Sunday, 13 September, 2009

Chinese Will Build Modular High Temperature Nuclear Reactors Like Cans of Soda: in Eight Packs

A 60 slide presentation Chinese HTR Program: HTR-10 results & Work Progress on HTR-PM by Zuoyi ZHANG, Institute of Nuclear and new Energy Technology (INET), Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China The Chinese High Temperature Reactors is one of the top 16 programs for the Chinese Government from 2006-2020. They figure that as they make their 13th to 31st pack of eight 200MW high temperature nuclear plants that cost will come down to 60% of the first one. Buying and building modular nuclear reactors like eight packs of beer or soda.They figure that as they make their 13th pack of eight 200MW electrical plants that cost will come down to 60-70% of the first one.They are targeting 90% of the cost of a Pressure Water Reactor (PWR) but worst case the HTR figures to 120% of the cost of the PWR.China plans to go to a very high temperature reactor design before 2020 and make hydrogen, switch to gas turbine and super-critical power cycle, and use spent fuel.

China hints at unveiling of new DF-41 ICBM

China hints at unveiling of new DF-41 ICBM
China will display five new missiles in its National Day Parade on Oct. 1, although the much-anticipated third generation Dongfeng 41 is not named directly.

Some Chinese media are quoting an unnamed military "leading missile expert" saying that the missiles will be second generation and already in use by the military. Other media are saying that the unveiling of the DF-41 is a possibility because it is not excluded by name.

"Military aficionados have been expecting to see the Dongfeng 41, known as the DF-41 or the CSS-X-10," but they will be disappointed, said the missile expert speaking to the Chinese-based news Web site Global Times. "The third generation is still under development and is unlikely to be displayed this time," said the source from the "Second Artillery Force."

According to Chinese media reports, the force is at the core of the country's counterattack nuclear deterrence, as noted in a Beijing government white paper titled China's National Defense in 2008, issued earlier this year by the Information Office of the State Council.

The first of the Dongfeng missiles, the DF-1, was a copy of the Soviet SS-2 Sibling missile and produced under license in China in the 1960s. It had a single RD-101 rocket engine running on a mixture of liquid oxygen and alcohol. Maximum range of the DF-1, long retired, was around 350 miles with a 1,000-pound payload.

The DF-41 is believed to have a range between 7,000 and more than 8,500 miles and have a flexible warhead capacity. It can carry one, three, six or 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle warheads.

The latest Dongfeng, the DF-41, is an improvement on the DF-31 and its longer-range sister the DF-31A, which are road-mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs developed by the 4th Aerospace Academy, now Academy of Rocket Motor Technology.

The DF-31 has a range of more than 5,000 miles with a single 1,000 kt warhead, or up to three 20-150 kt MIRV warheads. The upgraded DF-31A has a range of around 7,000 miles. Only around 12 are believed to be in service.

The Global Times report hinted that more might be on view during the parade, including a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Julang 2, also known as JL-2 or CSS-NX-4. The JL-2 is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 with a similar range and designed for current and next-generation nuclear-powered submarines.

The JL-2 is comparable in size and performance to the American Trident C-4 long-range multiple-warhead three-stage solid-fuel missile.

The Global Times said that another source, naval expert Li Jie, "didn't exclude the possibility of Julang-2's appearance" on Oct. 1. The navy would showcase some types of ship-to-ship missile, ship-to-air missile and multiple rocket launchers at the parade. "Maybe two to three of them will be unveiled for the first time," Jie said.

Western analysts and military bloggers have said that the National Day Parade could be the time to unveil the DF-41 and other hardware because of the significance of this year's event, which is put on only once every 10 years. The 2009 parade celebrates the birth of communist-run China 60 years ago.

First rehearsals for the parade in Tiananmen Square featured a mass pageant involving nearly 200,000 people and 60 simulated floats, media reported at the end of August. The rehearsal was held at night "to avoid affecting the public," a spokesperson for the celebration preparation committee said.

Li Daguang, a senior military expert at the PLA University of National Defense, said that the parade is not for saber-rattling but to promote national pride, confidence and awareness of national defense. "Some countries, observing China's parade with colored glasses, show off their weapons around the world on the battlefield instead," he said.

Sunday, 6 September, 2009

PRC Theft of U.S. Nuclear Warhead Design Information ; Proliferation

The PRC is one of the worldís leading proliferators of weapons technologies. Concerns about the impact of the PRCís thefts of U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information, therefore, include the possible proliferation of the worldís most sophisticated nuclear weapons technology to nations hostile to the United States.

Russian Assistance to the PRCís Nuclear Weapons Program

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the PRC and Russian scientists became increasingly cooperative in civilian nuclear technology, and apparently, military technology. The Select Committee is concerned that the growing cooperation between Russia and the PRC is an indication of current or future nuclear weapons cooperation. The Select Committee judges that Russiaís nuclear weapons testing technology and experience could significantly assist the PRC with its nuclear weapons program under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which does not permit physical testing.

While the PRC could share its knowledge of U.S. advanced thermonuclear warhead designs with Russia, Russia may not be interested in deviating from its past developmental path, since existing Russian warhead designs are apparently simple and reliable. The large throw-weight of Russian ballistic missiles has given them less cause for concern about the size and weight of their warheads. Russiaís nuclear stockpile maintenance requirements under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are thus very different than those of the United States.

The prospect of PRC-Russian cooperation, if that were to include military cooperation, would give rise to concerns in several areas, including nuclear weapons development and nuclear stockpile maintenance, nuclear weapons modeling and simulation, and nuclear weapons testing data.

How the PRC Acquired Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information from the United States: PRC Espionage and Other PRC Techniques

The Select Committee judges that the PRCís intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads have focused primarily on the following U.S. National Laboratories: Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, and Sandia. These efforts included espionage, rigorous review of U.S. unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy laboratories.

Espionage played a central part in the PRCís acquisition of classified U.S. thermonuclear warhead design secrets. In several cases, the PRC identified lab employees, invited them to the PRC, and approached them for help, sometimes playing upon ethnic ties to recruit individuals.

The PRC also rigorously mined unclassified technical information and academic publications, including information from the National Technical Information Center and other sources. PRC scientists have even requested reports via e-mail from scientists at the U.S. national weapons laboratories. Peter Lee, who had been a scientist at both Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories and was convicted in 1997 of passing classified information to the PRC, gave the PRC unclassified technical reports upon request. The PRC also learned about conventional explosives for nuclear weapon detonation from reviewing unclassified technical reports published by Department of Energy national weapons laboratories.

PRC scientists have used their extensive laboratory-to-laboratory interactions with the United States to gain information from U.S. scientists on common problems, solutions to nuclear weapons physics, and solutions to engineering problems. The PRC uses elicitation in these meetings, where it shows familiarity with U.S. information in an effort to "prime the pump" in order to try to glean information about U.S. designs. U.S. scientists have passed information to the PRC in this way that is of benefit to the PRCís nuclear weapons program.

Specific examples of the loss of classified U.S. information in this manner are detailed in the Select Committeeís classified Final Report. The Clinton administration has determined that these examples cannot be publicly discussed.

The PRCís espionage operations, which use traditional intelligence gathering organizations as well as other entities, are aggressively focused on U.S. weapons technology.

The PRCís Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), which is under the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), is the entity in charge of the PRCís nuclear weapons program. It is responsible for the research and development, testing, and production of all of the PRCís nuclear weapons. The figure below shows the organization of the PRCís nuclear infrastructure.5

The China Academy of Engineering Physics has pursued a very close relationship with U.S. national weapons laboratories, sending scientists as well as senior management to Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. Members of the China Academy of Engineering Physics senior management have made at least two trips during the mid-to-late 1990s to U.S. national weapons laboratories to acquire information and collect intelligence. These visits provide the opportunity for the PRC to collect intelligence. The presence of such PRC nationals at the U.S. national weapons laboratories facilitates the PRCís targeting of U.S. weapons scientists for the purpose of obtaining nuclear weapons information.

U.S. and PRC lab-to-lab exchanges were ended in the late 1980s, but were resumed in 1993. Scientific exchanges continue in many areas including high-energy physics.6 Discussions at the U.S. national weapons laboratories in connection with the foreign visitors program are supposed to be strictly limited to technical arms control and material accounting issues. Nonetheless, these visits and scientific conferences provide opportunities for the PRC to interact with U.S. scientists outside of official meetings, and facilitate the PRCís targeting of U.S. weapons scientists.

The U.S. national weapons laboratories argue that there are reciprocal gains from the exchanges. The Department of Energy describes some of the insights gained from these exchanges as unique. On the other hand, PRC scientists have misled the U.S. about their objectives and technological developments. Despite considerable debate in Congress and the Executive branch, including several critical Government Accounting Office reports, the U.S. Government has never made a definitive assessment of the risks versus the benefits of scientific exchanges and foreign visitor programs involving the U.S. national weapons laboratories.7

How the U.S. Government Learned of the PRCís Theft of Our Most Advanced Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information

The U.S. Government did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy laboratories until 1995. The first indication of successful PRC espionage against the laboratories arose in the late 1970s. During the last several years, more information has become available concerning thefts of U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information, and how the PRC may be exploiting it. A series of PRC nuclear tests conducted from 1992 to 1996 that furthered the PRCís development of advanced warheads led to suspicions in the U.S. intelligence community that the PRC had stolen advanced U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information.

The "Walk-In"

In 1995, a "walk-in" approached the Central Intelligence Agency outside of the PRC and provided an official PRC document classified "Secret" that contained design information on the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, the most modern in the U.S. arsenal, as well as technical information concerning other thermonuclear warheads.

The CIA later determined that the "walk-in" was directed by the PRC intelligence services. Nonetheless, the CIA and other Intelligence Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that it contained U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information.

The "walk-in" document recognized that the U.S. nuclear warheads represented the state-of-the-art against which PRC thermonuclear warheads should be measured.

Espionage Definition of a "Walk-In"

A "walk-in" is an individual who voluntarily offers to conduct espionage. The Encyclopedia of Espionage defines a "walk-in" as "an unheralded defector or a dangle, a ëwalk-iní is a potential agent or a mole who literally walks into an embassy or intelligence agency without prior contact or recruitment." See the Spy Book, The Encyclopedia of Espionage, by Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen (RH Reference & Information Publishing, Random House).

The individual who approached the CIA in 1995 is suspected of being a "directed walk-in": a "walk-in" purposefully directed by the PRC to provide this information to the United States. There is speculation as to the PRCís motives for advertising to the United States the state of its nuclear weapons development.

Over the following months, an assessment of the information in the document was conducted by a multidisciplinary group from the U.S. Government, including the Department of Energy and scientists from the U.S. national weapons laboratories. The Department of Energy and FBI investigations focused on the loss of the U.S. W-88 Trident D-5 design information, but they did not focus on the loss of technical information about the other five U.S. thermonuclear warheads. A Department of Energy investigation of the loss of technical information about the other five U.S. thermonuclear warheads had not begun as of January 3, 1999, after the Select Committee had completed its investigation. Also, the FBI had not yet initiated an investigation as of January 3, 1999.

The PRCís Future Thermonuclear Warhead Requirements: The PRCís Need for Nuclear Test Data and High Performance Computers

Since signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the PRC has faced new challenges in maintaining its modern thermonuclear warheads without physical testing. Indeed, even after signing the CTBT, the PRC may be testing sub-critical or low yield nuclear explosive devices underground at its Lop Nur test site.

The PRC likely does not need additional physical tests for its older thermonuclear warhead designs. But maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile for these weapons does require testing. The ban on physical testing to which the PRC agreed in 1996 has therefore increased the PRCís interest in high performance computing and access to sophisticated computer codes to simulate the explosion of nuclear weapons.8

The Select Committee judges that the PRC has likely developed only a very modest complement of codes from inputting its own testing data into high performance computers. The PRC would, therefore, be especially interested in acquiring U.S. thermonuclear weapons codes for any new weapons based on elements of stolen U.S. design information.

The Department of Energy reports that the PRC has in fact acquired some U.S. computer codes, including: the MCNPT code; the DOT3.5 code; and the NJOYC code.9 MCNPT is a theoretical code that is useful in determining survivability of systems to electronic penetration and dose penetration in humans. DOT3.5 is a two-dimensional empirical code that performs the same kinds of calculations as MCNPT, except uses numerical integration. NJOYC acts as a numerical translator between DOT3.5 and MCNPT.

Given the limited number of nuclear tests that the PRC has conducted, the PRC likely needs additional empirical information about advanced thermonuclear weapon performance that it could obtain by stealing the U.S. "legacy" computer codes, such as those that were used by the Los Alamos National Laboratory to design the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead. The PRC may also need information about dynamic three-dimensional data on warhead packaging, primary and secondary coupling, and the chemical interactions of materials inside the warhead over time.

The Select Committee is concerned that no procedures are in place that would either prevent or detect the movement of classified information, including classified nuclear-weapons design information or computer codes, to unclassified sections of the computer systems at U.S. national weapons laboratories. The access granted to individuals from foreign countries, including students, to these unclassified areas of the U.S. national weapons laboratoriesí computer systems could make it possible for others acting as agents of foreign countries to access such information, making detection of the persons responsible for the theft even more difficult.

The Select Committee believes that the PRC will continue to target its collection efforts not only on Los Alamos National Laboratory, but also on the other U.S. National Laboratories involved with the U.S. nuclear stockpile maintenance program.

The PRC may also seek to improve its hydrostatic testing capabilities by learning more about the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos.

PRC Theft of U.S. Nuclear Warhead Design Information

The Peoples Republic of Chinaís penetration of our national weapons laboratories spans at least the past several decades, and almost certainly continues today.

The PRCís nuclear weapons intelligence collection efforts began after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, when the PRC assessed its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs.

The PRCís warhead designs of the late 1970s were large, multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons that could only be carried on large ballistic missiles and aircraft. The PRCís warheads were roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads designed in the 1950s. The PRC may have decided as early as that time to pursue more advanced thermonuclear warheads for its new generation of ballistic missiles.

The PRCís twenty-year intelligence collection effort against the U.S. has been aimed at this goal. The PRC employs a "mosaic" approach that capitalizes on the collection of small bits of information by a large number of individuals, which is then pieced together in the PRC. This information is obtained through espionage, rigorous review of U.S. unclassified technical and academic publications, and extensive interaction with U.S. scientists and Department of Energy laboratories.

The Select Committee judges that the PRCís intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories.

As a result of these efforts, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. thermonuclear design information that helped it fabricate and successfully test a new generation of strategic warheads.

The PRC stole classified information on every currently deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The warheads for which the PRC stole classified information include: the W-56 Minuteman II ICBM; the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM; the W-70 Lance short-range ballistic missile (SRBM); the W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM; the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM; the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM. The W-88 warhead is the most sophisticated strategic nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal. It is deployed on the Trident D-5 submarine-launched missile.

In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has determined that further information may not be made public.

The PRC also stole classified information on U.S. weapons design concepts, on weaponization features, and on warhead reentry vehicles (the hardened shell that protects a warhead during reentry).

The PRC may have acquired detailed documents and blueprints from the U.S. national weapons laboratories.

The U.S. Intelligence Community reported in 1996 that the PRC stole neutron bomb technology from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The PRC had previously stolen design information on the U.S. W-70 warhead in the late 1970s; that earlier theft, which included design information, was discovered several months after it took place. The W-70 has elements that can be used as a strategic thermonuclear warhead or an enhanced radiation ("neutron bomb") warhead. Following the initial theft of W-70 design information, the PRC tested a neutron bomb in 1988.

Classified U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information Acquired by the PRC

Designation Design Laboratory Weapon Platform

W-88 Los Alamos Trident D-5 SLBM

W-87 Lawrence Livermore Peacekeeper/M-X ICBM

W-78 Los Alamos Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM

W-76 Los Alamos Trident C-4 SLBM

W-70 Lawrence Livermore Lance SRBM

W-62 Lawrence Livermore Minuteman III ICBM

W-56 Lawrence Livermore Minuteman II ICBM

The PRC may have also acquired classified U.S. nuclear weapons computer codes from U.S. national weapons laboratories. The Select Committee believes that nuclear weapons computer codes remain a key target for PRC espionage. Nuclear weapons codes are important for understanding the workings of nuclear weapons and can assist in weapon design, maintenance, and adaptation. The PRC could make use of this information, for example, to adapt stolen U.S. thermonuclear design information to meet the PRCís particular needs and capabilities.

During the mid-1990s, it was learned that the PRC had acquired U.S. technical information about insensitive high explosives. Insensitive high explosives are a component of certain thermonuclear weapons. Insensitive high explosives are less energetic than high explosives used in some other thermonuclear warheads, but have advantages for other purposes, such as thermonuclear warheads used on mobile missiles.

The PRC thefts from our national weapons laboratories began at least as early as the late 1970s, and significant secrets are known to have been stolen as recently as the mid-1990s. Such thefts almost certainly continue to the present.

The Clinton administration has determined that additional information about PRC thefts included in this section of the Select Committeeís Report cannot be publicly disclosed.

The PRCís Next Generation Nuclear Warheads

The PRC has acquired U.S. nuclear weapons design information that could be utilized in developing the PRCís next generation of modern thermonuclear warheads.

The Department of Energy identifies two general design paths to the development of modern thermonuclear warheads:

* The first path, which apparently has been followed by the Russians, emphasizes simplicity and reliability in design
* The second path, which the U.S. has taken, utilizes innovative designs and lighter-weight warheads

The Select Committee judges that the combination of the PRCís preference for U.S. designs, the PRCís theft of design information on our most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and the PRCís demand for small, modern warheads for its new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles will result in the PRC emulating the U.S. design path to develop its next generation of thermonuclear warheads.

The PRC has already begun working on smaller thermonuclear warheads. During the l990s, the PRC was working to complete testing of its modern thermonuclear weapons before it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.1 The PRC conducted a series of nuclear tests from 1992 to 1996. Based on what is known about PRC nuclear testing practices, combined with data on PRC warhead yield and on PRC missile development, it is clear that the purpose of the 1992 to 1996 test series was to develop small, light warheads for the PRCís new nuclear forces.2

These tests led to suspicions in the U.S. Intelligence Community that the PRC had stolen advanced U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information. These suspicions were definitely confirmed by the "walk-in" information received in 1995.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC is developing for its next generation of road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles smaller, more compact thermonuclear warheads that exploit elements of stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen design information from the U.S. W-70 Lance warhead or the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead.

The following graph shows an unclassified history of the PRCís thermonuclear weapons development and its acquisition of classified information from the United States.

Completing the development of its next-generation warhead poses challenges for the PRC. The PRC may not currently be able to match precisely the exact explosive power and other features of U.S. weapons. Nonetheless, the PRC may be working toward this goal, and the difficulties it faces are surmountable. Work-arounds exist, using processes similar to those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision-guided munitions industry. The PRC possesses these capabilities already.

The Impact of the PRCís Theft of U.S. Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information

Mobile and Submarine-Launched Missiles

The main application of the stolen U.S. thermonuclear warhead information will likely be to the PRCís next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The PRC is developing several new, solid-propellant, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. These include both road-mobile and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Road-mobile ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles require smaller, more advanced thermonuclear warheads. The Select Committee judges it is likely that the PRC will use a new, smaller thermonuclear warhead on its next generation road-mobile, solid-propellant ICBM, the DF-31.

The DF-31 is likely to undergo its first test flight in 1999, and could be deployed as early as 2002. Introduction of the PRCís new, smaller thermonuclear warhead into PLA service could coincide with the initial operational capability of the new road-mobile DF-31 ballistic missile system.

The Select Committee judges that the PRCís thermonuclear warheads will exploit elements of the U.S. W-70 Lance or W-88 Trident D-5 warheads. While the PRC might not reproduce exact replicas of these U.S. thermonuclear warheads, elements of the PRCís devices could be similar.

Acceleration of PRC Weapons Development

The PRCís theft of classified U.S. weapons design information saved the PRC years of effort and resources in developing its new generation of modern thermonuclear warheads. It provided the PRC with access to design information that worked and was within the PRCís ability to both develop and test. And it saved the PRC from making mistakes or from pursuing blind alleys.

The loss of design information from the Department of Energyís national weapons laboratories helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and successfully test its next generation of nuclear weapons designs. These warheads give the PRC small, modern thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to current U.S. warhead yields.

Assessing the extent to which design information losses accelerated the PRCís nuclear weapons development is complicated because so much is unknown. The full extent of U.S. information that the PRC acquired and the sophistication of the PRCís indigenous design capabilities are unclear. Moreover, there is the possibility of third country assistance to the PRCís nuclear weapons program, which could also assist the PRCís exploitation of the stolen U.S. nuclear weapons information. Nonetheless, it is patent that the PRC has stolen significant classified U.S. design information on our most modern thermonuclear warheads.

While it is sometimes argued that eventually the PRC might have been able to produce and test an advanced and modern thermonuclear weapon on its own, the PRC had conducted only 45 nuclear tests in the more than 30 years from 1964 to 1996 (when the PRC signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), which would have been insufficient for the PRC to have developed advanced thermonuclear warheads on its own. This compares to the approximately 1,030 tests by the United States, 715 tests by the Soviet Union, and 210 by France.3

The following illustrates the evolution of smaller U.S. warheads.4

Effect on PRC Nuclear Doctrine

Deploying new thermonuclear weapons provides the PRC with additional doctrinal and operational options for its strategic forces that, if exercised, would be troublesome for the United States.

Smaller, more efficient thermonuclear warheads would provide the PRC with the opportunity to develop and deploy a multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) should it decide to do so. These smaller designs would allow the use of lighter and faster reentry vehicles that may be better able to stress and to overcome ballistic missile defenses.

The PRC has expressed considerable opposition to U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

Other advantages of increased warhead yield-to-weight ratios include extended missile ranges and accuracy improvements. Smaller warheads result in a more compact missile payload, extending the range of ballistic missiles. This permits the use of smaller-diameter sea-launched ballistic missiles and mobile missiles to strike long-range targets. Longer range could enable PRC ballistic missile submarines to strike the U.S. from within PRC waters, where they can operate safely.

Multiple Warhead Development

The deployment of multiple warheads on a single missile requires smaller warheads that the PRC has not possessed.

The Select Committee has no information on whether the PRC currently intends to develop and deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle systems. However, the Select Committee is aware of reports that the PRC has undertaken efforts related to multiple warhead technology.

Experts believe that the PRC currently has the technical capability to develop and deploy silo-based ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) and multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Experts also agree that the PRC could develop and deploy its new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with MRVs or MIRVs within a short period of years after a decision to do so, and consistent with the presumed timeframe for its planned deployment of its next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles.