave band fuze, a new guidance-and-control section, and a new 60 kg fragmentation warhead. The missile has a cutoff valve for thrust adjustment while in flight, probably to extend its range. The missile seeker is loaded with the target aircraft�s radio frequency (RF) signature before launch and relies on this information for tracking and intercept. The missile has an estimated maximum range of 60 km, with a maximum altitude of 18,000 meters.

A stand-alone FT-2000A battery consists of a central control station and twelve launchers, each holding one missile. The central control station has one master passive sensor and three auxiliary passive sensors. The auxiliary passive sensors coordinate with the master passive sensor through triangulation to determine angle and range of targets emitting in the 2- to 6-GHz band. This configuration is totally passive, relying on the RF emissions of the target.

A composite fire unit consists of FT-2000A launchers and missiles, integrated with standard SAM components like those of the HQ-2, SA-2, or SA-3. Although a special fire control unit and launcher are required, this configuration allows anti-jamming missiles to replace several of the command guided missiles normally associated with these SAMs.

Egypt

Egyptian technicians have reverse engineered and modified two Soviet SAMs -- the Ayn as Saqr (a version of the SA-7) and the Tayir as Sabah (a version of the SA-2).
V-75 Missile System

The V-75 SA-2 GUIDELINE is a medium to high altitude surface-to-air missile system. This two-stage missile has a large solid propellant booster stage fitted with four very large delta fins. The core stage consists of a storable liquid propellant sustainer rocket motor using inhibited red fuming nitric acid oxidizer and kerosene fuel. A set of four cropped delta-shaped wings are located near the mid-section, with a second in-line set of smaller fixed fins at the nose, and a third in-line set of slightly larger powered control fins at the tail.

The guidance system at an SA-2 site can handle only one target at a time, but can direct three missiles against a target simultaneously. Additional missiles could be fired against the same target after one or more missiles of the first salvo had completed their run. The Soviets apparently believed they must program three or four missiles against each target in order to achieve acceptable kill probabilities.

The 295 kg nuclear warhead used only on the SA-2E variant is believed to have a yield of 15 kT. The other V-75 variants have an internally grooved fragmentation warhead weighs 195 kg (130 kg of which is high explosive) with proximity, contact and command fusing available. This conventional warhead is fitted forward of the main fins and behind the nose-mounted guidance assembly. At medium and low altitudes the kill radius is about 65 meters and the blast radius for severe damage is 100-120 meters. The maximum blast radius against a high altitude target is approximately 250 meters, due to the rarefied atmosphere. The weapon has a accuracy of 75 meters with the large blast radius compensating for system inaccuracies.

The V-75 system is designed to be simple and easy to operate with the minimum of specialized training. The standard deployment pattern of a battalion site consists of six semi-fixed trainable single rail launchers are deployed in the familiar hexagon arrangement about 60-100 meters apart. The launchers may be dug into pits, left at ground level or hardened in concrete revetments. The battery command post fire control team and its computer, the Fan Song missile control radar, the P-12 Spoon Rest early warning radar, and typically six reload rounds on their articulated trailers are all located in the center of the launchers array.

The Spoon Rest A-band warning and target acquisition radar has a range of 275 km using a large Yagi antenna array.

SPOON REST


Function:


Target acquisition, early warning

Range


275 km

Frequency
A versions: A band (VHF)
B versions: VHF below A band

Comments
Power 314kw, BW 6x22.5
PRF 310-400pps
PW 4-6us
Max Alt 32km
Scan 2-6rpm

Associated weapon system


SA-2 GUIDELINE
FAN SONG fire control radar

Recognition

# Six yagi array with bisecting crossbar
# Mast mounted on 6x6 truck
# In transit, two truck carry array and generator

KNIFE REST

Type


KNIFE REST A


KNIFE REST B/C

Russian Designation


P-8 Dolfin


P-10

Function


Early Warning

Frequency
A-band

A-band

Range


75 km


70 km

Comment


75kw power
PW 4-12us


Associated weapon system


SA-2

Recognition

The maximum radar range of the E-band Fan Song A/B/F radar varies between 60-120 km depending upon target type, altitude and operating conditions. The G-band Fan Song D/E maximum range is extended to between 75-145 km under equivalent conditions.

FAN SONG
FAN SONG A/B FAN SONG C/E FAN SONG F

Function:


Fire Control & Tracking
Can track six targets simultaneously

Range
60-120km (A/B versions) 70-145km (D/E/F versions)

Frequency
E/F bands (A/B versions) G band (C/E versions) E/F bands (F version)

Comments
# 600kw power
# Vert Ant BW 10 10x2deg
# Hort Ant BW 2x10deg
# Scan 15.5-17HZ
# 1.0mw power
# Vert Ant BW 7.5x1.5deg
# Hort Ant BW 11.5x7.5
# Scan 15.5-17HZ
# PRF 828-1440 Search
# 1656-2880 Trk
# PW .4-1.2ms us
# 2-.9ms us
# 600kw power
# Vert Ant BW 10 10x2deg
# Hort Ant BW 2x10deg
# Scan 15.5-17HZ
# (guidance): PRF 44pps

Associated weapon system


SA-2 GUIDELINE SAM,
SPOON REST target acquisition radar

Recognition

# Trailer-mounted with tilting superstructure
# Two orthogonal antennas(lewis scanners)
# E version have 2 additional parabolic dishes
# Scanners exhibit 'flapping' motion in operation

HQ-7 / FM-80/-90 Feimeng 80

The Feimeng 80 air defense missile is a point defense missile that is usually deployed to ammunition depots or military bases. Its mission is similar to that of the "Avenger" missile. With an effective engagement range of 12-15km the system uses an E/F-band Acquisition radar and a J-band Engagement radar.

In order to reduce the danger of being hit by the enemy's air defense units, fighter bombers now use ultra-low-altitude flight to launch surprise assaults against ground targets. Ordinary radar and air defense missiles are relatively ineffective against planes and helicopters using this kind of tactics, flying at altitudes of scores of meters. Under such circumstances, low-altitude air defense missiles specially designed to hit objects flying in low altitudes have become increasingly important.

In the early 1990s China first publicly displayed its first mobile low-altitude and ultra-low-altitude missile -- the "Feimeng (Flying Midge)-80." Using a combination of infrared, television and radar guidance systems, this air defense missile system is under wireless command control all the way, which gives it excellent resistance to passive jamming, active jamming and crustal and meteorological noises. Compared to similar types of advanced air defense missiles abroad, the "Feimeng-80" is superior to the US Chaparrel, the British Rapier, and the German and French Roland in all-weather capability, combat response time, combat air space, and ability to deal with multiple targets. Its overall performance is comparable to the improved Sidewinder.

At the end of 1998, the "Feimeng-90," an improved version of the "Feimeng-80," was introduced. Compared to the old system, the target seeking range of the new system is increased from 18,400 meters to 25,000 meters, the homing range is increased from 17,000 meters to 20,000 meters, the maximum speed is increased from 750 meters/second to 900 meters/second, and the maximum range is increased from 12,000 meters to 15,000 meters, thus enhancing its long-range combat capability. At the same time, its maximum ultra radio frequency height is reduced from 30 meters to 15 meters. The new system also makes use of two-waveband radar instead of ordinary radar and features an improved television tracking system, which greatly increases its combat effectiveness.

Specifications
Contractor
Entered Service
Total length 3.0 m
Diameter 0.15 m
Wingspan 0.55 m
Weight 85 kg
Warhead Weight
Propulsion
Maximum Speed Mach 2.3
Operating altitude 15 - 5500 m
Operating range 8000 - 12000 m
Guidance mode Radar, IR & optical
Single-shot hit probability

Two more Chinese SSBN's spotted???????????

China appears to have launched two more ballistic missiles submarines from the Bohai shipyard at Huludao approximately 400 km east of Beijing. This could bring to three the number of Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) launched by China in the past three four years.



The two submarines were discovered during analysis of newly published commercial satellite images on Google Earth. This is the second time in three months that FAS has discovered new Chinese ballistic missile submarines on commercial satellite images. The first time was in July 2007, when the first Jin-class was disclosed on the FAS Strategic Security Blog.

The submarines on the new image have the same dimensions as the previous submarine.

So How Many Do They Have?

Whether China has now launched two or three Jin-class SSBNs is still unclear. The image of the first SSBN discovered at Xiaopingdao in July 2007 was taken on October 17, 2006. The new image of the two SSBNs at Huludao was taken six and a half months later on May 3, 2007. One possibility is that the Xiaopingdao SSBN returned to Huludao for repair or further adjustment and was captured on the 2007 photo together with the second SSBN. Another possibility is that the two Huludao SSBNs are indeed the second and third boats of the new Jin-class SSBN.

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimated in December 2006 that "a fleet of probably five TYPE 094 SSBNs will be built in order to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea SSBN presence." China has not stated how many SSBNs it plans to build and there is no authoritative information available in the public that confirms that China plans to build five SSBNs. It might, but it might also build less if it decides that three or four are sufficient.

Some Implications

The new Jin-class SSBNs add to the single and unsuccessful Xia-class (Type 092) that China launched in 1982. The Xia has never conducted a deterrent patrol and its operational status is in doubt. The rapid launch of two or three Jin-class SSBNs indicate that the Chinese navy feels confident it has overcome at least some of the technical problems that curtailed the Xia.

Each Jin-class appears to have 12 launch tubes for the new Julang-2 sea-launched ballistic missiles that are currently under development. If Julang-2 and three Jin-class SSBNs become fully operational, it would enable China to deploy up to 24 ballistic missiles at sea, assuming one boat would be in overhaul at any given time (and the Xia is still not operational). The range of the Julang-2 is estimated by the US intelligence community at more than 8,000 km (4,970+ miles), which brings Hawaii and Alaska (but not the continental United States) within reach from Chinese territorial waters.

Despite many rumors on the Internet about multiple warheads on Julang-2, the long-held assessment by the US intelligence community is that the Julang-2 will be a single-warhead missile.

Whether China plans to deploy a continuous sea-based deterrent is unknown. It appears doubtful because it would break with the Chinese practice of not deploying fully operational nuclear missiles. Nuclear warheads for China's land-based missiles are believed to be stored separate from the missiles, although this has never actually been verified for the entire force. If the submarines deployed into the Pacific (like U.S. and to a smaller extent Russian SSBNs) it would also break with Chinese policy of not deploying nuclear weapons outside Chinese territory. An alternative would be to operate the SSBNs as a surge capability, intended to deploy in a crisis.

PL-9

PL-9
DK-9

The PL-9 [Pili = Thunderbolt, or Pen Lung = Air Dragon] is China's latest third-generation air-to-air fighting missile. It has infrared guidance and boasts omnidirectional attack capability and good maneuverability. Its supplier is China National Aviation Import and Export Corporation. Its all-round performance is said to be better than that of the AIM-9L/M Sidewinder missile, and comparable to the R-73 of Russia. Apart from itPs control surfaces the PL-9 is almost identical to the Israeli Python 3, which was developed from the AIM-9L. But the PL-9 has only about one-third the range of the Python 3. Israel sold China its 9-mile range Python 3 infra-red guided air-to-air missile in the late 1980s.

The PL-9 is used as a surface-to-air guided missile, desinated the DK-9, in the 390 missile and artillery combination air defense system unveiled in 1991 by Beifang Industrial Company. This complex includes a photoelectric sensor, IBIS ultra-low-altitude searching radar, 3C&I command station, 90 double 37 anti-aircraft gun, 702 anti-aircraft fire control system (including a radar and optical surveillance system, a friend-and-foe identifier, a data transmission system, and fire control computer). One complete system can cover an airspace of 3,000 square kilometers and take on 48 targets simultaneously. The "80" anti-aircraft artillery system is a less advanced system based on the 702 fire control system lacks the PL-9 surface-to-air guided missile.

Specifications
Contractor
Entered Service
Total length 2.99 m
Diameter 160 mm
Wingspan 0.81 m
Weight 120 kg
Warhead Weight 10 kg
Propulsion single stage solid rocket
Maximum Speed Mach 2
Maximum effective range 15 km
Guidance mode IR
Single-shot hit probability

China's maturing navy

The East Asia security environment in which China is emerging demands that the matter of a maturing Chinese navy be put in a political context. Tension across the Taiwan Strait has recently relaxed. In Beijing, the leaders of economically successful and internationally active China do not want to jeopardize the nation's prospects for a bright future by initiating military conflict with Taiwan and the United States--quite the contrary. In Taipei, despite profound disagreement with Beijing and a major stir in domestic politics, a cautious posture in relations with Beijing now prevails. So, remarkably, amid deep, persistent, and mutual distrust, the current prospects for avoiding conflict across the Taiwan Strait are good. Well-informed Chinese officials and prestigious Americans who have had exchanges with senior Chinese leaders confirm the relaxed circumstances and express the conviction that Beijing is confident about the situation as Chinese leaders see it developing and that Taiwan, again content with the status quo, will remain measured in its actions. War across the Taiwan Strait is not looming.
Nevertheless, Beijing is, by modernizing its military, ensuring that things will not go awry in Taiwan, that its policy of intimidation continues to work. The indisputable reality is that this military--the People's Liberation Army (or PLA), and particularly its naval component, the PLA Navy (or PLAN)--is growing greatly in capability; further, it is a growing concern to defense and naval leaders in Washington, D.C., and other capitals, including Tokyo and Taipei. In a time of American preoccupation with the global war on terrorism, it is appropriate to draw attention to the crucial features of this modernization of components of the PLA. Beijing, if the "Taiwan problem" were to suffer a dramatic reversal, would have available an impressive force acquired for this purpose. If that force were effectively deployed, it would be sufficient in terms of hardware to undertake a two-pronged, PLA Navy-led campaign, with a big maritime component, against Taiwan and U.S. forces in a fashion that could be termed "jointness with Chinese characteristics."

A MILITARY TO DEFEND AND DETER
When pressed on the subject, Chinese officials began some months ago to deliver both publicly and privately (to the author and undoubtedly many others) the consistent message that the military budget is not excessive, manpower is shrinking, and the newly modernized PLA is not a threat. Chinese characterize the PLA instead as a deterrent force--as were U.S. forces during the Cold War, they are quick to remind. When pressed further, they accept unabashedly the retort that the modernization surge is, so far, narrowly focused on the Taiwan contingency. It is directed to deterring Taiwan's movement toward independence, which they consider the top "threat to Chinese sovereignty," and to curbing the ability of the United States to intervene rapidly and effectively were China compelled, as Beijing perceives it, to use military force against Taiwan.
So the concern is that hard-liners in Beijing, obsessed by the "Taiwan problem" might not allow prudence to prevail in decision making in a crisis and, consequently, could order the use of military force because of what they perceive as intolerable "splittist" conduct by Taipei. In evaluating the risks of an imprudent decision by Beijing, it might be asked rhetorically whether the current Chinese Communist Party is capable of as bad a choice in a future Taiwan crisis as most observers think the party made with the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the actions in 1989 now referred to simply as "Tiananmen." Some observers increasingly find reason to be optimistic, but it is hard to offer unqualified assurance that Beijing could not again make a very bad decision.
It is the result of decisions obviously made several years ago that a new, modern, and much more capable PLA Navy has, along with the Air Force and 2nd Artillery Corps (the ballistic- and long-range-cruise-missile force), been acquired and deployed. A stunning modernization effort continues. Regardless of how Beijing's intentions are viewed, the surge in PLA modernization has radically changed the military situation for Taiwan. Taipei is more than ever forced to look to Washington to cope with this more advanced, capable PLA, with the strategic depth of huge China behind it.

Moreover, the PLA now hopes to bring to reality concepts its strategists have written about, such as how an inferior force can prevail against a superior opponent--that is, China versus the United States. Specifically, the critical aspects of a new navy and the highly significant synergies that may develop between it and the missile and air forces warrant full attention, because they are directed specifically at deterring, delaying, or complicating timely and effective American access and intervention. U.S. forces must be able, should the Taiwan pot boil over, to turn the tables and deter Beijing from using its proclaimed deterrent forces--or to ensure a favorable outcome if mutual deterrence fails. The ultimate American goal, however, should be to make the chances of conflict even less than they are. Understanding the important developments described here seems a necessary step toward that goal.
STARTING WITH QUESTIONS

The following questions and answers may be an unusual way to begin probing the specific naval aspects of the issue, but they focus on an often neglected, but arguably the most surprising, single PLAN acquisition program--its bold move to build quickly a modern nuclear submarine force despite its troubled past in this arena. These incisive questions--posed to the author in 2005 by experts on the Chinese submarine force--are especially useful in that they take the PLA's Taiwan obsession fully into account but also look beyond. They reveal the layers of complexity and uncertainty inherent in the very rapid and impressive modernization of the PLA Navy--a navy that, it is worth emphasizing, is arguably the only one in today's world that the U.S. Navy must deter or be able to defeat, but also a navy that under different circumstances could become a high-seas partner.
* How "mature" is China's navy? Does the PLAN have the requisite human capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen to become a world-class fleet? The PLAN is most nearly mature with respect to platforms and weapons but, approximately in the order listed, progressively less so in human capital, organizational practices, and exercise regimen. It is working to become better in each.

* Are nuclear submarines a good fit for China's emerging naval strategy? Will the balance of forces (i.e., nuclear versus diesel submarines) change in the future? The currently emerging balance is a good fit, especially vis-a-vis China's current set of potential adversaries. If the Taiwan problem were eliminated somehow, a shift toward nuclear submarines to protect more distant sea-lanes would be a logical option. This makes the PLAN nuclear submarine program a possible bellwether for future naval policy more generally.

* What are the trends in undersea warfare and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in the western Pacific region? The superiority of the U.S. nuclear submarine force will continue; however, the Chinese are apparently developing ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit ships at sea. This capability to lob numerous accurate ballistic missile warheads high over the heads of all defenders could effectively circumvent the anticipated quiet and capable U.S. nuclear attack submarines. The PLAN has previously seen these submarines as all but impossible to penetrate with its own submarines (or surface ships) to reach the carriers and cruisers it wants to disable. Despite the PLAN's ineptitude at antisubmarine warfare, short of a (plausible) major breakthrough, the trend in submarine/ASW competition is going China's way: the PLAN's submarine numbers and diversity trump, or at least could saturate, likely ASW opposition for the foreseeable future, especially in case of the short war Beijing contemplates. With respect to Taiwan's ASW capability (almost an oxymoron now), the Republic of China (ROC) Navy would still have to learn to use its P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft after getting them; its prospective new submarine force of eight diesel submarines, if approved for acquisition (as currently seems unlikely), would be a decade or more from operational status and even then inadequate for antisubmarine warfare against what would by then have become a remarkably numerous, diverse, and advanced PLAN submarine force.
* What strategic dilemmas might Washington encounter as a result of China's new nuclear submarine force? Beijing's smug confidence that Washington must always keep in mind China's status as a nuclear power will be reinforced if the PLAN is successful with its ongoing program to build several modern Jin-class (Project 094) nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). Its sequential construction of Shang-class (Project 093) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) adds the component of reach (range and speed) to the existing qualities of numbers of its nuclear and conventional submarines, as well as quietness for a growing portion of that force and potency of weapons for a similar portion--especially for the new Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, with their long-range, supersonic, sea-skimming antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). A "new PLAN" with these new nuclear-powered submarines and stunning array of other new and modern platforms and weapons is highly likely to view itself in a different strategic light, as yet unrevealed, than has the "old PLAN."
A MATURING BUT STILL ADOLESCENT NAVY

Harking back to the title of this article, the PLA Navy might best be described as an adolescent rather than mature navy, with the caution that adolescents can exhibit qualities across the range from juvenile to adult, often commit crimes that warrant treatment as adults, and mature unpredictably. To extend the adolescence analogy a bit more, the PLAN is growing remarkably in size and strength, even "bulking up" (in the American vernacular); all observers remark how it has grown since the last time they saw it. (3)

Simply fielding more modern units does not make the PLAN a truly modern operational force. The limits on how China's and the navy's leaders are able to employ their new capabilities represent significant shortcomings, and success in the effort to overcome them is far from assured. Put another way, the PLAN has matured remarkably insofar as acquiring platforms and equipment (ships, submarines, aircraft, radars, and so on) and weapons (antiship cruise missiles, air defense missiles, torpedoes, and the like) is concerned, but this "new PLA Navy" has not matured fully in exercising its forces and developing the command and control capabilities, coordination means, and intelligence and targeting support needed to make that force fully operational--especially in comparison with its most important and most capable potential adversary, the U.S. Navy. (4)

Better officers are on the way up--if they make it. The PLAN recognizes that to conduct complex joint operations, exercise greatly enhanced command and control, and effectively employ modern weapons it needs a better-educated, more worldly officer corps, and it is striving to do that, or so it says. (5) PLAN officers are taking more prominent positions in institutions that do strategic thinking; for example, in two recent firsts for naval officers, Admiral Zhang Dingfa headed the Academy of Military Science (he now serves as the commander of the PLAN), and Rear Admiral Yang Yi is still director of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Beijing. The PLA Navy seeks officers educated in first-rate civilian universities. (6) The emphasis, however, appears to be on specific technical and scientific education; (7) this approach neglects, it seems, the parallel need for specialists in operations, security issues, strategic studies, and international affairs.
Details aside, an important and yet unanswered question is whether the PLA Navy wants officers better educated or considers them better Red. That is, will competent, forward-thinking officers be selected for flag rank, or will party loyalty and personal connections continue to prevail as the paramount selection criteria? (9) This author has lectured and conferred at the National Defense University and other PLA institutions on several occasions at which junior officers asked all the questions and did all the talking while flag and general officers who were students remained silent--at least in part, it appeared, for fear of being outshone in these lively and insightful discussions. It would seem that at some point the demands of a modern PLA will force the promotion of more of the officers who have all the intelligent questions and original thoughts.
Organization is improving, but maybe not yet enough. The PLA Navy structure has been streamlined: naval aviation no longer stands alone as though an almost separate service; closer ties have been established with the PLAN's marine corps; and there are fewer layers in the chain of command. (10) Nevertheless, the author has observed and been told, there is still much deadwood at the top: individuals in green uniforms with two or more stars on their shoulders (PLA ground-force generals) who persist in treating the PLAN as mostly an adjunct to the army, and senior officers who, through lack of vision, fail to move decisively toward true joint operations. These generals represent obstacles at a time when real coordination with the 2nd Artillery Corps and the PLA Air Force would lead to enormous advances in the ability to polish off Taiwan, threaten American intervention capabilities, and keep Japan off balance.

China's navy is still failing to conduct exercises needed to develop its potential capability. It continues to steam in the littoral for the most part. However, the PLAN aspires to, and is erratically striving to conduct, training and exercises in more distant waters; to make its training more like combat; to challenge itself in exercises with active, maneuvering opposition forces; and otherwise to add realism to its training and exercise activity. It has even been so bold as to engage, in August 2005, in a major multiphased exercise with the Russian Navy, a notable advance beyond the minor, very basic exercises it has conducted with the French, British, Australian, Pakistani, and Indian navies in recent years. (11) A few years ago the PLAN would not have participated in such exercises at all, fearing not only prying (as well as spying) but embarrassment, that its shortcomings and backwardness would be revealed. Chinese naval leaders now seem sufficiently confident in their crews to seek international partners for exercises. (It will be interesting to see if several unflattering post-exercise Russian media reports rejuvenate concerns that bilateral exercises lead to ridicule and embarrassment.
Still, the import of the Russian-Chinese exercise should not be overstated. It was initially described by many as preparation for countering U.S. forces in the region. As later and more accurately described, however, it primarily demonstrated that Sino-Russian bilateral relations are strong, especially military-to-military relations and arms sales. The exercise itself, held in waters just off the Shandong Peninsula, was hardly a simulation of access denial against approaching U.S. forces. Its significance in that respect would seem to be less direct. The fact that it was held at all suggests that the Russians are more likely than we might have surmised to provide logistic and possibly intelligence support--specifically, to offer to resupply missiles and spare parts for the key Russian weapon systems that China would employ in combat with Taiwan and the United States.
If it would be exaggeration, then, to assess this exercise as a sign of emergence as a fully mature force, the PLAN is creeping toward real blue-water exercises with composite task forces including surface combatants, submarines, and aviation. So far, only in occasional and isolated distant submarine transits does it approximate the task of confronting an enemy, the U.S. Navy, that it might need to keep at arm's length, many hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast. (14) In short, the PLAN is not visibly conducting exercises, alone or with other services, that rehearse confrontation with approaching U.S. Navy forces. The United States should be alert to such a development with this new force, a force designed to have the capabilities that could make such operations feasible.

ATTACKS FROM SEVERAL AXES

A new aspect of budding maturity, what could facetiously be termed "socialization," is looming and demands attention--the prospect that the PLAN and the 2nd Artillery Corps could (and should) join hands to bolster the nation's capability to attack Taiwan and pose a significantly greater and more diverse threat to the ability of the United States to intervene in the region. The greatly increased number and highly improved accuracy of China's medium- and short-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and SRBMs), plus strategic and technical writings, suggest strongly that senior Chinese military leaders have recognized the enhancement of naval capabilities that would result from support by ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles. China's MRBMs (the DF-21C) and SRBMs (DF-15 and -11), with conventional warheads, have capabilities well beyond the psychological intimidation of Taiwan. (15) Prospective synergies stem from the ability of these potent missile arsenals to suppress Taiwan's offensive and defensive air power, support amphibious and airborne assaults on the island, strike American bases in the region, and possibly damage heavily Taiwanese naval forces before they could leave port.

However, the most important aspect of the increasing ballistic-missile threat is the prospect that within a few years China may be able seriously to threaten not only American land bases but also carrier strike groups, with maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs). (16) MaRVed missiles, with conventional warheads, would maneuver both to enhance warhead survival (defeat missile defenses) and home on mobile (or stationary) targets. (17) The implications for the PLAN of this prospective 2nd Artillery capability are, of course, profound; they include the ability to degrade U.S. air and missile defenses (including the Aegis systems and carrier flight decks). That would allow follow-on attacks by layered, diverse, and appropriately redundant PLAN submarine, air, and surface forces firing large numbers of very modern and capable ASCMs, torpedoes, and even their guns if the earlier attacks suppress most defenses. (18) This and what follows are in clear outline the sort of threat the PLA and PLA Navy wish to pose to U.S. Navy forces. The precisely focused force the Chinese have built and what they have written about its use leave no doubt about the concept--although there are grave doubts about their ability to conduct it.
Whether, or how soon, the ballistic-missile threat becomes a factor in the ability of the PLAN to deter, confuse, and delay or, alternatively, confront approaching U.S. Navy forces, the ability to launch lethal antiship-cruise-missile attacks is an area where the PLAN is already near or at maturity--even if the targeting of American forces at which to launch them has not reached a mature state. The PLAN became early a cruise-missile navy, as a way of overcoming other deficiencies. Now it must be described as a modern cruise-missile navy, at least with respect to the platforms and lethal, evasive missiles it is deploying. (19) The PLAN's four newest classes of submarines, armed with potent ASCMs, fall just below MaRVed ballistic missiles in the hierarchy of potential or emerging threats to U.S. forces.
At the top of the submarine component of the overall threat are the eight new Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia that are now being successively delivered to China. These submarines threaten carrier strike groups through their ability to launch, while submerged over a hundred miles away, the SS-N-27B/Sizzler antiship cruise missile. (20) After a subsonic flight to the target area, the SS-N-27B makes a supersonic, sea-skimming, evasive attack. (21) It is described by its marketers and others as part of the best family of cruise missiles in the world and, in the opinion of some, as able to defeat the U.S. Aegis air- and missile-defense system that is central to the defense of carrier strike groups. (22)

Shang-class (Type 093) SSNs are possible partners for the new Kilos. The surprisingly rapid construction of successive units in this new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine implies special utility in a Taiwan contingency. The Shangs could, if they prove sufficiently quiet and fast and are properly equipped with sensors, be part of the net by which the PLAN locates and identifies approaching U.S. carrier strike groups. (23) If used this way, they could be part of a matrix composed of such detection and reporting means as satellites, merchant ships, and even fishing boats with satellite phones.

Having served as part of the matrix that detects targets for the ballistic missiles and Kilos, the Shangs could then join with the Song- and Yuan-class non-nuclear submarines (SSs) in attacks against selected U.S. forces that have, as expected in the sequenced PLA attack concept, suffered by that point significant degradation of their air and missile defenses. (24) These three classes of submarines could carry out, from several attack axes, submerged launches of large salvoes of subsonic, but still very capable, ASCMs. Of course, further follow-on attacks by torpedoes cannot be discounted if they appear to be needed.

China's other new nuclear-powered submarine program, the Jin-class (Project 094) ballistic-missile submarine, is primarily a part of China's strategic deterrent, but it will necessarily play a role as backdrop for this Taiwan scenario. (25) As with China's modernized and augmented land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, Beijing can act more confidently in bold undertakings vis-a-vis the United States when its strategic forces are more secure. With the Jins, Beijing is adding a layer of insurance that American missile defenses could be saturated--and that Washington would know it. Washington, of course, would have to take into account the fact that it is dealing with a capable nuclear power whose missiles have become very mobile and hard to detect.
A DAUNTING ASW CHALLENGE

The success of the described PLAN submarine attacks using submerged-launch antiship cruise missiles depends to some degree on thwarting or coping with U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities, primarily aircraft (P-3Cs and to a lesser extent shipborne helicopters) and SSNs. One method by which the Chinese might complicate the ASW picture for the Americans is to use large numbers of submarines, including the score or more older submarines--Han-class SSNs and Romeo- and Ming-class SSs--which may be noisy but cannot be ignored. In round numbers, the PLAN might, in a campaign where it has chosen the time to ready the crews and initiate operations, be able to deploy more than twenty modern SSNs and SSs and roughly the same number of older submarines. (26) The long range of the ASCMs carried by the new Kilos means that those submarines need not come within a hundred miles of the target ships, if targeting information can be obtained remotely--greatly expanding the areas that American SSNs and P-3Cs would have to search. The speed and practically unlimited underwater endurance of the new Shang SSNs could allow them to close targets promptly to launch their shorter-range ASCMs after the initial attacks by longer-range missiles have degraded defenses.
The role of Taiwan in antisubmarine warfare deserves some attention. Taiwan's current ASW capability is minimal. That capability might improve in the foreseeable future were Taiwan to obtain from the United States the much-discussed P-3Cs, but that will depend on how seriously the ROC Navy pursues the demanding task of learning how to do antisubmarine warfare with that aircraft. If it does that well, Taiwan's P-3Cs might offer a measure of help in the big ASW problem that the PLAN could create in the East China Sea and beyond. (27) The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would offer another measure of assistance, if Tokyo were to make a political decision to involve its forces in that way. All this said, China's growing and improving submarine fleet has outpaced U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese ASW in the difficult littoral waters of the region, which generally favor submarines seeking to escape detection. (28) Open-ocean areas may be a slightly riskier proposition for the PLAN's submarines, unless they actually achieve the elusive new levels of stealth to which China aspires.

The previously described antisurface-warfare roles seem the most likely ones for the PLAN's new Shangs. It does not seem likely that the PLAN, inexperienced compared to the U.S. Navy in undersea warfare, would use its few new SSNs--precious to the Chinese but almost certainly not comparable to American SSNs in capability and stealth--in an effort to strip the carrier groups of their submarine protection. So far, China has conceded that aspect of the game to the United States and chosen to avoid dueling with the superior American submarines. By electing to develop a land-based ballistic-missile threat against ships at sea, China is pursuing a path that could keep U.S. submarines from blocking a critical initial attack on carrier strike groups. If in the event the ballistic-missile concept is not usable or fails in execution, the new Kilos with the SS-N-27B, the many other submarines with ASCMs, and the increasingly capable PLA naval air force B-6s, FB-7s, and Su-30MK2s (to be mentioned in more detail later) provide other alternatives that largely avoid American underwater-warfare superiority. The point is that as the Shangs are introduced into the fleet, it seems unlikely that they will be expected to take on American SSNs directly.
ENOUGH TO MAKE WASHINGTON PAUSE?

The intensity and persistence of PLAN attacks on U.S. Navy forces could well be affected by Beijing's perception of the fragility of a government on Taiwan subjected to a major assault from everything from ballistic missiles to aircraft to special forces--and much more. It should be remembered that the primary purpose of denying or delaying access by U.S. forces would be to convince Taipei that waiting for help is futile, that capitulation and negotiation--on Beijing's terms--are the only reasonable option. Success against U.S. forces is, therefore, important largely for its effect on Taipei's will to fight on. Success in such conflict would be sweetest for the PLA if the United States never became actively involved, concern about the capabilities of a modernized Chinese force having led American leaders to delay or withhold carrier strike
Returning from strategic considerations to the fight itself, were one to occur, the Chinese can be expected next to deliver air-launched antiship cruise missiles once the air defenses of the U.S. strike groups, and possibly regional bases as well, are degraded. So this "layer" in the assault might be the PLA Navy Air Force, attacking several hundred miles out to sea from China (in some cases possibly much farther) with potent new air-launched ASCMs fired from new aircraft from Russia (the Su-30MK2) and indigenous long-range B-6s (a new version with new missiles) and FB-7 maritime interdiction aircraft, also with new ASCMs. (29) (Note how many times the word new appeared, correctly, in that sentence.) Some PLA Air Force aircraft have similar capabilities. At a minimum, the U.S. Navy would have to be concerned about vulnerability to such an attack and, if it had, indeed, sustained damage, might feel it had to retreat. Beijing would make sure that such a development was not lost on Taipei--and we are seeking here to understand more fully how Beijing envisions a conflict with its modernized forces, not necessarily the reality.

Surface combatants would be a final layer if a supposedly casualty-averse Washington and teetering Taipei have not yet taken the point. Cleanup attacks might in such a case be intended, with very capable ASCMs from the several new or upgraded classes of destroyers and frigates. These warships are led, with respect to lethal firepower, by Russian Sovremennyys (soon to increase from two to four) with supersonic, very evasive SS-N-22s. (30) China has built or is building enough new and modernized destroyers and frigates to form several modern surface action groups, each capable of long-range attacks with almost equally lethal, although subsonic, ASCMs. Also--and here it is finally beginning to overcome a long-standing shortcoming--the PLA Navy is on the way to acquiring good fleet air defenses using surface-to-air missile systems. (31)

To capture succinctly the scope of the modernization of the surface combatant force, it can be said that the Chinese are now building and dramatically upgrading more classes of modern destroyers and frigates (these combatants clearly outmatch those of Taiwan) than previous rates suggested they might acquire ships in this decade.
The question that cannot now be answered is whether such a visible and slow-moving force, even with dramatically improved air defense, could actually engage even a damaged U.S. force and not be subject to devastating attack by other American strike forces. There are, however, broader uncertainties for the PLAN. As noted, the concepts outlined above emerge from the force Beijing is building and from PLA doctrinal and other writing. Beijing has made hard decisions and executed expensive programs in the ongoing surge in the modernization of the PLA, with great emphasis on naval, air, and missile forces for such operations as described. But surveillance and targeting support will be needed if this force is to deter or confront American intervention efforts. To that end, it appears that China is making significant efforts to gain a varied capability from space, land, sea (including undersea), and air to locate, identify, track, and target naval forces. (33) China is lagging in this arena--real success in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) arena could take a decade--but one might make a guess that some rudimentary, if not reliable and consistent, capability could be cobbled together within a couple of years. In other words, there is impending danger that U.S. ships could be detected and effectively targeted. At least equally important is whether China will be able to coordinate, command, and control such operations--that is, what of the C4* to go with the ISR? The PLAN, although now more realistic and somewhat bolder in its training and exercises, as mentioned above, has not, for example, touted or otherwise given evidence of rehearsals of encounters with simulated carrier strike groups hundreds of miles east of China, as it might do as part of a deterrence scheme.
There is, as described, no doubt about the acquisition of modern platforms and threatening weapons, but there remains puzzlement as to whether and how promptly the PLA Navy and the other crucial components of the PLA will make all this capability truly operational. There is, nevertheless, an additional serious corollary as to whether Beijing would feel compelled in some circumstance to initiate hostilities against Taiwan and to confront U.S. forces even if preparations were short of optimal. It is hard to relax with respect to Beijing and Taiwan, even if we think Chinese command and control is not up to the task.

This all adds up to a complex planning and execution challenge for an inexperienced PLA. In the scenario depicted above, it would be conducting two major campaigns simultaneously: one to subdue Taiwan and the other to delay effective American intervention. The campaign against Taiwan would likely include initial ballistic-missile and land-attack cruise-missile attacks; special forces, fifth-column sabotage, and other such actions; information operations; major air attacks; and amphibious and airborne assaults to secure lodgments to allow occupation and control of Taiwan. The campaign against the United States, in addition to being preceded by extensive efforts temporarily to cripple American C4ISR, ([dagger]) would, it should be remembered, consist of the described ballistic- and cruise-missile attacks on carrier strike groups and possibly regional U.S. bases, submarine attacks using various forms of antiship cruise missiles, and then selections from such follow-on options as ASCMs from air or surface forces. This would be an extraordinarily demanding undertaking against a daunting foe for a PLA leadership that has no experience in such combat.
The author's guess is that the PLA would quickly succeed against Taiwan but would probably falter against U.S. forces, against which it would encounter surprises, countermeasures, and other capabilities that would likely cause severe reversals. It must also be remembered, however, both that China's best strategic and military minds are working on these problems and that Beijing may feel it has to act against Taiwan regardless of how challenging the prospect may appear. Moreover, it is unlikely that the leaders of today's modernized PLA would tell the civilian leadership that their military is not ready. On the contrary, Beijing and the military have reason to believe that their forces are of such a nature as to avoid American strengths, like SSNs and advanced C4ISR, and to make the most of China's strengths, such as its ballistic and cruise missiles and new conventional and nuclear submarine forces. The United States has the task not only to deter this modern military that could embolden Chinese leaders but also, irresistibly yet subtly, to lead those leaders to the conviction that a decision to attack Taiwan is not in China's interests and would not likely result in reunification.
BEYOND "THE TAIWAN PROBLEM"

The PLA, especially the PLAN, now seems almost wholly, even obsessively, focused on the Taiwan problem. Two other factors should be taken into account, however, and already seem to be intruding into Chinese strategic thinking. First, an emerging China wants to build a military appropriate to the country that it is becoming. Second, China's all-important national economic growth, which keeps the Communist Party in power, is dependent on ocean commerce. As the PLA Navy tries to look beyond Taiwan or to decide what, even now, it should be thinking about besides that, it sees a long-term capability to secure sea and land routes for the flow of oil and natural gas, as well as other commodities, as a leading priority for China.

Will we see an organic air capability and a shift to more nuclear submarines? A PLA Navy able to carry out that mission would almost certainly have some form of organic air, so that it could effectively operate beyond the range of land-based aircraft--far south in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, even to the Indian Ocean. Current shipyard work on the incomplete aircraft carrier Varyag may be the start of a move in that direction, unlike so many Chinese aircraft-carrier rumors of past decades. (34) Another consideration could be a leaning toward submarines with greater range, speed, and independence from land bases. This could mean that nuclear-powered attack submarines, despite the added cost, might be preferred over diesel-electric or even air-independent-propulsion submarines.

SSNs are a possible bellwether of PLAN strategic thinking. China is now building and buying three classes of nonnuclear submarines: the Kilos, the Songs, and the Yuans (some speculate about the exact character of the Yuan propulsion system). These submarines, along with the older Mings and remaining Romeos, represent a major investment and will almost certainly constitute a majority of the submarine fleet for the next fifteen years or more. It will, nevertheless, be worthwhile to keep an eye on China's success with the Shang attack class, to ascertain whether it will feel the need suggested above for a faster, more independent force to protect distant sea lanes, and whether an emerging China will follow the American example and diversify its SSN fleet to include land-attack cruise-missile capabilities and the ability to insert special forces--or possibly other, novel capabilities needed in emerging missions for an emerged China.
China's navy has developed in many remarkable ways, but perhaps the biggest test of maturity is the bold attempt to leap to a new status in the prestigious and unforgiving domain of nuclear submarines--where it had previously faltered. To a significant degree, the success or failure of its new nuclear-powered submarines, the Jin-class ballistic-missile class as well as the Shangs, is likely to determine future decisions for the Chinese submarine force. The American example in diversifying its nuclear submarines may also become a factor, in the form of an example. The outcome for the nuclear submarine force could set the tone for a navy that either comes to feel that it ranks with the best or, having "tried out for the pros" finds that once more it has faltered.
In any case, it is instructive to imagine a particularly intelligent and competent young Chinese naval officer just beginning his service. That junior officer must today see the prospect, at least, of a promising career ahead as a nuclear submariner in a globally capable "real navy"--the prospect of professional challenge and esteem comparable to that of an American counterpart. That in itself is a remarkable and telling change from a few years ago, when serving on troubled Chinese nuclear submarines was thought by some to be as much a joke as a job. Such success as the Chinese submarine force attains would tend to be infectious and to bolster the professionalism of other components of the modern PLAN, where newfound pride is thriving as well. The PLA Navy is not fully mature, but it has established its potential for that status in the air, on the sea, and, conspicuously, under the sea.