Wednesday 28 November 2007

China's nuclear capabilities

The recent annual report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission says, "Beijing continues to improve its older intercontinental ballistic missiles and seeks to field increasingly mobile, accurate and survivable and therefore more credible ICBMs ... China's newer longer-range [missile] systems will reach many areas of the world ... including virtually the entire continental United states."
Yet it seems that China has more to worry about than the United States, according to another recent report. It found, just like classic "missile gap" alarm of the Cold War, that the US military, intelligence agencies and conservative think-tanks and news organizations are exaggerating China's nuclear-weapons capability to justify developing a new generation of nuclear and conventional weapons.
And in a surrealistic act of mirror-imaging, the Chinese have been citing US weapons upgrades as a rationale for modernizing theirs, locking the two nations in a dangerous action-and-reaction competition reminiscent of the Cold War, according to a report issued on November 30 by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).
In a perverse way it actually makes sense. Ever since the crackup of the Soviet Union, various political and military figures have been desperately searching for rationales to justify hanging on to and modernizing the US nuclear arsenal.
Of course, the negligible size of China's nuclear forces has made that a hard sell. As the report notes right at the start, "The Chinese-US nuclear relationship is dramatically disproportionate in favor of the United States and will remain so for the foreseeable future."
Even the Pentagon's last annual "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" report notes that Beijing has consistently stated its adherence to a "no first use" nuclear doctrine, which is that China will never use nuclear weapons first against a nuclear-weapons state, nor will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state or nuclear-weapons-free zone.
It also noted that China currently deploys about 20 silo-based, liquid-fueled ICBMs, which constitute its primary means of holding continental US targets at risk. But according to the FAS-NRDC report, the United States has more than 830 missiles - most with multiple warheads - that can reach China. By 2015, when US intelligence projects that China will have 75 missiles primarily targeted against the United States, the US force will include 780 land- and sea-based missiles.
The report found that although the United States has maintained extensive nuclear-strike plans against Chinese targets for more than a half-century, China has never responded by building large nuclear forces of its own and is unlikely to do so in the future. As a result, Chinese nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively much inferior to their US counterparts.
China's total stockpile numbers about 200 warheads; the United States has nearly 10,000. By 2015, after China deploys a new generation of ballistic missiles and the US has completed its planned reductions, China may have some 220 warheads and the US more than 5,000.
The report's main finding is that the Pentagon and others routinely highlight specific incidents out of context that inaccurately portray a looming Chinese threat. Specifically, the report demonstrates that they have been embellishing China's submarine- and long-range-missile capabilities.
US intelligence agencies warn that the Chinese will be able to target 75-100 nuclear warheads at the continental United States by 2015. But that prediction assumes China will be able to deploy 40-55 new DF-31A missiles before 2015, in addition to two other shorter-range missiles. Given that the Chinese have yet to conduct test flights of the DF-31A, the report concluded that that assumption is highly questionable.
The Pentagon also has made much out of the fact that China's next-generation missiles will be mobile. But the majority of China's ballistic-missile force has always been mobile, the report points out, and the US military has targeted it as a routine matter since the 1980s. In fact, improved US targeting of Chinese missiles has played a significant role in prompting China to develop new long-range missiles.
As the report makes clear, the disparity between US and Chinese nuclear capabilities is so overwhelming as to make any talk about the Chinese threat farcical. For example: None of China's long-range nuclear forces are believed to be on alert; most US ballistic missiles are on high alert, ready to launch within minutes after receiving a launch order.
China's sole nuclear-ballistic-missile submarine has never gone on patrol. As a result, the crews of the new Jin-class subs currently under construction will need to start almost from scratch to develop the operational and tactical skills and procedures that are essential if a sea-based deterrent is to be militarily effective and matter strategically. China may be able to build two or three new missile subs over the next decade, but they would be highly vulnerable to anti-submarine forces; the US Navy has 14 missile-bearing subs and has moved the majority of them into the Pacific. China may have a small number of aircraft with a secondary nuclear capability, but they would be severely tested by US and allied air-defense systems or in air-to-air combat. The United States operates 72 long-range bombers assigned missions with nuclear gravity bombs and land-attack cruise missiles. China does not have nuclear-armed cruise missiles, although US intelligence suspects it might develop such a capability in the future. The United States has more than 1,000 nuclear cruise missiles for delivery by aircraft and attack submarines.
Another relevant aspect of the report, especially in light of recent US experience with Iraq, details how badly US intelligence has misjudged Chinese nuclear capabilities. The report found that estimates about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal were grossly overstated, sometimes by several hundred percent, and timelines for when new systems would come on line were almost always much too optimistic.
The reasons for these misjudgments include China's ability to keep its capabilities hidden, a tendency among some intelligence analysts to overstate their conclusions, and the Pentagon's general inclination to assume the worst. This predisposition to exaggerate the Chinese threat unfortunately remains evident today.
The sad irony is that both countries point to what the other is doing as a justification to modernize. The report notes that China is about to deploy three new long-range ballistic missiles that the US says were developed in response to its own deployment of more accurate Trident sea-launched ballistic missiles in the early 1980s.Meanwhile, the US has increased its capability to target Chinese mobile missiles, and the Pentagon is arguing that the long-term outlook for China's long-range ballistic-missile force requires increased targeting of Chinese forces.

Sunday 25 November 2007

China's Attitude Toward Nuclear Deterrence

China's official position on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons generally, is that it stands for total nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China has often criticized the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first. China has been particularly critical of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, or so-called "nuclear umbrellas," provided by the other nuclear weapon states (particularly the United States) to their allies. China is also officially opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories, and has stated that China has never deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of another country. China has also been especially critical of using nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear weapon states, and has repeatedly called on the nuclear weapon states to agree to a legally-binding, multilateral agreement under which they would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (negative security assurances). Despite Beijing's affirmations of its no-first-use policy, many foreign analysts question the credibility of China's nuclear doctrine.
Chinese statements regarding nuclear deterrence:
At a briefing on missile defense, Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:

"We are against NMD, not because we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. We just hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. As is known to all, Chinese nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers. Yet, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects of China's national security."For the first time since 1995, the China's National Defense White Paper stated that Chinese nuclear forces are intended for deterrence. Unlike the 1998 White Paper, the 2000 White Paper did not make reference to the deterrence policies in other countries.
China maintains a small but effective nuclear counterattacking force in order to deter possible nuclear attacks by other countries.

In july China issued a White Paper called China's National Defense. It stated:
China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. At the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1996 China clearly put forward a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament: 1. The major nuclear powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles; 2. All nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally binding international document as soon as possible; 3. all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their borders should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon states should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations; 4. no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or missile defense systems, which harm strategic security and stability; 5. all states should negotiate and conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."
"China has always opposed the policy of nuclear deterrence and has long committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-free countries and regions . . . [China has] invariably urged nuclear states to conclude a peace agreement on the mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." ["China Manufactures Nuclear Weapons for Self-Defense - Embassy."
Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
Though the Cold War has already come to an end, some countries are still adhering to the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons the nuclear-weapon states concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence .
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

"The major nuclear powers should renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence".
The official Chinese newspaper People's Daily stated that "Some nuclear powers stubbornly uphold policies of nuclear deterrence based on first use of nuclear weapons."
After its 45th nuclear test, China stated that "Major nuclear weapon states should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence".
Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
"In the post-cold war era of today, it is obviously anachronistic to continue with the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first-use of nuclear weapons and thus subjecting other countries to nuclear threat."
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:China does not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence and the nuclear weapons developed by China are solely for self-defense, never meant to pose against or threaten any specific country.The Chinese Foreign Ministry issue a statement calling for the "other nuclear-weapon States to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and commit themselves explicitly to the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons."
A Future Shift in China's Deterrence Strategy?

Although official Chinese policy has not changed, many China analysts are beginning to question chinas long-term commitment to its policies of no-first-use and minimum deterrence. Pointing to alleged incongruities between Chinese nuclear modernization and its traditional policies, scholars have conducted interviews with Chinese officials to learn more about the debate within the government and the prospects for a future change in official Chinese policy. According to some foreign analysts, American military superiority, ballistic missile defense systems, instability on Chinas borders, and a desire to increase the credibility of its deterrent have all prompted China to this reevaluate its current policy.
Alistair Iain Johnston explores the three theories Western scholars have used to explain how China views its nuclear weapons. First, scholars often argue that China maintains a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence and aspires only to possess the capabilities necessary to maintain a credible deterrence. Second, some analysts argue that many Chinese officials have never genuinely accepted minimum deterrence, but instead lean toward some form of limited war-fighting or flexible response. Third, other scholars point to the effect of Chinese culture on its strategic policy, particularly its minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility, and patience, and the resulting Chinas nuclear policies.
China's Attitude Toward Nuclear Deterrence

China's official position on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons generally, is that it stands for total nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China has often criticized the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first. China has been particularly critical of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, or so-called "nuclear umbrellas," provided by the other nuclear weapon states (particularly the United States) to their allies. China is also officially opposed to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories, and has stated that China has never deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of another country. China has also been especially critical of using nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear weapon states, and has repeatedly called on the nuclear weapon states to agree to a legally-binding, multilateral agreement under which they would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (negative security assurances). Despite Beijing's affirmations of its no-first-use policy, many foreign analysts question the credibility of China's nuclear doctrine.

Chinese statements regarding nuclear deterrence:

March 2001: At a briefing on missile defense, Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:

"We are against NMD, not because we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. We just hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. As is known to all, China’s nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers. Yet, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects of China's national security."

For the first time since 1995, the China's National Defense White Paper stated that Chinese nuclear forces are intended for deterrence. Unlike the 1998 White Paper, the 2000 White Paper did not make reference to the deterrence policies in other countries:China maintains a small but effective nuclear counterattacking force in order to deter possible nuclear attacks by other countries
China issued a White Paper called China's National Defense. It stated:

China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. At the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1996 China clearly put forward a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament: 1. The major nuclear powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles; 2. All nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally binding international document as soon as possible; 3. all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their borders should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon states should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations; 4. no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or missile defense systems, which harm strategic security and stability; 5. all states should negotiate and conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."
The Press Service of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow stated:

"China has always opposed the policy of nuclear deterrence and has long committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-free countries and regions . . . [China has] invariably urged nuclear states to conclude a peace agreement on the mutual commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons." ["China Manufactures Nuclear Weapons for Self-Defense - Embassy,"
Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
Though the Cold War has already come to an end, some countries are still adhering to the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons…the nuclear-weapon states concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence”. [Statement by H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:The major nuclear powers should renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence". [Statement by Qian Qichen at the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.]
The official Chinese newspaper People's Daily stated that "Some nuclear powers stubbornly uphold policies of nuclear deterrence based on first use of nuclear weapons." ["Nuclear Pact Will Be A Step To Disarmament--China,]After its 45th nuclear test, China stated that "Major nuclear weapon states should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence".
Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:
"In the post-cold war era of today, it is obviously anachronistic to continue with the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first-use of nuclear weapons and thus subjecting other countries to nuclear threat."
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:China does not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence and the nuclear weapons developed by China are solely for self-defense, never meant to pose against or threaten any specific country.” [Statement By H.E. Qian Qichen, Vice Premier And Foreign Minister And Head Of Delegation Of The People's Republic Of China At The 1995 Review And Extension Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry issue a statement calling for the "other nuclear-weapon States to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and commit themselves explicitly to the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons."
A Future Shift in China's Deterrence Strategy?

Although official Chinese policy has not changed, many China analysts are beginning to question chinas long-term commitment to its policies of no-first-use and minimum deterrence. Pointing to alleged incongruities between Chinese nuclear modernization and its traditional policies, scholars have conducted interviews with Chinese officials to learn more about the debate within the government and the prospects for a future change in official Chinese policy. According to some foreign analysts, American military superiority, ballistic missile defense systems, instability on Chinas borders, and a desire to increase the credibility of its deterrent have all prompted China to this reevaluate its current policy.

Alistair Iain Johnston explores the three theories Western scholars have used to explain how China views its nuclear weapons. First, scholars often argue that China maintains a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence and aspires only to possess the capabilities necessary to maintain a credible deterrence. Second, some analysts argue that many Chinese officials have never genuinely accepted minimum deterrence, but instead lean toward some form of limited war-fighting or flexible response. Third, other scholars point to the effect of Chinese culture on its strategic policy, particularly its minimalism, ambiguity, flexibility, and patience, and the resulting Chinas nuclear policies. Johnston argues that China's nuclear modernization program may be geared toward developing the capacity to move from a minimum deterrence to a limited deterrence nuclear strategy, and notes that Chinese strategists are increasingly willing to distinguish between the two approaches. "Limited deterrence" entails the capability to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities, which would require expanded deployments. However, such a limited deterrence capability may still be a long way off. According to Johnston, "It is fairly safe to say that Chinese capabilities come nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited deterrence." He further explains that, according to his research, number of Chinese strategists now explicitly reject minimum deterrence as a viable option for China as the doctrine reduces Chinas deterrence, increases the countrys vulnerability to attack, and offers no means to control an arms race.
Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes agree, noting that, Over the past decade, certain indicators suggest that these long-held aspects of Chinese nuclear weapons doctrine may be undergoing some reconsideration. They suggest that, behind the scenes, Chinese officials are currently engaged in a serious debate regarding the future of Chinas military. The authors suggest that some Chinese military planners advocate a shift to limited deterrence, including introduction of limited war-fighting capabilities, improved command and control and early warning systems, smaller, survivable, mobile, more accurate and diverse cruise and ballistic missile nuclear delivery systems, possible abandonment of the NFU policy, missile defenses, and the addition of counterforce targets. Paul Godwin adds, Minimum deterrence, which uses a single countervalue punitive strike on cities to deter, is seen by many Chinese strategists as passive and incompatible with what they see as a future requirement for more flexible nuclear responses.
Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes also consider the domestic political situation surrounding Chinas strategic policy and discuss its potential effect on a future change in Chinese policy:
¦From a strictly doctrinal perspective, it is likely that such a shift must await shifts in the domestic political hierarchy and its view of the outside world, factors which have consistently driven Chinese doctrinal choices. Moreover¦ technical constraints will remain one of the foremost drivers determining the direction of doctrine in the near-term. Rather than force a stark analytical choice between either a doctrine of minimal deterrence or one of limited deterrence, it makes more sense to draw out two important nuances to better understand this debate. First is to recognize the differences between operational doctrine and what we might call aspirational doctrine in the Chinese context. Second is to recognize that the Second Artillery “ which oversees strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional missiles more likely operates on three levels of doctrine: credible minimal deterrence with regard to the continental United States and Russia; limited deterrence with regard to Chinas theater nuclear forces; and an offensively-configured, preemptive, counterforce warfighting posture of active defense or offensive defense for the Second Artillerys conventional missile forces.

Tuesday 20 November 2007

THE LASTMINUTE FOR DOOMSDAY CLOCK

over the past six years, the Bush administration has spent almost $100 million on a highly

classified program to help Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, secure his country’s

nuclear weapons, according to current and former senior administration officials.But with the

future of that country’s leadership in doubt, debate is intensifying about whether Washington has

done enough to help protect the warheads and laboratories, and whether Pakistan’s reluctance to

reveal critical details about its arsenal has undercut the effectiveness of the continuing

security effort.

The aid, buried in secret portions of the federal budget, paid for the training of Pakistani

personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear security training center in

Pakistan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near completion, even though it was

supposed to be in operation this year.
A raft of equipment — from helicopters to night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment —

was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories

that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age.

While American officials say that they believe the arsenal is safe at the moment, and that they

take at face value Pakistani assurances that security is vastly improved, in many cases the

Pakistani government has been reluctant to show American officials how or where the gear is

actually used.
That is because the Pakistanis do not want to reveal the locations of their weapons or the amount

or type of new bomb-grade fuel the country is now producing.

The American program was created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the Bush administration

debated whether to share with Pakistan one of the crown jewels of American nuclear protection

technology, known as “permissive action links,” or PALS, a system used to keep a weapon from

detonating without proper codes and authorizations.
In the end, despite past federal aid to France and Russia on delicate points of nuclear security,

the administration decided that it could not share the system with the Pakistanis because of

legal restrictions.

In addition, the Pakistanis were suspicious that any American-made technology in their warheads

could include a secret “kill switch,” enabling the Americans to turn off their weapons.

While many nuclear experts in the federal government favored offering the PALS system because

they considered Pakistan’s arsenal among the world’s most vulnerable to terrorist groups, some

administration officials feared that sharing the technology would teach Pakistan too much about

American weaponry. The same concern kept the Clinton administration from sharing the technology

with China in the early 1990s.
American officials and nuclear experts, some of whom were concerned that Pakistan’s arsenal

remained vulnerable.

Since then, some elements of the program have been discussed in the Pakistani news media and in a

presentation late last year by the leader of Pakistan’s nuclear safety effort, Lt. Gen. Khalid

Kidwai, who acknowledged receiving “international” help as he sought to assure Washington that

all of the holes in Pakistan’s nuclear security infrastructure had been sealed.

In recent days, American officials have expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is

well secured. “I don’t see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in

jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, told a Pentagon news conference on Thursday.
Admiral Mullen’s carefully chosen words, a senior administration official said, were based on two
separate intelligence assessments issued this month that had been summarized in briefings to Mr.Bush. Both concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was safe under current conditions, and onealso looked at laboratories and came to the same conclusion.
The secret program was designed by the Energy Department and the State Department, and it drewheavily from the effort over the past decade to secure nuclear weapons, stockpiles and materials

in Russia and other former Soviet states. Much of the money for Pakistan was spent on physical

security, like fencing and surveillance systems, and equipment for tracking nuclear material if

it left secure areas.
Still, the Pakistani government’s reluctance to provide access has limited efforts to assess the
situation. In particular, some American experts say they have less ability to look into the
nuclear laboratories where highly enriched uranium is produced — including the laboratory namedfor Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man who sold Pakistan’s nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea andLibya.
while Pakistan is formally considered a “major non-NATO ally,” the program has been hindered
by a deep suspicion among Pakistan’s military that the secret goal of the United States was to
gather intelligence about how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistan’s arsenal, which is

the pride of the country.



 

Sunday 18 November 2007

What's behind increase in the military budget of China

At the Fifth Session of the 10th National People's Congress, it was announced that the country's military budget for 2007 is 350.92 billion yuan, or roughly US$44.94 billion. This marks a 17.8 per cent increase over the previous year, or $6.8 billion.The increase has drawn wide attention from the international community. Many express misgivings out of shear misunderstanding. But some look at the increase through stained lenses or stretch the matter to suit their own ends. Others try to use the growth in China's military spending to create a propaganda splash.

A famous Chinese saying goes: "Seeking truth after facts." There is a similar saying in the West: "Facts speak louder than words." These two sayings apply to evaluating China's military spending increase.

I would like to offer my point of view in the hope of clearing away misunderstanding.

First comes the question: Why the increase by the unprecedented wide margin of 17.8 percent?

The growth is primarily caused by the sharp increase in the wages, living expenses and pensions of 2.3 million People's Liberation Army officers, civilian personnel, soldiers and army retirees. The pay rise came in the latter half of 2006.

Large numbers of officers from battalion level down and non-commissioned officers received the sharpest pay rise 100 percent.

These people constitute the backbone of the military forces, directly involved in leading soldiers in military duties, training programs and logistical activities. On the personal side, they are the primary source of income for their families. Over a long period of time, their wages have remained very modest.

In view of all this, it is imperative to raise their pay by large margins.

The pay of the officers from the regimental level up, civilian personnel and army retirees has also been increased by 80 percent.

At the same time, all rank-and-file soldiers' living allowances and board expenses have also been increased.

The composition of the Chinese military expenditure is roughly the same as that of the United States. Wages, housing and services take up almost one-third of the total spending.

Take 2006. These categories of expenditure stood at $12 billion, within the total $38.1 billion. Of this $12 billion, $8 billion went to wages, living costs and pensions.

With the rise in these budget by an average of 60 percent in 2007, the total increase in these categories reaches $4.8 billion. This accounts for the lion's share in the growth of 2007's total military spending.

Of course, spending on hardware research and development and weapons procurement has also increased. And the money spent on training and exercises and on maintaining military activities has risen, too. But this kind of spending growth pales beside the increase in personnel expenditures.

It is unlikely that military personnel wages will go up by large margins every year. So, the possibility is extremely low that the country's military spending will increase dramatically in the coming years.

There is another question: Does China's military expenditure outstrip its actual needs now that the 2007 Chinese military budget has surpassed Japan's $42 billion and Germany's $37.5? It still trails Britain's $62.38 billion and France's US$50.78 billion. It is a fraction of the United States' $532.8 billion,

China's military spending falls far behind that of many other countries, whether in terms of actual amount, military personnel per capita expenditure, or the general population per capita military spending.

The country's military budget ranks fourth among the world countries and its GDP also stands fourth in the world. Coincidence? Maybe. I think the two No 4 positions are logically connected to each other.

China is a big country. The military is, therefore, obligated with overwhelmingly heavy tasks in defending the country. To compound this, the country is threatened by separatism, terrorism and hegemonism. In view of all this, China's sizable military spending is totally justified.

My latest research shows that a country would find it hard to achieve military modernization when military personnel per capita spending remains below $100,000.

The US military's per capita budget in 2007, for instance, is $383,000, the highest in the world. Next comes Britain ($324,000), followed by Japan ($175,000), Germany ($148,000) and France ($146,000).

In contrast, China's per capita spending on its soldiers is only US$19,540. The country has set a rather moderately paced timetable by today's international standards to modernize its military forces. Extending to 2050, it covers three stages: from 2006 to 2010, from 2010 to 2020, and from 2020 to 2050.

It is predicted that, during these three phases of military modernization, China's military budget will increase moderately each year to keep up with the country's economic development and its defense needs. This is aimed at closing the wide military strength gaps between the country and the world's military powers.

Does China's military expenditure outstrip its actual defense needs? Facts constitute the best gauge.

Western military analysts are very clear that Chinese fleets, air force, ground troops and strategic rocket forces are on a secondary tier with the world's leading military powers in terms of quality and quantity of its core battle equipment.

The basic facts and stark reality determine that it is impossible for China to enter an arms race with the world's military powers. Most important of all, China's State strategy and military strategy are geared to peaceful development and active defense.

The ultimate goal is to build a harmonious society inside the country and a world in harmony outside. So the country needs no military expansion or a strategy designed for military interference overseas. China has no military bases overseas and the country has never launched pre-emptive attacks against others.

By all measures, Chinese military expenditure is still very humble.

Thursday 15 November 2007

China's National Defense Preface issued by the Information Office of the State Council People's Republic of China part 3

Military Legal System

During the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the Standing Committee of the NPC, the State Council and

the CMC, exercising their prescribed functions and powers, formulated and revised 99 military

laws and regulations. The general headquarters/departments, military area commands, Navy, Air

Force and Second Artillery Force formulated and revised nearly 900 military rules and

regulations. In 2006, the CMC began to implement its law-making program for the Eleventh

Five-Year Plan period. In a period of five years, a military legal system will take shape which

covers multiple aspects, and is coherent, scientific, closely knit and well-designed.

As military courts exercise the function of civil trial within the military, military

procuratorates have begun to conduct civil prosecution on a trial basis and supervise civil

trials in the military in accordance with the law. In line with the regulations on the people's

supervisory system practiced by civil procuratorates, military procuratorates have started to

introduce, on a trial basis, a system of servicemen's supervisors to strengthen supervision over

investigation of misconduct on duty. In conformity with the requirements of the state's

procedural law, a new servicemen's jury system has been established, which specifies the

selection of jury members and the procedure for the performance of their duties. In keeping with

the state's judicial system, the PLA has instituted a specialized rank system for military judges

and procurators which consists of 11 grades at three levels. This has enhanced the professional

performance of the military judicial personnel.

In recent years, based on the experience gained from appointing military lawyers at the three

levels of combined corps, division and brigade in the Army, units at and above the brigade level

in the Second Artillery Force have also started to be staffed with military lawyers. The General

Armaments Department and the Navy have set up professional legal advisory offices concerning

national defense patents and maritime issues. Military lawyers have played an active role in

providing support to commanding officers and organs in decision-making, defending defendants in

criminal trials, and undertaking civil cases to protect the legitimate rights and interests of

military units and personnel.

Military Institutional Education

Under the unified leadership of the CMC, the PLA institutional education is managed at two

levels: by the general headquarters/departments and by the military area commands (Navy, Air

Force or Second Artillery Force). The four general headquarters/departments provide overall

guidance for all PLA educational institutions, and the General Staff Headquarters administers

military education. The development goal of military educational institutions is to establish and

improve a new school system with distinct military features to shift priority from education of

officer candidates for academic credentials to pre-assignment education. The new system takes

pre-assignment educational institutions as the main form, and makes a distinction between these

two types of education. The PLA has 67 military educational institutions, which are divided into

two types: those for academic credentials and those for pre-assignment education. The former

offers undergraduate education for pre-commission officers and graduate education for officers.

The latter consists of elementary, intermediate and advanced level institutions and NCO schools,

and offers pre-assignment training and rotational training for active-duty officers and NCOs.

Some pre-assignment educational institutions also offer graduate courses in military science. At

the same time, 112 regular institutions of higher learning in China undertake the task of

training defense students, thus gradually increasing the number of military officers trained in

civilian educational institutions.

The PLA endeavors to improve the overall performance of military educational institutions through

focused and coordinated development. It has launched a project for establishing key military

colleges and schools in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. It continues to focus efforts on

building a number of institutions and research centers for disciplines and specialties that are

important in building an informationized military and winning informationized wars. A new round

of reform in teaching is underway to improve the training target models for officers in different

fields and at different levels, and to develop new programs and curricula for the training of

military personnel. The PLA is also improving the information network for military training, and

has built more virtual laboratories, digital libraries and digital campuses to provide distance

learning and online teaching and training. In graduate education, the focus is shifted from

academic-oriented to practice-oriented, from emphasis on quantity to emphasis on quality, and

from a relatively closed-door approach to a more open and diversified approach. The PLA now has

41 educational institutions authorized to award doctor's degrees and 60 to award master's

degrees.

Management System of Military Cadres

In 2005, the PLA began to reform the evaluation, selection and appointment system for military

cadres, and to institute a system to evaluate commanding officers. It conducts both evaluation

and examination in selecting leading officers at the level of deputy regimental commanders for

combat troops. It has improved the regulations on reserve cadres, and works to establish a

long-term mechanism to select and train outstanding young cadres. In March 2006, with the

approval of the CMC, the four general headquarters/departments jointly promulgated the Provisions

of the PLA on Rewarding Technical Experts, which gives awards and allowances to military

technical experts.

In June 2005, the State Council and the CMC promulgated the Regulations of the PLA on Contract

Civilians, deciding to introduce a system of employing contract civilians to fill some support

posts in the military, so that active-duty officers, who are limited in number, mainly take up

command and combat posts. The regulations contain specific provisions on the nature and status of

contract civilians, the procedures of their employment, and the coordination of the civil and

military authorities' relevant policies. In 2006, the PLA started the employment of contract

civilians.

Officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work are resettled in one of the

following two ways: state-planned job assignment, and finding jobs by themselves. The State

Council has an office for overseeing the nationwide resettlement of such officers. The provinces

(autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government) have corresponding

offices for resettling such officers in their respective administrative areas. The General

Political Department is in charge of PLA-wide transfer of officers and non-commissioned officers

to civilian work, and Party committees and political organs at and above the regiment level are

responsible for transferring officers to civilian work in their own units. The provincial

military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are responsible for turning over PLA

officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work in their respective

provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government. In 2005,

the state and the PLA began to deepen the reform and adjustment of the policies on resettling

officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work.

Supporting the Government and Loving the People

The PLA attaches great importance to mass work, taking supporting the government and loving the

people as its major thrust. The political organs of the four general headquarters/departments and

the military area commands, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force all have offices for

mass work. The political organs of corps, divisions (brigades) and regiments also have special

officers in charge of such work. These offices and officers are responsible for maintaining

contacts and coordination with governments at all levels. Education in supporting the government

and loving the people is conducted PLA-wide. The PLA participates in national economic

development, emergency rescue and disaster relief, and public welfare activities.

In the past two years, the engineering troops of the Army, Navy and Air Force have taken part in

more than 430 key construction projects for transportation, hydropower, communication and energy

infrastructure. The PLA has assisted in building new socialist villages in the countryside, and

provided regular assistance to poor farmers in more than 19,000 villages. It has helped build

over 48,000 small public projects such as water-saving irrigation projects, drinking water

projects for both people and livestock, roads, and hydropower projects, bringing immediate

benefits to nearly 800,000 people. In addition, it has helped build or enlarge 211 primary and

secondary schools, enabling 142,000 school dropouts to return to class. PLA troops stationed in

China's western region have taken part in such ecological engineering projects as the

construction of shelterbelts and the improvement of small drainage areas. They have planted 210

million trees and sown grass on more than 13 million sq m of land. PLA hospitals have established

regular assistance relations with more than 400 county or township hospitals in the western

region. They have helped train key members of the medical staff, made rounds of visits offering

free medical consultation and treatment, and donated medical equipment and medicine. The PLA and

PAPF have dispatched over 340,000 troops to take part in more than 2,800 emergency rescue and

disaster-relief operations, involving more than 40,000 vehicles, flown more than 2,000 sorties

(including the use of helicopters), evacuated over 3.4 million people and prevented economic

losses of several billion yuan. At the end of 2006, the PLA donated 230 million yuan and over

930,000 cotton-padded clothes and quilts to disaster- and poverty-stricken areas.

In June 2005, the State Council and the CMC promulgated the Regulations on Participation of the

PLA in Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief, prescribing the PLA's main tasks, coordination with

local people's governments, limits of authority and procedures for employing troops, joint

command with local authorities, preparations and readiness, financial and material support, etc.,

for such operations.

V. People's Armed Police Force

The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) is charged with the fundamental task of safeguarding

national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live and work in

peace and contentment. It strives to make itself a powerful, disciplined and politically reliable

force.

Structure and Organization

As a component of China's armed forces and subordinate to the State Council, the PAPF is under

the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The State Council exercises leadership over

the PAPF through relevant functional departments, assigns routine tasks to it, decides its size

and number of organizations, and is responsible for its command, operations, and financial and

material support. The PAPF has an independent budgetary status in the financial expenditure of

the state. The CMC is responsible for the PAPF's organizational structure, management of

officers, command, training and political work. It exercises leadership over the PAPF through the

four general headquarters/departments. In terms of conducting public security operations and

relevant capability building, the PAPF General Headquarters is under the leadership and command

of the Ministry of Public Security, and the PAPF units at and below the contingent level are

under the leadership and command of the public security organs at the same level. The PAPF has a

total force of 660,000.

The PAPF consists mainly of the internal security force and forces guarding gold mines, forests,

water and electricity supply, and communications. The border security, firefighting and security

guard forces are also components of the PAPF. The PAPF General Headquarters is the leading and

commanding organ that directs and administers the internal security force and forces guarding

gold mine, forest, water and electricity, and communications, etc., and provides guidance to

other forces subordinate to the PAPF. Under it are the headquarters, political department and

logistics department. The PAPF has one commander-in-chief, one first political commissar (assumed

concurrently by the Minister of Public Security), one political commissar, and several deputy

commanders-in-chief and deputy political commissars. The PAPF internal security force is composed

of contingents at the level of the province (autonomous region or municipality directly under the

central government) and armed police divisions. Contingents, detachments and squadrons are

instituted at the province, prefecture, and county levels, respectively. The armed police

divisions have regiments, battalions and companies in battle order, which are stationed in a

number of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government.

The forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have

their own headquarters, which function as their leading and commanding organs. The PAPF General

Headquarters has an educational institution directly under it. The contingent headquarters and

the headquarters of the forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and

communications have elementary command colleges under them.

Basic Tasks

In peacetime, the PAPF is tasked to perform guard duties, handle emergencies, combat terrorism,

and participate in and support national economic development. In wartime, it assists the PLA in

defensive operations.

Every day, more than 260,000 PAPF servicemen are on guard duty. Through the combined use of

manpower, facilities and technologies, the PAPF has effectively enhanced the efficiency of guard

duties and security in recent years. The PAPF annually handles an average of over 100 cases of

attempted attacks against guarded targets and escape attempts by detained suspects and imprisoned

criminals, organizes thousands of important temporary duties, and ensures the security of

important international and national conferences and large-scale events, in cooperation with the

government departments concerned. Adhering to the guidelines and principles for handling

emergencies, and using proper methods and tactics, the PAPF effectively safeguards the

fundamental interests of the people, social stability and the dignity of the law. The PAPF

anti-terrorism units closely follow the state's anti-terrorism guidelines and principles, and

enhance their combat-readiness training. They have been involved in the successful handling of

cases of bombing attempts and kidnapping incidents. The various units of the PAPF take an active

part in efforts to keep local order, and assist the public security departments in catching and

arresting criminal suspects and cracking down on organized criminal gangs.

The PAPF gold mine force has completed 38 geological prospecting projects in a dozen provinces

and autonomous regions, and found some rich gold deposits. In the last two years, the PAPF forest

force has put out 552 forest or prairie fires, protecting valuable natural resources. The PAPF

water and electricity force has taken part in the construction of 21 key national projects,

including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the West-East Natural Gas Transmission Project, the

South-North Water Diversion Project, and major hydropower projects. The PAPF communications force

is responsible for the maintenance of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway and the Sichuan-Tibet Highway,

and has undertaken the construction of national high-grade highways, extra-long tunnels and

bridges. Those projects built by the PAPF communications force are all up to standards. In the

past two years, 224,000 PAPF troops have participated in 2,320 emergency rescue and disaster

relief operations, and rescued and evacuated 250,000 people in disaster-stricken areas.

Force Building

The PAPF is working to strengthen itself through science and technology. It is enhancing staff

competence, and conducting strict management so that its personnel can fully perform their

duties. Using the national information infrastructure, the PAPF has established a preliminary

system of three-level integrated information networks, linking general headquarters with the

grass-roots squadrons. It has made progress in real-time command and control, management of

duties through visual means, networked education and training, and office automation. The PAPF

possesses a basically complete range of equipment through R&D and procurement of urgently needed

weaponry and equipment. It has set up and improved a distinctive mechanism for the selection,

training and employment of officers and NCOs. In particular, priority is given to the training of

inter-disciplinary personnel. The PAPF conducts mission-oriented training on a priority basis to

better perform guard duties, manage emergencies and combat terrorism. It participated in China's

"Great Wall-2003" and "Great Wall II" anti-terrorism exercises, and the SCO's "Joint-2003"

exercise, and sponsored the "Guard-04" and "Guard-06" exercises to deal with large-scale

emergencies. The PAPF runs its forces strictly and pursuant to the law. It stresses that leaders

make decisions, administrative organs conduct management, and officers and men perform their

duties strictly in accordance with the law. As a result, its overall performance has been greatly

boosted.

The PAPF is steadily improving its logistical support system based on self-support and

supplemented by social and PLA support to raise the efficiency of integrated support. It runs a

crisis response support system covering the three echelons of the general headquarters,

contingents (divisions) and detachments (regiments), to better respond to emergencies, and

unexpected and complex situations. It promotes standardized and institutional logistical

management by exploitation of IT and uniformly standardizes its facility configurations, work

procedures, operating mechanisms and management requirements. The PAPF is pursuing reforms in

housing, procurement of bulk materials and project procurement, medical care, and outsources

food, barracks and bedding and clothing services.

In recent years, the PAPF has conducted friendly exchanges with the armed police forces, military

police, internal security forces, public security forces and other similar forces of more than 30

countries to draw on each other's practices and cooperate in conducting anti-terrorism training.

Its medical personnel, as part of Chinese rescue teams, have participated in disaster-relief

missions in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the tsunami in

the Indian Ocean.

VI. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force

China, responding to new developments in modern warfare and the needs of national security, is

reinforcing national defense mobilization and reserve force building to enhance its capabilities

of rapid mobilization, sustained support, comprehensive protection and swift shift from a

peacetime to wartime footing.

Mobilization of the Armed Forces

China's mobilization of the armed forces includes the mobilization of manpower, weaponry and

equipment, as well as logistical materials. The main tasks of the PLA's mobilization are as

follows: to formulate plans for wartime troop mobilization and support according to operational

plans, carry out pre-regimentation of reservists into active units and organization of reserve

units, and expand and form units according to wartime structure and organization upon the state's

issuance of a mobilization order. The main tasks of the PAPF's mobilization are to formulate

mobilization and support plans based on the PAPF's possible wartime tasks, carry out

pre-regimentation of reservists and adjustment, expansion and reorganization of units, and adjust

the organizational system or form or expand units according to designated tasks after the state

issues a mobilization order. The main tasks of the militia's mobilization are to call up

militiamen, adjust and reinforce organizations, issue weapons and equipment, carry out pre-war

training, and provide support in accordance with the needs of wartime manpower mobilization and

plans for participating in warfare and supporting the front.

Acting on the directives of the State Council and the CMC, the General Staff Headquarters

organizes and conducts mobilization of the armed forces with the assistance of the General

Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department as well as

the relevant government departments. The Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force are

responsible for the mobilization of their respective forces. The military area commands,

provincial military commands and local Party committees and governments at different levels are

responsible for the mobilization of reserve forces within their respective jurisdictions.

By maintaining a lean standing army, improving the reserve service system, setting up reserve

units, designating manpower replenishment areas, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and

organizing civil-military mobilization rehearsals, China has ensured the smooth mobilization of

the armed forces, enabling the latter to deter or defuse security crises with even a downsized

standing force. In recent years, China has accelerated the adjustment and reform of the

organization and structure of the militia and the reserve forces and increased the number of

reservists with high-tech backgrounds, and strengthened the reserve forces of the Navy, Air Force

and Second Artillery Force. As a result, the level of the general quality of the backup forces of

national defense has been raised notably.

Mobilization of the National Economy

The basic policies for the mobilization of the national economy are:

· To boost economic mobilization based on China's development strategy and its economic

strength, and incorporate the development of the defense economy into that of the national ec

onomy;

· To make economic mobilization a bridge between China's economic development and available

national defense capacities, and strike a balance between military and civilian needs and between

peacetime and wartime needs in economic restructuring, to keep the national defense economy at a

proper level in peacetime;

· To speed up the development and application of new and high technologies and dual-purpose

technologies, and give priority to the mobilization of high-tech products and the reserves of

high technology, to raise the overall scientific and technological level of economic

mobilization;

· To build an organizational structure, mechanism and legal system of economic mobilization in

keeping with the socialist market economy for dealing with both wars and emergencies in

accordance with the assigned functions of economic mobilization, to serve economic development in

peacetime and respond rapidly in cases of emergency or war; and

· To pursue the principle of self-defense by the whole nation and improve the capacity of

economic mobilization to meet the needs of defensive operations under conditions of

informationization.

The primary objective is to establish a complete economic mobilization system with the dual

functions of responding to both wars and emergencies, and to set up an economic mobilization base

that is an integral part of China's economy to meet the economic needs of local wars and

unexpected incidents.

With the rapid growth of China's economy, the capacity of its economic mobilization has been

steadily raised. In building information and communications systems, highways, railways, bridges,

tunnels, airports, ports, docks and major urban infrastructures, China pays close attention to

the requirements of national defense, and ensures that peacetime needs and wartime needs are

properly balanced. In working to set up a mechanism of economic mobilization for responding to

both wars and emergencies, China has set up a system of plans for economic mobilization that

takes both peacetime and wartime needs into consideration. It has established economic

mobilization centers in the machine-building, weaponry, aviation, space, shipbuilding and

chemical industries, and has optimized the mobilization structure and layout. It has basically

completed a survey on the potential of economic mobilization and set up an information system for

economic mobilization management by the state and a number of provinces and municipalities

directly under the central government. As a component of the national emergency response force,

economic mobilization offices at different levels have established a mechanism for contacts

between economic mobilization offices and emergency reaction management offices to provide

support for handling public emergencies and ensure public security.

Civil Air Defense

Civil air defense (CAD), air defense of critical areas and field air defense constitute China's

homeland defense structure. The tasks of the CAD in the new era are to protect the people and

their property and China's economic development in wartime, and carry out disaster prevention and

relief and handle public unexpected incidents in peacetime. The CAD expenses are born by the

state and the public. The state has promulgated the Civil Air Defense Law, and the people's

governments at various levels have formulated and improved corresponding CAD rules and

regulations. CAD work is incorporated into plans for economic and social development by the

people's governments at and above the county level.

China's CAD capabilities in preparations against war, integrated urban protection and public

unexpected incident response have been greatly enhanced in recent years. Interconnected and

interoperable communications networks for command and warning at the provincial, city and county

levels have been basically established, and urban air defense early-warning networks have been

improved. Over 85 percent of areas in major cities are covered by air-defense sirens. Most of the

key CAD cities have CAD command posts. All large and medium-sized cities have protection and

rescue contingents for emergency rescue, rush repair, medical aid, fire fighting, maintenance of

order, chemical defense, epidemic prevention, communications and transportation. Short-term and

full-time training courses are conducted, and emergency rescue drills for handling disasters are

organized to help the public acquire CAD knowledge and skills. CAD courses are included in school

teaching programs and curricula. Volunteer CAD teams have been formed in some factories, mines,

enterprises and communities.

Militia Force Building

China's militia is under the unified direction of the State Council and the CMC, and the dual

leadership of local Party committees and governments as well as the military commands. The

concept of people's war, and the principle of combining regular work with military training and

combining peacetime needs with wartime needs are observed in the building of the militia.

The focus of the militia work is being shifted from rural areas to cities and areas along

communication lines. The setting up of militia forces has expanded from state-owned enterprises

to private enterprises and from traditional industries to high-tech industries. Specialized

technical units rather than infantry are becoming the backbone of the militia. The proportion of

antiaircraft artillery, ground artillery, missile, communications, engineering, anti-chemical,

reconnaissance, information and other specialized technical units in the overall militia force is

being raised. The building of militia units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force is

being strengthened. A new organizational structure of the militia has taken shape, with

specialized technical units and units with corresponding specialties serving as the main body,

and air defense units, units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and emergency

response units playing a leading role.

The state has increased investment in militia weaponry and equipment, with priority given to

equipment for air defense, emergency response and maintenance of stability. The state has phased

out a number of out-dated weapons. Militia training reform has been deepened; a four-level system

for organizing training is practiced, the four levels being provincial military commands,

prefectural military commands, people's armed forces departments of counties (county-level cities

or municipal districts) and basic-level people's armed forces departments. Through interlinked

training as well as joint training and exercises with active PLA units, the militia has boosted

its capabilities of conducting rapid mobilization and carrying out its specialized tasks.

Reserve Force Building

As a component of the PLA, the reserve force receives priority in the building of the defense

reserve. The reserve force conducts peacetime training as provided for in relevant regulations,

assists in maintaining order when necessary pursuant to the law, and activates its units in

wartime in observance of the state's mobilization order.

In recent years, while keeping its overall size unchanged, the reserve force has reduced the

number of Army reserve units, while increasing the numbers of reserve units of the Navy, Air

Force and Second Artillery Force, the proportion of specialized technical reserve units and the

number of logistical and equipment support reserve units, thus accomplishing the task of forming

new reserve units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in the Tenth Five-Year Plan

period. Most of the PLA's reserve divisions, brigades and regiments have training bases, armament

depots, necessary office space and living quarters, and optical-fiber cable communication. With

military training as the primary task, the PLA reserve units carry out training strictly pursuant

to regulations, ensuring the accomplishment of all training tasks. The focus of training is being

shifted from individuals and units to command posts, key technicians and higher levels of

training such as joint and live-fire exercises.

VII. Border and Coastal Defense

Adhering to the principles of conducting overall planning, placing equal emphasis on land and

sea, giving priority to defense, and integrating defense and administration, China is endeavoring

to make its border and coastal defense unified, effective, solid and informationized.

Border and Coastal Defense System

China's border and coastal defense is under the unified leadership of the State Council and the

CMC, and practices an administration system of sharing responsibilities between the military and

the local authorities. The State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense, composed of the

relevant departments of the State Council and the PLA, and under the dual leadership of the State

Council and the CMC, guides and coordinates China's border and coastal defense. All military area

commands, as well as border and coastal provinces, prefectures and counties have commissions to

guide and coordinate border and coastal defense within their respective jurisdictions.

The PLA is the main force for defending China's borders and coasts. The PLA border defense force

has a three-level structure, namely, regiment, battalion and company. The PLA coastal defense

force has a five-level structure, namely, division, brigade, regiment, battalion and company. In

2003, the PLA border defense force took over the defense of the China-DPRK border and the Yunnan

section of the China-Myanmar border from the border public security force, thus enabling the

state to integrate land border defense and administration. The border public security force is

tasked with safeguarding security and maintaining social order in border and coastal areas.

Within the border public security force there are contingents in provinces (autonomous regions or

municipalities directly under the central government), detachments, groups, border police

substations and frontier inspection stations in border and coastal areas, border inspection

stations in open ports, and marine police force in coastal waters. Since China launched its

reform and opening-up program, the state has consolidated border and coastal law-enforcement

functions in organizations responsible for public security, customs, inspection and quarantine,

maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs and environmental protection. The

state has also established and reinforced the border public security force, as well as border and

coastal law-enforcement contingents for marine affairs, anti-smuggling, fisheries administration

and maritime surveillance.

Building Border and Coastal Defense

China has promulgated the Law on National Defense, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the

Contiguous Zone, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and other

relevant laws and regulations, and updated its border and coastal defense policies and

regulations pursuant to international laws and practices, to manage its border and sea areas in

conformity with the law. China endeavors to strengthen its border and coastal defense,

administration and control, and build a modern border and coastal defense force featuring joint

military-police-civilian efforts in defense and administration. Over the past decade and more,

the state has invested more than RMB 2 billion in construction of border defense infrastructure,

building over 20,000 km of patrol roads, over 6,000 km of barbed-wire fences and installing some

600 sets of monitoring equipment. Construction of coastal defense infrastructure, including duty

piers, monitoring stations and centers and auxiliary facilities has been underway since 2004.

China pursues a good-neighborliness policy, and works to enhance friendship and partnership with

its neighbors. It calls for settling boundary and maritime demarcation issues with countries

concerned in a fair and equitable manner, and through consultations on the basis of equality.

China has signed land border treaties or agreements with Myanmar and 11 other neighboring

countries, thus resolving boundary issues left from history with these countries; it is currently

negotiating with India and Bhutan to settle boundary issues with those two countries

respectively. Since 1996, China has set up bilateral consultation mechanisms on the law of the

sea with the Republic of Korea and Japan, to exchange views on maritime demarcation and

cooperation. In 2004, the Agreement Between China and Vietnam on the Demarcation of the Beibu

Gulf officially entered into force.

China actively promotes border and coastal defense cooperation with its neighbors, strengthens

border and coastal defense contacts in different fields and at various levels, and handles in an

appropriate manner border- and coastal-defense-related issues with countries concerned. In 2005,

the Agreement on Joint Patrols by the Navies of China and Vietnam in the Beibu Gulf was signed,

and China respectively signed with the Philippines and Indonesia the Memorandum of Understanding

on Maritime Affairs Cooperation and the Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation. In

July 2006, China and India reopened the border trade route at Nathu La Pass, which links China's

Tibet with Sikkim, India. China's border and coastal defense forces, acting strictly in

accordance with international law and the agreements and understandings signed by China with its

neighbors, have established and improved mechanisms for talks and meetings with their

counterparts in the neighboring countries, and conduct law enforcement and anti-terrorism

cooperation to jointly maintain peace and stability in border areas and related sea areas.

Ensuring the Stability of Border Areas

Stability and development of border areas are the foundation for border and coastal defense. The

Chinese government attaches great importance to work related to ethnic minorities and economic

development in border areas; it has formulated a series of policies and adopted many strategic

measures in this regard. In the early days of New China, close to one million PLA officers and

men were collectively transferred to civilian work in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Tibet

and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, and Heilongjiang and Yunnan provinces. They were organized

into production and construction corps and state farms, and made great contributions to the

economic development of the border areas and the maintenance of border stability in those areas.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the state moved a large number of industrial enterprises and skilled

workers from inland and coastal areas to border areas, and set up a fairly complete industrial

system and communications and transportation network there. Since the reform and opening-up

policy was initiated in the late 1970s, the state has set up 253 open ports and implemented the

strategy for developing the western region and revitalizing old industrial bases including

Northeast China. It pursues the policy of developing border areas and making border inhabitants

prosperous, and consolidating defense through building close ties with the local people. It has

taken steps, including encouraging inland provinces to provide assistance to their border

counterparts, to accelerate the economic development there. This has laid a solid foundation for

strengthening border and coastal defense.

The PLA border defense force and the border public security force are resolute in maintaining

social stability in border areas and unity among ethnic groups, and take an active part in the

economic development of border areas. They take measures to crack down hard on cross-border

crimes, such as weapon smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal border crossing and human

trafficking, and on separatist, violent and terrorist activities. They strictly implement the

ethnic and religious policies of the state, respect the customs and lifestyle of ethnic

minorities, and strengthen PLA unity with the government and the people, together with unity

among ethnic groups, thus contributing to maintaining political stability and promoting social

development and progress in border areas.

VIII. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

China's defense-related science, technology and industry focuses on consolidating its foundation,

making independent innovation, and speeding up the implementation of the strategy of transition

and upgrading, so as to ensure the production and supply of military equipment and promote the

development of national economy.

Improving the industrial structure, enhancing its capabilities of developing and producing new

and high-tech weaponry and equipment. Defense-related science, technology and industry endeavors

to accelerate structural adjustment in research and production, adopt advanced production modes,

promote specialized production and upgrade processing technologies. Priority is given to R&D of

new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, and endeavors to achieve breakthroughs in a number of

key technologies and leapfrogging technological progress, thus speeding up weaponry and equipment

modernization. Defense-related science, technology and industry is enhancing its core

capabilities in R&D and production of the overall systems and key subsystems of major projects,

and introducing more competition into the manufacturing and processing of general and supporting

equipment, gradually establishing an all-round outsourcing system of cooperation for developing

and producing weaponry and equipment. Priority is given to upgrading technologies and products in

the nuclear, space, aviation, shipbuilding, weaponry, electronics and other defense-related

industries, so as to form a cluster of high-tech industries to drive the growth of China's

economy. In 2005, the output value, added value and gross revenue of the entire spectrum of

defense-related science, technology and industry increased by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent and 21.6

percent, respectively, over the previous year.

The defense manufacturing industries have been further informationized. The Tenth Five-Year Plan

period saw the rapid development of digitalized manufacturing technology and wide application of

computer-aided design, manufacturing and system-integrated manufacturing technologies in China's

defense industries. The capabilities of master design and development, as well as of final

assembly and integration, and the technological level of precision and super-precision processing

were significantly raised. The means and methods of systems integration, experimentation and

simulation, as well as of inspection and testing were upgraded.

The defense industry enterprises have stepped up restructuring and reform, and are exploring

approaches for diversifying their ownership structure and steadily transforming themselves into

share-holding enterprises. The reform of defense-related research institutes is being speeded up

and greater support was given to research institutions engaged in strategic research, basic

research and research in the public interest.

Strengthening capabilities of independent innovation. Efforts are being made to improve the

innovative system of development and production of weaponry and equipment, and the innovative

system of technology for high-tech industries combining military and civilian needs. The former

takes master design, final assembly and manufacturing, and experimentation and verification as

leading factors, and is supported by research and manufacturing of core systems and specialized

equipment, and completed by an outsourcing system. The latter combines production, education and

research, takes enterprises as the main body and research institutions as the mainstay, and is

market-orientated. Priority is given to enhancing basic research, key technology research and

frontier technology research. As a result, a number of state-of-the-art scientific and

technological achievements that enjoy independent intellectual property rights have been made.

Patent applications have increased rapidly -- at an average annual rate of over 40 percent. Major

scientific and technological projects, such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project,

are being carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises combining

military and civilian needs and to bring about overall improvements in defense-related science

and technology. Platforms for developing weaponry systems, lab systems for defense-related

science and technology, and research and application centers for advanced industrial technologies

are being built. As a result, a fairly mature scientific and technological infrastructure is

taking shape, which is well-configured, multi-functional, efficient and based on close

cooperation between the military and civilian sectors. In addition, higher education and

vocational education are being boosted for defense-related science, technology and industry.

Three professionally specialized contingents are being constructed, namely, a contingent of

business managers, a contingent of professionals and specialists and a contingent of skilled

workers. Efforts are being made to establish an innovative mechanism to absorb and train

high-caliber people for defense-related science, technology and industry.

On the premise of strictly honoring its international commitments, China encourages and supports

participation in international cooperation and competition in civilian-military industries.

IX. Defense Expenditure

Pursuant to the National Defense Law and the Budget Law, and guided by the principle of

coordinated development of national defense and the economy, the Chinese government decides on

the size and use of defense expenditure in an appropriate way to meet the demands of national

defense in keeping with China's economic development.

China's defense expenditure mainly comprises expenses for personnel, training and maintenance,

and equipment. Personnel expenses mainly cover salaries, insurance, food, clothing, and welfare

benefits for officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men as well as for civilian

employees. Training and maintenance expenses cover troop training, institutional education,

construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and other expenses on routine

consumables. The equipment expenses mainly cover research on, experimentation with, and

procurement, maintenance, transportation and storage of weaponry and equipment. The defense

expenditure covers not only the active forces, but also the militia and reserve forces. Also

covered by the defense expenditure are costs to support part of the retired officers, education

of servicemen's children and the national economic development, as well as other social expenses.

Since the early 1990s, to safeguard its sovereignty, security and unity, and to keep pace with

the global revolution in military affairs, China has gradually increased its defense expenditure

on the basis of its economic development. This increase, however, is compensatory in nature, and

is designed to enhance the originally weak defense foundation. It is a moderate increase in step

with China's national economic development. In the 1980s, China began to shift the focus of its

work to economic development. At that time, it was decided that national defense should be both

subordinated to and serve the country's overall economic development. As a result, national

defense received a low input, and was in a state of self-preservation. From 1979 to 1989, the

average annual increase of defense expenditure was 1.23 percent. However, the defense expenditure

actually registered an average annual decrease of 5.83 percent, given the 7.49 percent average

annual increase of the consumer price index in the same period. From 1990 to 2005, the average

annual increase in defense expenditure was 15.36 percent. As the average annual increase of the

consumer price index during the same period was 5.22 percent, the actual average increase in

defense expenditure was 9.64 percent.

Chart 1: Comparison Between the Growth Rate of China's Defense Expenditure and the National

Residential Consumer Price Index (1989-2005)

China's GDP in 2004 and 2005 was RMB15,987.8 billion and RMB18,308.5 billion, respectively, with

a growth rate of 10.1 percent in 2004 and of 10.2 percent in 2005. The state financial

expenditure was RMB2,848.689 billion in 2004 and RMB3,393.028 billion in 2005, up 15.57 percent

and 19.11 percent respectively over the previous year. China's defense expenditure in 2004 and

2005 was RMB220.001 billion and RMB247.496 billion, respectively, with growth rates of 15.31

percent and 12.50 percent. In the past two years, the share of China's annual defense expenditure

in its GDP and in the state financial expenditure in the same period has decreased, being 1.40

percent and 7.74 percent respectively in 2003, 1.38 percent and 7.72 percent in 2004, and 1.35

percent and 7.29 percent in 2005. Its defense budget for 2006 is RMB283.829 billion

The increased part of China's defense expenditure is primarily used for the following purposes:

(1) Increasing salaries and allowances of military personnel and improving their living

conditions. Along with the growth of China's economy and the steady improvement of the people's

life, the salaries and allowances of military personnel and the pensions of retired officers are

increased accordingly. The insurance, medical, housing and other benefits are also increased.

Subsidies are being increased, too, to compensate for regional and post differences, and the

living conditions of the troops stationed in hardship areas are being improved. (2) Increasing

investment in weaponry and equipment and infrastructure. The PLA is accelerating its

informationization drive, increasing the expenses on procurement and maintenance of weaponry and

equipment, upgrading the military infrastructure, and increasing input for improving the

facilities for border and coastal defense troops. (3) Supporting the training of military

personnel. The PLA is increasing input into education and training through both military

educational institutions and regular institutions of higher learning. It is also increasing

subsidies for professionals with outstanding performance and incentives for experts, and

increasing the budget for the employment of contract civilians. (4) Compensating for price rise.

As the prices of oil, building materials and staple and non-staple foodstuffs rise, the PLA

accordingly increases the expenses on military petroleum, oils and lubricants and defense

engineering, and raises the boarding subsidies. (5) Increasing expenses for international

cooperation in non-traditional security fields.

Both the total amount and per-serviceman share of China's defense expenditure is low compared

with those of some other countries, particularly major powers. In 2005, China's defense

expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the

United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan. China's

defense expenses per serviceman averaged RMB107,607, amounting to 3.74 percent of that of the

United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan.

China practices a strict system of financial appropriation of defense funds . The PLA's budgeting

is based on the defense development strategy, military building objectives and annual military

tasks set by the state. Budgeting units at each level carry out studies to decide on their budget

items, make calculations of their requests for funds and then report to the next-higher

authorities. The General Logistics Department, working with the relevant departments of other

general headquarters/departments, analyzes, calculates and verifies the annual budget requests

submitted by all the military area commands, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and

draws up the defense budget. After being reviewed and approved by the CMC, the defense budget is

submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The latter, on the basis of medium- and long-term fiscal

plans and the estimated revenue of the year, puts forward a plan for military expenditure

appropriations after consultation with the General Logistics Department, and then incorporates it

into the annual financial budget draft of the central government. Upon approval by the State

Council, the annual financial budget is submitted to the Budget Work Committee of the NPC

Standing Committee and the Finance and Economic Committee of the NPC for review before it is

submitted to the NPC for review. After the budget of the central government is approved by the

NPC, the Ministry of Finance informs in writing the General Logistics Department of the approved

defense budget. The defense budget is then implemented down to troops at different levels through

prescribed procedures.

Financial departments are instituted at the General Logistics Department, military area commands,

Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and units at the levels of corps, division (brigade)

and regiment. These departments are responsible for the appropriation, management and supervision

of the defense funds. The auditing offices of the state and the PLA conduct strict supervision of

the defense budget.
X. International Security Cooperation

China pursues a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and

coordination, and adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It works to promote

good-neighborliness, mutual benefit and win-win, and endeavors to advance international security

cooperation and strengthen military relations with other countries.

Regional Security Cooperation

Since its founding five years ago, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has steadily

deepened and expanded cooperation in security, economic and cultural areas in practical terms. A

decision-making mechanism has taken shape, with the Council of Heads of State and the Council of

Heads of Government being its core. Two permanent bodies, namely, the Secretariat and the

Regional Anti-terrorism Structure, have also been established. A number of documents on

cooperation in fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking have been adopted.

In April 2005, the SCO, ASEAN and the Commonwealth of Independent States signed a memorandum of

understanding on conducting cooperation in counter-terrorism. In July, the Concept of Cooperation

between SCO Members on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was adopted at the SCO

Astana Summit. In April 2006, a meeting of SCO defense ministers was held in Beijing, and the

Sixth SCO Summit was held in Shanghai in June. Ten documents, including the Declaration on the

Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, were signed during the Summit.

China attaches great importance to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the 13th ARF Ministerial

Meeting in July 2006, China called for enhancing mutual trust, respecting diversity and properly

handling the ARF's relations with other mechanisms. In the past two years, China has, within the

ARF framework, hosted the Seminar on Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional

Security Issues, sponsored the ARF Seminar on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

with the United States and Singapore, held the Fifth and Sixth ARF Inter-sessional Meetings on

Disaster Relief with Indonesia, and held the Fourth ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on

Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime with Brunei.

China's cooperation in the non-traditional security area with ASEAN and within the framework of

ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea has achieved significant progress. In January

2005, China proposed a series of initiatives on disaster prevention and reduction at the Special

ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunamis. In August, China hosted the

Workshop on Policing Exchanges and Cooperation among the Capital Police Agencies of ASEAN, China,

Japan and the Republic of Korea, during which the Beijing Declaration on Policing Exchanges and

Cooperation among the Capital Police Agencies of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

was signed. In October, China hosted the Second International Congress of ASEAN and China on

Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs. The Beijing Declaration and other

documents were adopted. In November, China attended the Second ASEAN and China, Japan and the

Republic of Korea Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the First China-ASEAN Informal

Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.

Honoring Commitment to International Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

China has made sound preparations for implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). To

this end, a preparatory office has been established at the PLA General Armaments Department. With

the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the State Environmental

Protection Administration, the China Earthquake Administration and other government departments,

this office is responsible for setting up 11 monitoring stations in China as part of the

international monitoring system, and formulating their administrative regulations and detailed

rules for the implementation of the CTBT. Two primary seismological monitoring stations have been

set up in Hailar and Lanzhou, respectively, and three radionuclide stations have been set up in

Beijing, Guangzhou and Lanzhou, respectively. The surveying of the two sites for two infrasound

stations in Beijing and Kunming has been completed, and construction is scheduled to start soon.

The China National Data Center and the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory have been built, and are

now in trial operation.

China supports multilateral efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Biological

Weapons Convention. It has attended the review conferences, annual meetings of State Parties and

meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts in an active and responsible manner. China

has also submitted in a timely fashion to the United Nations declarations regarding

confidence-building measures under the Convention.

China honors in good faith its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has promptly

and completely submitted all the annual declarations, subsequent declarations regarding newly

discovered chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China and the annual national programs related

to protective purposes. It has also received more than 100 on-site inspections by the

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The PLA is working, in strict compliance

with the Convention, to ensure the smooth management and operation of the "single small-scale

facility" and the "10kg Schedule I Chemical Synthesis Laboratory." China and Japan have held 42

rounds of bilateral consultations to accelerate the destruction of the chemical weapons abandoned

by Japan in China. Since 2005, China has assisted Japan in 24 on-site verifications, and

recovered over 3,100 chemical weapons abandoned by Japan. At the request of Japan, China has

taken into temporary custody the recovered Japanese-abandoned chemical weapons confirmed by

Japan. These chemical weapons will be destroyed by Japan in the future.

China fully honors its obligations under the amended Landmine Protocol to the Convention on

Certain Conventional Weapons. The PLA keeps its troops fully informed of China's obligations, and

has implemented the technical standards and limitations specified in the Protocol. It has carried

out a general check of all the anti-personnel landmines that do not meet the standards of the

Protocol, and has destroyed several hundred thousand old landmines in a planned way. China has

made technical modifications to usable anti-infantry landmines in inventory to make them conform

to the technical standards of the Protocol. China continues to take an active part in

international demining operations. In the period September-December 2005, Chinese military

demining experts worked in Thailand to train demining personnel and give on-site instructions.

China also provided Thailand with demining equipment. In the period September-December 2006,

China ran demining training courses for Lebanon and Jordan in Nanjing, and provided the two

countries with demining equipment. China has taken part in a constructive way in the discussions

on anti-vehicle landmines by the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain

Conventional Weapons, and is making preparations for ratifying the Protocol on Explosive Remnants

of War.

China is firmly opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of

delivery. It supports the United Nations in playing its due role in non-proliferation. China is a

party to all international treaties on non-proliferation and related international organizations.

It has established a complete legal regime for controlling the export of nuclear, biological and

chemical weapons, missiles and other related sensitive items and technologies, and all defense

items. China follows strict procedures in approving exports, to ensure effective export control.

Military Exchanges and Cooperation

China has established military ties with over 150 countries and military attaché offices in 107

countries. A total of 85 countries have military attaché offices in China. In the past two

years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 60 countries, and defense ministers,

commanders-in-chief of the services, chiefs of the general staff and other high-ranking officers

and military-related officials from more than 90 countries have visited China. China and Russia

hold regular high-level military exchanges, and the general staff headquarters of the two

countries have held the ninth and tenth rounds of strategic consultations. The military

activities connected with "Russia Year" were successful. In October 2005 and July 2006, Chinese

and US military leaders exchanged visits. China and the US maintain in-depth exchanges through

institutionalized defense consultations and maritime military security consultations. China has

enhanced high-level military contacts and defense consultations with the European countries, and

China-Europe military exchanges have progressed steadily. China maintains military contacts with

its neighbors, and has enhanced military exchanges with other developing countries. Since 2005,

China has held workshops for senior officers from Latin American and Middle Eastern countries,

and China-Germany, China-France workshops for senior officers. It has also hosted the SCO defense

and security forum and the China-ASEAN workshop on Asia-Pacific security issues. Since 2002,

China has held 16 joint military exercises with 11 countries. In August 2005, China and Russia

conducted the "Peace Mission-2005" joint military exercise in Russia's Vladivostok and China's

Shandong Peninsula, and their respective offshore waters. In November and December 2005, the PLA

Navy held joint maritime search and rescue exercises with its Pakistani, Indian and Thai

counterparts, respectively. In September 2006, China and Tajikistan conducted the

"Cooperation-2006" joint counter-terrorism military exercise. In September and November 2006, the

Chinese Navy and the US Navy conducted joint maritime search and rescue exercises in the offshore

waters of San Diego and in the South China Sea. In December 2006, China and Pakistan held the

"Friendship-2006" joint counter-terrorism military exercise. In the past two years, the PLA has

sent observers to military exercises held by Turkey, Thailand, Pakistan, India, the US and

Australia. In September 2005, the PLA invited 41 military observers and military attachés from

24 countries to attend the "North Sword-2005" maneuvers organized by the Beijing Military Area

Command. Naval ships from Thailand, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United

Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, France, Singapore and Peru have paid port visits to China. PLA

naval ships have visited Pakistan, India, Thailand, the United States, Canada and the

Philippines. In the past two years, the PLA has continued to expand exchanges of professional

expertise and military students with its foreign counterparts. It has sent division- and

brigade-level officers of combat troops and relevant functional organs of the Navy, Air Force,

Second Artillery Force, military area commands, and general headquarters/departments on overseas

study tours. Over 500 military personnel have been dispatched to study in more than 20 countries,

and over 2,000 military personnel from more than 140 countries have come to China to study in

military schools.

Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations and International Disaster Relief Operations

Since 1990, China has sent 5,915 military personnel to participate in 16 UN peacekeeping

operations. Eight lost their lives and several dozens were wounded on duty. Since 2000, China has

sent 893 peacekeeping police officers to seven mission areas. At present, China has 1,487

military peacekeeping personnel serving in nine UN mission areas and the UN Department of

Peacekeeping Operations. Among them, 92 military observers and staff officers, 175 engineering

troops and 43 medical personnel are in Congo (Kinshasa); 275 engineering troops, 240

transportation troops and 43 medical personnel are in Liberia; 275 engineering troops, 100

transportation troops and 60 medical personnel are in Sudan; and 182 engineering troops are in

Lebanon. China also has a total of 180 peacekeeping police officers in Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti and

Sudan.

The PLA has actively participated in the international disaster relief operations conducted by

the Chinese government. It has set up an emergency command mechanism, sent personnel to join

specialized rescue teams, provided equipment, and assisted in mission-oriented training. In the

past two years, PLA personnel have joined China's international rescue teams in international

rescue operations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia.

They have conducted search and rescue operations for people in distress, treatment of the sick

and injured and prevention of epidemics, and assisted the Chinese government in providing relief

materials to disaster-stricken countries.