Monday 31 December, 2007

Multiple Warhead Delivery.

U.S. technology also has been critical to enabling China to develop MIRVs. To increase their effectiveness against a larger number of targets, most modern ICBMs are equipped with these MIRV warheads. MIRV delivery requires an advanced warhead "bus" that is able to point and release warheads with precision. Although it does not appear that any stolen or purchased U.S. technology has helped China to develop such a warhead bus, commercial interaction with a U.S. satellite maker did provide China the impetus to build a Smart Dispenser that allows a single space launch vehicle to place multiple satellites in orbit. The technology required for the satellite Smart Dispenser is virtually identical to that needed for a MIRV bus. To date, Motorola has launched 12 of its Iridium communication satellites from China's Long March LM-2C/SD rockets that use the Smart Dispenser bus. According to the Chinese engineer mentioned earlier, the Smart Dispenser project was moribund until it was revived by commercial funding from U.S. firms. The Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concludes that commercial interaction with a U.S. company had a "pulling effect" on China's satellite Smart Dispenser program.

Because of its progress in building small, accurate nuclear warheads and its development of a satellite Smart Dispenser that can be converted to a MIRV bus, China now has the option to retrofit its existing 8,000-mile-range DF-5 ICBMs to carry multiple warheads. In fact, the Long March LM-2C/SD used to launch the communication satellites is only a slightly modified DF-5 ICBM. Outfitting China's estimated 26 DF-5s with an 8-warhead MIRV bus would increase the number of nuclear weapons carried by the DF-5s from 26 to 208.

Canadian engines turn up in Chinese attack helicopter

The U.S. State Department said it was investigating how engines made by a Pratt & Whitney subsidiary in Canada turned up in a Chinese attack helicopter.

Pratt & Whitney Canada said last week that 10 engines were sent to China in 2001 and 2002 under a Canadian government export license for use in civilian copters. But the engines, the company said, ended up in prototypes of the Z-10, China's first domestically developed attack copter, designed to carry guided antitank missiles.

While the Canadian government plans no action against Pratt & Whitney over the military diversion, a State Department spokesman, Karl Duckworth, said the U.S. government was continuing an investigation into the company's actions. He declined to provide details, though U.S. export controls prohibit providing certain technology for military use.

It is unclear under what conditions the controls would apply to Pratt & Whitney. Some foreign-made technology uses American components and designs, and Pratt & Whitney is owned by a U.S. company, United Technologies of Hartford, Connecticut.

In an e-mailed statement, Jean-Daniel Hamelin, a spokesman for Pratt & Whitney Canada, said the company was selected by a Chinese aircraft maker in 2000 to provide engines for the civilian variation of a helicopter that was simultaneously being developed for the military. When the company, based near Montreal, applied for an export license, it understood that the Chinese would develop their own engine for the military model, Hamelin wrote.
But, Hamelin added, "the Chinese engine encountered delays, and our engines were used during the development of the common platform." Shipments to China by the company's Canadian unit stopped in 2002. It is unclear why sales were halted.

The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which issued the export license, said Friday that it had no concerns about the way the engine sale was handled or the effectiveness of its export control program for technologies with potential military applications.

Tuesday 25 December, 2007

China not ruffled by missile interception

CHINA reacted mildly today to a Japanese naval destroyer's shooting down of a dummy ballistic missile over the Pacific, saying only that it hoped its Asian neighbour would not cause instability in the region.
Japan has been working with the US on missile defence and today shot down the missile in space, becoming the first US ally to accomplish such a feat from a ship at sea.The US and Japan alliance tworries China because of any implications it may have for Taiwan, the self-governed island Beijing claims as its own.
China fears that Japan could help the US defend Taiwan should China use force to try to bring the island under mainland rule.The US switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, recognising "one China", but is obliged by the Taiwan Relations Act to help the island defend itself.
"We have taken note that Japan has reiterated many times it will follow the path of peaceful development," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said."We also hope that the relevant actions of the Japanese side will be conducive to safeguarding peace and stability in the region," he said.
Asked about reports linking the missile interception to the Taiwan issue, Qin said he could not comment directly."The Taiwan question is China's internal affair," he said.
"China opposes any country meddling in the Taiwan question in any form."The muted response could be due to a pending visit by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who is expected in China in coming weeks for his first visit to the country as leader.
Ties between the two countries, who compete for diplomatic and economic influence in Asia, have improved since an "ice-breaking" visit by Fukuda's predecessor, Shinzo Abe, last year, and a reciprocal trip by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April.
But relations remain sensitive to Japan's past militarism and wartime invasion of China, and the two have a long-running dispute over territorial boundaries and natural resources in the East China Sea.

China Lake UAV airfield opens


NAWCWD�s Unmanned Systems (US) Technical Project Office (TPO) inaugurated its new unmanned air systems (UAS) operations airstrip when two Raytheon Cobra unmanned air systems lifted off and flew missions at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake on Dec. 13.

�The importance of unmanned systems in the future of warfighting is increasing and China Lake provides an ideal atmosphere to develop and test emerging technologies,� said Michael Keeter, chief engineer in the US TPO. �These first flights with Cobra represent the first fruits of an enduring commitment by NAWCWD to support the weaponization and systems development of small UAS. What we do here in the future will lead to advancements in warfighting capabilities.�

The US TPO is working to weaponize UAS already in existence, and to standardize the concepts, techniques, and integration of weapons, sensors, and targeting technologies that are related to weaponization of future unmanned systems. China Lake offers a great location for collaborating with a variety of companies as well as other government organizations whose goal is to connect weapons with smaller platforms, Keeter said. The US TPO currently has a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement in place with Raytheon.

According to Raytheon officials, the Cobra UAS is just the first step in an evolutionary process.

�Cobra is a test-platform for developing future UAS solutions that support future naval capabilities,� said Don Newman, Raytheon Missile Systems UAS program director. �It has a rugged and reliable airframe that allows us to integrate and test a variety of components to determine whether they advance the capability of new unmanned aircraft systems, such as the Killer Bee. For Raytheon, inaugurating the new airstrip at China Lake is a highly symbolic act that recognizes the importance of continuing to develop and test advanced new unmanned systems for the U.S. Navy.�

The 2,200-by-50-foot asphalt airstrip located at Armitage Field is just one piece of the infrastructure at China Lake created to support the development of unmanned systems. The US TPO also has a state-of-the-art weaponization lab close to the ramp and has recently taken delivery of a mobile command and control lab that will be used to support both operations at the airstrip and remote operations.

�We have a long legacy of skilled engineers at China Lake with vast amounts of experience in weapons related work across the kill chain,� said Andy Corzine, US TPO lead. �We�re taking that knowledge and the advancements in technology and applying it to small weapons on small platforms. Our geographical location and our unique range assets make China Lake a very UAS-friendly location. We�re going to take advantage of that and make some significant contributions to needed warfighting capabilities.�

Monday 24 December, 2007

CHINESE DOCTRINE TOWARDS INDIA'S THREATS

China Doctrine;On a visit on December 2 to the Sino-Indian border, Union defence minister A.K. Antony gave voice to a concern that has been getting reiterated for long by his country's military. "It's an eye-opener," said a shocked Antony, as he toured forward posts in Nathu La. "There is no comparison between the two sides. Infrastructure on the Chinese side is far superior. They have gone far in developing their infrastructure," he told journalists who had flown in with him on the trip.

Even as Antony was expressing his shock and dismay, the Indian army was putting the finishing touches to a new operational doctrine, also known as the conventional war-fighting doctrine, which has made a dramatic new assessment of Chinese capabilities Prepared by the military along with the Integrated Defence Headquarters in consultation with various institutes of the Indian army, the document gives a fair idea of how military India's posture needs to be shaped to take on the new Chinese challenges.

A significant
departure from earlier assessments has been made vis-a-vis China's military capabilities and its ability to mobilise troops. So far, Indian military planners were of the view that it would take the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) at least "two seasons" (three to four months) to fully mobilise for a war against India. While this would mean a "high-intensity conflict" that could involve strategic weapons, the conventional wisdom was that India had the edge in terms of manpower on the border.

But moving away from the "two seasons" build-up theory, the new doctrine concludes that the Chinese could mobilise in just thirty days.This capability is the result of decades of meticulous planning and strategic perception of the Chinese leadership. It built roads and a strategic railway across the Tibetan plateau. The 1,140-km Qinghai-Tibet line, considered the highest railway in the world at 16,640 ft, A depleted eastern command is one of India's worries. Also, most fighting units are stationed in Kashmir.

has come as a wake-up call for military planners in Delhi. The Qinghai-Tibet link with its capacity to carry over 900 troops—that's a battalion strength—in each train has reshaped the way the Indian military looks at Chinese capabilities.

India's planners have always based their estimate of the mobilisation time required by China on the Taiwan factor. China has all along concentrated the bulk of its forces against Taiwan and kept itself in readiness for any "superpower intervention"—that is by the US. Should there be any large-scale operation against India, it would have to divert its troops from Taiwan. The improved infrastructure—roads and the railway line—have rendered earlier Indian estimates outdated. The Chinese can deploy its troops faster than ever before.

Says Brigadier Arun Sahgal (retd), a long-time China-watcher and presently deputy director of research at Delhi's United Services Institution: "As per our estimates, the PLA has over 40 divisions, out of which seven are armoured divisions. Of these, we expect China will be in a position to deploy 20 to 22 divisions against India in quick time." In addition, China has been building up its rapid reaction forces along with its airborne corps. "The greater strategic mobility capability of the Chinese in terms of rapid reaction forces as well as build-up of special forces is what we have to look at very closely," says Sahgal.

The Chinese military has traditionally divided its military into seven designated military regions (MRs), of which two are of concern for India. The Chengdu MR, which primarily faces Arunachal Pradesh, the sensitive Siliguri corridor, Nepal and Bhutan, has nearly 1,80,000 troops on the borders. In the west, the Lanzhou MR faces India's Jammu and Kashmir, and controls Aksai Chin, under Chinese occupation since 1962.

This region has nearly 2,20,000 troops. Both MRs have been strengthened by the modernisation drive of the Chinese military and have added rapid reaction forces as well as specialised units known as the Quantou and Kuaisu units which can launch deep attacks into enemy territory.

Points out Srikant Kondapalli, a professor of China studies at jnu's School of International Studies: "So far India has managed to retain a conventional troop superiority that ranges from 5:1 in certain sectors to as high as a 10:1 ratio." He is quick to point out that this "conventional superiority" is mostly on paper and can be quickly nullified by quick troop mobilisation and with China's missile strength. "The Chinese artillery has a considerable strategic as well as tactical arsenal. However, China does have a "No First Use' policy, and in the event of hostilities, it is likely to replace its nuclear warheads with conventional warheads. Either way, this could prove to be to our disadvantage," he feels.

However, with the coming of the new doctrine, Kondapalli feels that the Indian military has taken a significant step. "A decade ago, the Indian military's doctrine was built around deterring Pakistan and merely dissuading China. With the new doctrine, it has taken a significant step towards deterring China. The success of the Agni-III missile programme has added to this new posture significantly and the sooner we operationalise the missile, the better," he says.

But while the Indian army has conventional superiority on paper, there are other worrying factors. Under the Calcutta-based Eastern Command, the army has three corps which are severely depleted of troops. Most fighting units have been moved to the Kashmir sector over the last 15 years. "In 1990," an army official told Outlook, "we had finalised the Dual Task and Relocation Plan for our fighting formations and decided that it would be relevant for only ten years. But it has been there for nearly two decades. This needs to change." This means that the Kalimpong-based 33 Corps, Tezpur-based 4 Corps and the Dimapur-based 3 Corps will have to increase their troop strengths.

At present, most of 3 Corps is tied up in counter-insurgency operations, while the 27th Division is just returning to the 33 Corps. This division was moved out for Operation Parakram and has been in Jammu and Kashmir ever since. Similarly, the 8 Mountain Division that was moved out in early 1990 continues to be in Kargil as a part of the Leh-based 14 Corps.

While these deployments have to be reconsidered, the new doctrine is a critical update on where the army must position its firepower and its troops. On the whole, it is now left to the ministry of defence to operationalise the doctrine and ensure that India's borders with China are adequately fortified.

Nuclear war between iran and israel


a doomsday scenario that we all fear deeply. A new study compiled by the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), headed by former Pentagon analyst Anthony H. Cordesman, explored just such a nightmare scenario, noting that it could lead to the death of between 16- 28 million Iranian civilians, and 200-800 thousand Israelis.


This hypothetical, research-oriented study also explored other contingencies for unconventional warfare in our region, noting the tactics that various countries could potentially employ in such instances.


As pertains to nuclear warfare, the study found that an Israeli nuclear scrimmage with Iran would most likely last for about three weeks. Aside from the aforementioned direct casualties, the study could not determine how many additional long-term casualties would arise from fallout and radiation in the weeks and months following such an attack.


One essential requirement for nuclear confrontation in our region, according to the study, is allowing Iran’s nuclear program to develop, unhindered by a pre-emptive strike by either Israel or the United States. If US or Israeli preemption does not occur, the study found, Iran could very well have 30 nuclear warheads available for warfare between 2010-2020. Israel, by comparison, currently has 200 nuclear war heads with both air and sea launch capabilities, according to the study.

Israeli missiles have greater strike range

The bottom line, according to this study, is that Israel quite simply has more potent and effective bombs. Israel currently has a 1megaton (mt) nuclear bomb, whereas Iran does not yet have the ability to develop a bomb with more than 100 kilotons of power. What this means, in essence, is that the Israeli bomb can lead to three times as many casualties as its Iranian counterpart (chiefly due to third-degree burns), and has an “area of extreme lethality” (the range within which a nuclear bomb is fatal) ten-times as great.


Which Israeli cities are most likely to be targeted by Iran? Tel-Aviv and central Israel (all the way down to Ashdod) are the most likely targets, as is Haifa. Israel, conversely, has more than 10 Iranian cities on its “hit list” including Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Qazvin, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahvaz, and Kermanshah.


Cordseman also noted that Iran would have lower fission yields, and less accurate force into cluster targeting on Israel’s two largest urban complexes, and that the Iranian side would also most likely be thwarted by Israel’s missile defense systems. Notable among these is the “Arrow 2” anti-ballistic missile which could most potentially shoot down most nuclear missiles launched by Iran.


Furthermore, Israel could strike Iran with far grater accuracy and precision, hitting its cities with deadly aim utilizing both its own satellites, as well as those of the Unitedstates.

Friday 14 December, 2007

chinese war strategy towards India


china war startegy
china army form tibet and burma side,
china airore on startegic bases of india,
china subs form bangldesh and arabia ,
terroist from kashimr and bangladesh,
ma form nepal and interior india.
This is the latest war strategy of China towards India.As far as I think Indian defence is not at all week to repeat 1962.But the problem is lying with poltical side.If the present govt still takes in cool manner telling "HINDU CHINY BHAI BHAI",def 1962 will repeat.I request them to take serious action so that China should not even think to invade India or try to grab its intrests.

Thursday 13 December, 2007

China honors commitment to int'l arms control, non-proliferation?

China has honored its commitment to international arms control and non-proliferation, says a white paper issued Friday by the Information Office of the State Council.

China has made sound preparations for implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), says the white paper titled "China's National Defense in 2006".

To this end, a preparatory office has been established at the General Armaments Department of the People's Liberation Army, the paper says.

With the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the China Seismological Administration and other government departments, this office is responsible for setting up 11 monitoring stations in China as part of the international monitoring system, and formulating their administrative regulations and detailed rules for the implementation of the CTBT, the paper says.

Two primary seismological monitoring stations have been set up in Hailar and Lanzhou, respectively, and three radionuclide stations have been set up in Beijing, Guangzhou and Lanzhou, respectively.

The surveying of the two sites for two infrasound stations in Beijing and Kunming has been completed, and construction is scheduled to start soon. The China National Data Center and the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory have been built, and are now in trial operation.

China supports multilateral efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention, says the paper.

The paper says China honors in good faith its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and has promptly and completely submitted all the annual declarations, subsequent declarations regarding newly discovered chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China and the annual national programs related to protective purposes.

According to the paper, China has also received more than 100 on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

China fully honors its obligations under the amended Landmine Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the paper says.

The People's Liberation Army has carried out a general check of all the anti-personnel landmines that do not meet the standards of the Protocol, and has destroyed several hundred thousand old landmines in a planned way.

China has made technical modifications to usable anti-infantry land-mines in inventory to make them conform to the technical standards of the Protocol, says the paper.

China opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, says the paper, claiming that China supports the United Nations in playing its due role in non-proliferation.

China endeavors to make border, coastal defence informationized:

China is endeavoring to make its border and coastal defense unified, effective, solid and informationized, says a white paper on China's National Defense in 2006 issued by the Information Office of the State Council, here Friday.

The White Paper introduces that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the main force for defending China's borders and coasts. In 2003, the PLA border defense force took over the defense of the China-DPRK border and the Yunnan section of the China-Myanmar border from the border public security force, thus enabling the state to integrate land border defense and administration.

Since China launched its reform and opening-up program, the White Paper says, the state has consolidated border and coastal law-enforcement functions in organizations responsible for public security, customs, inspection and quarantine, maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs and environmental protection. The state has also established and reinforced the border public security force, as well as border and coastal law-enforcement contingents for marine affairs, anti-smuggling, fisheries administration and maritime surveillance.

The White Paper stresses that China has promulgated the Law on National Defense, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and other relevant laws and regulations, and updated its border and coastal defense policies and regulations pursuant to international laws and practices, to manage its border and sea areas in conformity with the law. China endeavors to strengthen its border and coastal defense, administration and control, and build a modern border and coastal defense force featuring joint military-police-civilian efforts in defense and administration.

According to the White Paper, over the past decade and more, the state has invested more than two billion yuan (around 250 million U.S. dollars)in construction of border defense infrastructure, building over 20,000 kilometers of patrol roads, over 6,000 kilometers of barbed-wire fences and installing some 600 sets of monitoring equipment. Construction of coastal defense infrastructure, including duty piers, monitoring stations and centers and auxiliary facilities has been underway since 2004.

The White Paper says that China pursues a good-neighborliness policy, and works to enhance friendship and partnership with its neighbors. It calls for settling boundary and maritime demarcation issues with countries concerned in a fair and equitable manner, and through consultations on the basis of equality. China has signed land border treaties or agreements with Myanmar and 11 other neighboring countries, thus resolving boundary issues left from history with these countries; it is currently negotiating with India and Bhutan to settle boundary issues with those two countries respectively.

The PLA border defense force and the border public security force take measures to crack down hard on cross-border crimes, such as weapon smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal border crossing and human trafficking, and on separatist, violent and terrorist activities, thus contributing to maintaining political stability and promoting social development and progress in border areas.

Tuesday 11 December, 2007

China awards Russian officials for successfully holding national years

Chinese ambassador to Russia Liu Guchang awarded honorary medals and other awards to several Russian officials in Moscow on Friday for their contribution to the organization of the theme years in China and Russia on behalf of Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Wu Yi.

Bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many areas were deepened and enriched thanks to the successful national years which have fueled the development of a strategic partnership of cooperation, Liu said at the award ceremony in Moscow.

Among those awarded with the medal "for an outstanding contribution to the organization of the national years" are Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov, Sino-Russian Friendship, Peace and Development Committee Chairman of the Russian side Leonid Drachevskiy and Director of the First Asia Department of the Foreign Ministry Konstantin Vnukov.

Denisov expressed appreciation for the medal, vowing to further promote Russia-China strategic partnership of coordination and called for the further expansion of Russian-Chinese relations.

The Tibet Railway Line Now Used for Military Transport

Chinese troops traveled on the high-speed Qinghai-Tibet railway from Mainland China to Lasha. It was the first time they had done so since the world's highest railway line was officially inaugurated on July 1, 2007.

Gong Yongqian, a People's Liberation Army representative at the Qinghai-Tibet railway company, stated that compared to air and highway transportation, the railroad offers cheaper yet much larger transport capacity with relatively less impact from climate. He was quoted as saying that the "railway will become a primary mode" for transporting troops to Tibet, replacing the air and road routes used since 1950 when Chinese soldiers annexed Tibet.

Xinhua reported that logistics for the troupes in transit along the Qinghai-Tibet railway has already been determined.

Sunday 9 December, 2007

CHINA'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

China's Second Artillery Corps, a strategic missile troop of the People's Liberation Army, mainly has the task of strategic nuclear counterattack. The research as well as the development of strategic nuclear weaponry are the foundation for constructing and developing the Second Artillery Corps.

China's strategic nuclear weapons were developed because of the belief that hegemonic power will continue to use nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. From the day of establishment, the People's Republic of China faced a major economic and technology blockade from hostile powers. Further, it also faced serious nuclear threats from hegemonism. To oppose nuclear war, smash nuclear blackmail, safeguard national security and sovereignty, and keep peace throughout the world, China needed a powerful national defense and its own strategic nuclear weapons. At that time, the Central Committee of the Party, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai made a wise decision to make China's strategic nuclear weapons independently. This decisive and timely step paved the way for developing our strategic nuclear weapons.

As early as 1956, Mao Zedong pointed out, "We also need the atom bomb. If our nation does not want to be intimidated, we have to have this thing." In June 1958, he stated, "To make atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, and intercontinental missiles, from my point of view, is perfectly possible in ten years." Later on, he further instructed us that development of strategic nuclear weapons should "have some achievement, and be fewer but better." What Mao Zedong said gave us a clear guidance on our effort to research and manufacture our strategic nuclear weapons. It is not hard to imagine how difficult it was during those days in China to develop advanced weapons with a weak economy and a backward scientific and technological community. But under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and its specialized committee, all Chinese people gave strenuous support to the cadres, the experts, the technicians, and the PLA officers and men who shouldered the responsibility of developing our advanced weapons. These people exerted themselves to carry out a determined struggle for the final victory. They lived plainly, they worked hard, they devoted themselves selflessly to the projects, they relied on their own efforts in research and manufacturing, and after an extremely hard struggle they surmounted the difficulties at last.

On October 16, 1964, our first atom bomb exploded successfully; on October 27, 1966, we succeeded on our nuclear missile trial test; on June 17, 1967, our first hydrogen bomb was exploded. These tests allowed made us step into a new period, that of mastering the development of nuclear missile weapons. China's achievements within such a short period of time evoked a strong response all over the world. The Chinese Government has declared again and again, "China is compelled to conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons in order to break the nuclear monopoly; China's nuclear weapons will be used definitely for self-defense; the Chinese Government has always advocated an all-round prohibition and a complete destruction of nuclear weapons in the world." This is the fundamental stand China maintains on possessing nuclear weapons.

In 1958 we built up the special Artillery Corps, then on July 1, 1966, the Second Artillery Corps was officially established with approval of the Central Military Committee. In the last 20 years, the Corps has gradually been developed and strengthened and equipped with different kinds of nuclear missile weapons it made by itself. The Second Artillery Corps trained in the use of weapons, coordinated training, battle simulation and tactical exercises, and successfully launched different types of missiles and improved both its ability to master strategic weaponry and fighting capability. At the same time, it strengthened its research work on the formation of weapons systems, weapons use in battle, and development of such systems, and improved weapon quality. It has also done a great amount of work on command systems, battlefield construction, weapons testing, and maintenance and repair. The Second Artillery Corps has become a well-trained strategic missile corps with a certain level ofnuclear counterattack capability.

For over 30 years, we developed our strategic nuclear weapons from short-range to medium-range to long-range and intercontinental missiles, and provided our army with a number and variety of missiles and nuclear weapons. Our armed forces are now capable of striking back with nuclear weapons, which greatly strengthens our national defense and our international status. Additionally, it helps to weaken the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers, contain nuclear war, and safeguard world peace.

Since the 1980s, the international situation has relaxed somewhat, but the role of military force in national security policy has not decreased. The number of strategic weapons owned by the big nuclear powers has already surpassed the saturation level, and weapon technology has reached a very high level, constituting a serious threat to world peace and security. At the same time, the problem of nuclear proliferation and especially the concern of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands have become more and more serious, and there is no end to the regional arms race. We should have a clear mind and maintain vigilance when facing such a situation, and should also follow the development of the high technology in the world, maintaining our strategic nuclear weapons in accordancewith the actual conditions of our country.

The research and development of our first generation of strategic nuclear weapons were a great success, but we must understand that there is still a great distance between the world's advanced level of technology and our own. Our historical experience has shown that for the sake of our national security interests, and for world peace and stability, we must develop strategic nuclear weapons and keep pace with the advanced world level. Ours is a developing country that is engaged in economic construction. Our Party Central Committee and the Central Military Committee have, according to scientific analysis of the international situation and in consideration of the actual conditions of our country, made decisions to change the strategic thinking that guides our military development. Under the current situation, the development of our strategic nuclear weapons should focus on long-term goals. We should develop advanced weapons that suit our national defense strategy, and at the same time we should improve current weapons to raise the quality and the comprehensive fighting capability. Science and technology should be our guideposts, and we should aim for advanced levels of 21st century technology, strengthening the study of single-item high technology weapons. We should work hard on the survival, fast reaction, accuracy, and break-through and high-command technologies for weapons systems. These should be the direction for the development of our strategic nuclear weapons. We should conduct research in the following aspects:

* Improve the survivability of the strategic nuclear weapons. Survivability is an important factor in waging a nuclear counter strike. We should strengthen research on small, solid fuel and highly automated mobile missiles and on the technology of invisibility, for reinforcing defense work against nuclear or nonnuclear strike; and improve the survivability of missiles before launch and in flight.
* Improve the striking ability of strategic nuclear weapons. Accuracy and power are chief factors used to judge weapon striking power. To increase the credibility of limited nuclear deterrence, we should work to improve accuracy, and our new generation of strategic weaponry should be of higher precision.
* Improve the penetration technology of strategic weapons. Strategic weapons can be used in actual fighting only when they can penetrate enemy defenses and reach and strike the target a necessary condition to protect itself and destroy a target. In an era when space technology is developing rapidly and a defense system with many methods and many layers is appearing, we should pay special attention to the study of break-through technology.

To sum up, we conclude that the development of strategic nuclear weapons is one main aspect in strengthening national defense and is an important symbol of modernization for our military. In future development, the advanced qualities of strategic weapons will rely to a large degree on the development of the high technology and reflect the comprehensive power of a country. To safeguard more effectively our national security and territorial integrity and sovereignty, plus the socialist modernization construction, we must have a modernized army and improve and develop our strategic nuclear weapons. We should, in accordance with the actual conditions of our country, develop a limited number of high quality strategic nuclear weapons that could be used effectively to strike back against an enemy using nuclear weapons to attack us. We should strive to build a small in number but effective strategic missile corps with Chinese characteristics, and make further contributions to the safeguarding of our country, world peace, and the progress of mankind.

China pursues self-defensive nuclear strategy

China says it pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy in a White Paper on National Defense issued in Beijing Friday.The White Paper, issued by the Information Office of the State Council, says China's nuclear strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy."Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China," the White Paper says.

China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, the White Paper says."It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons," the White Paper says.

It says that China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs.China endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force, the White Paper says.

It says that China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission and China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force."It has never entered and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country." the White Paper says.

Thursday 6 December, 2007

CHINA'S MISSILE FORCE MODERNIZATION

A U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress notes that China has the potential to build "as many as a thousand" new ballistic missiles over the next decade. China is developing new ballistic, cruise, and anti-missile systems, and is investing heavily in advanced guidance systems and satellites to improve missile accuracy. Where possible, foreign technology is being sought to improve China's future missile development. Increasingly, Chinese missile forces will be equipped with highly destructive non-nuclear warheads.
New Long-Range Ballistic Missiles

The PLA has two ICBM development programs and one submarine-launched ballistic missile program that may result in new deployed missiles by 2010. The most advanced, the solid-fueled 5,000-mile-range DF-31 ICBM, which has enough range to hit the western United States, may enter service in the next few years. In late 1998, the DF-31 was reported to be ready for an ejection test from its launch tube. This missile will form the basis for China's next submarine-launched missile, the JL-2. By the end of the next decade, China is expected to field the 8,000-mile-range DF-41 solid-fueled ICBM. Both it and the DF-31 will be mobile. China's new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), based on a new WS-2400 heavy transport vehicle revealed at the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show, shows influences from the Russian MAZ TEL sold to China. A better TEL, likely operating from a network of mountainside caves, would enhance the survivability of these mobile ICBMs.
Both the DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs are expected to incorporate multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. For many years, China has been suspected of trying to develop MIRV warheads; in early 1998, U.S. Air Force General Eugene Habinger stated publicly that China was developing MIRVs for its ICBMs. As a result of an investigation conducted by a congressional panel led by Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA), it was revealed in early 1999 that in the mid-1980s, China had obtained secret data from the Los Alamos National Laboratory concerning the U.S. W-88 nuclear warhead. The W-88 is the smallest and most modern U.S. nuclear warhead and is mounted on the U.S. Navy Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile.

On March 14, U.S.A.National Security Advisor stated "there's no question" that China benefited from nuclear warhead secrets leaked from the Los Alamos labs. One source notes that U.S. W-88 information could have saved China "two to ten years" of effort. Possible evidence that China is developing new smaller re-entry vehicles to carry its new smaller nuclear weapon was gathered by the author at the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show.
The Multiple-Warhead Option.
China has suggested that it may respond to a U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) by increasing the number of missiles or warheads that it could aim at the United States. The addition of smaller nuclear warheads to its arsenal also gives China the option to modify its existing 8,000-mile-range DF-5 ICBMs with multiple warheads as another means of responding to NMD. The DF-5 currently has only one large warhead that is not very accurate. A "bus" that China developed to launch multiple U.S. Motorola "Iridium" communication satellites could quickly be converted to carry up to eight small nuclear warheads. The Chinese Long March CZ-2C/SC space-launcher used to loft ten Iridium satellites to date is a slightly modified version of the DF-5 ICBM. According to press reports, U.S. intelligence services estimate China may have 18 to 26 DF-5 ICBMs. Modifying these DF-5s with an eight-warhead MIRV bus increases the number of nuclear weapons carried by its DF-5s .
Better Medium- and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

To achieve its regional objectives, China puts great emphasis on its medium- and short-range missile forces. China is improving the 1,125-mile-range DF-21 ballistic missile that entered service in the late 1980s. China's armed forces may have more than 80 of these solid-fueled missiles, which are both road- and rail-mobile. 24 Jane's Defence Weekly, citing Japanese military sources, reports that China recently fielded an advanced version of the DF-21, known as the DF-21X. This new DF-21 may have a new highly accurate warhead that uses navigation satellite data like the U.S. GPS network or radar guidance technology. If this new warhead used radar guidance in a manner similar to the U.S. Pershing II, which correlates images from the missile's radar with digital map pictures in the warhead's computer, it could achieve an accuracy within a radius of 50 meters. This level of accuracy would mean the difference in capability between hitting an airfield or hitting a particular hangar on the airfield. The new DF-21 variant is expected also to have a longer range, perhaps up to 1,800 miles.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs).
Especially for missions near Taiwan, China intends to rely heavily on short-range ballistic missiles to overcome the technical superiority of Taiwan's air force. U.S. intelligence estimates that China could deploy up to 650 of the 360-mile-range DF-15 and 180-mile-range M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to areas near Taiwan. The DF-15 is a sophisticated missile that uses warhead shaping to make radar detection more difficult and a second stage to confuse anti-missile radar. But it may soon get better. At the 1996 Zhuhai show, the author was told that satellite navigation technology was being used to improve the accuracy of the short-range DF-15 missile. This solid-fueled missile is both road- and rail-mobile. One Chinese article says that an enhanced guidance system under investigation "can raise impact accuracy by an order of magnitude." For the DF-15, this could mean improved accuracy from a 300-meter radius to a 30-meter radius. Similar guidance upgrades could also be used to improve the M-11, which sources in Taiwan believe will go to Army units, whereas the DF-15 is controlled by the Second Artillery.
New Cruise Missiles

As seen in the case of short-range ballistic missiles, the Second Artillery and other PLA services are likely to have their own land-attack cruise missiles now in development. The Pentagon has noted that land-attack cruise missiles for theater and strategic missions are a "relatively high development priority" for China and that initial versions "should be ready early in the next century." China has been investigating combined GPS/Inertial and Terrain-Contour Matching (TERCOM) guidance systems to give high accuracy to its cruise missiles. China could gain insights for this guidance technology by studying U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles reportedly obtained from Afghanistan. Russian and Israeli cruise missile companies are another likely source of advanced cruise missile guidance technology.

China's first new land-attack cruise missile is reported by one source to be the 240-mile-range YJ-22, an advanced development of the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile but with a straight wing and a probably better engine. A long-range strategic version of this cruise missile, similar in capability to early U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles, likely will enter service after 2005. Both new cruise missiles probably will be carried by multiple platforms, such as trucks, aircraft, ships, and submarines.
New Supersonic Tactical Missiles

China is developing ramjet engine technologies to confer supersonic speeds on its missiles that complicate interception. In addition, ramjets offer the potential to increase the range of a smaller missile. China's existing ramjet-powered missiles are large and cannot travel great distances, but the purchase of the Russian Raduga SS-N-22 ramjet-powered anti-ship missile could give China a new source of cruise missile ramjet technology. China is reported to have purchased co-production rights to the ramjet-powered, Mach-2 speed, 125-mile-range Zvezda Kh-31P missile, which was designed by the Russians to counter the radar of U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missiles and the U.S. Navy Aegis ship-defense radar. Attacking radar systems is essential to destroying an opponent's anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems.
New Conventional Missile Warheads

Although many new Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles have the option of carrying a small nuclear warhead, China is placing great emphasis on developing powerful non-nuclear warheads. Mounted on new, much more accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, such warheads make possible long-range precision strike missions without recourse to nuclear weapons, thus reducing the prospect of nuclear retaliation. China is developing Radio Frequency (RF) weapons that simulate the electromagnetic pulse created by nuclear explosion, which has the effect of wiping out computer and electronic systems. An RF-armed missile might be able to disable a communication grid on a warship without causing great casualties. China is also interested in building cluster munitions for ballistic or cruise missiles that could disable airbase runways. Such cluster warheads eventually could arm the new version of the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile.

Anti-Missile, Anti-Satellite, and Space Warfare

China's government loudly protests U.S. anti-missile plans but says almost nothing about its own anti-missile or anti-satellite programs, or its space warfare plans. The PLA is aware of the need to defend against opposing missiles and the need to exploit the U.S. military's high dependence on reconnaissance and communication satellites. PLA literature on future warfare acknowledges the need for a range of systems to deny the enemy's use of space. Engineering reports thought to be co-authored by the head of the China Aerospace Corporation's 2nd Academy, which manufactures surface-to-air missiles, indicate that China may be developing anti-missile or anti-satellite systems.

According to Chinese officials interviewed at the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show, China will complete in two years a new version of the FT-2000 surface-to-air missile that could have an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability. The FT-2000 is designed to home in on the emissions of electronic warfare aircraft like the U.S. EA-6B Prowler. The next version of the FT-2000 will be radar-guided and similar in performance to the Russian Fakel S-300PMU, which China purchased in 1991. These missiles may be related to China's HQ-9 surface-to-air missile program, which sought to marry guidance and command technology from the Russian S-300 and missile-seeker radar from the U.S. Patriot missile. A U.S. source has told the author that China does indeed have an example of the Patriot; at the 1997 Moscow Air Show, an official with a Russian missile design bureau told the author that the HQ-9 will use the same guidance frequency as the Patriot.
Laser ASAT

Last year, the Pentagon reported to Congress that "China already may possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers" and that, "given China's current level of interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future." China has invested heavily in its own laser programs but may also benefit from foreign technology. China is recruiting Russian laser technicians, and Chinese engineers appear to be familiar with current U.S. military laser developments and with the potential for lasers to destroy or disable targets.

To support civilian space activities, such as its manned space program, and also for military purposes, China is trying to develop a global space-tracking capability. The Pentagon notes that China already has a good space tracking capability; in 1987, it began to operate a space tracking station on the islands of Tarawa in the South Pacific state of Kiribati. China is also reported to be entering into space tracking ventures with Brazil and France.
Space Information Systems

As it seeks the means to deny space to future adversaries, China is seeking also to exploit outer space more effectively for military missions. China is developing new military satellites for high-resolution imaging, radar imaging, signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection, navigation, and communication. At the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show, China announced it would launch six reconnaissance satellites: four imaging satellites and two radar satellites. When in orbit, this network will give China coverage of Asia twice daily for regular imaging and once daily for radar images. Radar satellites can penetrate cloud cover and are very useful for finding naval formations at sea. As does the U.S. military, China probably also will seek to integrate access to commercial satellite imaging into its military operations. China has long been a customer for images from French commercial satellites and is developing signal and electronic intelligence satellites which can also also be used, in conjunction with information from imaging satellites, to provide targeting data for missiles, aircraft, and submarine missions. Not content to rely on foreign navigation satellites, such as GPS or its Russian counterpart (called GLONASS), China is developing its own navigation satellite network. At the Zhuhai Air Show, China announced that a future navigation satellite network will be based on small satellites--which are less expensive, easier to launch, and can be replaced quickly.
HOW CHINA'S MISSILES THREATEN AMERICA AND ASIA

China's growing missile forces pose a future threat to the United States and to U.S. forces and allies in Asia. It is not certain how fast China's intercontinental missile forces will grow, nor is it certain that they will grow to rival the U.S. missile arsenal. But in the next decade, they will increase in sophistication and survivability. In the next decade, the potential of scores to several hundred new, well-concealed Chinese mobile ICBMs will make more difficult the task of defending America from nuclear missile attack. China can be expected also to use its larger ICBM force as a political weapon to constrain American actions, especially support for U.S. friends and allies.
Combining Missile and Sensor Technology

China's most profound challenge to the balance of power in Asia is the PLA's developing "reconnaissance-strike complex" of highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, combined with multiple layers of long-range sensors. Over the next ten years, China will build more capable imaging and radar satellites, and perhaps electronic intelligence satellites. Reconnaissance data from satellites will be added to data from future AWACS, electronic intelligence aircraft, long-range radar, and signal intelligence-gathering systems to provide precise targeting data for ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as air and naval platforms. Weapons systems will be guided to their targets with a high degree of accuracy with the help of either Chinese or foreign navigation satellites. The challenge for China will be to fuse these sensors to provide useful reconnaissance and targeting data for its developing cruise and ballistic missiles. China also will have to develop new doctrine, tactics, and inter-service cooperation to enable such long-range missile strike missions. China clearly has some way to go before it can boast of such a capability, but it is working to achieve this goal.

By 2005, China's developing missile forces will pose a grave threat to Taiwan. Chinese satellites and AWACS aircraft likely will be able to provide constant targeting data for missile strikes by satellite-guided DF-15s, M-11s, and new cruise missiles to attack airfields, secondary airfields, ports, military command posts, and major government buildings. Missiles and cruise missiles armed with Radio Frequency warheads could attack communication and power grids to sow chaos among the population. The same range of targets in Japan could be attacked by future long-range cruise missiles and DF-21 missiles armed with terminally guided high explosive or Radio Frequency warheads. American military facilities in Japan and Okinawa also would be vulnerable to new DF-21 missiles and future long-range cruise missiles.
POLITICAL WARFARE

China also views missiles as a tool for political intimidation. China fired ten DF-15 missiles near Taiwan in July 1995 and March 1996, and could have fired 20 to 30 missiles in March. 42 The 1995 missile firing affected Taiwan's stock market and caused some panic. In 1996, the missiles were sent just outside Taiwan's two major ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung. Both demonstrations were intended to illustrate Beijing's anger over its perception that President Lee Teng-hui was seeking an "independent" Taiwan that would never unite with the mainland. This attempt to intimidate Taiwan backfired by increasing the re-election margin of President Lee in the March 1996 elections, but China's use of missiles and the U.S.-China military confrontation of 1996, in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier groups to deter China, may have unnerved the Clinton Administration. By October 1997, the Administration announced a new policy that set new limits on American support for Taiwan: the "three no's."

From this concession, China's political and military leaders very likely drew the lesson that missile intimidation can work. Late last year, China reportedly held missile exercises that targeted Taiwan and U.S. forces in Asia. And in early March, it was reported that China might now have 100 to 150 short-range missiles in areas near Taiwan, with possible plans to increase that number to 650 by 2005. In 1994, the United States sold Taiwan the Patriot PAC-2 system, which has a limited anti-missile capability to defend only a small area. To meet the threat of increased numbers of Chinese ballistic missiles and new cruise missiles, Taiwan will require much more capable missile defense systems.

China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing U.S. Missile Defense

Revelations that China stole U.S. nuclear warhead secrets highlight two strategic challenges to the United States. First, China is building a range of new ballistic and cruise missiles. New, small nuclear warheads--developed with the help of the stolen information and other U.S. data--will allow China to place multiple warheads on new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or equip short-range missiles with nuclear warheads. China has increased to over 100 the number of missiles pointed at Taiwan, and future theater ballistic and cruise missiles could threaten U.S. forces and allies in Asia. Second, China is seeking to weaken U.S. alliances by waging a loud and menacing campaign to prevent the U.S. deployment of missile defenses in Asia that can guard against the growing North Korean and Chinese missile forces.

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has long viewed missile forces as a principal component of its future warfare plans. By developing a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear missiles, the PLA hopes to deter American support for Taiwan and project power in Asia. In the next several years, China can be expected to field a new mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, more accurate medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, a new land-attack cruise missile, and new reconnaissance and intelligence satellites that will support missile operations. Along with plans to make greater use of outer space for military purposes, China is seeking to develop the means to destroy opposing satellites and may also be developing its own missile defenses.

But China's interest in missile defenses has not stopped it from mounting a major diplomatic campaign of threats this year to block the U.S. deployment of missile defenses in Asia. China hopes to create the impression that American defensive missiles, not China's new offensive missiles, threaten peace in Asia. The Clinton Administration is not responding adequately to China's threats and is not sufficiently affirming the need for U.S. missile defenses. It is essential that the United States quickly develop and deploy adequate missile defense systems, lest uneasy U.S. friends and allies turn to their own missile--or even nuclear--options to deter China. The Administration should state clearly that China's new missiles threaten peace in Asia, accelerate the development of effective missile defense systems to protect U.S. forces in Asia from both increasing Chinese and North Korean missile forces, and develop and share theater missile defense systems with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. The Administration also should suspend civilian space cooperation with China until it enters into agreements with the United States that limit future missile competition.
FOR CHINA, MISSILES ARE A KEY FUTURE WEAPON

The importance of missiles to China's future military posture is emphasized dramatically by recent revelations that China obtained critical information on the U.S. W-88 nuclear warhead that allowed it to develop a similar small nuclear warhead. In China's developing strategy and doctrine, missiles hold a place of priority that is perhaps above that of air or naval forces. PLA missile-related doctrine is evolving from one that stresses the use of nuclear missiles to deter other nuclear powers to one that envisions a range of uses for nuclear and non-nuclear armed missiles at the regional level. 1 Most ballistic missiles are now controlled by a special service within the PLA called the Second Artillery. As China builds new short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, its Army, Navy, and Air Force likely will be given more missile-based strike missions as well. China's emphasis on missiles is due also to a practical reality: China by itself cannot build a modern air force and navy, but it can build a variety of modern missiles.


Asymmetric Warfare

In addition to compensating for PLA weaknesses, missiles allow the PLA to exploit deficiencies in the military forces of the United States and other possible Asian adversaries which have no effective defenses against theater or tactical missiles or against supersonic anti-ship missiles. Missiles also are essential to a high-priority PLA goal: to build the forces needed to wage modern information warfare. Like the United States, China recognizes the vital importance to future warfare of gaining information dominance. China intends to use missiles to launch reconnaissance and communication satellites. China may also use missiles to attack satellites or terrestrial-based command, communication, computer, control and intelligence (C4I) systems. 3
Importance of Foreign Technology

The high priority that the PLA and the political leadership in China place on missile force modernization is reflected in China's determination to obtain foreign missile technology, whether by cooperation, sale, or subterfuge. Indeed, China's aerospace sector and its missile and space programs receive greater political support and resources than aircraft programs. But despite the progress China has made on its own to develop modern missiles, it still requires foreign technology inputs to keep pace with the United States. Some of China's sources for missile technology include:
The United States. Stolen W-88 small nuclear warhead data; stolen neutron bomb data; possible Tomahawk cruise missiles obtained via Afghanistan; 4 use of U.S. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) navigation signals; 5 information derived from commercial cooperation that is critical to improving the reliability of space launch vehicles; 6 and subsidy for future missile programs from U.S. purchase of Chinese satellite launch services. The father of China's missile program, Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen, was an important early U.S. rocket expert; he returned to China in 1955 following alleged McCarthy-period persecution. Since the 1980s, many younger Chinese aerospace engineers have studied at U.S. universities.
Russia. Has marketed the Raduga Kh-65SE and Novator Alpha cruise missiles to China; has sold China the Raduga SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic anti-ship missile, co-production rights for the Zvezda Kh-31 supersonic anti-radiation missile, and data on large military lasers; very likely has sold China data from the VEGA-M bureau on radar satellites; and sold the S-300PMU surface-to-air missile that is helping China develop future anti-missile systems. From Belarus, China has obtained a MAZ missile transporter used for a Soviet missile that can help China make mobile its new ICBMs. 7
Israel. Possible co-development with China of a land-attack cruise missile; 8 sale to China of its Phalcon airborne radar that could help guide Chinese anti-ship missiles; alleged sale of U.S. Patriot missile to China which may be assisting future Chinese anti-missile programs. 9
Germany, Britain. Germany's DASA aerospace company has helped China develop communication satellites; Britain's University of Surrey is helping China develop small satellites, which are more difficult to detect and less expensive to produce and launch.
Kiribati, France, Brazil. Kiribati has allowed China to establish a satellite tracking station on its island of Tarawa; France and Brazil may soon begin space-tracking cooperation with China.

Sunday 2 December, 2007

submarine

Type 035 electric diesel calss submarine

The French Nuclear Connection

The deal between the French nuclear behemoth Areva and the Chinese to build two nuclear power plants and run others in China may be part of an answer to that country’s growing energy demand. Not to mention gross pollution. It also gives the now struggling nuclear business a big shot in the arm, and brings a little known, and growing power into focus as a major energy player: Sarkozy’s France.

The Bush administration has hoped it could pump up nuclear as a clean alternative fuel. Since Three Mile Island the business has been in the dumps, mired in controversy over waste disposal and overall safety. As part of its expanding operations, Areva now wants to enter the U.S. market and has cut a deal with Constellation Energy, a Baltimore utility, to sell power plants here. The French, of course, have long played an important role in the oil and gas business with historic interests in Algeria, where the first major LNG exports to the U.S. originated; in West Africa, where the Gulf of Guinea has become a hot spot in the search for what’s left of the world’s oil and gas; and the Middle East.

But the country’s role in reviving the nuclear power business is not so well known. Currently France produces 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Areva builds reactors, but also is engaged in mining and processing uranium in Gabon, Niger, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia, Finland, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. According to the company's web site, it has built 100 of the 303 light water nuclear reactors in the world—throughout France and in South Korea, South Africa, and Argentina.

In Canada it owns a major share in the Cigar Lake project in Saskatchewan, which has been billed as an enormous uranium mine, potentially supplying about one tenth of the world’s consumption. And it has numerous uranium interests in British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, and in the Arctic archipelago in Nunavut. In the U.S., Areva has uranium mining holdings in Texas and Wyoming and, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, is considering building an enrichment facility in New Mexico.

The deal could give China another foot in the door of the North American energy business. Previously the Chinese have been interested in participating in the oil sands business in Alberta and now with France as a partner can play a larger role in producing and processing uranium not only in Canada but in the U.S.

What next—will we start exporting uranium to China?

China's Strategic strike capability

China has been upgrading its H-6 bombers and producing H-6K bombers in an effort to improve its aerial nuclear strategic deterrence. The subsonic speed of the H-6 and non-stealthy sorties prevented it from breaking through the air-defense networks of Russia, the United States and Japan. Fitted with D-30-P2 engines of greater thrust power, the H-6K has a greatly increased range and combat payload. The two engines, each with a thrust power of 12,000 kilograms, may enhance the H-6K's ammunition capacity to around 12 tons, enabling it to carry large long-range cruise missiles.

Before 2006, China had no effective long-range air-launched cruise missiles. Judging from their exterior structure, the range of the YJ-63 cruise missiles it has fitted on the H-6H is no more than 200 kilometers. The deployment of this cruise missile in its 10th Bomber Division appears to be aimed at reinforcing strike capability on tactical targets in Taiwan.

The H-6K has a reinforced fuselage structure and uses more composite materials, and the hardpoints fitted on it are also newly designed. Armed with long-range cruise missiles, even though it is still a subsonic bomber, the H-6K now has the operational capability to project nuclear deterrence. The fire control software of the H-6K will also undergo necessary modifications.

A careful analysis of the configuration of the six cruise missiles loaded on the H-6K bomber, a picture of which appeared recently on Chinese Web sites, indicates China may have imitated the Russian KH-55A air-launched cruise missiles. In the mid-1990s, China acquired six such missiles from Ukraine through smuggling -- a feat confirmed by Ukrainian authorities.

Although the image of the H-6K is blurred, it can be seen that the air-intake channel is close to the stabilizing fin at the tail, very similar to the pneumatic structure of the KH-55A. This indicates that the H-6K bomber is powered by turbofan engines. This photo also indicates that China very likely has started to produce a Chinese version of the KH-55.

The KH-55 and KH-55SM can be either conventional or nuclear cruise missiles. It is not likely that the development of such long-range aggressive weapons was intended for conventional offensive operations. Such missiles can be armed with a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead. Thus the Chinese version of the KH-55 could be fitted with both conventional and nuclear warheads. The KH-55 has a length of 8.09 meters and a diameter of 0.514 meters -- 0.77 meters for the KH-55SM. The KH-55 has a wingspan of 3.1 meters, a weight of 1,700 kilograms and a flying speed of Mach 0.48-0.77. The total weight of the 6 KH-55 missiles is 10.2 tons. These figures give some idea as to why China is upgrading its H-6H to the H-6K.

The acquisition of the H-6K and new generation long-range cruise missile is an epoch-making event for the PLA air force. When used for conventional precision offensive operations, the Chinese KH-55 fired from Chinese air space will put the entire Korean peninsula within strike range, and also much of Japan, including the whole of Okinawa, parts of Honshu Island and all of Kyushu and Shikoku.

If the Chinese KH-55 has the 2,500-kilometer strike range of the original Russian KH-55, H-6K bombers taking off from an airport in northeast China could directly launch attacks within China's own air space upon almost all targets in Tokyo, Hokkaido and Honshu. Moreover, the H-6K bombers deployed in the 8th Bomber Division under the southern Guangzhou Military Region could be forward-deployed and launch aerial attacks upon Guam.

From the official Chinese news release after the successful flight tests of the H-6K, it can be clearly sensed the Chinese military has high expectations for this bomber. It is not just an upgraded variant of the H-6 or intended only for tactical purposes. The news release described its test flight as an event that "20,000 Xian Aircraft Company staff have been longing for, for 13 long years." Guests invited to observe the maiden flight of the bomber included top leaders from the Central Military Commission and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.

It appears that the entry into service of the H-6K has given the Chinese air force genuine operational capability to launch nuclear attacks upon adversary targets.

Wednesday 28 November, 2007

China's nuclear capabilities

The recent annual report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission says, "Beijing continues to improve its older intercontinental ballistic missiles and seeks to field increasingly mobile, accurate and survivable and therefore more credible ICBMs ... China's newer longer-range [missile] systems will reach many areas of the world ... including virtually the entire continental United states."
Yet it seems that China has more to worry about than the United States, according to another recent report. It found, just like classic "missile gap" alarm of the Cold War, that the US military, intelligence agencies and conservative think-tanks and news organizations are exaggerating China's nuclear-weapons capability to justify developing a new generation of nuclear and conventional weapons.
And in a surrealistic act of mirror-imaging, the Chinese have been citing US weapons upgrades as a rationale for modernizing theirs, locking the two nations in a dangerous action-and-reaction competition reminiscent of the Cold War, according to a report issued on November 30 by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).
In a perverse way it actually makes sense. Ever since the crackup of the Soviet Union, various political and military figures have been desperately searching for rationales to justify hanging on to and modernizing the US nuclear arsenal.
Of course, the negligible size of China's nuclear forces has made that a hard sell. As the report notes right at the start, "The Chinese-US nuclear relationship is dramatically disproportionate in favor of the United States and will remain so for the foreseeable future."
Even the Pentagon's last annual "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" report notes that Beijing has consistently stated its adherence to a "no first use" nuclear doctrine, which is that China will never use nuclear weapons first against a nuclear-weapons state, nor will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state or nuclear-weapons-free zone.
It also noted that China currently deploys about 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled ICBMs, which constitute its primary means of holding continental US targets at risk. But according to the FAS-NRDC report, the United States has more than 830 missiles - most with multiple warheads - that can reach China. By 2015, when US intelligence projects that China will have 75 missiles primarily targeted against the United States, the US force will include 780 land- and sea-based missiles.
The report found that although the United States has maintained extensive nuclear-strike plans against Chinese targets for more than a half-century, China has never responded by building large nuclear forces of its own and is unlikely to do so in the future. As a result, Chinese nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively much inferior to their US counterparts.
China's total stockpile numbers about 200 warheads; the United States has nearly 10,000. By 2015, after China deploys a new generation of ballistic missiles and the US has completed its planned reductions, China may have some 220 warheads and the US more than 5,000.
The report's main finding is that the Pentagon and others routinely highlight specific incidents out of context that inaccurately portray a looming Chinese threat. Specifically, the report demonstrates that they have been embellishing China's submarine- and long-range-missile capabilities.
US intelligence agencies warn that the Chinese will be able to target 75-100 nuclear warheads at the continental United States by 2015. But that prediction assumes China will be able to deploy 40-55 new DF-31A missiles before 2015, in addition to two other shorter-range missiles. Given that the Chinese have yet to conduct test flights of the DF-31A, the report concluded that that assumption is highly questionable.
The Pentagon also has made much out of the fact that China's next-generation missiles will be mobile. But the majority of China's ballistic-missile force has always been mobile, the report points out, and the US military has targeted it as a routine matter since the 1980s. In fact, improved US targeting of Chinese missiles has played a significant role in prompting China to develop new long-range missiles.
As the report makes clear, the disparity between US and Chinese nuclear capabilities is so overwhelming as to make any talk about the Chinese threat farcical. For example: None of China's long-range nuclear forces are believed to be on alert; most US ballistic missiles are on high alert, ready to launch within minutes after receiving a launch order.
China's sole nuclear-ballistic-missile submarine has never gone on patrol. As a result, the crews of the new Jin-class subs currently under construction will need to start almost from scratch to develop the operational and tactical skills and procedures that are essential if a sea-based deterrent is to be militarily effective and matter strategically. China may be able to build two or three new missile subs over the next decade, but they would be highly vulnerable to anti-submarine forces; the US Navy has 14 missile-bearing subs and has moved the majority of them into the Pacific. China may have a small number of aircraft with a secondary nuclear capability, but they would be severely tested by US and allied air-defense systems or in air-to-air combat. The United States operates 72 long-range bombers assigned missions with nuclear gravity bombs and land-attack cruise missiles. China does not have nuclear-armed cruise missiles, although US intelligence suspects it might develop such a capability in the future. The United States has more than 1,000 nuclear cruise missiles for delivery by aircraft and attack submarines.
Another relevant aspect of the report, especially in light of recent US experience with Iraq, details how badly US intelligence has misjudged Chinese nuclear capabilities. The report found that estimates about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal were grossly overstated, sometimes by several hundred percent, and timelines for when new systems would come on line were almost always much too optimistic.
The reasons for these misjudgments include China's ability to keep its capabilities hidden, a tendency among some intelligence analysts to overstate their conclusions, and the Pentagon's general inclination to assume the worst. This predisposition to exaggerate the Chinese threat unfortunately remains evident today.
The sad irony is that both countries point to what the other is doing as a justification to modernize. The report notes that China is about to deploy three new long-range ballistic missiles that the US says were developed in response to its own deployment of more accurate Trident sea-launched ballistic missiles in the early 1980s.Meanwhile, the US has increased its capability to target Chinese mobile missiles, and the Pentagon is arguing that the long-term outlook for China's long-range ballistic-missile force requires increased targeting of Chinese forces.

Sunday 25 November, 2007

China's Attitude Toward Nuclear Deterrence

China's official position on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons generally, is that it stands for total nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China has often criticized the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first. China has been particularly critical of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, or so-called "nuclear umbrellas," provided by the other nuclear weapon states (particularly the United States) to their allies. China is also officially opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories, and has stated that China has never deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of another country. China has also been especially critical of using nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear weapon states, and has repeatedly called on the nuclear weapon states to agree to a legally-binding, multilateral agreement under which they would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (negative security assurances). Despite Beijing's affirmations of its no-first-use policy, many foreign analysts question the credibility of China's nuclear doctrine.
Chinese statements regarding nuclear deterrence:
At a briefing on missile defense, Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:

"We are against NMD, not because we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. We just hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. As is known to all, Chinese nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers. Yet, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects of China's national security."For the first time since 1995, the China's National Defense White Paper stated that Chinese nuclear forces are intended for deterrence. Unlike the 1998 White Paper, the 2000 White Paper did not make reference to the deterrence policies in other countries.
China maintains a small but effective nuclear counterattacking force in order to deter possible nuclear attacks by other countries.

In july China issued a White Paper called China's National Defense. It stated:
China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. At the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1996 China clearly put forward a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament: 1. The major nuclear powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles; 2. All nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally binding international document as soon as possible; 3. all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their borders should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon states should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations; 4. no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or missile defense systems, which harm strategic security and stability; 5. all states should negotiate and conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."
"China has always opposed the policy of nuclear deterrence and has long committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-free countries and regions . . . [China has] invariably urged nuclear states to conclude a peace agreement on the mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." ["China Manufactures Nuclear Weapons for Self-Defense - Embassy."
Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
Though the Cold War has already come to an end, some countries are still adhering to the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons the nuclear-weapon states concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence .
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

"The major nuclear powers should renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence".
The official Chinese newspaper People's Daily stated that "Some nuclear powers stubbornly uphold policies of nuclear deterrence based on first use of nuclear weapons."
After its 45th nuclear test, China stated that "Major nuclear weapon states should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence".
Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
"In the post-cold war era of today, it is obviously anachronistic to continue with the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first-use of nuclear weapons and thus subjecting other countries to nuclear threat."
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:China does not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence and the nuclear weapons developed by China are solely for self-defense, never meant to pose against or threaten any specific country.The Chinese Foreign Ministry issue a statement calling for the "other nuclear-weapon States to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and commit themselves explicitly to the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons."
A Future Shift in China's Deterrence Strategy?

Although official Chinese policy has not changed, many China analysts are beginning to question chinas long-term commitment to its policies of no-first-use and minimum deterrence. Pointing to alleged incongruities between Chinese nuclear modernization and its traditional policies, scholars have conducted interviews with Chinese officials to learn more about the debate within the government and the prospects for a future change in official Chinese policy. According to some foreign analysts, American military superiority, ballistic missile defense systems, instability on Chinas borders, and a desire to increase the credibility of its deterrent have all prompted China to this reevaluate its current policy.
Alistair Iain Johnston explores the three theories Western scholars have used to explain how China views its nuclear weapons. First, scholars often argue that China maintains a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence and aspires only to possess the capabilities necessary to maintain a credible deterrence. Second, some analysts argue that many Chinese officials have never genuinely accepted minimum deterrence, but instead lean toward some form of limited war-fighting or flexible response. Third, other scholars point to the effect of Chinese culture on its strategic policy, particularly its minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility, and patience, and the resulting Chinas nuclear policies.
China's Attitude Toward Nuclear Deterrence

China's official position on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons generally, is that it stands for total nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China has often criticized the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first. China has been particularly critical of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, or so-called "nuclear umbrellas," provided by the other nuclear weapon states (particularly the United States) to their allies. China is also officially opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories, and has stated that China has never deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of another country. China has also been especially critical of using nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear weapon states, and has repeatedly called on the nuclear weapon states to agree to a legally-binding, multilateral agreement under which they would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (negative security assurances). Despite Beijing's affirmations of its no-first-use policy, many foreign analysts question the credibility of China's nuclear doctrine.

Chinese statements regarding nuclear deterrence:

March 2001: At a briefing on missile defense, Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:

"We are against NMD, not because we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. We just hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. As is known to all, China’s nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers. Yet, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects of China's national security."

For the first time since 1995, the China's National Defense White Paper stated that Chinese nuclear forces are intended for deterrence. Unlike the 1998 White Paper, the 2000 White Paper did not make reference to the deterrence policies in other countries:China maintains a small but effective nuclear counterattacking force in order to deter possible nuclear attacks by other countries
China issued a White Paper called China's National Defense. It stated:

China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. At the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1996 China clearly put forward a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament: 1. The major nuclear powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles; 2. All nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally binding international document as soon as possible; 3. all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their borders should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon states should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations; 4. no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or missile defense systems, which harm strategic security and stability; 5. all states should negotiate and conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."
The Press Service of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow stated:

"China has always opposed the policy of nuclear deterrence and has long committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-free countries and regions . . . [China has] invariably urged nuclear states to conclude a peace agreement on the mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." ["China Manufactures Nuclear Weapons for Self-Defense - Embassy,"
Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
Though the Cold War has already come to an end, some countries are still adhering to the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons…the nuclear-weapon states concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence”. [Statement by H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:The major nuclear powers should renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence". [Statement by Qian Qichen at the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.]
The official Chinese newspaper People's Daily stated that "Some nuclear powers stubbornly uphold policies of nuclear deterrence based on first use of nuclear weapons." ["Nuclear Pact Will Be A Step To Disarmament--China,]After its 45th nuclear test, China stated that "Major nuclear weapon states should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence".
Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
"In the post-cold war era of today, it is obviously anachronistic to continue with the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first-use of nuclear weapons and thus subjecting other countries to nuclear threat."
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:China does not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence and the nuclear weapons developed by China are solely for self-defense, never meant to pose against or threaten any specific country.” [Statement By H.E. Qian Qichen, Vice Premier And Foreign Minister And Head Of Delegation Of The People's Republic Of China At The 1995 Review And Extension Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry issue a statement calling for the "other nuclear-weapon States to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and commit themselves explicitly to the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons."
A Future Shift in China's Deterrence Strategy?

Although official Chinese policy has not changed, many China analysts are beginning to question chinas long-term commitment to its policies of no-first-use and minimum deterrence. Pointing to alleged incongruities between Chinese nuclear modernization and its traditional policies, scholars have conducted interviews with Chinese officials to learn more about the debate within the government and the prospects for a future change in official Chinese policy. According to some foreign analysts, American military superiority, ballistic missile defense systems, instability on Chinas borders, and a desire to increase the credibility of its deterrent have all prompted China to this reevaluate its current policy.

Alistair Iain Johnston explores the three theories Western scholars have used to explain how China views its nuclear weapons. First, scholars often argue that China maintains a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence and aspires only to possess the capabilities necessary to maintain a credible deterrence. Second, some analysts argue that many Chinese officials have never genuinely accepted minimum deterrence, but instead lean toward some form of limited war-fighting or flexible response. Third, other scholars point to the effect of Chinese culture on its strategic policy, particularly its minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility, and patience, and the resulting Chinas nuclear policies. Johnston argues that China's nuclear modernization program may be geared toward developing the capacity to move from a minimum deterrence to a limited deterrence nuclear strategy, and notes that Chinese strategists are increasingly willing to distinguish between the two approaches. "Limited deterrence" entails the capability to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities, which would require expanded deployments. However, such a limited deterrence capability may still be a long way off. According to Johnston, "It is fairly safe to say that Chinese capabilities come nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited deterrence." He further explains that, according to his research, number of Chinese strategists now explicitly reject minimum deterrence as a viable option for China as the doctrine reduces Chinas deterrence, increases the countrys vulnerability to attack, and offers no means to control an arms race.
Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes agree, noting that, Over the past decade, certain indicators suggest that these long-held aspects of Chinese nuclear weapons doctrine may be undergoing some reconsideration. They suggest that, behind the scenes, Chinese officials are currently engaged in a serious debate regarding the future of Chinas military. The authors suggest that some Chinese military planners advocate a shift to limited deterrence, including introduction of limited war-fighting capabilities, improved command and control and early warning systems, smaller, survivable, mobile, more accurate and diverse cruise and ballistic missile nuclear delivery systems, possible abandonment of the NFU policy, missile defenses, and the addition of counterforce targets. Paul Godwin adds, Minimum deterrence, which uses a single countervalue punitive strike on cities to deter, is seen by many Chinese strategists as passive and incompatible with what they see as a future requirement for more flexible nuclear responses.
Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes also consider the domestic political situation surrounding Chinas strategic policy and discuss its potential effect on a future change in Chinese policy:
¦From a strictly doctrinal perspective, it is likely that such a shift must await shifts in the domestic political hierarchy and its view of the outside world, factors which have consistently driven Chinese doctrinal choices. Moreover¦ technical constraints will remain one of the foremost drivers determining the direction of doctrine in the near-term. Rather than force a stark analytical choice between either a doctrine of minimal deterrence or one of limited deterrence, it makes more sense to draw out two important nuances to better understand this debate. First is to recognize the differences between operational doctrine and what we might call aspirational doctrine in the Chinese context. Second is to recognize that the Second Artillery “ which oversees strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional missiles more likely operates on three levels of doctrine: credible minimal deterrence with regard to the continental United States and Russia; limited deterrence with regard to Chinas theater nuclear forces; and an offensively-configured, preemptive, counterforce warfighting posture of active defense or offensive defense for the Second Artillerys conventional missile forces.

Tuesday 20 November, 2007

THE LASTMINUTE FOR DOOMSDAY CLOCK

over the past six years, the Bush administration has spent almost $100 million on a highly

classified program to help Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, secure his country’s

nuclear weapons, according to current and former senior administration officials.But with the

future of that country’s leadership in doubt, debate is intensifying about whether Washington has

done enough to help protect the warheads and laboratories, and whether Pakistan’s reluctance to

reveal critical details about its arsenal has undercut the effectiveness of the continuing

security effort.

The aid, buried in secret portions of the federal budget, paid for the training of Pakistani

personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear security training center in

Pakistan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near completion, even though it was

supposed to be in operation this year.
A raft of equipment — from helicopters to night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment —

was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories

that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age.

While American officials say that they believe the arsenal is safe at the moment, and that they

take at face value Pakistani assurances that security is vastly improved, in many cases the

Pakistani government has been reluctant to show American officials how or where the gear is

actually used.
That is because the Pakistanis do not want to reveal the locations of their weapons or the amount

or type of new bomb-grade fuel the country is now producing.

The American program was created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the Bush administration

debated whether to share with Pakistan one of the crown jewels of American nuclear protection

technology, known as “permissive action links,” or PALS, a system used to keep a weapon from

detonating without proper codes and authorizations.
In the end, despite past federal aid to France and Russia on delicate points of nuclear security,

the administration decided that it could not share the system with the Pakistanis because of

legal restrictions.

In addition, the Pakistanis were suspicious that any American-made technology in their warheads

could include a secret “kill switch,” enabling the Americans to turn off their weapons.

While many nuclear experts in the federal government favored offering the PALS system because

they considered Pakistan’s arsenal among the world’s most vulnerable to terrorist groups, some

administration officials feared that sharing the technology would teach Pakistan too much about

American weaponry. The same concern kept the Clinton administration from sharing the technology

with China in the early 1990s.
American officials and nuclear experts, some of whom were concerned that Pakistan’s arsenal

remained vulnerable.

Since then, some elements of the program have been discussed in the Pakistani news media and in a

presentation late last year by the leader of Pakistan’s nuclear safety effort, Lt. Gen. Khalid

Kidwai, who acknowledged receiving “international” help as he sought to assure Washington that

all of the holes in Pakistan’s nuclear security infrastructure had been sealed.

In recent days, American officials have expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is

well secured. “I don’t see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in

jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, told a Pentagon news conference on Thursday.
Admiral Mullen’s carefully chosen words, a senior administration official said, were based on two
separate intelligence assessments issued this month that had been summarized in briefings to Mr.Bush. Both concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was safe under current conditions, and onealso looked at laboratories and came to the same conclusion.
The secret program was designed by the Energy Department and the State Department, and it drewheavily from the effort over the past decade to secure nuclear weapons, stockpiles and materials

in Russia and other former Soviet states. Much of the money for Pakistan was spent on physical

security, like fencing and surveillance systems, and equipment for tracking nuclear material if

it left secure areas.
Still, the Pakistani government’s reluctance to provide access has limited efforts to assess the
situation. In particular, some American experts say they have less ability to look into the
nuclear laboratories where highly enriched uranium is produced — including the laboratory namedfor Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man who sold Pakistan’s nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea andLibya.
while Pakistan is formally considered a “major non-NATO ally,” the program has been hindered
by a deep suspicion among Pakistan’s military that the secret goal of the United States was to
gather intelligence about how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistan’s arsenal, which is

the pride of the country.