Anticipating a showdown with Iran, Israel decides secretly to deploy a submarine off its arch-foe's coast.

Anticipating a showdown with Iran, Israel decides secretly to deploy a submarine off its arch-foe's coast.

But how? The quickest route from Israel's Mediterranean coast is via the Suez Canal, which runs through Egypt and which the classified vessels shun. So the submarine is hidden in the belly of a commercial tanker, which delivers it to the Gulf.

Such is the plot of an Israeli thriller, "Undersea Diplomacy". Does it hold water? Perhaps not. Then again, the author, Shlomo Erell, is no mere novelist. He's an ex-admiral with experience in Israel's most sensitive military planning.

"It's pure fiction, but it's informed fiction," he said simply, when asked if his book reflects how the Israeli fleet of Dolphin-class submarines could be used against Iran, whose leadership has called for Israel to be "wiped off the map", stoking international concern over Tehran's nuclear programme.

Israel has three Dolphins, with two more on order from Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, a German shipyard custom-building them at a steep discount as part of Berlin's bid to shore up a Jewish state founded in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust.

The submarines are a subject of deepest secrecy given speculation that they carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

Many analysts believe the Dolphins are Israel's "second strike" weapons, referring to the Cold War theory that a country can deter foes from launching nuclear attacks by maintaining the ability to retaliate, even after its own territory has been laid waste. A nuclear "platform" out at sea is the best guarantee.

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons, and independent experts say it is years away from any such capability. Some, in turn, think Israel's expanding submarine fleet may be part of preparations to foil the perceived future threat through force.

"There is nothing on the horizon to suggest Iran would have the capability to knock out Israel's nuclear delivery means," said Sam Gardiner, a retired U.S. air force colonel who stages Middle East wargames for U.S. government and private clients.

The Dolphins, he said, may be part of "a conventional capability to deal with the number of targets Israel believes would need to be struck in a conventional preemptive attack".



DISTANCE NO OBJECT?

Israel sent jets to bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 and has hinted it could do the same against Iranian facilities if U.S.-led diplomatic pressure failed to rein in Tehran's plans.

But the Iraqi raid was on a single site, relatively close to Israel's borders. Targets in Iran might be too numerous and distant for Israel's air force, especially as intermediate Arab states or Turkey would likely refuse overflight rights.

Israel is assumed to have ballistic missiles, yet its small size may make surprise launches impossible: an unannounced missile test in January became news within minutes as the startled residents of nearby towns reported the roaring takeoff.

Submarines could bridge the gap, especially if positioned in Iranian waters. That possibility has given rise to speculation that Israel wants five Dolphins in order to allow for at least one to be at sea at all times while others are being serviced.

The question remains of how far they might travel.

Israeli navy sources say the Dolphins do not use the Suez -- to avoid being inspected by Egyptian harbourmasters. That means that, to reach the Gulf, Israel would either have to resort to fantastical ruses like the one in "Undersea Diplomacy", or send the submarines around Africa -- a month-long trip at least.

Jason Alderwick, a maritime analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, is sceptical.

"I don't buy the idea of a rotation. These submarines have not been purchased with a view to operating in the Gulf," he said. As Dolphins run on conventional rather than nuclear power so require regular refuelling and shore maintenance, he described them as better suited to close Mediterranean missions.

Israel also has access to the Red Sea through Eilat port. But navy sources said there was no plan to dock submarines there because the narrow Red Sea, which is shared with several Arab states, is vulnerable to blockades at the Straits of Tiran.



DETERRENTS NEVER USED

Restricted to the Mediterranean, analysts point out, the Israeli Dolphins could pose a "second-strike" threat to Iran only if they carried nuclear cruise missiles capable of hitting targets as far as 1,500 km (970 miles) away.

Lee Willett of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies noted that Dolphins lacked the vertical tubes used by much bigger Western and Soviet-era submarines to launch ballistic missiles.

Cold War tests showed nuclear warheads are too heavy to be delivered long distances on cruise missiles, so Israel could hit Iran only with conventional warheads if they were fired from the Mediterranean, he said.

A nuclear attack on Iran by a Dolphin, Willett argued, would have to be from the Gulf, which in turn would give away an unsupported submarine's position and probably doom it to being destroyed by surviving Iranian forces.

"The whole point of a deterrent is that it's never used," Willett said. "In designing the Dolphins as a second-strike platform, I imagine the Israelis were thinking 'it's not ideal, but it's the best we've got'."

Israel does not discuss its nuclear capabilities, under an "ambiguity" policy billed as warding off regional enemies while avoiding the kind of provocations that can trigger arms races.

Erell appeared to support such thinking. The message of his book -- which made a modest splash in Israel, and is currently available only in Hebrew -- was "how to use a submarine without resorting to war". "It's about affecting statecraft," he said.

China's stockpile of nuclear warheads has increased sharply

China's stockpile of nuclear warheads has increased sharply, with more DF-31A and JL-2 long-range strategic ballistic missiles entering service, giving it preliminary capability to engage in three-dimensional nuclear strikes upon opponent targets.

The changes in the Chinese nuclear capability started in 1995, before which the People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force was often teased as "a military service that needed an exit strategy." At that time, most of the soldiers serving in the PLASAF were doing little more than growing vegetables and raising pigs.

This miserable situation was the result of the aftershock of the large-scale nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union. After 1995, however, with the increase in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, China began to refocus its attention on the development of nuclear capability so as to possess effective deterrence against possible U.S. military interference in the Taiwan Strait.

This marked the beginning of the transformation of the PLASAF from a force with balanced nuclear and conventional capability to one more focussed on nuclear capability. In terms of technology, the PLASAF sped up the development of carrier vehicles for long-range strategic missiles, mainly the DF-31 and JL-2.

In addition, in order to make up the shortfall in its nuclear arsenal within a short period of time, China produced additional DF-5A intercontinental ballistic missiles, and undertook to prolong the service life of its existing DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and DF-4 long-range strategic missiles.

With the deployment of more ICBMs, the number of Chinese long-range strategic missile brigades has also increased. Meanwhile, at least two 094 ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs, and one 092-M SSBN have entered service.

There are signs that the DF-4 long-range ballistic missile positions at Delinghayuan in the western province of Qinghai have been expanded. Straight highway lanes stretch for several hundred kilometers in the region, and some highway sections have been revamped and new preliminary missile positions have been constructed. This indicates that China will very likely start deploying more DF-31A highway-mobile ICBMs to replace the DF-4s.

The strategic missile brigades most likely to receive the DF-5 and DF-5A ICBMs include the No. 801 and No. 804 brigades. The No. 813 brigade is stationed at Nanyang in Henan province, a unit generally believed to be armed with DF-31 ICBMs. In addition, the No. 809 and No. 812 brigades stationed in Qinghai are also armed with DF-4s, as well as the No. 803 and No. 805 brigades, stationed in Hunan.

Some of these DF-4 brigades may have started to receive DF-31A ICBMs. The positioning of DF-4s and DF-31As seem to be very close within the PLA Second Artillery Force, and both are called long-range strategic missiles, while the D-5 is called an ICBM. There is speculation that there is a No. 818 missile brigade armed with the DF-31, but this has not been confirmed by official sources. Because China currently does not have a sufficient quantity of ICBMs with a range above 10,000 kilometers (about 6,200 miles), efforts to upgrade and prolong the service life of its DF-5s is very likely to continue.

The increase of nuclear warheads within the PLA Second Artillery Force focuses on the strategic objective of deterring other major nuclear powers from attempting "nuclear blackmail" toward China. China has sufficient supplies of material for the production of nuclear warheads. It has very rich uranium resources, and its production of plutonium reserves has continued for a number of years. Western military observers generally believe China has enough nuclear material to produce 1,000 nuclear warheads.

Because the DF-31 ICBM and JL-2 SLBM use new types of carrier vehicles, China in recent years has been putting a lot of effort into the research and development of MIRVs -- multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. As a result, the DF-31 and JL-2 will be armed with new warheads, and some DF-5As and DF-5s may also become the platforms for these newly developed warheads. Western intelligence analysts generally believe that China now commands the technology to separate three warheads.

As for the number of ICBMs under each missile brigade, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese and Russian ICBM brigades may both be armed with nine missile units. If that is the case, calculating on the basis of three DF-5/DF-5A brigades and four to five DF-4 brigades or DF-31A brigades, China would have approximately 63 to 72 ICBMs and long-range strategic missiles.

Among these missile brigades, if each of the missiles deployed at the three DF-5/5A missile brigades and at least two DF-31A brigades are armed with three warheads, there are in total 135 nuclear warheads. If the two to three DF-4 long-range strategic missile brigades are included, and each missile is armed with a single warhead, there are a total of 18-27 DF-4 warheads. So far, the DF-5 has always been armed with one warhead.

This means the total number of China's long-range nuclear warheads would be between 153 and162. This is taking into consideration the fact that China has been steadily upgrading its long-range strategic missiles.

China's development of sea-based strategic nuclear capability is obviously aimed at acquiring strengths equivalent to that of the Second Artillery Force, giving China two-dimensional and effective strategic nuclear strike competence. As a result, the build-up of sea-based nuclear weapons has been quite fast-paced.

At present, two Type 094 SSBNs are fitted with 24 JL-2 long-range strategic missiles, totaling more than 72 nuclear warheads. Adding the warheads fitted on the 12 JL-1A IRBMs on Type 092M SSBNs, China is now supposed to have a total of 84 sea-based nuclear warheads. Thus, at the current stage, the overall number of China's sea-based and land-based nuclear warheads should be between 237 and 246.

The PLA Navy's Type 094 SSBN fleet is going to continue expanding in the next five years, and the number of SLBMs will increase dramatically as a result. Even with only five Type 094 SSBNs, the total number of warheads will very likely reach 180. Including the warheads of the 12 JL-1A IRBMs, China should have 192 sea-based nuclear warheads within the next five years.

Furthermore, the pace of expansion of the DF-31A is going to speed up. Some Western media have claimed that China will deploy at least 50 DF-31As, bringing the number of China's new nuclear warheads to 150. And the design of a new-generation Type 096 SSBN has already begun. China Central Television earlier revealed images of an SSBN carrying 24 SLBMs, indicating the navy's newer generation SSBN will be fitted with more nuclear warheads.

As to the explosive yield of these nuclear warheads, the earlier variants of DF-5 ICBM warheads may include 1 million-ton class nuclear bombs and hydrogen bombs. Judging from China's series of nuclear tests in the past, the maximum explosive yield of a PLASAF nuclear warhead could reach 1-3 million tons. The new generation DF-31A missiles are armed with MIRVs, and each warhead has an explosive yield of approximately 100,000 tons. China has so far developed a whole series of nuclear warheads with an explosive yield of 100,000 to 500,000 tons.

Sizzler's

The U.S. Navy, after nearly six years of warnings from Pentagon testers, still lacks a plan for defending aircraft carriers against a supersonic Russian-built missile, according to current and former officials and Defense Department documents.
The missile, known in the West as the ``Sizzler,'' has been deployed by China and may be purchased by Iran. Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England has given the Navy until April 29 to explain how it will counter the missile, according to a Pentagon budget document.The Defense Department's weapons-testing office judges the threat so serious that its director, Charles McQueary, warned the Pentagon's chief weapons-buyer in a memo that he would move to stall production of multibillion-dollar ship and missile programs until the issue was addressed.``This is a carrier-destroying weapon,'' said Orville Hanson, who evaluated weapons systems for 38 years with the Navy. ``That's its purpose.''
``Take out the carriers'' and China ``can walk into Taiwan,'' he said. China bought the missiles in 2002 along with eight diesel submarines designed to fire it, according to Office of Naval Intelligence spokesman Robert Althage.
A Pentagon official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Russia also offered the missile to Iran, although there's no evidence a sale has gone through. In Iranian hands, the Sizzler could challenge the ability of the U.S. Navy to keep open the Strait of Hormuz, through which an estimated 25 percent of the world's oil traffic flows.
Fast and Low-Flying;``This is a very low-flying, fast missile,'' said retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, a former U.S. naval attache in Beijing. ``It won't be visible until it's quite close. By the time you detect it to the time it hits you is very short. You'd want to know your capabilities to handle this sort of missile.''
The Navy's ship-borne Aegis system, deployed on cruisers and destroyers starting in the early 1980s, is designed to protect aircraft-carrier battle groups from missile attacks. But current and former officials say the Navy has no assurance Aegis, built by Lockheed Martin Corp., is capable of detecting, tracking and intercepting the Sizzler.
``This was an issue when I walked in the door in 2001,'' Thomas Christie, the Defense Department's top weapons-testing official from mid-2001 to early 2005, said in an interview.`A Major Issue'``The Navy recognized this was a major issue, and over the years, I had continued promises they were going to fully fund development and production'' of missiles that could replicate the Sizzler to help develop a defense against it, Christie said. ``They haven't.''
The effect is that in a conflict, the U.S. ``would send a billion-dollar platform loaded with equipment and crew into harm's way without some sort of confidence that we could defeat what is apparently a threat very near on the horizon,'' Christie said.The Navy considered developing a program to test against the Sizzler ``but has no plans in the immediate future to initiate such a developmental effort,'' Naval Air Systems Command spokesman Rob Koon said in an e-mail.
Lieutenant Bashon Mann, a Navy spokesman, said the service is aware of the Sizzler's capabilities and is ``researching suitable alternatives'' to defend against it. ``U.S. naval warships have a layered defense capability that can defend against various missile threats,'' Mann said.
Raising Concerns;McQueary, head of the Pentagon's testing office, raised his concerns about the absence of Navy test plans for the missile in a Sept. 8, 2006, memo to Ken Krieg, undersecretary of defense for acquisition. He also voiced concerns to Deputy Secretary England.In the memo, McQuery said that unless the Sizzler threat was addressed, his office wouldn't approve test plans necessary for production to begin on several other projects, including Northrop Grumman Corp.'s new $35.8 billion CVN-21 aircraft-carrier project; the $36.5 billion DDG-1000 destroyer project being developed by Northrop and General Dynamics Corp.; and two Raytheon Corp. projects, the $billion Standard Missile-6 and $1.1 billion Ship Self Defense System.

Charts prepared by the Navy for a February 2005 briefing for defense contractors said the Sizzler, which is also called the SS-N-27B, starts out flying at subsonic speeds. Within 10 nautical miles of its target, a rocket-propelled warhead separates and accelerates to three times the speed of sound, flying no more than 10 meters (33 feet) above sea level.

Final Approach

On final approach, the missile ``has the potential to perform very high defensive maneuvers,'' including sharp-angled dodges, the Office of Naval Intelligence said in a manual on worldwide maritime threats.

The Sizzler is ``unique,'' the Defense Science Board, an independent agency within the Pentagon that provides assessments of major defense issues, said in an October 2005 report. Most anti-ship cruise missiles fly below the speed of sound and on a straight path, making them easier to track and target.

``We take the threat very seriously,'' Admiral Michael Mullen, chief of U.S. naval operations said today.

``Secretary of Defense England has asked us to come to him by April with our approach,'' Mullen said in an interview with Bloomberg Television. There ``may not be a single answer. It would probably be a multifaceted.''

The Sizzler ``is very fast and it has maneuvering characteristics that are of concern,'' Mullen said. ``That has put us in a position to make sure we evaluate it as rapidly and specifically as we can.''

McQueary, in a March 16 e-mailed statement, said that ``to the best of our knowledge,'' the Navy hasn't started a test program or responded to the board's recommendations. ``The Navy may be reluctant to invest in development of a new target, given their other bills,'' he said.

`Aggressive Marketing'

The Sizzler's Russian maker, state-run Novator Design Bureau in Yekaterinburg, is ``aggressively marketing'' the weapon at international arms shows, said Steve Zaloga, a missile analyst with the Teal Group, a Fairfax, Virginia-based defense research organization. Among other venues, the missile was pitched at last month's IDEX 2007, the Middle East's largest weapons exposition, he said.

Zaloga provided a page from Novator's sales brochure depicting the missile.

Alexander Uzhanov, a spokesman for the Moscow-based Russian arms-export agency Rosoboronexport, which oversees Novator, declined to comment.

`Pressing Threat'

McVadon, who has written about the Chinese navy, called the Sizzler ``right now the most pertinent and pressing threat the U.S. faces in the case of a Taiwan conflict.'' Jane's, the London-based defense information group, reported in 2005 in its publication ``Missiles and Rockets'' that Russia had offered the missile to Iran as part of a sale in the 1990s of three Kilo- class submarines.

That report was confirmed by the Pentagon official who requested anonymity. The Office of Naval Intelligence suggested the same thing in a 2004 report, highlighting in its assessment of maritime threats Iran's possible acquisition of additional Russian diesel submarines ``with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles.''

The Defense Science Board, in its 2005 report, recommended that the Navy ``immediately implement'' a plan to produce a surrogate Sizzler that could be used for test